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Preface 
Vietnam and China have occupied an important place in Australia’s history. The 
Chinese came very early to the nascent colonies and the Vietnamese came in 
increasing numbers, particularly over the last three decades. They have formed 
large and vibrant communities in Melbourne, greatly enriching the life of the city. It 
is not surprising that Melbourne is also home to some of Australia’s, indeed the 
world’s, leading specialists in the field of Vietnamese and Chinese law.  This book 
is the welcome product of a conference organised by two of the Vietnam specialists. 
Using the pooled resources of Deakin Law School and the University of Melbourne 
Law School, a conference about ‘Law and Governance: Socialist Transforming 
Vietnam’ was held during 11–13 June 2003. Vietnam experts joined leading Chinese 
law scholars to debate the many meanings of socialism and its dynamic 
transformations within Asia. This book, which evolved from those conference 
discussions, will be essential reading for legal specialists and policymakers interested 
in the development of law and governance in Asian Socialist states. 
I had worked with Associate Professor John Gillespie of Deakin Law School on 
an earlier project with the Australian International Legal Cooperation Committee 
(AILEC), which focused its attention on developing links with Vietnam, Cambodia 
and Laos between 1993 and 1997.  John was the driving intellectual force behind a 
Conference in Hanoi that resulted in the publication Commercial Legal Development 
in Vietnam: Vietnamese and foreign commentaries in 1997.1  Pip Nicholson was also at 
that Hanoi Conference, in the early stages of her research program on the role of the 
courts in Vietnam.  Later she would join the Asian Law Centre at the University of 
Melbourne, adding a formidable expertise on Vietnam to the Centre’s program, 
which already was a strong base for teaching and research on China. The value of 
their contribution to academic life in Melbourne is borne out by the quality of the 
papers delivered at the conference and reworked for publication here.  There had 
not been much collaborative scholarship produced on Vietnamese law between the 
Hanoi and Melbourne Conferences, although individuals have produced key 
analyses of specific areas.  This book will fill a void.  The publication also debates 
how to compare and contrast Chinese and Vietnamese legal change. 
The joint editors have written a lengthy introductory chapter outlining the themes 
of the publication and the key arguments of each contributor.  I will not try to précis 
their work.  What stands out, however, is the range of inputs into the process of law- 
making in Vietnam and China, the complexity of Vietnamese and Chinese society 
and politics, and the importance of a historical perspective when analysing both 
states. It also brings out the Vietnamese government’s persistent endeavours to 
maintain its independence in charting the future role of law in their country, and 
the folly of those who conflate Vietnamese and Chinese approaches to law and 
governance.  This volume brings together experts from Australia and overseas to 
present a range of very interesting interpretations of a complex phenomenon. 
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The conference was the third in a series of international conferences in which 
the Asian Law Centre has played a key role.  The first, in 2001, was held in Mongolia, 
opening that hitherto closed system to scrutiny.  The second, in 2002, took up the 
theme of Islamic Law and its impact on the West.  The fourth, in 2005, evaluated 
legal education reforms in Japan at the end of their first year of operation. Each 
conference has focused the Australian expertise in the relevant area and so far has 
produced lively exchanges and valuable published proceedings. The Asian Law 
Centre under Tim Lindsey’s leadership is to be congratulated on its choice of strategic 
themes, its role in bringing diverse expertise together, and its openness to cooperative 
academic ventures. 
China and Vietnam are now the world’s first and second largest socialist states. 
This volume provides the first sustained account of how socialism influences legal 
development in these countries, by drawing on Confucianism, religion, education, 
public administration and international treaty practice. The book also provides 
comparative insights into the similarities and differences in legal development in 
these countries. 
Those who attended the conference will welcome the chance to read the polished 
versions of the papers. Those who did not attend are about to be rewarded with a 
rich offering of views on Socialism and governance in two of the world’s oldest and 
most unique civilizations. 
Malcolm Smith 
Chuo Law School 
(former Director of the Asian Law Centre and member of AILEC) 
April 2005 
NOTES 
1 Gillespie (ed.), J., 1997. Commercial Legal Development in Vietnam: Vietnamese and foreign 
commentaries,  Butterworths, Sydney. 
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1 
The diversity and dynamism of 
legal change in socialist China 
and Vietnam 
John Gillespie and Pip Nicholson 
Asian socialist legal transformation is most often considered from a Chinese 
perspective.1 Occasionally analysis of Vietnamese socialist legal change is also 
undertaken.2 The unique feature of this book is that the contributors seek to tease out 
the significance of Asian socialist transformation comparatively, looking to the 
experience of legal change in both China and Vietnam.3 
Further, this investigation of socialist legal transformation proceeds from diverse 
perspectives. Many of those investigating how the laws and legal institutions of 
both China and Vietnam have been reshaped in the recent past write as ‘foreign 
commentators’ on legal change. But their investigations sit beside analyses of legal 
change by both Chinese and Vietnamese scholars. In the case of Vietnam, ‘insider’ 
scholarship written and published in English remains relatively rare (Gillespie 
1997). The result is a rigorous comparative analysis of Asian legal transformation 
from indigenous and foreign perspectives. 
The studies presented in this book complement the existing comparative literature 
on legal transformation in Eastern Europe.4 They focus on the extent to which ‘Asian’ 
legal culture, or more specifically the legal cultures of China and Vietnam, reshape 
or alter the legal changes introduced to enable a market economy and improve 
governance structures. The studies engage with two core concerns: how to analyse 
legal change in Asian transitional socialist states, and the comparative 
transformative experience of particular institutions and laws in China and Vietnam. 
The studies chronicle theoretical and practical responses to legal reform as these 
countries change from planned economies to socialist-oriented economies. In 
addition to analysing ‘legal change’, each author engages either expressly or 
implicitly with meanings of socialism and their implication for legal reform. The 
studies address how ‘socialism’ shapes, constrains, enables or is irrelevant to reform 
in twenty-first century Asian states. 
1 
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These issues were initially canvassed at the ‘Law and Governance: socialist 
transforming Vietnam and China’ conference in Melbourne on 12–13 June 2003. 
But as Nguyen Chi Dung of the Vietnamese Office of the National Assembly ironically 
noted there, Chinese and Vietnamese commentators ‘travel to the West to discuss 
socialism. In Vietnam’, he noted, ‘these issues are not debated. Instead, we look to 
practical solutions’.5 
SOCIALISM VARIOUSLY CONFIGURED 
The diversity of opinions about socialism presented here mirrors the many ways it 
is debated and understood in the twenty-first century, both by comparative scholars 
and those living within socialist systems. Some authors adopt working definitions 
of socialism that reflect Soviet Marxist-Leninist doctrine, which they argue was 
adopted into China and Vietnam during the early days of their revolutions (Gillespie, 
Chapter 3; Nghia, Chapter 4; Chao Xi, Chapter 5; St.George, Chapter 6; Bui, Chapter 
7; Nicholson, Chapter 8; Nguyen and Steiner, Chapter 9; and Biddulph, Chapter 
10). Others leave issues of doctrine to one side and frame their discussion in terms 
of power (Painter, Chapter 12; and Hansen, Chapter 14). One contributor attributes 
legal change to ‘palace wars’ between competing Party and state factions in which 
socialist norms have little impact on legal outcomes (Dowdle, Chapter 2). Still other 
authors adopt an essentially non-socialist perspective, framing the analysis in terms 
of economic policy change—the shift from planned to mixed-market economies 
(Fforde, Chapter 11; Bryant and Jessup, Chapter 13). 
Authors differ not only in the way they conceptualised socialism (theoretically, 
power relations or economic change), but also in whether they think socialism is 
adapting to social change. There is a point when the meaning ascribed to socialist 
values changes so much from the Marxist-Leninist canon that they can no longer be 
considered socialist. But ascertaining when this point is reached depends much on 
the observer’s judgment about the characteristics and utility of socialism. 
Although few authors attempt normatively to define socialism, every author 
employs implicit understandings about its ongoing social relevance. The mixed 
views about the dynamism and contemporary relevance of socialism contrast with 
a general Western perception that capitalism adapts to new conditions. Few would 
argue, for example, that Western welfare states are no longer capitalist because they 
have abandoned Adam Smith’s laissez faire prescriptions. Yet many assert that socialist 
states are no longer socialist because mixed-market reforms have overtaken planned 
economies. 
The way authors conceptualise socialism, at least in part, influences their 
conclusions about its ongoing relevance. For example, Dowdle (Chapter 2) uses a 
static, or epistemologically closed, definition of socialism that leaves little space for 
change and adaptation. On the other hand, authors examining legal and state 
institutions (St. George, Chapter 6; Bui, Chapter 7; Nicholson, Chapter 8; Nguyen 
and Steiner, Chapter 9; Bryant and Jessup, Chapter 13) found that certain core 
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socialist ideas about Party leadership, democratic centralism and state economic 
management remained deeply entrenched even though socialist legality is becoming 
more law-oriented. Biddulph (Chapter10), Gillespie (Chapter 3) and Nghia (Chapter 
4) emphasise the fragmented nature of both Chinese and Vietnamese legal reforms 
and stress that rights-based economic reforms did not necessarily flow into other 
social spheres, while Chao Xi (Chapter 5), who focuses on market reforms, argues 
that socialist theory has pragmatically adapted to new economic conditions without 
necessarily losing sight of socialist values, such as Party leadership and state 
economic ownership. 
Other authors (Fforde, Chapter 11; Painter, Chapter 12; Hansen, Chapter 14) 
argue that socialist ideas influenced legal and administrative reforms only marginally 
(if at all). Overall, however, most authors conclude that core socialist values are 
contextually adapting to new social conditions. 
LAW AND MARKETS IN TRANSITION 
The authors accept that China and Vietnam have largely changed from planned 
economies to mixed-market economies where private enterprise is allowed, even 
fostered, but the state retains a strong management and ownership role. But an 
economic definition of transition does not necessarily explain legal changes evident 
in Vietnam and China. While most contributors agree that China and Vietnam have 
provided a clear vision for economic reform, they believe that sociopolitical reform 
has either been largely left implicit (Vietnam) or recast rhetorically as a transition to 
a rule of law (China). They suggest that change is more experimental than visionary 
and that legal transition remains opaque, sometimes unstated, contested, dynamic 
and unresolved. 
Authors adopt three approaches to the core question of whether socioeconomic 
and legal reforms are interrelated, unrelated or even mutually constituted. There is 
not complete coherence within each approach and most authors argue elements 
from more than one approach. But the threefold classification is nevertheless useful 
for illustrative purposes. Fforde and de Vylder (1996) have influentially argued in 
relation to Vietnam that economic reforms were a gradual, pragmatic response to 
existing social conditions. In other words, the state has struggled to maintain 
relevance by legitimising ‘bottom-up’ economic reforms with post factum economic 
policies and laws. Chao Xi (Chapter 5) makes a similar observation regarding 
commercial legal development in China, with the proviso that legal reforms aiming 
to unleash private sector development are not permitted to compromise the Party’s 
leadership and the ‘socialist road’ to economic development. According to this 
position, laws respond to social pressure for economic reform, but certain state 
organisational arrangements are shielded from ‘bottom-up’ reforms. 
Occupying a middle position, Gillespie (Chapter 3), Nghia (Chapter 4) and 
Biddulph (Chapter 10) agree that much legal development responds to a dialogical 
exchange between the state and society. But Gillespie and Nghia also stress that 
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Vietnam is proactively seeking access to international capital and markets and has 
imported commercial laws and practices to secure these advantages. International 
trade treaties have flattened regional differences between élite-level lawmakers, 
creating an international legal dialogue that remains remote from, and frequently 
incomprehensible to, local political and economic ideas. Because imported legal 
reforms are not linked to underlying social processes, they are unlikely to engage 
with, and significantly alter, core socialist precepts like party leadership, democratic 
centralism and collective mastery. 
Gillespie and Nghia share this middle position with many other authors who 
implicitly see market changes as significant, if not catalysts, for change without 
specifically engaging in the details of market change and its implications for legal 
reform discourse (St. George, Chapter 6; Bui, Chapter 7; Nicholson, Chapter 8; 
Nguyen and Steiner, Chapter 9; and Bryant and Jessup, Chapter 13). 
The third position does not specifically attribute any great importance to the 
influence of economic change on legal change (Hansen, Chapter 14). This chapter 
examines changes in the Vietnamese treatment of religion without situating these 
changes in an economic context or without seeing them as affected by economic 
changes. 
METHODOLOGIES AND THEIR IMPACTS 
The utility of the chapters lie not only in their stories of change and their conceptions 
of socialism, but also in the diversity of analytical tools used. It is a feature of the 
chapters that the different analytical approaches generate varying conclusions about 
the role of socialism in contemporary China and Vietnam. As a result, they not only 
offer a diverse range of understandings about socialism and its transformation in 
China and Vietnam, but also display a range of possible analytical approaches. 
Dowdle (Chapter 2), Gillespie (Chapter 3) and Nghia (Chapter 4) use variations 
of discourse analysis to explore undercurrents in socialist thinking. As most legal 
thought is communicated, discourse analysis captures conflict and change in legal 
ideas. It shows how long-standing socialist ideas have alternatively resisted and 
accommodated new concepts. Both Gillespie and Nghia draw ideas from outside 
legal thinking, such as economic, cultural and Confucian notions, to assess changes 
in socialist thinking. 
Discourse analysis also offers insight into the potential for change. Discursive 
groups or communities use epistemologies to determine which ideas are acceptable. 
If the epistemologies governing ‘discursive groups’ (like the central Communist 
Parties of Vietnam and China) are inclusive, these authors argue that there is potential 
for legal change. 
Others, such as Chao Xi (Chapter 5), St. George (Chapter 6), Bui (Chapter 7), 
Nicholson (Chapter 8), and Nguyen and Steiner (Chapter 9), examine disparities 
between socialist ideology and theory as it is announced and practised. This 
analytical tool opens the discussion to interactions between officially promoted 
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ideals and governance practices in legal institutions. The ‘gap’ between law (or 
policy/ ideology) and practice, as identified by these chapters, raises speculation 
about reform trends. Nicholson, for example, shows that despite rhetorical movement 
toward judicial independence, the Party retains a tight control over the ideas 
circulating within the courts and recruitment of judges. She speculates that the state 
may face agitation for change from the private legal profession. Nguyen and Steiner 
(Chapter 9), through their analysis of defence counsel, confirm this. They bring the 
concept of human agency back into the discussion, demonstrating that individuals 
opposing orthodox socialist ideals (such as democratic centralism) can alter the 
administration of justice. 
Still others, such as Biddulph (Chapter 10), Fforde (Chapter 11) and Painter 
(Chapter 12), locate change in particular institutional and social struggles. Biddulph, 
for example, uses Bourdieu’s concept of the ‘legal field’ to argue that local 
understandings transformed central ‘rule of law’ rhetoric into state management. 
In a similar vein, Fforde suggests that reform of state-owned enterprises has been 
shaped by local struggles between ministries and directors of state-owned 
enterprises, more than high-level socialist or capitalist ideals. 
Finally, Bryant and Jessup (Chapter 13) and Hansen (Chapter 14) use legal 
doctrine to search for legal change. Bryant, for example, explores the 
internationalisation of the Vietnamese legal system by examining doctrinal 
approaches to the ‘incorporation’ doctrine in international law. For Hansen, the 
treatment of the Catholic Church in Vietnam can be explained, in part, through a 
reading of legal texts and through historical analysis of state–church relations. He 
finds little evidence that socialist thinking in or outside legal doctrines influences 
freedom of worship. 
TRANSFORMING SOCIALISM: CONSTITUTIONALISM, 
LEGALISM AND CONFUCIANISM 
Turning to the first of the chapters that draws on discourse theory, Dowdle (Chapter 2) 
employs an epistemological study of socialism to ask what is socialist about law in 
China and Vietnam. He makes the semantic point that every country is entitled to 
describe their policies as socialist, but questions whether this makes their policies 
socialist ‘in fact’. Dowdle uses the example of constitutional transformation in China 
and Vietnam to demonstrate that the major legal changes taking place are largely 
untouched by socialist values. 
Dowdle’s main contention is that socialist precepts in these countries are 
discussed in closed epistemological frameworks and, as a consequence, have not 
significantly engaged and shaped the emergence of constitutionalism. Put differently, 
discussion about how socialism should transform state institutions is conducted 
within élite circles that are largely closed to external ideas. Institutions, he argues, 
have their own epistemologies that determine which criteria to take into account 
when assessing ideas. Constitutionalism emerged in the United States, Dowdle 
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explains, because the revolutionary drafters favoured the Enlightenment ideal of 
political knowledge being open to every citizen. They drafted a constitution that 
made political institutions accountable to public debate. 
Though acknowledging their very different political and economic foundations, 
Dowdle draws parallels between the rise of constitutionalism in the West and in 
China. Rather than Enlightenment ideals, he argues that political expediency is 
propelling constitutionalism in China. According to this account, Deng Xiaoping 
banished his main rivals to political oblivion in the moribund National Congress. 
But his rivals reclaimed power by bringing the National Congress into the political 
mainstream. They achieved this objective by convincing the ruling élite that the 
Communist Party would not have embarked on the disastrous Cultural Revolution 
and made other grave errors if the National Congress had performed its constitutional 
function of representing the views of the masses to political decision-makers. The 
Party made mistakes because, as a closed epistemic community, it lacked access to the 
wide range of views required to maintain legitimacy and govern a complex society. 
Dowdle further posits that socialist ideals are conspicuously absent from the 
processes shaping constitutionalism in China. He attributes this to the Party’s closed 
epistemological framework and its reluctance to apply socialist ideas meaningfully 
to contemporary political problems. Dowdle convincingly argues that although 
constitutional reforms in China were motivated by power politics, rather than the 
Enlightenment values underpinning Western reforms, once in place, policymaking 
based on popular representation may create its own momentum. He calls this process 
‘runaway legitimisation’. 
Where he differs from other contributors is in his assertion that socialist ideas 
have played a minor role in institutional change. Biddulph (Chapter10) and Chao 
Xi (Chapter 5), on the contrary, argue that, rather than operating like a closed 
epistemic community, the Chinese Communist Party has flexibly adapted socialist 
ideology to accommodate new institutional settings such as private enterprises and 
to vary institutionalised practices, such as those within the Chinese police. That 
socialist values are still guiding legal reforms is shown in the way that lawmakers 
have preserved Party leadership and state ownership. 
Consistent with Dowdle’s proposition that power politics can induce constitutional 
reforms, there is compelling evidence that Party politics is exciting representative 
reforms in the Vietnamese National Assembly. Certain Party leaders believe that some 
policymaking power should be transferred to the National Assembly, since only a 
broadly constituted representative body has access to the range of social views needed 
to resolve complex problems like corruption and land distribution. In tandem with 
political pressures, Party leaders are using long-standing socialist principles of 
‘people’s mastery’ and ‘socialist democracy’ that advocate popular supervision of 
state institutions to justify a more representative democracy. As a recent amendment 
to the Constitution attests, the state believes that people’s mastery is necessary to 
develop ‘a prosperous people, strong country, equitable, democratic and civilised 
society’ (Pham Van Hung 2001:66–9). 
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It is also interesting to speculate whether differences in the public’s respect for 
the Party in China and Vietnam affect the importance attached to socialist values. 
There are grounds for arguing that the Communist Party of Vietnam enjoys 
considerably more public support than its Chinese counterpart (Kerkvliet et al. 1999). 
There was no cultural revolution in Vietnam to discredit Party decision-makers and 
only a generation has passed since the Party delivered the country from foreign 
invaders. 
Finally, Dowdle’s structural explanations for institutional change envisage 
possible pragmatic legal reform. Quarantined from underlying political and social 
discourse that may constrain change, Dowdle argues that Party élites freely accept 
ideas that provide political advantage. Élites reject ideas that compromise the system 
that gives them privileged access to power, such as Party leadership, but other 
reforms, such as constitutionalism, are acceptable because they have the potential 
to extend power over rivals. 
In contrast, Gillespie (Chapter 3) argues, using discourse theory, that while 
Vietnamese socialist legal thinking has always been fragmented it remains important. 
At the outset he notes that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam administration 
borrowed uncritically and extensively from the Soviet Union. While the legal 
borrowing was comprehensive, its implementation, argues Gillespie, was always 
mediated by practical policymaking. 
Challenges for those commenting on socialist legal systems identified by Gillespie 
include the need to move any analysis beyond an exclusive focus on socialist legality 
to include the other equally abstract but significant notions of democratic centralism 
and collective mastery. It is too easy to miscast the role of law in contemporary 
socialist states if Western lawyers only concern themselves with narrow debates 
about changes to socialist legality. Gillespie argues persuasively that, historically, 
the Vietnamese Party–state variously invoked all three tenets to legitimate its 
leadership and govern. It is not possible to trace the changes to the role of law and its 
many implications unless all three precepts are analysed. 
Looking to the contemporary period, it is Gillespie’s thesis that it is not possible 
to characterise Vietnamese legal change as consistent across jurisdictions. More 
particularly, Gillespie contends that an analysis of the way law is legitimated, 
debated and reformed suggests that the legal discourses within the economic, legal 
and cultural spheres of Vietnamese society produce very different interpretations, 
both between the discourses and within them. For example, it is suggested that legal 
transplantation debates within Vietnam reveal both a continuing instrumentalist 
conception of law and a local commentary drawing on Western socio-legal insight 
into the ways laws permute and transform. 
While cautious of overcasting his interpretation of the three identified discourse 
areas within Vietnam, Gillespie ultimately concludes that where law and politics 
are ‘interwoven’ politics dominates. For example, he suggests that where the debate 
concerns the extent to which law will regulate or ‘constrain party political power’ 
Western rule of law precepts are not admitted into the debates. In contrast, where the 
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state seeks to regulate emerging market activity Marxist-Leninist conceptions of 
‘socialist legality’ have been adapted to become ‘more legalistic and rule-oriented’ 
to enable East Asian developmentalism to flourish. Thus Gillespie concludes that 
the regulation of the market has shifted from being based upon moral and Party 
edicts and policies to an increased use of normative laws. 
Nghia (Chapter 4) emphasises the role of pre-modern values such as 
Confucianism in contemporary legal discourse more than Dowdle (Chapter 2) and 
Gillespie (Chapter 3). Nghia examines the interplay between traditional legal 
thinking, socialist law and rights-based law in Vietnam. His main contention is 
that Confucian and socialist precepts continue to provide moral values that bind 
society and determine the social relevance of law. Like other authors (Gillespie, 
Chapter 2; and Painter, Chapter 12) Nghia argues that imported ideas have formed 
hybrids with local precepts and practices. 
Although he concedes that Confucian, Buddhist and Daoist values coexisted, 
Nghia believes that Confucianism created the standard norms for Vietnam’s society. 
He bases this view on work by Vietnamese scholars such as Dao Duy Anh and does 
not engage with Western scholarship (for example, Giebel 2001) that contests the 
existence of uniform Confucian values throughout the country. Contrasting with 
the negligible impact of French colonial legalism, Nghia argues that socialism 
profoundly changed Confucian thinking. He argues that socialism merged with 
Confucian values that privileged communitarianism, state management of society 
and instrumental legalism. These norms continue to play a prominent role in 
economic regulation. For example, the xin cho (application grant) approach to 
economic regulation is attributable to Confucian-socialist notions of state 
management. 
The introduction of the ‘law-based state’ doctrine in the 1992 Constitution has 
not fundamentally changed the underlying Confucian-socialist norms. Even though 
the Soviet term ‘socialist legality’ is no longer fashionable, its message that public 
interests should prevail over private interests, that states should ‘manage’ (quan ly) 
societies, and that law is an instrument of state power, remains intact. Nghia 
concludes that hasty legal borrowing has left Vietnam with a ‘jungle of law’ and 
that there is much to be learnt from legal borrowing from Japan and Singapore 
where more care is taken to adjust imported norms to suit local social norms. As an 
interim measure, he speculates that certain Confucian values could augment and 
even compete with imported laws to build ‘social trust, discipline and order’. 
ENDURING SOCIALIST IDEOLOGY AND PRACTICE 
Moving from the insight offered by discourse theory, Chao Xi (Chapter 5), St George 
(Chapter 6), Bui (Chapter 7), Nicholson (Chapter 8) and Nguyen and Steiner (Chapter 
9) take up the story of socialist legal transformation in Chinese and Vietnamese 
institutions. As noted previously, each author invokes the theory–practice gap to 
investigate how socialism, and more particularly democratic centralism, socialist 
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legality and people’s mastery, enable or constrain legal change. In each of these 
studies the authors explore what is meant by socialism theoretically and then 
investigate how socialist ideology has been transformed, marginalised or retained. 
In examining the development of the enterprise law, Chao Xi contests the view 
that legal reforms in China have proceeded largely without the benefit of socialist 
thinking. He shows that the first enterprise law evolved from a series of compromises 
between socialist ideology and economic efficiency during the 1970s and 1980s. 
Each compromise eroded the state sector. Enterprise reforms commenced with the 
creation of joint-stock companies. But these hybrid state–private entities were only 
permitted to operate in economic sectors neglected by state-owned enterprises. Later, 
the government sought greater efficiency gains by separating ownership and 
management over state-owned enterprises. During that period ‘the socialist economic 
road’ and Marxist-Leninist theory influenced lawmakers. 
More recently, Jiang Zemin informed the National Congress in 2002 that, in 
order to remain a socialist country, the state must keep public ownership its core 
economic policy. Lawmakers drafting a revised Corporations Law were instructed 
to take what was useful from capitalism while retaining socialist principles of state 
ownership and economic management. The resulting tensions between ‘the socialist 
road’ and managerial efficiency produced incremental reforms. For example, 
although the new Company Law applies to both state and private entities, a complex 
shareholding system gives the state a controlling interest in an estimated 84 per 
cent of privately listed companies.6 In addition, the law permits the Party to establish 
committees in every private company. 
Chao Xi observed that Russian lawmakers were unconstrained by socialist 
ideology and adopted Western corporate laws with disastrous results (Black, 
Kraakman and Tarassova 2000). He concludes that ‘Chinese enterprise reforms are 
but a means to bolster socialism and its economic foundations’. Although Marxist- 
Leninist orthodoxy has conceded ground to economic efficiency, company law 
remains an instrument used to secure state ownership and Party leadership. 
St. George (Chapter 6) identifies a mismatch between Party-stated objectives for 
the Vietnamese higher education curriculum and the manner in which education is 
evolving as a partly privatised activity. She analyses the impact of socialist doctrine 
(defined as Marxism–Leninism with Ho Chi Minh thought) on the development of 
the Vietnamese 1998 Education Law. Before turning her attention to the Education 
Law of 1998, she notes the problematic role for law in a socialist state, noting the 
ways in which the Party has sought to legitimate law as an instrument of ‘all’ 
classes rather than as a bourgeois instrument reflective of the capitalist mode of 
production. St.George’s analysis then turns to higher education, and specifically 
considers the socioeconomic and political role of education. 
St  George contends that Vietnamese education is cast as ‘intrinsically ideological’. 
She notes that socialism is explicitly invoked as an aim of education in Articles 2, 3 
and 23 of the Law and that Article 36 provides that the ‘content of higher education’ 
must include the ‘scientific subjects of Marxism–Leninism and Ho Chi Minh thought’. 
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She characterises these inclusions as ‘committing the national education system to 
building socialism in the country, as well as to creating people who are socialist in 
character’. She also correctly notes that invoking socialism is not a feature of all 
Vietnamese laws. 
Having established the rhetorical commitment of the Party-led drafting committee, 
St George notes that, in certain vital respects, the law departs from its ostensible 
commitments to socialist ideology. In particular, she cites the practice of allowing 
private education facilities and schools to establish their own relations with 
community (particularly donors) as indicating the dominance of practical politics 
over consistent socialist policymaking. In relation to fees, she notes that the law is 
internally inconsistent in allowing no ‘commercialisation’ of education, but 
permitting the use of economic activities to generate funds for schools. Looking at 
the issue of administration of schools generally, St George identifies that the law 
should be interpreted as much by what is left out as by what was included. She 
notes that in the final, twenty-third draft the administration of education is dealt 
with only cursorily. While a leadership role is retained for central government, the 
law specifically states that educational institutions are to establish their own 
regulations affecting relations between schools, families and community. 
In conclusion, St George contends that Marxism–Leninism and Ho Chi Minh 
thought feature as the doctrines that should be taught in curriculum and inculcated 
in students. Yet the practical realities of an educational system starved of funds and 
straining to accommodate all those who wish to participate has produced a situation 
where the Party, at least partly, relinquishes control over the delivery of education. 
Bui (Chapter 7) argues, unlike St George, that legal teaching remains infused by 
Marxist-Leninist doctrine. She examines changing notions of socialist law in 
Vietnam’s legal education system. The State Education Development Strategy for 
2001–10, she notes, envisages a ‘scientific education system with a socialist 
orientation and nationalist nature. It should be based on the foundation of Marxist- 
Leninist theories and Ho Chi Minh thought’. The state has the capacity to implement 
this policy because law courses are well funded and taught by state-managed 
institutions and staffed by public servants. 
She finds that law school curricula reflect Marxist-Leninist theories, but Ho Chi 
Minh thought is not yet taught. Before studying substantive legal subjects, students 
are first instructed that law reflects the will of the working class and state economic 
management (quan ly nha nuoc ve kinh te). These doctrines are considered necessary 
in the mixed-market economy to protect the working class from exploitive capitalism. 
As Bui observes, even though students are later exposed to subjects about market 
laws, ‘ideologies of state economic management are often well rooted and continue 
to develop during the four year course’. Since most legal issues are approached 
from a state management perspective, students soon learn that law’s main function 
is to privilege state interests. 
Bui believes that legal education lags behind other social sciences in adapting 
its curriculum to market conditions. She attributes this discrepancy to the prominence 
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given in legal education to socialist theories that classify ‘social relationships’ into 
‘independent law branches’. For example, land law is considered an independent 
branch because land is a ‘special commodity’ owned by the state. This classification 
system constrains teachers from creating new legal taxonomies that reflect the 
introduction of rights-based laws into the legislative framework. 
Bui also shows that structural factors reinforce socialist values. Consensual 
decision-making used to review curricula discourages teachers from engaging in 
the controversial debates required to promote reforms. A didactic pedagogy also 
discourages students from asking questions that may expose gaps between law as 
taught and actual economic and social conditions. Teaching reforms that encourage 
problem solving may eventually create more demand for relevant legal instruction. 
But law teachers have recently been forbidden from working in the legal profession, 
a decision that distances the most progressive teachers from law-in-action. 
She finishes her chapter by considering the impact legal education has on the 
legal system. University mission statements stress that legal education should 
improve ‘political and moral qualities and the consciousness to serve the people’, 
but neglect to mention the skills required to equip students as members of the legal 
profession. Only 3–4 per cent of students find work in the legal system, yet legal 
study is considered prestigious and worthwhile because most students find 
employment as state officials. Bui gloomily concludes that the purpose of legal 
education is to train state officials to perpetuate socialist management practices. 
Her finding that the education system inculcates core socialist values corroborates 
Nicholson (Chapter 8) and Nguyen and Steiner (Chapter 9), who argue that socialist 
ideals still profoundly shape decision-making in state institutions. 
Nicholson (Chapter 8) examines tensions between long-standing socialist 
approaches to law and reforms strengthening law-based processes in Vietnamese 
courts. She finds mixed messages about the trajectory of law reform in the 2002 
Politburo Resolution No. 8 on Forthcoming Principal Judicial Tasks. The Resolution 
reaffirmed decades-old socialist legality doctrine that the Party leads the state. Judges, 
for example, are enjoined not only to follow laws, but also the Party line. In addition, 
the Party reserves the right to direct political, organisational and personnel policies 
within courts. 
Counterbalancing socialist legality, Resolution No. 8 also instructs courts to 
guarantee citizens’ equal treatment before the law, real democracy, fair trials based 
on merit and rights for lawyers to collect evidence and represent clients before and 
during trials. Broadly reflecting the law-based state doctrine adopted in the 1992 
Constitution, these reforms appear to show the Party responding to social demand 
for more predictable, efficient and transparent courts. 
But Nicholson wonders whether lawyers will seize, or be permitted to seize, the 
opportunity under the new adversarial court procedures to shift judicial decision- 
making closer to the law; this issue is taken up in the following chapter by Nguyen 
and Steiner (Chapter 9). Nicholson finds support for both continued Party leadership 
over courts and a greater emphasis on law-based judicial outcomes in theoretical 
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discourse. She describes orthodox socialist legality as a ‘policy–law dichotomy’ in 
which law and Party policy (and state plans) are interchangeable. Applying this 
doctrine, courts have historically considered law only one means of implementing 
Party policies. Although Resolution No. 8 reaffirmed the ‘policy–law dichotomy’, 
socialist legality is now modified by the law-based state doctrine that promotes self- 
managed courts, law-based judicial decision-making and an increased role for the 
private legal profession. 
Nicholson reconciles these contradictory positions by suggesting that although 
in principle courts are expected to follow law, in practice open-ended legislative 
drafting gives the Party numerous opportunities to direct judicial outcomes by 
influencing the interpretation of law. She also presents evidence that other socialist 
doctrines, such as democratic centralism and collective mastery, influence judicial 
practices. For example, democratic centralism insists on strict top-down judicial 
decision-making, and vague echoes of collective mastery are discernable in the 
Party’s decision to allow lay people’s assessors to judge cases with professionally 
trained judges. 
Nicholson concludes that reforms promoting law-based decision-making in the 
courts have not displaced long-standing socialist norms such as Party leadership, 
democratic centralism and collective mastery. But she acknowledges that procedural 
changes giving courts self-management powers and modest adversarial proceedings 
may act as catalysts for more far-reaching reforms. A practical confirmation of 
Nicholson’s theorising is found in Chapter 9 by Nguyen and Steiner. 
Nguyen and Steiner use the changing role of lawyers in Vietnam to assess the 
contemporary relevance of socialist legal concepts. They argue that socialist legality 
and democratic centralist principles imported by revolutionary leaders, extirpated 
colonial legality from Vietnamese legal institutions. Rather than balancing conflicting 
rights, courts in the new society followed democratic centralism by vertically 
implementing Party rules and policies. Independent bar associations established 
under French rule were closed and most French trained lawyers fled or were purged. 
The few who proved their loyalty to the new regime became state officials entrusted 
to implement state policy. 
Starting with the 1980 Constitution, which provided for the establishment of 
organisations for lawyers, the authors argue the state has incrementally given lawyers 
more autonomy. The Ordinance on Lawyers’ Organisations, passed in 1987, paved 
the way for the reintroduction of bar associations and the possibility of a private 
(non-state) legal profession. The Ordinance on Lawyers 2001 codified Party policy 
that acknowledged the role the legal profession play in protecting the democratic 
and legal rights of citizens. 
The authors then assess whether high-level policy has influenced the way state 
officials administer the interaction between lawyers and clients. They show that 
lawyers require ‘good relationships’ and the payment of bribes to secure access to 
state officials and cooperation to mediate on behalf of their clients. 
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In the court system, new criminal and civil procedures codes have introduced 
modest adversarial procedures that now place lawyers on a similar, if not equal, 
footing with procurators in criminal trials. But the authors note that the judicial 
practices developed over many decades when judges and procurators dominated 
trials are unlikely to change without considerable encouragement. For example, 
they convincingly show that in the notorious Nam Cam criminal trial the state was 
not prepared to allow lawyers to depart from the prosecution’s script and fully 
represent their clients’ interests. The authors assert that lawyers acting for a high- 
ranking Party member broke the democratic centralism principle of prearranging 
outcomes in important trials. More particularly, defence counsel contested the 
accusations rather than delivering a plea in mitigation in this instance. In contrast 
to the Minh Phung criminal trial conducted five years earlier, in this instance the 
Chairman of the Bar Association and some media outlets were prepared to support 
the rights of lawyers to represent their clients fully and vigorously. 
Chapter 9 primarily focuses on state-directed reforms, but it also postulates how 
lawyers will change the legal system. Implicit in the authors’ narrative is Weber’s 
assumption that lawyers work towards the formally rational elements of law, because 
these instruments provide the self-contained doctrinal rules that inform predictable 
and consistent legal opinions. For example, Nam Cam’s lawyer used legal arguments 
to expose shortcomings in the prosecution’s case and commercial lawyers argued 
with state officials to protect statutory legal rights from bureaucratic interference. 
In Vietnam’s state-directed legal landscape it is also possible that, rather than 
promoting private legal rights, lawyers will prefer to mediate and negotiate their 
clients’ interests with state authorities. Evidence presented in Chapter 9 shows 
lawyers forming ‘good relationships’ with bureaucrats and judges and altering 
outcomes with bribes. This behaviour undermines ‘formal rationality’ and is entirely 
consistent with the situational and discretionary outcomes promoted by socialist 
legality. That lawyers pursue both strategies, sometimes simultaneously, implies a 
transitional and fragmented legal space. Whether lawyers decide that formal legal 
rationality is the most persuasive strategy depends not only on changes with the 
state, but also on the kinds of interests clients want protected. 
SOCIALIST TRANSITIONS: THE CENTRE AND THE LOCAL 
In part three, Biddulph (Chapter 10), Fforde (Chapter 11) and Painter (Chapter 12) 
each explore the intersections and conflicts between centre-led and locally-instituted 
change. Both Fforde and Painter explore the extent to which state-owned enterprise 
and administrative reforms respectively reflect endogenous change, rather than the 
implementation of Party-led legal reform. Biddulph, on the other hand, uses Bourdieu’s 
(1987) device of the ‘legal field’ to find evidence of central legal influence in the local 
administration of detention powers in China. She argues this at once enables the 
Party–state to reconstitute its powers legally, while not diminishing them. 
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More particularly, Biddulph explores the changing role of law in China in the 
context of administrative detention powers. In particular, she asks whether Chinese 
administrative detention powers are debated and defined in legal or political terms. 
Through a study of the Chinese police detention power, ‘Detention for Investigation’ 
(shourong shencha), Biddulph examines how the Chinese state manages legal reform 
and change to maintain social order. 
Biddulph argues that it is possible to discern local contests concerning whether 
administrative powers should be maintained and how they might be legitimised. 
Further, she argues that without the use of the ‘field’ as an analytical tool it is all too 
easy to cast Chinese law reform as inevitably producing a thin version of the ‘rule of 
law’ (Peerenboom 2004). Biddulph’s preference is not to see Chinese legal reform 
reflecting a transitional paradigm, inevitably replicating Western-style legal 
institutions and processes. Rather, she argues that the emerging contests of the role 
and place of administrative law bring to the fore the ways in which the state, and 
particularly the Party, produce and manage legal change. She argues that, while it 
appears that the Chinese Party–state, and its various agencies, appropriates the 
rhetoric of the rule of law and reform, it in fact continues to pursue various policies 
for control and social order. 
Biddulph characterises socialism in terms of state power. She does not trace 
developments in Chinese socialist ideology, preferring instead to cast Party–state 
instrumentalism as local, pragmatic and increasingly harnessing the language and 
rhetoric of law to produce new patterns of social order. She demonstrates that the 
administrative power to detain Chinese has not been lost, but instead has been 
recast and legitimised by its reintroduction in the Chinese Criminal Procedure Law. 
This transformation is cast as a largely indigenous exercise played out among the 
new ‘law’ professionals, including police, academics and lawyers. 
Unlike Biddulph, Fforde (Chapter 11) does not define socialism in ideological 
terms. Rather he contends that Vietnamese ‘socialism’ is a local political force: more 
pragmatic than ideological. He characterises its ‘political’ objectives as enabling 
stable transition to an enhanced role for the ‘law of value’ while concurrently 
retaining the Party–state as the mediator of public–private interests. This 
characterisation of the role of the state as more affected by ‘rule than by law’ leaves 
socialist doctrine and law per se of little relevance in the context of Vietnamese state- 
owned enterprise reform. 
More particularly, Fforde takes up three questions: whether and how socialism 
shapes law and law-related institutions, whether external or internal factors explain 
legal change, and, finally, whether socialist doctrine inhibits legal change. To answer 
these, he undertakes surveys of laws relating to state-owned enterprises and media 
commentary in two time periods. First, Fforde looks at the interaction between law 
and state-owned enterprise practice in the early 1990s and then compares this with 
their interaction between 2000–02. Second, he considers the role played by law in 
media reporting of state-owned enterprise activities, again over these two time 
periods. 
15 The diversity and dynamism of legal change 
Fforde demonstrates the Party–state’s pragmatic understanding of its 
socioeconomic reality to explain how it is that the state can officially enable state- 
owned enterprise reform and concurrently constrain it. This constraint is legitimised 
because too many shocks could harm the Vietnamese economy and its citizenry. In 
this sense, a pragmatic political sense produced ad hoc Party interventions in the 
early 1990s rather than systemic policy or law-based reforms. 
Moving to the early twenty-first century, Fforde contends that while state-owned 
enterprises are now ostensibly managed more systematically, they in fact continue 
unshaped by law. While law generally has become more detailed, Fforde cites the 
ongoing ambiguities of particular laws and the leadership’s continued ad hoc style 
in support of this thesis. This analysis forms a part of Fforde’s wider thesis that law 
and even economic policy ought not be seen as shaping Vietnamese socialist 
transformation (or indeed perhaps any transition?). Instead, he characterises regulation 
of state-owned enterprises as a fluid context-driven phenomenon where the state 
selectively and sporadically invokes policy to give effect to their pragmatic preferences. 
Fforde’s findings contrast with those of some other commentators. For example, 
Gainsborough (2003) argues that economic decisions in Vietnam are pragmatic in 
the sense that they do not consistently follow particular ideals, but in forming 
decisions, Party leaders draw on predetermined sets of ideas, many of which are 
socialist. In studying the ‘hollowing-out’ of the state sector in Ho Chi Minh City 
during the 1990s, he concluded that neoliberal economic ideas have not penetrated 
the thinking of senior state officials deeply. Instead, privatisation followed 
compromises between socialist thinking and personal gain. 
Returning to the questions Fforde asks upfront, he concludes that practical politics, 
and not ideologies, shape law. This view contrasts with Chao Xi’s and Gainsborough’s 
summation that law reforms aim to reconcile state ownership ideology with 
economic efficiency and personal interests. Further, Fforde’s argument implicitly 
suggests that internal factors (a local understanding of what is needed) dominate 
policy and lawmaking affecting state-owned enterprises. Finally, he argues that it 
remains hard to answer the question of whether socialism impedes legal change, as 
the relationship between the two is at best dynamic and fluid. He rejects the notion 
that law drives transition and remains sceptical about its relevance to transition. 
Painter (Chapter 12), writing about transforming socialist ideals in the context 
of public administrative reform in Vietnam, is also sceptical of the local impact of 
centrally determined reform policy. He identifies three factors that influence the 
interaction between local and imported ideas about administrative reform. First, 
how important is political rhetoric to change? Second, what institutional factors 
make competing ideas about reform appear attractive to policymakers? Third, are 
reform ideas assessed according to their compatibility with Party doctrine? 
For Painter, Party policies and theories dominate public administrative reform. 
He notes that public administrative reform stresses linkages joining state reform 
and Party reform, grassroots democracy and mass-organisation reforms. These 
objectives reflect long-standing Marxist-Leninist notions of Party leadership over 
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the state, democratic centralism and collective mastery. Less importance is given, he 
believes, to imported Western reforms that stress administrative efficiency and 
rational bureaucratic processes. 
Drawing from administrative and legal transplantation literature, Painter 
maintains that imported public administrative reform initiatives rarely follow 
prescribed patterns. Rather than applying set solutions for identified problems, 
reforms are fragmented into multiple agendas that ‘have a life of their own, solutions 
look for problems as much as vice versa’. He borrows the metaphor of ‘cropping up’ 
to describe the phenomena where global ‘talk’ or discourse about administrative 
reforms produce similar solutions to problems in different localities. 
The case for ‘cropping up’ reform is tested in a study concerning Vietnamese 
salary reform. Painter contends that the state sought to increase public sector salaries 
by implementing a series of local adaptations that clearly reflected ‘themes and 
models that are very familiar in the global context’. In other words, the ideas used to 
reform public administration were largely borrowed, but the selection and adaptation 
of these ideas followed local political imperatives. He concluded that multilateral 
donors did not impose the public administrative reforms that were eventually 
adopted by local authorities. Borrowed ideas were merged with local precepts and 
practices to produce homegrown hybrid solutions. His observations about public 
administrative reforms are based on salary reform and do not contest the broader 
view that other initiatives, such as administrative streamlining and judicial 
accountability reflect a global agenda (Vichit-Vadakan 1996). 
Painter leaves his readers with the important insight that borrowed ideas 
frequently take on new roles in host countries. As Luhmann (1987) puts it, transplants 
act as ‘irritations’ or ‘perturbations’ that give rise to new and unpredictable political 
and legal meanings. What is left unsaid is how core socialist notions, such as Party 
leadership, democratic centralism and collective mastery, are reconciled with 
imported administrative reforms promoting a Weberian meritocracy. Finally, what 
is the transformative potential for imported ideas to create what Dowdle calls 
‘runaway legitimation’ and generate their own momentum for change? 
RECONCILING IDEOLOGIES: INTERNATIONALISM AND 
CATHOLICISM 
The final two chapters take up the issue of reconciling ideologies, each arguing that 
socialism is reconcilable with other ideologies. In particular, Bryant and Jessup 
(Chapter 13) (on international law) and Hansen (Chapter 14) (on Catholicism) argue 
that socialism impacts on Vietnam’s capacity to integrate other ideological 
commitments. Hansen argues forcefully that Vietnamese socialism per se has not 
precluded Catholicism, rather historical antagonisms between church and state 
have caused tensions. Bryant and Jessup argue that Vietnamese socialism is 
preventing the systematic incorporation of international law, but international law 
is introduced in an ad hoc manner. 
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More particularly, Bryant and Jessup argue that the legacy of Vietnamese socialist 
ideology undermines Vietnam’s apparent preparedness to allow those international 
treaties it has ratified automatically to become a part of Vietnamese domestic law. 
They note that the incorporation approach to international law (one that provides if 
you have signed a treaty it automatically becomes a part of a state’s law without 
need for a separate legal instrument) is not explicitly adopted in Vietnam. Rather, 
the 1998 Ordinance on the Conclusion and Implementation of International 
Agreements only countenances incorporation in Vietnam where the treaties are 
either consistent with Vietnamese law or address areas currently not covered by 
Vietnamese law. But, Bryant and Jessup argue, accepting this qualification, the 
Vietnamese fail consistently to give legal effect to ratified treaties. 
The authors note that Vietnamese scholars and commentators on international 
law consistently argue that international laws ought not be binding on Vietnam, 
unless they are specifically transformed. They note that this is consistent with 
Marxist-Leninist jurisprudence, which conceives of law as reflecting the economic 
base. Within such a framework it is not possible uncritically to adopt international 
laws as these laws would, by definition, reflect the capitalist bases of the nations 
that produce them. Further, they note that a preoccupation with sovereignty, which 
they ascribe to ideological tenets, has stymied the incorporation of ratified treaties. 
The result, as this chapter documents, is a law–practice gap in Vietnam. The 
provisions enabling the direct incorporation of treaties consistent with Vietnamese 
law or filling in gaps in domestic law are rarely cited. Rather, treaties are given effect 
through regulations and policies introduced by the responsible ministry or agency 
and not through a high-ranking legal instrument, such as an ordinance or law 
passed by the National Assembly. The result is that international law is implemented 
through policy or low-ranking laws in an ad hoc fashion. In effect, practical politics 
subverts the ideological argument against the incorporation of treaties, but it does 
so covertly rather than through National Assembly lawmaking. In conclusion, the 
authors call upon the Vietnamese state explicitly to adopt an incorporation approach 
to the international treaties to which it is a signatory. 
In contrast, Hansen contends that church–state relations in Vietnam ought not be 
seen as constrained by Marxist ideology. Rather, he argues, that the mutual distrust 
between church and state in contemporary Vietnam, where evident, is a function of 
history. He bases his contention on two arguments. First, through an analysis of the 
constitutional and criminal law provisions affecting the ability of citizens to maintain 
their Catholic faith, Hansen argues that the Communist Party of Vietnam never intended 
to wrest spiritual leadership of Vietnamese Catholics from Rome. In particular he argues 
that, unlike China, Vietnam never required the ordination of bishops not in communion 
with Rome. Put another way, while the Vietnamese state has at various times been 
unsympathetic toward Catholics, Hansen suggests it has never systematically sought 
to sever structural links between the local church and its leadership in Rome. 
Second, Hansen investigates the incarceration of Father Ly in Vietnam and 
concludes that his agitation went beyond issues of faith to engage directly with 
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political issues of the day. For that reason the Vietnamese state’s prosecution of 
Father Ly can be defended. Hansen contends again that it is not ideology that results 
in Father Ly’s prosecution, rather his overt political actions in a one-party state. 
Hansen notes the increasing freedom to practise religion and also describes 
unenforceable constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion, he does not attribute 
either manifestation of church–state relations in Vietnam to ideology. He reiterates 
his characterisation of an antagonism that evolved as a result of the long history of 
mutual distrust of the political agendas of church and state to explain each 
phenomenon. 
Hansen writes as a cleric and lawyer arguing persuasively that the Vietnamese 
Party–state has, in recent times, softened its restraint of religious freedom vis-à-vis 
Catholics. Not all will be persuaded by a thesis that does not address why it is that 
contemporary Catholics are still, in the main, distrusted by the political élite and 
remain prevented from maintaining their faith and holding political posts. But 
Hansen argues forcefully that ideology has been overcast as an explanation of 
church–state relations in Vietnam. This is a bold analysis downplaying the 
importance of Marxism to state–church relations and casting the contest as about 
power rather than beliefs. 
In summary, several themes emerge from the diverse and insightful accounts of 
legal and institutional change in China and Vietnam. Most authors agree that, 
despite the changes instituted by market reforms, certain core socialist ideas continue 
to order state–society relationships. But the authors also think that understandings 
of socialism are both ideologically and contextually constructed. These chapters 
demonstrate how certain socialist ideals change their meaning and significance 
according to context. Those studying socialist precepts in tightly controlled 
institutions such as courts and universities found relatively low levels of adaptation 
and hybridisation in official thinking, whereas those studying the interaction of 
socialist concepts with market and non-state institutions reported high levels of 
adaptation. These studies also show that Party and state leaders selectively plunder 
the socialist canon for situationally appropriate ideas, producing fragmented 
meanings that retain their authority in some social arenas, but not in others. Finally 
the chapters point to a set of questions and methodologies to guide further studies 
in the dynamism of law and legal institutions within socialist Asia. 
NOTES 
1 See, for example, Lubman (1999); Peerenboom (2002); Chen (1999); Potter (2001); Vermeer 
and d’Hooghe (2002); Chi (2000); Turner et al. (2000); Otto et al. (2002); Otto et al. (2000). 
2 See, for example, Bergling (1999); Gillespie (2004); Nicholson (2002); Pham Duy Nghia (2002); 
Quinn (2002); Sidel (2002). 
3 For an excellent treatment of the comparative transformative experience of Asian socialism, 
but not confined to a discussion of legal change see The China Journal, Special Issue on 
Transforming Asian Socialism, Vol. 40, July 1998. See also Chan et al. (1999); Abuza (2001). 
4 See, for example, Barry (1992); Frankowski and Stephan (1995); Varga (1995); Kornai (1990). 
19 The diversity and dynamism of legal change 
5 Nguyen Chi Dung, Comment at the Law and Governance: Socialist transforming Vietnam and 
China conference, Asian Law Centre at the University of Melbourne and Law School, Deakin 
University, Melbourne, Australia 12–13 June 2003. 
6 Vietnamese Ministry of Finance figures show that the state retains a major (51 per cent or 
more) stake in 47 per cent of privatised state owned enterprises and a controlling stake in 
many more (Dua Tu Chung Khoan, 12 April 2004:16). 
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Of ‘socialism’ and ‘socialist’ 
legal transformations in 
China and Vietnam 
Michael Dowdle 
One of the great tragedies of modern constitutionalism is that it has remained largely 
insulated from the concerns that socialism was developed to address. These concerns 
are real, and deserve more constitutional attention then they generally receive. The 
insights gleaned from Vietnam’s experience with the process of legal transformation 
perhaps can go some way toward rectifying this tragedy. We cannot presume, 
however, that it is enough that Vietnam chooses to call itself, its laws and its 
constitution ‘socialist’. In order for the ‘socialist’ experiences of Vietnam to contribute 
to a meaningfully ‘socialist’ vision of legal transformation, their self-described 
‘socialism’ must be somehow amenable to the experiences of others. 
In the search for a possibly socialist legal transformation of Vietnam, one needs 
to be clear about the parameters of the discussion. On the one hand, since Vietnam 
is identified as a ‘socialist’ country, any legal change experienced by that country 
could credibly be termed a ‘socialist legal transformation’. Such tautologies have 
little analytic utility, however. In order to constitute a meaningful topic of discussion 
and enquiry, the idea of socialism that informs our search for a socialist legal 
transformation has to function as an independent, rather than dependent, variable. 
Of course, the Vietnamese are free to define ‘socialism’ and ‘socialist law’ as they 
see fit, just as if I decided to define ‘cat’ as a colour midway between red and fuchsia, 
I am perfectly within my rights to do so as a fully autonomous member of humanity. 
I would, however, find it well nigh impossible to participate in any meaningful 
discussion with others about the nature of cats. Similarly, to the extent that the idea 
of a ‘socialist legal transformation’ seeks to refer to something more than Vietnam’s 
sui generis experiences, it must reference something beyond Vietnam’s own, and 
possibly self-styled, ‘socialist’ interpretations of those experiences. 
21 
Asian Socialism and Legal Change 22 
This is not to suggest that Vietnam’s ‘socialist’ interpretation or actual experience 
of ‘law’ and ‘legal transformation’ must conform to outside expectations or even be 
intelligible to others. Nevertheless, as a cognitive matter, we need a minimal set of 
common points for reference. A lack of common points will not delegitimate the 
truths—relative or otherwise—that reside within the Vietnamese experience. It would, 
however, effectively prevent this experience from contributing to our larger 
appreciation of the human condition. 
Even if we agree that the idea of a socialist legal transformation in Vietnam is 
something beyond whatever the Vietnamese say it is, we still leave room for 
divergence about what socialist legal transformation in Vietnam is, or could be. 
What follows is an exploration of how one particular variant of this phenomenon, 
what we will call a ‘socialist constitutional transformation’, could be conceptualised 
so as to allow the Vietnamese experience to contribute to a more global appreciation 
for the potential of that idea. 
I have selected this ‘constitutional’ variant of socialist legal transformation 
because I believe that it offers a better opportunity for meaningful Vietnamese 
contribution than does the ‘rule of law’ metric that more commonly informs 
comparative legal analyses. Underlying the idea of a socialist legal transformation 
has to be some non-tautological conception of what constitutes a ‘legal system’. The 
traditional rule of law conceptualisation, what Peerenboom (2002) and others have 
referred to as a ‘thin’ rule of law conception, sees ‘law’ simply in terms of certain 
mechanistic attributes. Examples of these attributes include the presence of a robust 
set of transparent and predictable rule-based definitions of both private and public 
competencies and powers, an independent judiciary capable of enforcing these 
rules free from the pressures of politics or expediency, and so on. Such a definition, 
however, would reduce the quest for a ‘socialist’ legal transformation to one of mere 
bookkeeping—a routine recording of whether or not a particular society does or 
does not have these requisite ‘legal’ structures. It would allow us to determine 
whether or not Vietnam has a legal system, but its ultimately deductive character 
would prevent Vietnam’s particular ‘socialist’ experiences from contributing 
anything meaningful to our understanding of the phenomenon of law.1 
In order to allow Vietnam’s ‘socialist’ experiences to contribute meaningfully to 
our own ongoing learning about the nature of the rule of law and legal development, 
we need to adopt a ‘thicker’—or what Rawls (following Kant) would have called a 
more ‘comprehensive’—vision of rule of law, one that perceives the possibility of 
normative linkages between the phenomenon of ‘law’ and whatever human values 
might be implicated by Vietnam’s particularly ‘socialist’ transformation (see Pogge 
2002). The idea of constitutionalism fills this bill quite nicely. Our common 
understanding of ‘constitutionalism’ embodies some reference to the idea of law, 
and in this way it can inform our understandings of legal transformation. But as we 
shall see further below, it also refers to something that is more than law, and in this 
way embeds that reference to ‘law’ within a larger web of ideas about the nature of 
human society. 
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The remainder of this chapter explores what a Vietnamese socialist 
‘constitutionalism’ would look like in a way that could contribute to our knowledge 
about the nature and function of law within human society. It does not make any 
claims, however, about whether or not such phenomena as Vietnamese socialist 
constitutionalism or socialist legal transformation actually exist, or whether they 
should exist as a moral or practical matter. It could be the case, for example, that the 
particular aspects of human society that concern, or should concern, Vietnamese 
socialism are not coterminous with the particular aspects of human society that 
effect notions of constitutionalism. Such a condition would not delegitimate 
Vietnamese socialist understandings of society or government, but I am not interested 
in the legitimacy or lack thereof of Vietnam’s ‘socialist’ experiences. I am simply 
interested in exploring how we might determine whether these experiences do indeed 
have something to contribute to our own understanding of the larger human 
phenomena of ‘constitutionalism’ and its role in ‘legal transformation’. 
To do this, I will adopt an unabashedly functionalist approach to understanding 
and defining constitutionalism. This is because the concept of constitutionalism 
emerges in response to assumptions and concerns that were originally distinctly 
‘Western’ and distinctly capitalist (or more precisely ‘mercantilist’). A rigorous focus 
on functionalism would tend to objectify these particular assumptions by expressing 
them in terms of explicit cause–effect relationships. This makes it easier to account 
for this phenomenon in the translation to different cultures and political–economic 
systems. Of course, functionalism has also come under attack for its cultural 
presumptuousness. Functionalist arguments too often presume that the particular 
functional needs of societies are universal, or that correspondence in structural 
form evinces correspondence in functional need. I will attempt to avoid such an 
analytic pratfall by allowing cultures to speak for themselves as to the particular 
functionality of their self-styled ‘constitutional’ systems. 
The functionality of constitutionalism lies in its political epistemic character. 
More specifically, it lies in its recognition that valid political understandings are 
not monopolised by discrete and insular elements of society. To make such a 
demonstration, I will begin in the second section to explore what a political 
epistemology is and why it is important. As I will explain, ‘political epistemology’ 
refers to the normative criteria that political institutions use to determine whether a 
particular claim deserves to be taken into account in political decision-making. We 
shall also see that, despite their ethereal, metaphysical character, political 
epistemologies can significantly affect the patterns of decision-making made by the 
polity. 
I will then explore why the idea of ‘constitutionalism’ gained purchase in the 
United States and Europe. We will see that what constitutionalism did was describe 
a new opening-up of political epistemology. Previously, European political 
epistemology had assumed that valid political insight could only come from a 
particular, insular segment of society. To the extent this assumption was ever valid, 
it was rendered obsolete with the onset of mercantilism. The appeal of US 
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constitutionalism lay in the fact that it recognised this new political–epistemic 
situation. I will then engage in a comparative exploration of constitutional 
functionality in the People’s Republic of China to show how despite its socialist 
and generally non-Western predicates, China’s use of constitutionalism evinces 
this same particular functionality. 
Finally, I examine some of the implications of all this for an exploration into a 
distinctly ‘socialist’ legal transformation in Vietnam. I begin by taking particular 
notice of the fact that, despite being a strongly self-identified socialist country, China’s 
idea of constitutionalism operates largely outside of its idea of socialism. As we 
shall see, this is because the Chinese idea of socialism exists within a largely closed 
epistemic framework, which effectively renders it irrelevant to the particular, 
epistemically-opening functionality of constitutionalism. Analogous to this 
phenomenon is the failure of the early Anglo-American constitutionalism to associate 
itself with Christianity, despite the defining role that Christianity played in the self- 
identity of both England and the United States during the time of their respective 
constitutional formations. In both countries, the early constitutionalists recognised 
that Christianity’s ultimately closed epistemic character rendered it incompatible 
with constitutionalism as they saw it. 
Of course, none of this is to suggest that Vietnam’s own idea of socialism is 
similarly epistemically closed or otherwise similarly constitutionally irrelevant. 
What it does suggest, however, is that to the extent our interest in Vietnam’s ‘socialist’ 
legal transformation is motivated by a desire to see how that experience might 
rectify oversights in Western visions of law and constitutionalism, the epistemology 
that informs the phenomenon of Vietnamese socialism will have to be, perhaps for 
that purpose only, epistemically open. 
OF INSTITUTIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL EPISTEMOLOGIES 
The particular functionality of constitutionalism lies in its ability to encapsulate 
institutionally a particular kind of political epistemology. In this section I will 
examine what a political epistemology is and why it is important. 
Political society is itself a kind of institution. In order to function effectively, 
institutions must have agreed-upon criteria for determining which of the myriad of 
competing factual claims confronting the institution will be taken into account in 
intra-institutional decision-making. We will call such a collection of criteria an 
‘institutional epistemology’. In other words, an institutional epistemology refers to 
the normative collection of rules and methods a particular institution uses to 
determine whether particular claims are to be afforded institutional respect, that is, 
whether they are to be treated as ‘true’. 
Of course, many will often question the degree to which actual institutional 
decision-making comports with that institution’s purported normative epistemology. 
Kuhn (1962) famously demonstrated, for example, that scientific ‘truths’ were 
frequently informed by factors such as reputation, professional opinion and 
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intellectual fad that science itself claimed should be irrelevant to truth 
determinations. Similarly, both critics of the common law and even some common 
law judges claim that judicial decision-making in common law courts is frequently 
informed by factors that are not recognised as valid by the formal epistemology of 
that institution (see Posner 1990; and Singer 1984). 
But institutional epistemologies can have important institutional effects even where 
they are not perfectly adhered to. For example, they significantly affect the capacity of 
an idea to propagate through the system. Studies have found that epistemically 
consistent information propagates more readily through an institution than does 
epistemically inconsistent information, even where the technologies and ideas 
operating outside of received normative understandings of the institution prove useful 
in addressing institutional problems (see Roger 1995; Elster 1995; Barenberg 1994). 
In this way, institutional epistemologies significantly shape institutional 
evolution. This is true even where decision-makers do not personally take the 
institution’s own epistemology particularly seriously. Studies of institutional 
behaviour and dynamics have also found that institutional leaders and opinion 
makers who successfully introduce new ideas and norms for strategic, instrumental 
purposes often lose control of these ideas and norms after they become accepted by 
the institution (Elster 1995; Barenberg 1994). For example, authoritarian governments 
in Eastern Europe and Latin America frequently sought to assuage pluralist, interest- 
based opposition by setting up state-corporatist interest organisations operating 
ostensibly on behalf of these classes. The strategic design behind this move was, on 
the one hand, to secure the political support of these interests by symbolically 
recognising and legitimating their particular concerns, while on the other hand 
preventing these concerns from interfering with governance by ensuring that these 
organisations would operate as an agent of the state rather than as an agent of the 
target interests. In numerous instances, however, the state-corporatist organisation 
originally set up simply to provide the appearance of interest-based empowerment 
actually began working on behalf of its constituency in direct contradiction of the 
original strategic intent of their founders. The simple symbolic act of recognising 
the legitimacy of these interests, incorporating them into the state’s formal political 
epistemology as it were, ultimately opened the door to these interests’ more effective 
participation in political decision-making (see Baohui Zhang 1994; Elster 1996). 
Institutional epistemology can also shape actual institutional decision-making 
by dictating particular organisational structures to the institution. To see how this 
is so, let us compare two legal institutions with two different formal institutional 
epistemologies: juries and forensic laboratories. The institutional epistemology 
employed by a jury is essentially conventionalist, in the sense that it holds simple 
consensus as the defining feature of institutional truth (see Reichenbach 1938). 
Insofar as a jury is concerned, a claim becomes ‘true’ simply by virtue of the fact that 
a certain portion of that jury accepts it as true. The reasoning behind the decision is 
largely irrelevant, as is the possibility that that truth might lie in direct contradiction 
of other truths found by that same jury (Abraham 2001). The institutional 
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epistemology employed by a forensic laboratory, on the other hand, is primarily 
positivist. A forensic laboratory will ostensibly recognise the truth of a claim of 
culpability only when that claim can be rationally, consistently extrapolated from 
other truths recognised by forensic institutions (see Gadamer 1996). The mere 
presence of some sort of consensus among a selected group of individuals is 
epistemically2 irrelevant. 
Of course, Kuhn (1962) has famously demonstrated that, despite their formal 
objection to conventionalism, scientific communities—like forensic laboratories— 
are, in fact, governed by conventionalist epistemic forces. Assuming this to be the 
case, does it mean that the decision-making patterns of juries and laboratories are 
really indistinguishable? 
This is clearly not the case. The different institutional epistemologies of 
laboratories and of juries have caused each to assume a distinct organisational 
structure and these structures give very different shapes to their respective decision- 
making patterns. In order to activate its democratic, conventionalist function, service 
on a jury is determined largely by lottery (Abramson 1994). At the same time, however, 
the conventionalist nature of a jury decision renders the process by which that 
decision is made inherently opaque—a jury does not articulate the reasoning that 
underlies its determination—which, in turn, gives rise to the possibility that some 
jury decisions could be founded on unfair or unjust biases (Harvard Law Review 
1997). For this reason, the information on which a jury may base its decision is 
strictly filtered.3 Service in a forensic laboratory, by contrast, is not democratic, but 
limited (at least insofar as the forensic decision-makers in that laboratory are 
concerned) to persons who possess specialised knowledge and training (see 
Schroeder 1992). Since the validity of a scientific truth–claim derives from the 
transparency of the relationship between that claim and other established scientific 
truths (Kahn 2001), there is thought to be no need for institutional filtering of the 
knowledge that these specialists are allowed to view.4 
Obviously, the decision-making pattern of a largely random collection of citizens 
viewing carefully filtered evidence in an opaque decision-making environment will 
differ significantly from that of a homogeneous selection of trained specialists with 
unfiltered access to evidence but whose decision-making processes must be transparent 
in order to be credible. Thus, even accepting Kuhn’s claim that scientific determinations 
are ultimately as conventionalist as jury determinations, the differing normative 
character of the forensic laboratory’s decision-making epistemology, vis-à-vis that 
of the jury, nevertheless produces very different patterns of decision-making.5 
HISTORICAL DIMENSIONS: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
IN EARLY MODERN AMERICA AND WESTERN EUROPE 
The emergence of constitutionalism in early modern America and later in Western 
Europe is directly associated with the appearance of a new, institutional 
epistemology for political decision-making. Under feudalism, statecraft skills were 
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effectively cultivated only within a small, distinct and insular class of the population. 
As a result, the knowledge, understandings and skills associated with statecraft 
were effectively limited to members of that particular population, a condition we 
will refer to as being ‘epistemically closed’. With the rise of mercantilism, however, 
many of these skills became increasingly deployed within and comprehensible to 
persons outside this aristocratic élite and political knowledge became progressively 
open. 
However, Europe’s standard state-level forms of political organisations, which 
had developed in and reflected the presumption of the feudal era, were slow to 
adapt to this new epistemic condition. US constitutionalism, by contrast, developed 
initially and primarily in the context of a mercantile society, and thus both recognised 
and encapsulated political dynamics associated with this new open political 
epistemology. As the political capacities and ambitions of epistemically-excluded 
populations increasingly clashed with the political monopolies of the old European 
order during the nineteenth century, European polities began turning to US 
constitutionalism as a means for opening political epistemology in a nevertheless 
controlled, regulated manner. Herein resides the real functionality of modern 
constitutionalism—its capacity to conceptualise political systems founded on a 
largely open political epistemology. 
On the reproduction of political knowledge 
Institutions are complex phenomena. On the one hand, they frequently endure and 
are intended to endure for generations, but they are ultimately comprised primarily 
of individuals that endure for much shorter spans. Moreover, these individuals 
must possess particular skills and knowledge necessary for the effectiveness of the 
institution. In order to survive and be effective, institutions must therefore be able to 
ensure that the individuated knowledge necessary for its survival and effectiveness 
is continually being ‘reproduced’ in new individuals who can take over from older 
individuals when they leave the institution. 
Institutions can reproduce institutional knowledge in a number of ways. For 
example, an institution might seek to instil relevant skills and knowledge itself via 
internal training processes. An example of this would be the apprenticeship 
arrangements found in many craft and artisan communities. Where other institutions 
within the society are producing the relevant skills and knowledge, however, the 
reproducing institution can save time and money by simply ‘raiding’ these other 
institutions for its personnel. When a large US public corporation needs a new CEO, 
it often simply hires someone with significant prior experience as an executive officer 
from another US corporation because the particular knowledge demanded of a CEO 
is now produced in a myriad of institutional sites throughout the corporate world. 
Obviously, how a particular institution goes about reproducing itself depends 
to a large extent on factors within the larger society from which that institution 
draws its members. Where the relevant skill is highly fungible within the larger 
society of which that institution is a part (for example, literacy in industrialised 
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economies), the institution will find it cheaper to rely on other institutions for 
reproduction (for example, public schools). The less fungible the skill (for example, 
violin-making), the more incentive there is to develop and reproduce that knowledge 
in-house (for example, apprenticeship systems) (see Becker 1975). 
Government is itself an (intergenerational) institution. Its long-term success 
clearly depends in part on its ability to ensure that the particular skills and 
understandings that underlie effective governance—what we will refer to somewhat 
misleadingly as ‘political knowledge’—are being continually and effectively 
reproduced in new generations of personnel. As per our discussion above regarding 
the different strategies for reproducing institutional knowledge, different 
governments adopt different approaches to this problem, depending in part on 
particulars in the larger society of which that government is a part. 
The reproduction of political knowledge in feudal Europe: closed versus open 
epistemic systems 
During the early formation of the European state system, the skills and techniques 
associated with political leadership in Europe were not produced by society at 
large. They had to be produced by political institutions ‘in-house’. This was the 
ultimate functional basis for feudalism. Feudalism effectively created a specialised 
sub-community—the nobility—that sought to ensure the (re)production of persons 
with the skills and understanding necessary for governmental effectiveness. This 
reproductive aspect of feudalism was most clearly reflected in the original English– 
Norman system of feudal tenures, a system in which the King (and other higher- 
level nobility) would grant perpetual land-rights to another in exchange for a pledge 
to provide particular forms of service. Under this system, the principal source of 
knights for the King’s armies was those families vested with military tenure, who 
were obligated to provide ‘knight’s service’ in exchange for their dominium over a 
parcel of the King’s land. Similarly, public administrators often came from families 
vested with civil tenure. Such a system made perfect sense in a society in which both 
effective military talents (such as wielding a lance while on horseback and wearing 
heavy armour) and effective literacy required years of specialised training that society 
at large did not, and could not, provide.6 
One by-product of creating distinct and insular institutional environments for 
the reproduction of particular institution-specific skills and understandings is that 
these environments would generally enjoy a kind of monopoly in the production 
and reproduction of that kind of knowledge. Where a particular kind of knowledge 
is monopolised by a particular, discrete and insular community, I will refer to it as 
‘epistemically closed’. There are at least two kinds of epistemic closure. One is a 
kind of closure, which I will call ‘functional’, that occurs when the institution is the 
only one that is able produce the particular knowledge relevant to that institution. 
During the tenth and eleventh centuries, the University of Bologna functionally 
monopolised the reproduction of what would later become known as the Civil Law 
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in Western Europe, because it was the only institution in Western Europe with 
access to the historical materials from which principles of civil law derived, 
Justinian’s Corpus Juris Civilis (of which it had the only copies) (Vinogradoff 1968; 
Haskins 1957). 
Monopolising institutions can also develop what we might call deontological 
closure. Deontological closure results when the institution’s epistemology refuses 
simply as a formal matter to accept or consider potential knowledge that originates 
from outside the institution, without regard as to whether or not that knowledge 
could actually contribute to institutional effectiveness. When the Catholic Church 
determined in the sixteenth century, via the Council of Trent, that theological truths 
could henceforth only be issued from properly recognised Catholic theologians 
(Pelikan 1984), it produced a particular institutional epistemology that would be 
called ‘deontologically’ closed. 
To be clear, few, if any, actually functioning institutional epistemologies are 
completely closed or completely open. In general, most, if not all, institutional 
epistemologies are simply more closed or more open, depending on the degree to 
which they limit pro forma possible sources of knowledge. Similarly, with regards to 
those institutions that do evince some degree of epistemic closure, that closure is 
most frequently due to a combination of mutually reinforcing natural and 
deontological conditions. Nevertheless, as we shall see, these admittedly very unclear 
and ambiguous distinctions can still be useful in explaining constitutional 
functionality. 
Mercantilism7 and the ‘opening up’ of political knowledge 
It was noted that under feudalism the reproduction of political knowledge basically 
was monopolised by a particular sub-community of the feudal system, the nobility. 
The resulting epistemic closure may well have originally been functional, as would 
be the case where literacy and chivalry were not being effectively reproduced by 
society at large (Keen 1990). Over the centuries, however, economic and technological 
development conspired to destroy whatever functional advantages these epistemic 
monopolies enjoyed. The military discovery first of the longbow and, later, of the 
firearm, freed military effectiveness from its previous dependence on years of 
specialised knights-service training. Effective armies could now be produced from 
the general populace in a matter of months. Similarly, mercantilisation and the printing 
press meant that a widening diversity of non-enfeoffed communities were producing 
literacy and other administrative skills used to administer, or at least understand, 
government (see Keen 1990; Zaret 2000).8 
As these other populations gained force in society, the insular and distinct 
political sub-communities that had descended from those used to reproduce feudal 
government sought to maintain their epistemic monopolies by buttressing their 
deteriorating functional monopolisation of political knowledge with a more 
deontological monopolisation. As noted above, the Catholic Church, for example, 
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justified its continued monopoly over the promulgation of canonical law by claiming 
that only the Catholic Church could comprehend divine truths. Secular aristocracies 
adapted a similar tactic, creating an ‘artificial aristocracy’—in the words of Thomas 
Jefferson—in which the mere formality of being born into the feudal nobility 
supposedly evinced unique access to divinely bestowed political knowledge 
(Jefferson 1984 [1813]). Both the concept of a ‘natural law’, which linked traditional 
political practices to divine inspiration, and the ‘divine right of kings’, which linked 
the formality of Kingship with divinely-ordained truths, would be examples of this 
phenomenon.9 Another example of this tactic is found in how many political thinkers, 
such as Edmund Burke, associated the reproduction of effective political knowledge 
with something akin to animal husbandry (see, for example, O’Neill 2004). 
The advent of US constitutionalism 
As national political systems increasingly relied on deontological rather than 
functional means for maintaining control over the generation of political knowledge, 
their political epistemologies became increasingly ineffective in generating and 
maintaining social coherence. In England, increased tensions between the state’s 
formal epistemology that ‘the King can do no wrong’ and the growing belief of a 
new mercantile class that it could in fact see the King actually doing wrong ultimately 
produced a series of crises in the seventeenth century: the Long Parliament, a Civil 
War, Oliver Cromwell’s Interregnum and finally, the Restoration (North and Weingast 
1989). The overall result of this century-long tension was to kludge the underlying 
epistemic disagreement via the well-established common law device of the legal 
fiction (Dicey 1967). On the one hand, the English system maintained the appearance 
of a closed political epistemology, for example by formally continuing to recognise 
the classical doctrine that ‘the Queen could do no wrong’. On the other hand, it also 
established that the Queen’s omnipotence could be effectively manifested only where 
the action in question was the responsibility of someone else in government. 
Unfortunately, this particular kludge did not work insofar as American (and 
other English) colonialists were concerned, since they were not represented in the 
English parliament (Bailyn 1967). Therefore, when the American colonists sought 
to justify their independence from their English overseers, they did so in part by 
disputing the closed character of England’s official political epistemology.10 
Of course, the American colonists did not invent the idea that political 
epistemology was inherently open. Such an idea was a defining product of the 
Enlightenment, and even before then was very much present in the mercantilist 
city–state ‘republics’ of fourteenth-century Italy (Skinner 1989). American 
revolutionaries expressly drew from both sources in developing their advocacy for 
a particularly ‘open’ political epistemology. The real American contribution was 
not to invent this kind of epistemology, but to embed it within a particular, 
institutionalised framework of government, what they and I refer to as a ‘constitution’. 
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The marriage between the idea of a constitution and the notion that political 
knowledge was open was particularly apparent in the Federalist–Anti-Federalist 
exchange that accompanied the founders’ campaign to ratify the constitution. The 
Federalist–Anti-Federalist exchange was remarkable if for no other reason than for 
being the first extended deliberation on the future shape and path of government to 
take place in public newspapers. Moreover, although by-and-large penned by political 
élites, the newspaper articles that constituted this exchange were frequently written 
under noms de plume that suggested a more common origin (for example, ‘Publius’, 
‘The Federal Farmer’). 
In this exchange, both sides commented with pride on the presumptiveness of 
the ordinary American citizen’s willingness to proffer political insight. In opening 
this exchange in October of 1787, Publius (Alexander Hamilton) remarked: ‘It has 
been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this 
country…to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable 
or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice’ (Hamilton 1961 
[1787]:89). The Anti-Federalist ‘Brutus’ began his first essay by noting 
When the public is called to investigate and decide upon a [such a great] question…the 
benevolent mind cannot help feeling itself peculiarly interested in the result. In this situation, 
I trust the feeble efforts of an individual, to lead the minds of the people to a wise and 
prudent determination, cannot fail of being acceptable to the candid and dispassionate 
part of the community. Encouraged by the consideration, I have been induced to offer my 
thoughts upon the present important crisis of our public affairs (Brutus 1981 [1787]:363). 
Diffusion to England and beyond 
To the rest of the world, this new open political epistemology was the defining feature 
of this American ‘constitutionalism.’ In an appendix to his 1803 edition of Blackstone’s 
Commentaries on the Law’s of England, the English legal scholar St. George Tucker noted 
The American Revolution has formed a new epoch in the history of civil institutions, by 
reducing to practice, what, before, had been supposed to exist only in the visionary speculations 
of theoretical writers…The powers of the several branches of government are defined, and 
the excess of them, as well in the legislature, as in the other branches, finds limits, which 
cannot be transgressed without offending against that greater power from whom all 
authority, among us, is derived; to wit, the people (St. George Tucker 1999 [1803]:19). 
Perhaps nowhere is the defining linkage between ‘constitutionalism’ and an open 
political epistemology made more obvious than in the way this concept of 
‘constitutionalism’ began affecting nineteenth-century English politics. Up until the 
middle nineteenth century, English political thinkers had regarded the structure of 
English government as—in Dicey’s words—a kind of ‘sacred mystery of 
statesmanship’ (Dicey 1967:2; see also Harrison 1996), one whose wisdom and logic 
ultimately lay beyond rational critique by ordinary mortals (see Epstein 1994). The 
mere existence of a cabinet, for example, was not formally acknowledged in English 
constitutional scholarship until the early nineteenth century (Harrison 1996). 
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Beginning in the early nineteenth century, working-class radicals began 
introducing a new notion of ‘constitutionalism’ into British political debate, one 
derived expressly from the American experience that linked political legitimacy 
with widespread capacity to participate in the development of political knowledge. 
An example of this development can be seen in the radical publisher T.J. Wooler’s 
use of constitutional argument in his courtroom defence against charges of seditious 
libel in 1817. Inspired to a considerable extent by Thomas Paine’s articulation and 
defence of American theories of governance, Wooler used the term ‘constitutionalism’ 
to refer, not to a closed creed, but to a much more inclusive way of interpreting 
English political history. Over the objection of both the prosecutor and the presiding 
judge, he argued that interpretations and understandings of constitutional principle 
should be open to anyone. Wooler used this idea effectively to undermine efforts by 
the court and by government prosecutors to constrain courtroom discussion to 
technical points of law, and dramatically transformed the trial into a debate about 
the properly public character of England’s ‘constitutional’ rights (Epstein 1994). 
Within a generation, the popularisation of Wooler’s alternative, the American- 
derived vision of ‘popular constitutionalism’, engendered a cultural split within 
England over the meaning of English ‘constitutionalism’ (Dicey 1967; Kammen 
1986; Epstein 1994). The split had two related dimensions. On the one hand was the 
epistemic disagreement, outlined above, over the source of constitutional authority. 
On the other hand, there was a related political justice disagreement over the fairness 
of the particular distribution of political privilege within English society. England’s 
modern vision of constitutionalism, as famously introduced by Walter Bagehot and 
Albert Venn Dicey, compromised the two dimensions of this dispute: accepting the 
radical’s constitutionalist epistemic claims while rejecting their political justice 
arguments (see Schneiderman 1998; Tulloch 1977; Kammen 1986). In Dicey’s words, 
the wisdom of the English political system lay in its ability ‘to give to constitutions 
resting on the will of the people the stability and permanence which has hitherto 
been found only in monarchical or aristocratic states’ (Dicey 1886c). 
The epistemic experiences that caused first the Americans and later English 
reformers to reject England’s closed vision of political epistemology were not unique 
to them. Beginning in the late eighteenth century, the idea of an inherently open 
political epistemology spread across first to Europe, and then beyond. And with it 
spread the new, American idea of constitutionalism. The French Revolution, which 
rejected in extremis any aristocratic claim to innate privilege or superiority, also 
ushered in the enactment of France’s first self-described ‘constitution’ (the 
Constitution of 1791), an enactment that was expressly inspired by the American 
interpretation of its own experience (Billias 1990; Bourne 1903). Reformers in the 
post-Napoleonic German states then used both French and American visions of 
constitutionalism to begin urging the constitutionalisation of their own governments, 
a development that culminated in its initial stages in 1849 with the aborted 
Paulskirche Constitution of 1849 (Nipperdey 1996; Hartmann 2002). Towards the 
end of the nineteenth century, Japan and China began using the clearly-imported 
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concept to refer to new forms of government that soften their respective monarch’s 
formal monopolisation of political knowledge—both inventing entirely new words 
(kenpo and xianfa respectively) to capture this new notion. 
COMPARATIVE DIMENSIONS: CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN SOCIALIST CHINA 
The comparative strength of this concept, and its reference to the epistemic opening 
of political knowledge, is well demonstrated by recent events in the People’s Republic 
of China. China has recently experienced a constitutional emergence. As we shall 
see below, behind the emergence of this self-styled constitutionalism is an ongoing 
re-evaluation of the nature of political knowledge in China. 
Constitutionalism, socialism and political epistemology in China 
We noted above that the notion of ‘constitutionalism’ (xianfa) originally entered 
Chinese political discourse in the late nineteenth century, imported from Japan by 
scholars interested in replacing China’s absolutist monarchy with a more open 
political system. The monarchical system was formally dismantled in 1911. By the 
1920s, the idea that the political environment was to be governed by a constitution 
resembling that of Western countries was well-accepted within China. In the 1930s, 
when civil war broke out between the factions in power, the Republicans and the 
Communists, both sides adopted self-styled ‘constitutions’ to govern their respective 
territorial holdings (Fitzgerald 2002). 
During this same timespan, however, an alternative political epistemology— 
called socialism—was also shaping notions of governance within the communist 
faction. Socialism began in China as an epistemically open concept, finding its 
conceptual shape in debates among public intellectuals during the early part of the 
twentieth century (Li Yu-ning 1971). It was also one of the principal ideological bases 
for the Communist Party of China (CPC), but the CPC was an inherently closed 
epistemic community (van de Ven 1995). Modelling itself after the Communist Party 
of the new Soviet Union, it embraced what James C. Scott termed a ‘high modernist’ 
vision of social organisation, that is, one that saw effective social development purely 
in terms of top-down planning and organisation (led by the Party) (Schwartz 1968; 
cf. Scott 1998). Inherent in the act of placing yourself and your own designs uniquely 
at the pinnacle of social development is an assumption that no-one from the outside 
could possibly possess independent knowledge relevant to that endeavour. 
During the civil war period, the epistemic tension between the CPC’s closed, 
Leninist vision of socialism, on the one hand, and its use of a constitutional-style 
government on the other, was buffered somewhat by an institutional pragmatism 
brought about by the need to respond creatively to a number of serious threats to the 
Party’s survival (Fitzgerald 2002). Once the CPC succeeded in gaining control of the 
mainland from the Republicans, however, its internal epistemic contradiction became 
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more manifest. In 1954, the new People’s Republic of China enacted its first 
constitution, one which tried to establish a particular power balance between the 
constitutional and party systems (Jiang Jinsong 2003). Nevertheless, when the 
constitutional system—namely the national parliament, the National People’s 
Congress (NPC)—and the Party began to disagree on the Party’s role in the new 
Chinese state (specifically, over the viability of a multiparty political system), the 
CPC effectively dismantled the constitutional apparatus (Jiang Jinsong 2003). With 
the onset of the Cultural Revolution in the mid 1960s, a very epistemically-closed 
vision of socialism became the only institutionally recognised source of political 
knowledge in China (Schwartz 1968). 
The re-advent of Chinese constitutionalism 
By the mid 1970s, the Cultural Revolution was widely regarded within China, even 
among CPC political élite, as a social and political disaster. A new leader, Deng 
Xiaoping, sought to begin extracting China from the utter chaos caused by the 
CPC’s long string of failed policies. Political authority in China, however, continued 
to rest overwhelmingly on CPC affiliation. By famously characterising his reforms 
as ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics,’ Deng therefore legitimated himself and 
his ideas by linking them with the CPC’s unique competence to understand the 
truths of socialism (Kluver 1996; Chan 2003). 
At the same time, however, Deng also found it useful to resurrect the constitutional 
system, albeit more out of strategic, rather than epistemic, concerns. On the one 
hand, a resurrected constitutional system allowed him, symbolically, to distinguish 
his newer high-modern reformism from the disastrous high-modern reformism of 
the earlier CPC. Additionally, Deng’s support for economic transformation was not 
without opponents, some of whom enjoyed considerable prestige and respect within 
élite political circles. In order to promote his reforms, Deng sought ways to marginalise 
his more prestigious oppositions’ capacity to affect political decision-making 
without denying the CPC’s wisdom in affording such people respect. Placing such 
opponents in the resurrected, but still moribund, constitutional apparatus allowed 
him to recognise their political prestige while at the same time isolating them from 
political decision-making. 
One such opponent was Peng Zhen. Peng had been part of the CPC’s inner circle 
since at least the 1930s. He had participated in the Long March, a distinct badge of 
honour in the CPC, and served as mayor of Beijing during the 1950s. He was a 
protégé of Zhou Enlai, one of China’s most respected and admired political figures. 
However, he opposed significant aspects of Deng’s reforms, and Deng therefore 
had him assigned to the leadership of the newly reconstituted NPC. Technically the 
supreme constitutional body, the NPC was expected to, and for the most part did, 
operate largely as a ‘rubber stamp’ legitimator of important Party directives. The 
conventional wisdom is that Deng expected that Peng’s assignment to the rubber- 
stamp NPC would effectively remove his voice from high-level political decision- 
making (Tanner 1999). 
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This was not to be the case, however. Having been removed from an élite position 
in the CPC decision-making hierarchy, Peng sought to develop potential alternative 
sources of political authority, sources that existed outside the CPC’s direct 
bureaucratic control (Tanner 1999). Obviously, Peng could not appeal to truths of 
socialism in such efforts, since doing so would have required him either to work 
through decision-making pathways of the very institution from which he was 
effectively isolated, or alternatively to contest the closed character of socialism from 
outside of the CPC and thus alienate the very institution he was seeking to influence. 
Indeed, throughout the 1980s, moves to expand discussions about the nature of 
Chinese ‘socialism’ beyond the scope of the CPC were quickly quashed by the CPC 
(Sun Yan 1995). 
In seeking to promote the NPC’s role in political decision-making in China, 
Peng thus had to appeal to legitimate epistemologies that had purchase within the 
CPC but whose reproduction was not monopolised by the CPC. He solved this 
problem in part by reviving the CPC’s earlier articulated support for constitutionalism 
(Tanner 1999; Potter 2003). This strategy benefited him in a number of ways. First, 
the demise of the CPC’s interest in constitutionalism corresponded with the onset of 
the now discredited Cultural Revolution and this gave significant historical weight 
to his arguments (see, for example, Peng Zhen 1990a, 1990b; Jiang Jinsong 2003). 
Second, Peng was head of the NPC after 1983, which in turn was formally China’s 
paramount constitutional body. An appeal to constitutionalism thus gave some 
comparative advantage to the NPC, and through it, to Peng (O’Brien 1999). 
The epistemic nature of China’s new constitutionalism 
Peng’s epistemic machinations evinced the same appeal to an epistemically open 
political knowledge as we earlier saw in the emergence of constitutionalism in 
England and the United States. As noted above, at the core of Peng’s argument for a 
re-invigorated constitutionalism was a conceptual linkage between the collapse of 
the constitutional order and the onset of the Cultural Revolution. Of course, Peng 
was not the only member of the Chinese political élite to criticise the Cultural 
Revolution. In fact, the CPC had effectively delegitimated the Cultural Revolution 
when it tried and convicted the ‘Gang of Four’.11 The prosecution and conviction of 
the Gang of Four both signalled official acknowledgment that the Cultural Revolution 
had been a mistake and laid responsibility for that mistake wholly at the feet of 
particular individuals. 
By contrast, Peng argued that the Cultural Revolution was due to the CPC’s 
systemic failings, rather than merely to the personal failings of particular individuals. 
He attributed the Cultural Revolution to a lack of information and understanding 
within the party-system itself. This lack of information, he argued, had been caused 
by the dismantling of the constitutional system. He claimed that, because of the 
uniquely representational nature of the NPC, constitutionalism provided special 
access to knowledge that was vital to preventing the kinds of Party mistakes the 
Cultural Revolution represented (Peng Zhen 1990b). In this way, Peng’s argument 
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clearly linked the benefits of constitutionalism with what we are calling the opening- 
up of political epistemology. What he was saying, in effect, was that by itself the 
CPC hierarchy inherently lacks access to particular sources of knowledge that can 
be crucial to political decision-making, and that such knowledge can only come 
from representational institutions—institutions like the NPC that are able to directly 
perceive and reflect the diversity of experiences found in larger society. 
Of course, many have suggested that Peng’s appeal to constitutionalism was 
strategic—that in fact he was not actually interested in establishing 
‘constitutionalism’ as a normative matter. But since we are looking at 
constitutionalism from a functionalist perspective, what we are really interested in 
here is institutional effect, not personal intent. And regardless of Peng’s actual 
motivations, his arguments did seem to trigger a growing institutionalisation of 
constitutionalism in China, and institutionalisation that is indeed characterised by 
what we are claiming to be constitutionalism’s ultimate purpose, namely, to open 
political epistemology to input from sources outside the CPC or any other discrete 
and insular segment of society (see Dowdle 2002). 
For example, beginning in the late 1980s, the NPC began consulting with an 
increasingly diverse collection of societal interests when drawing up or reviewing 
draft laws and regulations. In some cases, it rejected draft legislation because it felt 
that the drafters had failed to take sufficient account of particular societal 
perspectives. It encouraged greater autonomy in NPC representatives and promoted 
the need for private capacity to challenge political decision-making. These 
‘constitutional innovations’ have since diffused to other areas of China’s 
constitutional apparatus. All this can be directly traced to Peng Zhen’s initial 
promotion of constitutionalism and to the need he articulated to free political 
epistemology in China from monopolisation by a discrete and insular collection of 
decision-makers (Dowdle 2002, 1997). 
WHITHER ‘SOCIALIST’ CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT? 
One of the things curiously absent from China’s evolving constitutional evolution 
is any distinctly ‘socialist’ aspect. Socialism and self-styled ‘socialist’ political 
doctrine have been the defining focus of Chinese political thought during the last 
half of the twentieth century (Schwartz 1968; Sun Yan 1995; Chan 2003). 
Nevertheless, Chinese constitutional discourse has yet to identify a distinctive 
correspondence between any of the key socialist doctrines to emerge in China and 
any of the particular structures, doctrines or procedures that constitute China’s 
constitutional system.12 
Our discussions above offer an explanation for this curiosity. If constitutionalism 
involves an opening-up of political epistemology, and if the epistemology of 
‘socialism’ as it has evolved in China is monopolised by the CPC as I suggested, 
then the two discourses would be epistemically incompatible. The reason why 
China’s socialist discourse remains in the main so irrelevant to China’s constitutional 
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development (at least insofar as its comparative relevance is concerned) is because 
the ‘truths’ of Chinese socialism would have very little purchase in the epistemic 
environment that governs Chinese constitutionalism. 
A similar phenomenon can be seen in the absence of any association between 
Anglo-American constitutional structures or practices and Christianity. Arguably, 
Christianity was as much a defining element of Anglo-American political 
communities during their respective periods of constitutional formation as socialism 
has been with regards to that of China. At the time of their respective constitutional 
formations, American and English constitutionalists readily identified themselves 
as members of distinctly ‘Christian’ nations, and were not shy about drawing 
parallels between Anglo-American political and constitutional acumen and their 
Christian piety (Bradford 1993)—just as Chinese constitutionalists today readily 
draw parallels between China’s political and constitutional acumen and their 
socialist piety. Nevertheless, Anglo-Americans, including Anglo-American Christian 
theologians, have largely rejected the idea that our respective constitutions have 
anything distinctly ‘Christian’ about them (Dreisbach 1999). 
This phenomenon can not simply be due to some misplaced strain of 
constitutional imperialism. Our respective constitutionalist founders were well 
aware that they were engaging in a very particularist venture, one that to them was 
by-and-large distinctly Anglo-Saxon (Kammen 1986). Today, we continue to 
acknowledge our constitutional particularism when we uncontroversially see in 
our constitutionalism distinctly ‘capitalist’ or distinctly ‘liberal’ elements. Nor is 
Anglo-American conceptual blindness in this regard unique to us. Even self- 
professed non-Christians in self-professed non-Christian countries (such as those 
in China, or in the Middle East, or in the former Soviet bloc) who have sought to 
resist universal application of Anglo-American constitutional models by-and-large 
have not founded their resistance on any distinctly ‘Christian’ aspect to Anglo- 
American constitutionalism. 
We find a particularly clear demonstration of Anglo-American constitutionalism’s 
intellectual resistance to Christian-theological doctrine in the intellectual history of 
the privilege against self-incrimination, a privilege that is prominent in both the US 
and English constitutional systems (1 Blackstone 1783 [1765]:*68). Until recently, 
contemporary jurisprudence has held that the privilege emerged in the common 
law in opposition to competing ecclesiastical law doctrine (Levy 1986). In fact, that 
privilege actually emerged initially in ecclesiastical law itself. Its initial justifications 
were founded in significant part in Christian theological doctrine. From there, it 
migrated into English and later into American constitutional law. It was there that 
it shed its religious underpinnings (Langbein 1994; Helmholtz 1990). 
What could have caused the constitutional law of two strongly self-identified 
Christian polities to repudiate the Christian origins of one of its fundamental 
maxims? The answer would seem to lie in precisely the kind of epistemic 
incompatibility that we saw above in the context of the conceptual disconnect that 
separates constitutionalism from socialism in socialist China. Particularly during 
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the Enlightenment, and perhaps so even today, many saw the fundamental 
epistemology of Christianity as being incompatible with the demands of the post- 
feudal European constitutionalism. The foundational epistemic building block of 
Christianity is faith. As described by John Locke, ‘[f]aith [in contrast with reason] is 
the assent to any proposition…upon the credit of the proposer as coming from 
GOD, in some extraordinary way of communication’ (Locke 1979). As per Locke, 
the very nature of faith prevents persons other than the believer from being competent 
to assess the truths inherent in the belief. Capacity to contribute to the truths of the 
belief thus is monopolised by the believer. Thus, under Locke’s description, faith 
comports with what we are calling a closed epistemology. 
American constitutionalists were strongly influenced by Locke’s views about 
the conflict between faith-based religion and reason-based constitutionalism (Walzer 
1983). This epistemic incompatibility between faith-based Christianity and reason- 
based constitutionalism also caused many leading religious figures to similarly 
reject the idea of a Christian constitutionalism (or what they tended to call a ‘Christian 
commonwealth’). John Witherspoon, a leading Presbyterian clergyman and 
President of the College of New Jersey (later to be known as Princeton), argued that 
Another reason why the servants of God are represented as troublesome is, because they 
will not, and dare not comply with the sinful commandments of men. In matters merely 
civil, good men are the most regular citizens and the most obedient subjects. But, as they 
have a Master in heaven, no earthly power can constrain them to deny his name or desert 
his cause (1802:415). 
Elder John Leland, leader of the Virginia Baptists, expressed the same sentiment 
more bluntly when he urged that ‘[t]he notion of a Christian commonwealth, should 
be exploded forever’ (Green 1845:118).13 
Of course, none of this is to deny that Christianity has often had decisive influence 
over various aspects of Anglo-American constitutional development. Nor is it to 
suggest that Christianity—or religion in general—should not have such influence 
(Greenawalt 1988). But just as Judaism’s significant influence on Albert Einstein 
(Jammer 1999) did not result in a discernibly ‘Jewish’ theory of relativity, 
Christianity’s epistemic incompatibilities with constitutionalism have caused its 
influence on Anglo-American constitutional development, like socialism’s influence 
on China’s constitutional development, to remain outside the cognition of 
‘constitutionalism’ per se. 
All this suggests another important point regarding our efforts to identify a 
‘socialist’ legal-constitutional transformation in Vietnam. Our analysis of the way 
that Christianity did and did not affect Anglo-American legal-constitutional 
development 200 years ago argues that, insofar as Vietnam’s ‘socialist’ legal or 
constitutional transformation is concerned, we need to be careful and not confuse a 
hypothesis that Vietnam’s constitutional or legal transformation has not been 
particularly ‘socialist’ with a hypothesis that Vietnam’s constitutional or legal 
transformation has not in fact been strongly and positively influenced by ‘socialism’. 
If it were to be found that Vietnam’s legal transformation was not distinctly ‘socialist’, 
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that would not denigrate at all socialism’s contributions or potential contributions 
to that country. It would not imply that socialism in Vietnam is a meaningless sham. 
It would not mean that socialism does not contribute anything valuable or important 
to Vietnam’s ongoing legal and constitutional transformation. It would simply mean 
that socialism’s particular contributions to Vietnam’s constitutional, political and 
social development remain, at least for the time being, outside the limits of 
constitutionalism’s particular Gestalt. 
CONCLUSION 
As I noted at the outset, the fact that Western constitutionalism continues largely to 
ignore the particular economic and societal injustices that socialism seeks to address 
should be of significant concern to us. To date, our experience has been that the 
burdens of ‘transformation’ tend to fall disproportionately—and, many argue, 
unjustly—on those very populations that socialism seeks to protect. The idea(l) of a 
socialist legal transformation is thus very enticing (Stiglitz 1994), and one hopes 
that Vietnam’s socialist heritage would allow it to contribute to our understanding 
of how such an ideal might be reified in humanity at large. But hope per se does not 
alleviate the need for hard and critical analysis. If Vietnam’s ‘socialist’ experiences 
are to point us in the direction of a distinctly ‘socialist’ form of human legal 
transformation, then the ‘socialism’ that defines those experiences must itself be the 
product of human reflection—not simply that of some distinct if valuable subset. 
NOTES 
1 For more on the problem of deductive legal models, see Dowdle (forthcoming). 
2 Such consensus does have important ramifications, insofar as the sociology of forensic truth is 
concerned. 
3 See, for example, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993). 
4 See Hsu (1999), which shows broad constitutional recognition of social need to protect unfiltered 
scientific access to information. 
5 One particularly visible example of this might have been the O.J. Simpson Trial. See Arenella 
(1996) and Thompson (1996). 
6 See generally Keen (1990). The feudal tenures system is described in Baker (1990). 
7 My use of the term ‘mercantilism’ in this context derives from the definition offered by Minchinton 
(1969:vii): 
‘Mercantilism’ can therefore be described as the striving after political power through economic 
means, which, given the circumstances of the time [ca. 1400–1700], meant through 
encouragement of trade and manufactures rather than the improvement of the land. 
8 See Keen (1990) and Zaret (2000). See also Dickson (1967) and Clapham (1958), who both 
describe the merchant class’s increasing penetration of governmental decision-making. 
9 With regards to the epistemic implications of the English doctrine natural law, see Jeremy 
Bentham (1996). With regards to the epistemic implications of the divine right of kings, see, for 
example, Jean Bodin (1992). 
10 There is no questioning that this new, open ‘American’ political epistemology was very much 
developed in pursuit of very strategic and self-serving ends. See also Howard Zinn (1995). I 
described above, however, how one important feature of institutional epistemologies is that 
they can reproduce and strengthen themselves simply by affecting institutional structures and 
other processes of runaway legitimation. 
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11 The ‘Gang of Four’ referred to four élite Party members (including Mao’s wife) who allegedly 
convinced Mao to initiate and perpetuate the Cultural Revolution in order to further their own 
personal ends. 
12 Constitutional scholars and intellectuals in China readily associate their constitution in general 
with something called Chinese ‘socialism.’ But as noted above, simply saying that China’s 
constitutional system is ‘socialist’, without linking distinctive aspects of its socialism with 
distinctive aspects of its constitutionalism, is comparatively meaningless (or more precisely, 
tautological): similar to one saying that Chinese food is ‘socialist’. Of course, to reiterate, the 
fact that the Chinese have not yet drawn particular links between their socialist experiences 
and their constitutional experiences does not diminish at all the importance or legitimacy of 
either China’s socialist system or its constitutionalist system. Nor does it diminish the legitimacy 
of their claims that their constitution is in fact a ‘socialist’ constitution. It simply means 
whatever ‘socialist’ aspects there may be to these experiences, they are aspects that—unlike 
many other aspects of Chinese constitutional experiences (see Dowdle 1997)—as yet remain 
inherently outside the realm of to meaningful comparative understanding. 
13 For a similar argument as made by a more modern Christian theologian, see Powell (1993). 
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Changing concepts of 
socialist law in Vietnam 
John Gillespie 
Few aspects of the Vietnamese legal system are more uncertain and controversial 
than the meaning of socialist law. It influences the way the Communist Party of 
Vietnam ‘leads’ the state, the way the state ‘manages’ society and the way officials 
and the public implement and obey laws. Socialist law resists definition. 
‘Socialist law’ generates confusion because it was introduced more than forty 
years ago to regulate the command economy, but the term is still in use to describe 
contemporary mixed-market regulation. This flexible usage raises the question what 
is socialist about socialist law? Does the term have immutable and intrinsic meanings 
or has it become a convenient label for state law? 
There are two main problems in assessing continuity and change in the meanings 
attached to ‘socialist law’. First, core Marxist-Leninist notions underpinning socialist 
law—socialist legality, democratic centralism and collective mastery—operate at 
too high a level of abstraction to convey concrete meanings. Marxist-Leninist ideology 
informs us that law has a class element that reflects state ownership over the means 
of production, but says little about other social relationships such as housing, family 
or traffic regulations. Western ‘rule of law’ ideas smuggled into the recently adopted 
law-based state (nha nuoc phap quyen) doctrine are equally uninformative. They 
maintain that socialist law should be equal, transparent and consistent, but rarely 
discuss broader normative issues. Socialist law needs middle-level propositions 
(an epistemological context) to acquire specific and systematic meanings. 
The second analytical problem is caused by the rapidly changing and 
fragmenting conceptual environment shaping ‘socialist law’. Socialist notions that 
the state owns the ‘means of production’ to safeguard workers’ interests have 
dissolved into Party policies that encourage foreign investment, international 
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economic integration and equitisation (co phan hoa) of state-owned companies. Ho 
Chi Minh’s declaration that ‘[i]f the people are hungry, it is the fault of the Party and 
the government, if the people are cold, it is the fault of the Party and government; if 
the people are sick, it is the fault of the Party and the government’ seems utopian 
compared with contemporary ‘user pays’ ‘socialisation’ policies (Thanh Duy 
1997:27–8). 
Our analysis needs to distinguish social change from social motion. Societies 
everywhere are in constant motion. Economies strengthen and weaken, social 
institutions rise and fall, and technology and global interaction move everyone. Yet, 
social motion rarely alters underlying legal meaning (Grossman 1971). We need to 
search for new legal meanings in the successive waves of social and legal changes 
that have transformed Vietnamese institutions and law. 
This chapter searches for change by comparing the narratives shaping the 
importation of Soviet political-legal ideas forty years ago with contemporary thinking 
about law. Rather than attempting an authoritative definition—a project doomed 
by fragmented social meanings—the discussion looks for representative meanings 
in written records and interviews with officials within the Party and state orbit. By 
determining which historical contexts convey the most representative meanings, 
the analysis gains insight into continuity and change in ‘socialist law’. 
This discussion needs a framework in which to place and compare different 
contextual understandings about socialist law. Discourse analysis is a useful tool, 
since political–legal ideas are largely generated through communicative processes 
(Luhmann 1987; Teubner 1993; Beck 1994). Discourse is taken to mean ‘all forms of 
spoken interaction, formal and informal, and written texts of all kinds’, especially 
political, economic, moral, cultural and legal modes of communication (Potter and 
Wetherell 1987:7). 
Discourse analysis does not capture every meaning of ‘socialist law’. Party and 
state writings deterministically portray Vietnamese culture as forged in the crucible 
of Red River Delta culture, based on moral rule, ‘led’ by a morally perfected Party 
and possessing a low level of legal consciousness. These storylines serve to remind 
us that, in focusing on Party and state discourse, this investigation is limited to one 
(admittedly highly influential) contextual understanding of socialist law. It is 
important to remember that there are many legal understandings fragmented 
throughout the numerous discursive communities in Vietnam. The views of those 
from outside the Party and state orbit are discussed in another setting. 
This discussion starts by mapping the main political-legal principles imported 
into the Democratic Republic of Vietnam from the Soviet Union. It then reflects on 
approaches to legal borrowing, asking why Soviet law was imported with few 
concessions to local practices and whether contemporary attitudes to imported 
laws have changed. The discussion argues that differences in the way Vietnamese 
policymakers borrowed ideas profoundly changed the meanings given to the ‘core’ 
Marxist-Leninist canon. It then examines contemporary narratives about law to 
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ascertain whether core legal meanings are more responsive to change in some 
discourse modes than in others. The chapter concludes that meanings invested in 
socialist law are fragmenting as core socialist political-legal principles are exposed 
to new thinking. 
BUILDING A SOCIALIST LEGAL STATE 
It was not until the First Congress of the Vietnam Workers Party (Dang Lao Dong Viet 
Nam) in September 1951 that legal cadres were instructed to ‘build up socialist law’ 
(Hoang Quoc Viet 1962:14–15). Officials in the incipient Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam previously characterised legality according to the French civil law concept 
of ‘democratic legality’ (phap che dan chu). The Third Party Congress in 1960 adopted 
the Soviet ‘socialist legality’ (sotsialisticheskaia zakonnost’) doctrine, which translated 
into Vietnamese as phap che xa hoi chu nghia [a state legal ideology] (Tran Hieu 
1971:108). 
At first, prominent legal writers such as Dinh Gia Trinh argued that economic 
conditions in people’s democracies like the Democratic Republic of Vietnam were 
insufficiently evolved to sustain Soviet-style socialist legality.1 Eventually the Soviet 
view, that legality in people’s democracies and in socialist republics was equivalent, 
prevailed. By the 1970s, Vietnamese writers uniformly accepted imported socialist 
legal thinking as their own and unreflectively equated Soviet law with socialist law 
(Pham Van Bach 1970; Ngo Van Thau 1982). Assertions that Soviet law was really 
a public law analogue of European civil law never entered Vietnamese legal 
discourse. 
Three doctrines constituted the ‘core’ socialist political-legal canon—socialist 
legality, democratic centralism and collective mastery. 
Socialist legality 
Socialist legality (phap che xa hoi chu nghia) is the main socialist legal doctrine. It was 
defined in Vietnamese writings during the 1960s as a tool of proletarian dictatorship 
(chuyen chinh vo san) to defeat enemies and to protect the revolution and collective 
democratic rights to organise, manage and develop a command economy (Dinh Gia 
Trinh 1961). 
Vietnamese writers reasoned from Marxist theory that worker-controlled societies 
required legal systems that reflect proletarian aspirations.2 The connection between 
law and class was explained by the familiar assertion that law is part of the 
‘superstructure’, which reflects the ‘will of the ruling class’ (y chi cua giai cap thong 
tri) and its control over the means of production. As the executive committee of the 
ruling class, the Party determined the content of law. The conflation of Party policy 
and law enabled the Party and state to use law as a ‘management tool’ (cong cu quan 
ly) to adjust or balance (dieu chinh) social relationships—a practice permitting the 
substitution of policy for law. 
Asian Socialism and Legal Change 48 
That law was primarily seen as a political tool is further implied by the low 
priority accorded to defining legal terminology. Words such as hieu luc (validity) 
and tinh hop phap (legitimacy) were used interchangeably with phap che (legality). 
Rather than legal certainty, writers were preoccupied with generating social 
compliance. In an effort to make legal terms appear more familiar to villagers, scholars 
replaced many Sino-Vietnamese legal terms with neologisms created from everyday, 
but imprecise, Vietnamese terms (Dinh Gia Trinh 1965). 
Democratic centralism 
Democratic centralism (tap trung dan chu), as conceptualised by Lenin, was an 
organisational principle binding Party and state (Lavigne 1985). A facsimile of the 
doctrine appeared in the political report delivered by President Ho Chi Minh to the 
Second National Congress of the Vietnamese Workers Party (VWP) in 1951 (Ho Chi 
Minh 1994:127). By the time it was formally adopted in the 1959 Constitution, it had 
matured into a two-pronged doctrine linking popular participation in state activities 
with centralised Party and state power. 
Party documents indicate that democratic centralism was introduced to 
consolidate central Party control over regional Party cadres, state officials and the 
general public (Le Van Luong 1960; Nguyen The Phung 1960). According to socialist 
strategic thinking, Party power constituted the most potent remedy to ‘regionalism’ 
(dia phuong chu nghia) and ‘departmentalism’. Only a hierarchically organised, 
disciplined Party could deliver the social and bureaucratic unity required for 
command economic planning. Article 10(f) of the VWP Statute 1960 explains the 
meaning of ‘centralism’ 
Individual Party members must obey the Party organisations. The minority must obey the 
majority. Lower organisations must obey higher organisations. Party organisations 
throughout the country must obey the National Delegates’ Congress and Central Executive 
Committee (Le Van Luong 1960:33). 
The second arm of democratic centralism was based on Lenin’s assertion that 
democracy is only possible where the working class ‘centralise[s] power in their 
hands’.3 Socialist democracy (dan chu xa chu nghia) was understood in two ways. 
Theorists argued that popularly elected legislatures (National Assembly and 
provincial legislative councils) should supervise state power on behalf of the people. 
Socialist democracy also encompassed Lenin’s revolutionary view that bourgeois 
democracy transferred the people’s democratic rights to elected representatives. He 
believed the working class had comparatively few opportunities to participate in 
government by influencing political decision-makers through ‘lobbying’ (chay lo 
thu tuc) and popular demonstrations. Democratic rights were better safeguarded by 
‘proletarian dictatorship’ (chuyen chinh vo san) that empowered the ‘ruling class’ to 
supervise state organs directly through their proxies: the Communist Party and 
mass organisations. Democratic centralism validated Party leadership (su lanh dao 
cua dang) within state and society. 
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Collective mastery 
The ideas that eventually coalesced into the ‘collective mastery’ (lam chu tap the) 
doctrine appeared in Party publications from the 1950s onwards (Pham Van Dong 
1952). Unlike socialist legality and democratic centralism, collective mastery was 
officially imagined through revolutionary Chinese thinking, though it drew 
inspiration from Lenin’s assertion that true democracy is only possible where workers 
exercise mastery over society. 
Vietnamese leaders were captivated by radical Maoist mass mobilisation theories, 
long after Stalinist jurists in the 1930s rejected public participation in state 
administration as ‘the old twaddle about the mobilisation of socially active workers’ 
(Vyshinski 1982 [1936]:81). This utopian vision enlisted law to ‘fundamentally 
remake the conscience of the people’. 
Party General Secretary Le Duan discussed collective mastery during the 1960s 
and 1970s, but the doctrine did not take hold until the euphoria surrounding 
reunification in 1975 made radical social transformation seem possible (Le Duan 
1994:242–3). At the Fourth Vietnam Workers Party Congress in 1976, collective 
mastery was described as a system where ‘the true and supreme masters are the 
social community, the organised collective of working people, with the worker– 
peasant alliance as the core’ (Pham Van Dong 1977:K11–K12). The slogan ‘the Party 
is the leader, the state is the manager and people are the masters’ (dang lanh dao, nha 
nuoc quan ly, nhan dan lam chu) unified Party, state and public relationships under 
collective mastery (Le Duan 1979:4). 
Theorists claimed that the path to collective mastery lay in eliminating conflict 
between the state and individuals (Le Thi 1977). This goal is evident in the Party 
slogan: ‘The important target of the revolution is to strengthen the unification between 
politics and the spirit of the people [tang cuong su nhat tri ve chinh tri va tinh than cua 
toan dan]’. In classless societies, collectivism replaced individualism, enabling people 
to live harmoniously without the laziness, individualism, selfishness and corruption 
associated with the ‘old society’ (xa hoi cu). Collective mastery rejected civil society 
or individual space outside state and collective orbits as bourgeois individualism. 
As a corollary, the doctrine was hostile to private legal rights. 
Collective values were encouraged in mass mobilisation campaigns led by the 
Party leadership. Early moral campaigns purged residual French cultural influences 
(1946–52), reformed land ownership (1953–56) and attacked ‘feudalistic property 
ethics and Confucian morals’ (Weggel 1986:415). During the 1970s and 1980s, the 
Party used mass organisations to mobilise popular support to ‘revolutionise the 
whole of life’ by remodelling society along state-lines (Le Phuong 1994). 
Taken together, socialist legality, democratic centralism and collective mastery 
generated four core socialist legal principles that closely resembled the imported 
Soviet ideas. First, law is not above the state, but rather emanates from the state. As 
an extreme manifestation of legal positivism, there is no space in socialist law for 
customary rules or natural rights. Second, the Party and state possess prerogative 
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powers to substitute policy for law. Law facilitates and orders, but never constrains 
state power. Third, the central ‘Party leads’ (su lanh dao cua dang) the state and 
society. Fourth, individual legal rights give way to the collective public good. 
IMPORTING SOCIALIST POLITICAL–LEGAL THOUGHT 
Explanations for the similarities between Soviet and Vietnamese legal thinking are 
found in Vietnamese approaches to legal borrowing during the 1960s and 1970s. 
Ignoring their own warnings against unreflective borrowing, Party leaders imported 
socialist law with few concessions to local conditions. Truong Chinh denounced 
‘gulping down raw other people’s culture, parrot-fashion learning, or the mechanical 
introduction of a foreign culture into our own without taking into account the 
particularities and concrete conditions of the country and its people’ (Truong Chinh 
1948:251). Ho Chi Minh wrote in 1924 that ‘Marxism is to be revised with respect to 
its historical basis, and to be consolidated by the ethnology of the East’. Later he 
was more direct: ‘[W]e are not like the Soviet Union; they have different habits and 
customs, history and geological conditions. We can take another road to socialism’ 
(Ho Chi Minh 1995:338). 
Their concerns rarely surfaced in the extensive Vietnamese literature concerning 
legal borrowing from the Soviet Union. This reluctance to localise Soviet legal 
reasoning is partially attributable to Marxist–Leninist hostility to the notion that 
culture plays a role in determining the characteristics of legal systems. Since both 
law and culture are located in the superstructure, their interaction is considered 
unimportant. The elaborate historical materialist explanations for legal development 
focused on linkages between European economic production and law, and said 
little about ‘Asiatic’ production (East Asian rice-growing economies) (Avineri 1969). 
Vietnamese theorists faced a choice between uncritically applying Marx’s 
Eurocentric legal theory to Vietnam or comprehensively rethinking Marxist theory 
in the context of ‘Asiatic’ production. Like the Chinese, they adopted a Maoist land- 
reform program, but applied the Soviet legal template to other social spheres. 
Marx also followed a well-established European intellectual tradition that 
depicted Asian societies in undifferentiated ways as ‘barbarians’ or ‘semi- 
barbarians’, portrayals that generated socialist antipathy to neo-Confucian and 
‘feudal’ culture (Marx 1969 [1877]:6). Truong Chinh evinced this orientalist thinking 
when he blamed the ‘Asian mode of production’ for backward economic and social 
conditions in Vietnam. He vilified traditional cultural precepts as ‘unscientific’, 
promoting ‘superstition, idealism, mysticism, bungling, carelessness, all those habits 
that are irrational or retrograde’ (Truong Chinh 1948:25–52). Vietnamese leaders 
sought a ‘new democracy culture’ based on ‘rational, progressive socialist 
legislation’. They considered the Soviet Union the most advanced socialist state 
and thought Soviet ‘proletarian culture’ should link the working classes in different 
countries. National cultural barriers based on ‘Asiatic’ and ‘feudal’ modes of 
production were supposed to dissolve in the face of this unifying force. 
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The adaptation of imported ideology to local conditions was further constrained 
by ethnocentric Soviet jurists, who encouraged ‘satellite’ nations to ‘build socialism’ 
through imitation, rather than experimentation. In exhaustively reviewing Soviet 
commentaries on Vietnamese legal development, Ginsburgs (1973) blamed political 
policy for the reluctance to localise legal borrowings. He wrote that the 
academic exploration of the distinctive attributes of socialist experimentation in the 
countries of the Soviet bloc became both safe and fashionable—as long, of course, as the 
main accent remained on the common heritage and the disparities were treated either as 
necessary tactical adoptions to ‘objective conditions’ or components in a pragmatic region- 
wide search for better solutions to existing socialist problems (1973:661). 
Vietnamese officials working in the legal sector during the 1960s recalled that 
law reform sought to transplant ‘proletarian culture’, and Soviet advisers 
discouraged local adaptation as ‘dangerous nationalism’ (chu nghia dan toc cuc 
doan).4 A general reluctance to address local conditions and diverge from the Soviet 
legal template is revealed in a series of articles written by Soviet jurists about 
Vietnamese legal development (Letsoni 1963). They seldom acknowledged, much 
less analysed, incongruities between imported Soviet ideals and local institutional 
and cultural conditions. Instead, they steadfastly focused on abstract political- 
legal principles such as socialist legality or procedural issues affecting civil and 
criminal codes (Sarogoratisk 1961). On the even rarer occasions when Vietnamese 
writers examined legal transplantation, discussion concentrated on narrow 
procedural differences between court practices (Ta Thu Khue 1963). An extensive 
review of the Vietnamese legal literature over this period has failed to find a single 
article analysing local political, economic and cultural barriers to Soviet law and 
organisational practices. 
Finally, Marxist-Leninism promised a socialist utopia built on an infallible 
scientific methodology. Party leaders promoted the belief that ‘Marxist doctrine is 
omnipotent because it is true. It is complete and harmonious’ (Truong Chinh 
1968:547). As an all-embracing philosophy the doctrine could only accommodate 
other viewpoints from a Marxist perspective. By adopting Marxist ‘scientism’—a 
comprehensive search for the fundamental guides to life—Vietnamese leaders created 
a doctrinaire intellectual environment. Because the Party and state determined the 
class relationships that generated legal consequences, legal concepts were by 
definition limited to subjects approved by the state. Critical analysis of legal ideology 
challenged Marxist-Leninist infallibility and was politically unacceptable. 
The preceding discussion suggests various factors combined to constrain local 
Vietnamese discourses from reshaping Soviet legal ideology 
• the deterministic link between the economic base and superstructure 
discouraged investigation into links between law and cultural factors 
• Marxism discredited East Asian economic and cultural practices 
• socialism promoted a global workers’ culture that de-emphasised regional 
differences 
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• as a holistic ideology Marxist-Leninism created a closed epistemological 
structure that only permitted analysis from its own self-referential 
perspectives 
• Vietnamese were reluctant to offend Soviet aid providers 
• Vietnamese lawmakers reconciled law and society through pragmatic 
experimentation (learning by doing) rather than theorising. 
ADAPTING SOCIALIST LAW: SEARCHING FOR VIETNAMESE 
LEGAL DISCOURSE 
Unlike socialist legality, Soviet organisational principles (democratic centralism 
and collective mastery) were consciously applied to and mixed with local political 
and moral ideas. Following independence, Party leaders soon discovered that 
imported egalitarian Soviet ideals could not easily displace neo-Confucian values 
and hierarchical practices (Hoang Quoc Viet 1964). While authorities struggled to 
apply socialist legality in everyday life, they pragmatically mixed Soviet 
organisational principles with pre-modern moral principles to get ‘in touch with 
the people’ (duong loi quan chung) (Thanh Duy 1997:27–8). Since people responded 
to tinh cam (sentiment) more readily than to abstract socialist legality, revolutionary 
morality was used to mobilise public support (collective mastery). 
Party theorists developed revolutionary morality by mythologising continuities 
between pre-modern morals and Marxist-Leninism (Nguyen Khac Vien 1974). 
Revolutionary morality promoted shared communitarian values—the idea that 
people are ‘a totality of their social relationships’, ‘collective discipline’ and the 
‘fulfilment of social obligations’. Confucianism and Marxist-Leninism were not 
entirely compatible because Marxist materialism discredited Confucian spirituality 
social hierarchies. 
More generally, revolutionary morality not only shared a similar moral outlook, 
but also a comparable administrative style with pre-modern governance. Ho Chi 
Minh frequently stressed the importance of moral leadership by the Party (Nguyen 
Khac Vien 1974; Quang Can 2001). He opined that ‘[i]f one does not have morality, 
one can hardly lead the people, however talented one can be’ (Ho Chi Minh 
1995:338). Party leaders were expected to ‘display higher knowledge than ordinary 
people…act with lucidity and clear-sightedness and…look farther and wider than 
others’ (Song Thanh 1995:6). Once Party leaders had attained a higher revolutionary 
morality—like mandarin ‘first knowers’—they were obliged to instruct and guide 
those with less ‘class sentiment or awareness’ (tinh cam giai cap). 
Like Confucian rule, revolutionary morality personalised state–society 
relationships. Theorists aimed to ‘strengthen the unification between politics and 
the spirit of the whole people’ (tang cuong su nhat tri ve chinh tri va tinh than cua toan 
va phap) by infusing personal relationships between cadres and the people with 
class sentiment or awareness.5 If the masses were awakened (giac ngo) to class 
sentiment or awareness, they would respect the Party as the highest ‘revolutionary 
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moral’ (dao duc cah many) authority. Party cadres in practice complained that the 
people followed orders from those they liked and ignored those from whom they 
disliked. Many officials were not originally from the working class and required 
constant reminding to remain close to the people. 
Pre-modern and socialist organisational principles converged in three areas: 
raising public interests over individual interests, promoting the state to lead society 
and treating law as a tool to maintain social order. 
The preceding discussion implies that socialist legality and socialist organisational 
principles (for example, democratic centralism and collective mastery) engaged 
different Vietnamese narratives. Soviet-trained Vietnamese lawyers imported 
socialist legality into a reified Soviet-influenced legal environment that rarely 
engaged the world outside élite legal institutions. Despite potent political and 
epistemological constraints, Soviet legal reasoning was not entirely isolated from 
local discourse. Through cultural osmosis it slowly acquired meanings from residual 
imperial Vietnamese and French legal epistemologies. Take, for example, the Sino- 
Vietnamese term phap che, which was used to translate the Soviet word for ‘legality’ 
(Dinh Gia Trinh 1964a). While phap che retained its Soviet meaning in scholarly 
discourse, in political discourse it reverted to its pre-modern legal meaning—to 
‘ensure legal compliance’ through mass legal or moral education campaigns. 
Vietnamese legal personnel extended the process of acculturation by 
pragmatically adapting Soviet laws to suit Vietnamese legal institutions (Nicholson 
2001). But they were content with highly contextualised, technical adjustments and 
did not meditatively theorise a distinctly Vietnamese socialist law. 
Various factors discouraged lawmakers from conceptually reconfiguring Soviet 
legal theory to suit local ideas and practices. Marxist-Leninist theory disassociated 
law from cultural relationships. It also assumed that a global workers’ culture would 
flatten out regional differences separating socialist countries. Most policymakers 
presupposed the infallibility of Soviet thinking and sought ways to make society 
resemble law, rather than making laws resemble society. They placed socialist law 
in a closed epistemological system with few points of communication with local 
moral and cultural thinking. 
In contrast with socialist legality, democratic centralism and collective mastery 
concepts were interwoven with local political and moral arguments promoting 
Party ‘leadership’ (Nguyen Khanh Toan 1964). They stressed hierarchies and 
communitarian sentiments that were analogous to, and easily blended with, Ho 
Chi Minh’s revolutionary virtue-rule. Moreover, they primarily addressed Party 
and state cadres—the group most influenced by the imported socialist ‘workers’ 
culture’. In the end, Soviet organisational principles established the Party and state 
architecture and the revolutionary virtue-rule regulated governance practices. 
Incompatibilities between imported legality and political and moral virtue-rule 
did not especially matter in the command economy, where the state primarily used 
discretionary powers to order society. Legality began to assume more importance 
when the Sixth Party Congress in 1986 formally agreed that ‘management of the 
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country should be performed through laws rather than moral concepts’. By this 
time, market forces were already undermining the administrative apparatus used 
to dispense virtue-rule. After decades without significant change, external conditions 
forced a discourse between socialist legality and local deliberations. 
CONTEMPORARY LEGAL BORROWING 
This section examines contemporary political, economic, moral, cultural and legal 
discourses for new meanings about socialist law. Following the doi moi reforms in 
1986, lawmakers began searching beyond the socialist world for legal inspiration. 
It is argued that the conceptual debates used to justify importing capitalist legal 
norms into commercial laws have significantly reconfigured some core beliefs 
underpinning socialist law.6 
Political discourse 
The Seventh Party Congress in 1991 changed the socialist political–legal canon by 
adding law-based state (nha nuoc phap quyen) concepts to socialist legality, democratic 
centralism and collective mastery (Do Muoi 1992). The law-based state promoted a 
procedural ‘rule of law’ based on stable, authoritative and compulsory law; equality 
before the law; and the use of law to constrain and supervise enforcement and 
administration. It also proposed a separation of Party and state functions where the 
Party was supposed to formulate socioeconomic objectives, leaving the state 
apparatus to enact and implement the Party line. 
Far from producing legal certainty, the law-based state failed to clarify whether 
the Party retained prerogative powers to substitute policy for law. The Constitution 
in 1992 appeared to place the Party under the rule of law, but it also reaffirmed the 
constitutionality of socialist legality, democratic centralism and collective mastery, 
doctrines that promoted Party paramountcy over law. 
Dao Tri Uc (1999:18), a prominent legal scholar, recently confirmed the Marxist- 
Leninist basis of law, stating that 
[l]egality (phap che) in general is the way to organise society, to put social life into the order 
that fits with the will of the ruling class. If laws are the legalised will of the ruling class, 
arising from the contemporary needs and social conditions of the ruling class, legality 
must be understood as the process to put that will into real life, making it reality. Thus, for 
us, legality has the same meaning as the need to institutionalise the requirement that state 
administration and social administration benefit the working people. 
Recalling Marxist ‘scientism’, this narrative first asserts that Marxist-Leninism 
and the thoughts of Ho Chi Minh are infallible and eternal truths. It then applies 
this a priori ‘truth’ to show that law reflects the ‘will of the ruling class’ (y chi cua giai 
cap thong tri). As the executive committee of the ‘ruling class’, the Party decides 
which laws ‘benefit the working people’ (Nguyen Van Thai 1996:3, 7). 
This political image of socialist law has been so successfully inculcated through 
Party policy, university and professional training courses and workplace practices 
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that many Vietnamese legal officials treat socialist law as indigenous thinking (Le 
Honh Hanh 1998; Le Minh Tam 1998). Recycling decades-old notions that Vietnam 
belongs to an international socialist family (gia dinh xa hoi chu nghia), many officials 
believe that socialist law is compatible with Vietnamese precepts because it 
originated from a similar ‘political system’ (he thong chinh tri). In the socialist family, 
the Soviet Union was considered the ‘elder brother’ and ‘family members’ followed 
what they were told. 
Some theorists have reconfigured class theory to make it more relevant to 
lawmakers, who are now required to borrow laws from non-socialist sources. Using 
class-based law as his theoretical compass, Dao Tri Uc (1995) developed a 
methodology to guide lawmakers borrowing norms from the Lê and Nguyen dynasty 
codes. He reasoned that Imperial Laws were composed of two basic elements— 
social norms that regulate common interests and rules designed to advance imperial 
families. ‘One should not jump to the conclusion’, he wrote, ‘that the first aspect 
[norms regulating common interests] is progressive and should be inherited, while 
the second aspect [laws promoting imperial families] is counter-progressive and 
therefore should not be inherited’ (Dao Tri Uc 1995:39). On the contrary, in his 
estimation, feudal laws were ‘progressive’ and worth borrowing, provided they did 
not conflict with common interests or the national interests. Departing from orthodox 
class-based thinking, he urged contemporary lawmakers to select laws from pre- 
modern sources that reflected the interests of the working class or that promoted 
national goals. 
For Dao Tri Uc, law in the superstructure should reflect both national and  worker 
interests. His reformulation of the link between the will of the working class and 
law gave lawmakers a theoretical licence to borrow laws from capitalist countries. 
He ultimately concluded that the purpose of law was to implement the Party line— 
a formulation that is consistent with the principles of orthodox democratic centralism 
and collective mastery (now renamed people’s mastery or lam chu nhan dan). It 
remains to be seen whether theorists working in other disciplines are prepared to 
change core Marxist-Leninist principles fundamentally and constrain Party political 
power with law. 
Economic discourse 
Market reforms have influenced legal discourse more than any other single factor. 
Economic arguments have challenged legal thinking about Marx’s causal link 
between the ‘economic base and superstructure’, ‘state economic management’ (quan 
ly nha nuoc kinh te) and international legal harmonisation. 
Party resolutions recognising private ownership have emboldened some 
economic writers to adapt the Marxist canon imaginatively to market conditions 
(Vu Anh Tuan 1998; Vo Khanh Vinh 1997). Some writers reaffirmed old orthodoxies 
that the ‘economic system of a society determines the nature and form of its legal 
system’, but used this argument to assert that changes in the ‘base’ or ‘mode of 
production’ induced by private ownership should be reflected by corresponding 
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legal changes in the ‘superstructure’. By this, they mean market laws in the 
superstructure should reflect mixed-market economic relationships. This new 
application of conventional Marxist thinking removes conceptual obstacles to 
importing rights-based market laws into the superstructure. 
Strongly influenced by Chinese Marxist theorists (Shih 1996), other Vietnamese 
writers insist that ‘laws have their relative independence and influence on the 
economic system’ (Vu Anh Tuan 1998:26–7; Le Minh Quan 1997:28–31). In other 
words, the economic base and superstructure co-exist with ‘relative autonomy’. 
This radical revision of Marxist orthodoxy not only removes conceptual obstacles 
to borrowing laws from non-socialist economies, it also abandons the core socialist 
idea that law reflects class interests. 
State economic management. Especially after the Fourth Vietnam Workers Party 
Congress in 1976, Soviet state economic planning became the primary regulatory 
instrument (Cong Tac Ke Hoach 1976). State planners needed administrative 
mechanisms to implement plans. Devised in the Soviet Union to link planning and 
economic production, ‘state economic management’ (quan ly nha nuoc kinh te) unified 
political and economic leadership in the state (Nguyen Nien 1976:34–6). ‘State 
economic management’ possessed a ‘party nature’ (tinh dang cong san), which gave 
Party and state authorities broad ‘prerogative’ powers to fine-tune economic 
production (Hoang Quoc Viet 1973:8–12; Le Thanh Nghi 1975). 
Calls by legal writers in the 1970s to legalise and systematise command planning 
with an economic code were rejected. Party leaders argued that prerogative powers 
were needed to ‘organically link’ the Party’s economic line with economic regulation. 
‘State economic management’ gave the Party and state extra-legal prerogative powers 
to micromanage the economy. 
Following doi moi reforms, regulatory tensions between imported market 
liberalism and ‘state economic management’ have increasingly surfaced in legal 
discourse (Doan Trong Truyen 1997). Views range from the neoliberal claim that 
states should only intervene to prevent market failures to orthodox state managerial 
models.7 Neoliberal theorists argue for a facilitative legislative framework 
administered by reactive state institutions such as courts. This regulatory formula 
limits state intervention to correcting market pathologies and deregulating ‘asking 
giving’ (co che xin cho) discretionary business licences. Neoliberal economic ideas 
are clearly evident in foreign donor-funded legal reforms, such as in the 
Comprehensive Legal Needs Assessment (LNA) Report,8 which provides that 
• citizens may do everything not expressly prohibited by law 
• the ‘state must not do anything, except that which is expressly permitted 
by law’ 
• citizens should have increased powers to ‘know, discuss and check’ state 
power. 
There is little discernable support for neoliberal economic ideas in the legal 
literature. A small number of Vietnamese legal academics are convinced ‘state 
economic management’ compromises liberal market rights, such as freedom to 
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conduct authorised business activities (Pham Duy Nghia 2002; Pham Duy Nghia 
2000). However, they remain sceptical about whether sweeping economic deregulation 
designed to remove bureaucratic discretion is an appropriate economic policy for a 
poor country experiencing uneven wealth creation. Instead, they support the 
Keynesian view that states should proactively redistribute wealth according to need. 
Other commentators favour a Japanese-style proactive regulatory model.9 They 
agree with neoliberal theorists that transparent legal systems encourage market 
stability and predictability, but believe that economic growth requires ‘Rhine 
capitalism’, where proactive states regulate economic producers (Vu Tuan Anh 
1994:253–4). They believe there is an ongoing role for ‘state economic management’ 
in controlling large state-owned enterprises and micro-managing the private sector. 
In their estimation, legal rules should constrain the exercise of prerogative ‘state 
management’ powers. 
At the other end of the regulatory spectrum, most commentators still support 
orthodox ‘state economic management’ that gives regulators extra-legal prerogative 
powers to manage the economy (Vu Ngoc Nhung 1999). They stress the compatibility 
between socialism and mixed-market economies—‘commodity production is not 
the opposite of socialism’. They also consider ‘the marriage of the private sector 
with a “socialist orientation” is one of convenience, not true love’ and the ‘market 
economy following a socialist orientation’ (kinh te thi truong theo dinh huong xa hoi 
chu nghia) is a necessary transitional stage on the road to socialism (Luu Ha Vi 
1997:1–4). ‘State economic management’ is thought necessary to ensure the economy 
follows the ‘socialist’ way. 
Party enthusiasm for ‘state economic management’ likewise seems undiminished 
by market reforms. Although the Resolution of the Fifth Plenum of the Party Central 
Committee in 2002 endorsed private sector development, it also reaffirmed that the 
‘socialist-oriented market economy is placed under state management’. 
Perhaps because it directly concerns politically sensitive prerogative powers, 
published writings rarely critically evaluate the relevance of ‘state economic 
management’ in a mixed-market economy. This reticence is also found in 
unpublished postgraduate dissertations that discuss the application of ‘state 
economic management’ to new commercial sectors such as the stock market or 
foreign banking. Rather than questioning the relevance of a command economy 
regulatory system, researchers have searched for ways to strengthen state control. 
Support for ‘state economic management’ is also found in some academic writings. 
Mai Huu Thuc (2001:23–4) obliquely argues that ‘state economic management’ is 
required to realise Party-mandated socioeconomic objectives. Hoang The Lien, the 
author of the ‘Legal Needs Assessment Legal Institutions Report’, was more explicit 
in recommending legal institutions reform to ‘improve leadership by party 
organisations over economic and financial management’ (Ministry of Justice 2002:40). 
International economic integration. Arguments supporting international economic 
integration have profoundly influenced legal thinking. Contrasting with the cryptic 
and coded references to ‘state economic management’, international economic 
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integration is vigorously debated. By the mid 1980s, Party leaders concluded that 
central planning, trade with Eastern bloc countries and import-replacement 
strategies could not replicate the economic growth experienced by Vietnam’s 
neighbours (Fforde 1999:44–63). In 1986, the Party adopted an ‘open door’ (mo cua), 
adopting policies of cautiously opening the economy to foreign trade and investment 
from capitalist countries. Most Vietnamese commentators attribute this reorientation 
more to economic necessity  than to an ideological shift towards free trade. 
Nevertheless, officials realised 
the biggest factor that may influence the direction of Vietnam’s future trade policy is the 
integration of this country into regional and international economic organisations. The 
process of joining the WTO compels Vietnam to adjust its whole trade system in accordance 
with the rules and disciplines of this organisation (Tran Thu Hang 1999:121). 
Entry into a bilateral trade agreement (BTA) with the United States in 2001 in 
some ways overshadowed WTO accession, which is currently scheduled for 2006. 
The BTA contained most WTO entry conditions and some additional provisions 
requiring Vietnam to change institutional structures to improve administrative 
review over ‘state economic management’ and widen market access for foreign 
legal practitioners.10 
Opinions concerning international economic integration are polarised. Most 
government sources uncritically promote integration (Nguyen Minh Tu 1999). 
Numerous studies have attempted to demonstrate that integration has improved 
domestic economic growth and reduced poverty (Giang Chau 2003; Minh Khuong 
1999). The 2001–10 Socio-Economic Development Strategy, issued by the Ninth 
Party Congress in 2001, endorsed this position. 
Not everyone in the Party supports economic integration. Nguyen Tan Dung, a 
Politburo member, cautions that integration and globalisation will erode national 
sovereignty 
Economic independence and sovereignty means first of all not being governed by or 
dependent on the outside for economic development lines and policies, on the economic 
and/or political conditions they wish to impose on us for assistance, bilateral or multilateral 
cooperation, the conditions which will cause harm to our national sovereignty and national 
basic interests (Nguyen Tan Dung 2002:3). 
Underlying his concern is the fear that international integration may compromise 
the capacity for state-owned enterprises to ‘constitute an important material force 
and macro instrument for the state to orient and regulate the economy’. Put more 
generally, the national interest (that is,  food, energy, environment and socioeconomic 
infrastructure) and economic growth supported by local capital and technology 
should be protected from foreign economic influence. Such views are heavily coloured 
by nationalism and deeply ingrained notions of ‘self-sufficiency’ (phat huy noi luc; 
literally, to promote internal strengths). Those advocating self-reliance believe the 
erosion of national sovereignty outweighs the putative benefits of international 
trade and investment (Pham Van Chuc 2002). 
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For different reasons, other economists have questioned the government’s assertion 
that international economic integration is an unqualified good (Tran Viet Phuong 
1999). Their research shows that international trade and investment can increase 
social inequality, a topic that is conspicuously absent from most government literature. 
Rather than passively accepting economic globalisation, they argue that careful 
state intervention can anticipate and reduce many harmful side-effects. Their writings 
are free of the visceral fears about foreign dependency animating political critiques. 
Unsurprisingly, government legal writings unreservedly embrace international 
economic integration. The Final Report of the Legal Needs Assessment is unequivocal 
in its support 
The concept of proactive international economic integration must be instilled in the 
development and completion of the legal system of Vietnam in all fields, from lawmaking 
and implementation, to legal education and dissemination. Vietnam’s legal system should 
not only reflect the specific features of this country, but also must meet international 
standards in order to be able to help Vietnam perform her international commitments 
based on the principles of national independence, self-determination and socialist orientation 
(Ministry of Justice 2002:25). 
International integration was put beyond doubt by the LNA action plan, which 
gave priority to legislative reforms required for BTA and WTO membership. 
Critiques by commentators following the government’s integrationist line 
generally considered narrow technical issues. Some have reviewed domestic 
statutory changes required to satisfy Most Favoured Nation, National Treatment 
and international intellectual property conditions imposed by the WTO (Tran Van 
Nam 2002; Nguyen Thanh Tam 2001). Others have described the reforms to 
administrative review required to meet treaty obligations (Hoang Phuoc Hiep 2001). 
Their work is distinguished by a reluctance to link legal harmonisation with broad 
economic arguments that legal harmonisation will create economic winners and 
losers. Only a few academic legal writers have queried government policy by 
suggesting that legal harmonisation should aim to minimise domestic economic 
dislocation (Pham Duy Nghia 2001). 
To summarise, shifts in Marxist economic thinking have made legal borrowing 
from capitalist countries theoretically respectable, but at the same time the role of 
‘state economic management’ in the mixed-market economy is unresolved. Legal 
discourse reflects this uncertainty. It oscillates between the neoliberal legal language 
that permeates foreign donor discourse and the ambiguous messages in Party and 
government writings about ‘Party leadership’ over the economy. 
With some notable exceptions (discussed below), legal discourse rarely considers 
the institutional and epistemological incompatibilities generated by superimposing 
a rights-based legislative framework over a Soviet-inspired legal system. Most 
contemporary writers focus on narrow legal technicalities without engaging in 
broader discursive narratives. In dismissing indigenous business culture as sub- 
optimal or non-existent, writers assume that international legal harmonisation is 
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simply a technical adjustment between legal systems. Further, unreflective borrowing 
is politically prudent, because critical research may implicitly fault Party policy by 
questioning economic integration. 
Uncritical law reform did not especially matter in the command economy, because 
officials could reconcile gaps between law and reality with ‘state economic 
management’ discretionary powers. This strategy is becoming less tenable in 
contemporary Vietnam, because foreign investors are prepared to test legal rights 
introduced in borrowed capitalist laws. Legal contests will bring into focus 
competition between extra-legal prerogative powers and legal rights, and the 
political, moral and legal rationales underpinning these regulatory approaches. 
Morality 
There is a long-standing tension between moral and legal discourse in Vietnam. 
Moral discourse was historically privileged over legal arguments (Ta Van Tai 1982). 
As we have seen, virtue-rule more than legality regulated pre-doi moi Vietnam. 
Legality was officially encouraged by the Sixth Party Congress in 1986, but rule 
through law was not formally accepted until the Seventh Party Congress endorsed 
the ‘state-based law’ (nha nuoc phap quyen) doctrine in 1991 (Do Moi 1992:30–8). By 
this time, most legal writers recognised that the separation of law and morality is a 
prerequisite of rights-based legal systems (Nguyen Nhu Phat 1997). 
Although it has significantly reconfigured socialist legality, law-based state 
discourse has had little impact on the Soviet organisational principles (democratic 
centralism and collective mastery) that legitimise Party moral ‘leadership’ (su lanh 
dao cua dang). For every official pronouncement that law governs state–society 
relations, other narratives strongly imply that moral rule is still a vital source of 
legitimacy and normative standards for Party leadership. The Party and state insist 
that ‘the CPV is the political force leading the whole system…and reforms of the 
political system should absolutely not touch the decisive point that the CPV has the 
sole leading role’ (Hoc Vien Hanh Chinh Quoc Gia 1991:11–9). 
The contemporary importance of moral rule is inferred from the unrelenting 
efforts to portray the Party as infallible—a moral exemplar. Reprising Ho Chi Minh’s 
assertion that the ‘Party is morality’, Tran Xuan Truong (2002) recently declared 
‘our Party is civilisation’. Nguyen Phu Trong (1999:7), a member of the Politburo, 
grandiloquently described the Party as ‘the intellect, the honour, the conscience of 
our time; the Party is the embodiment of the wisdom, quality, the quintessence of the 
nation’. 
Moral rule is further implied by the Party’s preoccupation with moral perfection. 
The Central Committee’s Political Report to the Ninth Party Congress in 2001 
proposed the following measures to strengthen Party leadership: forge revolutionary 
ethics, combat individualism, promote exemplary behaviour, and concentrate on 
self-improvement (Communist Party of Vietnam 2001). Public administration reforms 
aiming for meritorious recruitment and promotion were also recommended, but as 
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an adjunct to the moral perfection underpinning ‘Party leadership’. Government 
reports are also full of accounts attributing the gap between legislative objectives 
and social behaviour to poor implementation by officials who lack ideological 
knowledge and deviate from Party morality (Ngo Cuong 1997). They resemble in 
substance and tone the moral justifications for legal violations in legal writings 
during the 1960s. 
It is important to recognise the potential for transformative change. Evidence 
suggests that market forces and international treaty obligations are compelling the 
Party to replace moral regulation with due process and legal transparency. As foreign 
and domestic investors increasingly challenge the discretionary outcomes produced 
by moral rule, it is plausible that the Party and state will search for alternative 
sources of institutional order—legal sources of order. Moral solutions are difficult 
to sustain in a socially pluralistic mixed-market economy. 
Preliminary research suggests the shift from moral to legal regulation is already 
well advanced in the economic arena (Nguyen Thi Oanh 1998:3). Once moral rule 
declines in importance as a regulatory instrument, it is possible that the Party will 
open moral discourse to public debate. In the meantime, legal writers rarely mention 
moral rule, much less the appropriateness of political morality. Their silence contrasts 
with the vigorous exchanges concerning cultural borrowing. 
Culture 
Vietnamese writers are fascinated with the role culture plays in social and economic 
development.11 Many themes run through this discourse, but two concepts support 
the proposition that attitudes to cultural identity shape the way people approach 
legal borrowing. The first account infers from traditional village practices an 
authentic national culture (van hoa dan toc) surrounded by layers of received external 
influences (Dao Minh Quang 1993). Some writers in this tradition deride mandarin 
literati for ‘worshipping’ Chinese culture and consigning indigenous Vietnamese 
state and legal apparatus to a quagmire of neo-Confucian dogmatism and 
conservatism (Vu Khieu 1999; Dao Tri Uc and Le Minh Thong 1999). Like articles of 
faith, certain Vietnamese institutions like Red River Delta villages are placed within 
the traditional core, while other practices, particularly those derived from colonial 
and foreign sources, are relegated to the social margins. Such views are especially 
evident in political tracts designed by Party leaders to highlight a culture in 
opposition to foreign influences (Le Kha Phieu 1998). 
Contesting this nationalistic portrayal of the Vietnamese as heroic resisters against 
foreign domination, a second counter-narrative portrays Vietnamese culture in 
dialogue with foreign influences. Some commentators maintain that during the 
initial stages of anti-colonial resistance most Vietnamese intellectuals treated French 
culture with disdain (Dao Tri Uc and Le Minh Thong 1999). Later, when traditional 
values proved unable to combat colonial domination, prominent Vietnamese began 
to selectively borrow imported precepts and practices. Nationalist leaders such as 
Asian Socialism and Legal Change 62 
Phan Boi Chua and Phan Chau Trinh were influenced by French legal ideas such 
as civil rights and constitutionalism. Later still, lessons learnt by Ho Chi Minh in 
Europe, the Soviet Union and East Asia during the 1930s are described as having 
revitalised opposition to colonial rule (Quang Can 2001). The message for 
contemporary leaders is that cultural exchange invigorates and renews domestic 
values. 
Commentaries regarding foreign cultural borrowings are strongly influenced by 
perceptions about Vietnamese cultural identity. Those promoting cultural exchanges 
warn against an exaggerated national identity that inhibits learning from others 
(Nguyen Tran Bat 2002). They believe that foreign cultural values should be 
evaluated according to their capacity to increase social and economic 
competitiveness. 
Counter-narratives stressing Party-led resistance to foreign domination focus 
instead on how ‘global’ culture spread by foreign trade, media, Internet 
communications, cinema and tourism has the potential to subvert confidence in 
local traditions (Tran Van Giau 1995). This discourse theme reinforces xenophobia 
by characterising foreign influence as ‘peaceful evolution’ (dien bien hoa binh)— 
foreigners undermining Party and state authority. Its potency is demonstrated by 
the demotion of Le Dang Doanh, a prominent market reformer, for allegedly 
associating too closely with foreigners, especially Americans.12 
Borrowed cultural elements are portrayed as tainting or disrupting ‘core’ 
Vietnamese values. For example, foreign ideas are blamed for alienating the young 
from Vietnamese culture, causing them to lose their roots (mat goc), and breeding 
individualism and consumerism. Party resolutions echo these concerns: ‘the market 
economy, with its tremendous spontaneous power, has encouraged individualism 
and made the people attach importance to individual interests while forgetting the 
interests of the community’.13 
Rather than evaluating cultural imports according to their capacity to benefit 
society, this nationalistic narrative uses politically determined criteria to guide 
cultural borrowing. As the nation’s moral guardians, Party theorists select and 
promote core political and moral ideas that ‘protect the “beautiful traditions” (truyen 
thong tot dep) and values of the country’ (Le Kha Phieu 1998:42). The central concern 
is that ‘internal factors must have the leading role in directing the relations with 
and deciding the choice of external factors.’ 
Cultural debates rarely appear in legal writings, but their influence is evident in 
approaches to law reform. Differences between Western laws and core Vietnamese 
cultural values were explored in research conducted by the Legal Research Institute 
(Vien Nghien Cuu Khoa Hoc Phap Ly), a body attached to the Ministry of Justice.14 
Their search for legal norms in Vietnam’s Imperial Codes was strongly influenced 
by the ‘Asian values’ thesis. Promoted by Asian leaders such as Singapore’s Lee 
Kuan Yew and Malaysia’s Mohamad Mahathir, this nationalisitic rhetoric maintains 
that Asian states can withstand ‘negative’ global pressures and preserve social 
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stability and élite power by asserting core ‘traditional’, mainly Confucian, moral 
values. This approach was partially discredited when the East Asian economic 
crisis exposed deep structural flaws in the East Asian development model. Research, 
nevertheless, proceeded on the untested assumption that ‘East Asian’ cultural values 
will produce beneficial economic outcomes in Vietnam. 
Researchers plundered Vietnam’s pre-modern Imperial Codes, searching for 
quintessential Vietnamese-Confucian laws. In treating pre-modern legal norms as 
autonomous regulatory instruments, however, they detached these rules from the 
social, economic and cultural context that gave them meaning. Traditional preference 
for non-adversarial dispute resolution, for example, was attributed to a traditional 
Vietnamese communalism that discouraged ‘individuality’ and the ‘self’ (Dao Bao 
Ngoc 1999:32–5). Pre-modern political and economic constraints on court-based 
adjudication were ignored. 
Researchers also employed a dubious methodology that read history backwards. 
They used prevailing cultural values to assess the contemporary utility of pre- 
modern legal norms. For example, commentators imagined the early Lê Dynasty 
(fifteenth century) as a golden age of political-legal innovation when indigenous 
commercial practices crystallised into legally enforceable rights. This construction 
misconstrued the stated purpose of the Lê Code, which was to reproduce an imported 
Chinese social order (tam cuong). To the Confucian mind, close textual readings 
made limited sense, since legal meaning resided primarily in the moral teachings of 
mandarin literati (Whitmore 1995). Appeals to the letter of the law implied a 
disregard for morality, or worse, moral weakness. Commercial provisions in the Lê 
Code served a public law function to preserve village harmony and were never 
intended to confer private rights (Vu Van Mau 1963). 
Despite voluminous writings, researchers failed to find meaningful ways to 
incorporate traditional norms (duc tri) based on pre-industrial village life into a 
legal system regulating an educated and internationally integrated mixed-market 
society (Dao Tri Uc 1995). Researchers did not give legislative drafters the contextual 
information needed to ascertain whether pre-modern legal norms could regulate 
contemporary life. 
Without cultural frames of reference, legal drafters must rely on vague cultural 
stereotypes and the perceived prestige of particular legal systems to decide whether 
Chinese law, for example, is intrinsically more compatible with Vietnamese culture 
than US or Japanese law. Cultural compatibility seemed relatively unimportant to 
legal borrowing during the 1960–70s, when the Party was convinced that society 
was evolving into a transcultural Soviet-socialist utopia. But unreflective legal 
borrowing is untenable in contemporary Vietnam, where the state is borrowing 
laws from an eclectic range of legal sources. It is also difficult to explain by reference 
to either inward or outward-looking cultural discourses, as both caution against 
wholesale legal borrowing from foreign cultures. What remains unclear is why 
contemporary legal borrowers have been reluctant to bring lawmaking into 
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conversation with economic, moral and cultural discourses. 
LEGAL BORROWING DISCOURSE 
Like Soviet borrowing in the 1960s, post-doi moi legal borrowing has again 
superimposed foreign legal concepts over indigenous institutional and 
epistemological legal structures. This section examines whether contemporary 
lawmakers are more prepared than their predecessors to adjust borrowed law to 
local political, economic, moral and cultural concerns. 
Three analytical threads run through the literature. First, most writers use 
technical legal language to analyse foreign laws. Second, some writers have 
reconfigured Marxist-Leninism to make legal borrowing from capitalist countries a 
theoretical possibility. Third, a few commentators have quietly replaced Marxist- 
Leninism with borrowed Western sociological theory that embeds borrowed law in 
a broad discursive context. 
Returning to the first analytical thread, most legal writers avoid sensitive 
political, economic and moral comparisons between imported law and domestic 
conditions by narrowly focusing on technical legal rules (Dao Bao Ngoc 1999; 
Pham Duy Nghia 2000). Consider Hoang The Lien’s (1996) comparative 
consideration of legal capacity in the European and Vietnamese Civil Codes. His 
analysis examined the surface text without engaging underlying legal doctrines, 
much less the political, economic and moral discourses shaping legal preferences. 
For example, the legal capacity of companies was analysed by comparing the textual 
meaning of different statutory provisions, without explaining that these provisions 
operated in profoundly different legal systems and political economies. 
There are undoubtedly many explanations for this ‘black letter’ law approach to 
legal borrowing, such as a lack of comparative law and research skills. Never far 
below the surface is the political concern that law should reflect the ‘will of the 
ruling class’, as interpreted by the Party. The LNA project, coordinated by the 
Ministry of Justice, illustrates this problem. It assessed the suitability of Vietnamese 
laws and legal institutions according to their capacity to realise the four 
socioeconomic development strategies approved by the Ninth Party Congress in 
2001. Ministry officials ignored economic reports showing that the Party’s economic 
integration policy produces inequitable outcomes and committed the government 
to legal reforms required to ‘meet international standards in order to help Vietnam 
perform her international commitments’ (Ministry of Justice 2002:25). Political and 
cultural arguments that legal imports may erode ‘core’ Vietnamese cultural values 
were also disregarded. 
If legal needs are primarily assessed from Party and state political perspectives, 
it is comparatively unimportant whether legal imports are compatible with local 
conditions. Although lawmakers are generally well aware that incongruent laws 
are unlikely to produce desired outcomes, they feel constrained from localising law 
in a closed epistemological environment where legal discourse is subordinate to 
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political imperatives. Borrowed laws are consequently treated like technical 
fragments detached from a political, economic, moral and cultural context. 
The second analytical thread reveals the tension between political constraints 
over legal thinking, and government policies that now encourage lawmakers to 
consider the social impact of new law.15 This policy has emboldened some theorists 
to find new ways to localise borrowed law. While retaining the belief that Marxist- 
Leninism ‘is still the most scientific and creative ideology in the world’, they stress the 
need to apply socialist theory flexibly to new conditions (Le Honh Hanh 1998:319). 
Dialogue with Soviet lawyers slowed after the Russian Federation was formed, 
and Vietnamese theorists began looking for new sources of legal thinking. Most 
theorists lacked the linguistic skills to engage deeply with Chinese theory and, in 
any event, considered Chinese legal thinking comparatively underdeveloped. Some 
theorists turned to internal sources for new ideas, while others looked outside 
Vietnam for inspiration. 
Dao Tri Uc was among those many theorists who sought new ideas from local 
discourse. As previously mentioned, he attempted to make borrowed Soviet theory 
more relevant by reconfiguring Marx’s base–superstructure metaphor to justify legal 
borrowing from capitalist regimes. Others creatively used Ho Chi Minh’s eclectic 
blend of Western, Marxist-Leninist and pre-modern Vietnamese thinking as a 
‘political umbrella’ to smuggle new concepts into the legal discourse. They selectively 
plundered Ho Chi Minh’s thoughts for ‘rule of law’ or Confucian aphorisms to 
open the epistemological environment to ideas beyond the narrow parameters 
permitted by class-analysis (Tran Dinh Huynh 1999; Le Minh Tong 2000). 
Borrowing from external discourses, some theorists have attempted to expand 
the epistemological repertoire by increasing the narrow range of legal relationships 
recognised by orthodox Soviet legal taxonomies (Nha Nuoc va Phap Luat 1996). 
Soviet jurisprudence received into Vietnam during the 1960s used law instrumentally 
to ‘adjust social relationships’ (dien chinh). The state first classified ‘social 
relationships’ (quan he xa loi) according to shared class characteristics and then 
enacted laws to regulate social relationships within predetermined ‘independent 
law branches’ (nganh luat doc lap). Soviet legal taxonomies functioned well enough 
in a command economy, but now constrain Vietnamese lawmakers from thinking 
about market laws in conceptually coherent ways. 
Soviet finance law taxonomies illustrate the problem. They were developed to 
classify financial transactions in a centrally planned economy and influence the way 
legal actors conceived law. For example, Soviet taxonomies classify tendering rules 
as public finance law, because money is paid from the state budget. Consequently, it 
is difficult for lawyers to see the private law underlying tendering rules. 
The imported notion that ‘fair and equitable’ laws (cong bang cua phap luat) must 
balance social interests directly challenges the instrumental Soviet notion that law 
adjusts social relationships. As one writer put it, ‘law should be attached to politics 
but is not a servant of the state’ (Nha Nuoc va Phap Luat 1996:116-7). In other 
words, laws implement political policy, but are not ‘management tools’ (cong cu 
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quan ly). This new thinking allows lawyers to move beyond top-down Soviet 
taxonomies and conceptualise horizontal legal relationships. 
Other theories have attempted to blend Marxist thinking with Western thoeries 
that stress linkages between law and culture, especially legal culture (van hoa phap 
ly). Their writings unconsciously borrow from Durkheim’s ‘collective 
consciousness’—the notion that if society is an invisible moral environment 
surrounding individuals, then law is the visible manifestation of ‘community 
sentiment’ (Durkheim 1960). Though arguing that law reflects social mores and 
‘community sentiment’ (tinh lang nhia xom), they are unwilling to repudiate the 
Marxist base–superstructure metaphor and embrace a fully realised alternative social 
theory that explains the interdependence between law and society (Le Minh Tam 
1998). Without taking this final step, their theorising lacks the methodological tools 
lawmakers need to codify ideas from local discursive narratives. 
The third analytical thread contrasts with the previous theoretical approaches, 
because it uses Western sociological theory to bypass Marxist-Leninism. This subtle 
shift in thinking is revealed as much by what is not said as by explicit arguments. 
These writers rarely mention Marxist-Leninist formulas and clearly separate 
political, economic, moral and legal arguments. Unfettered by the base– 
superstructure metaphor, they are free to conceptualise complex interactions between 
borrowed law and society. 
Some German-trained academic lawyers argue from Weberian theory that 
imported foreign commercial laws (du nhap luat kinh te nuoc ngoai) will only induce 
desired behaviour where they are popular with the people (tinh pho thong), well- 
defined (xac dinh on dinh), predictable (co the du doan truoc) and transparent (tinh ro 
rang) (Pham Duy Nghia 2000, 2001). They maintain that hastily borrowed Western 
legal rules laws are incompatible with domestic ‘legal ideology’ (tu duy phap ly) and 
will not transplant successfully. 
Pham Duy Nghia (2000) argued that many Western commercial legal norms 
introduced capitalist political and economic ideals that were incompatible with the 
small-scale family structures and sentimental bonds that characterise Vietnam’s 
‘peasant legal culture’ (nen phap ly nong dan). He illustrated this point with Articles 
8 and 9 of the Commercial Law 1997, which imported Western unfair competition 
and consumer protection principles that functioned like idealistic political slogans 
(khau hieu) in Vietnam’s highly state-directed economy. He concluded that borrowed 
Western law is generally incompatible with domestic economic and cultural conditions, 
but legal importation is the only practical means of quickly enacting the commercial 
legal framework required for international economic integration. ‘Legal harmonisation’ 
(hai hoa phap luat) is a long-term project requiring the state to devote more resources 
to researching and reconciling imported precepts with local social conditions. 
CONCLUSION 
The introduction of the law-based state doctrine in 1991 opened up legal debate by 
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allowing Vietnamese commentators to re-evaluate long-standing socialist legal 
concepts. Their richly variegated legal discourses, considered in this chapter, convey 
multiple understandings of socialist law. In some areas socialist law has assimilated 
capitalist legal rights; in other areas it resembles decades-old Soviet discourse. 
It is also possible to infer from the legal discourse three interrelated propositions 
that suggest the potential for legal change. First, law is a process used by competing 
social agents to order state power. Second, power struggles determine whether 
epistemological settings governing legal discourse are closed and self-referential, 
or open and willing to engage new ideas. Third, rules that control the levers of 
power are more strongly contested than legal ideas on the periphery of power 
relations (Dezalay and Garth 2002). 
Democratic centralism and collective mastery rapidly became the central 
organisational principles governing power relationships among Vietnamese Party 
and government structures. These principles remain deeply embedded in political 
and moral narratives and resist conceptual changes that may disrupt longstanding 
power sharing arrangements. 
In contrast, socialist legality was for decades enmeshed in a quasi-Soviet legal 
language understood by only a few élite Soviet-trained lawyers. As a peripheral 
discourse with little direct bearing on political power, socialist legality was less 
constrained by political discourse than democratic centralism and collective mastery. 
Especially in the commercial arena, where the Party actively encouraged legal change, 
socialist legality has rapidly evolved in response to new economic ideas. Imported 
commercial laws are now beginning to supply the normative rules that were once 
almost exclusively the prerogative of Party edicts and moral campaigns. Change is 
much slower where legal thinking impinges on Party and state power. For example, 
commentators discussing the capacity for socialist law to constrain Party political 
power are not permitted to consider Western ‘rule of law’. 
Power-sharing arrangements have also influenced the epistemological 
conventions that allow socialist ideas to change. Responding to market forces, rigid 
base–superstructure determinism has partially given way to a Durkheimian and 
Weberian conceptual framework that places law in a broad social, political and 
economic matrix. Legal discourse is learning from new economic ideas, especially 
concepts sponsored by international trade agreements. Other epistemological 
barriers are also dissolving. Marxist antipathy towards East Asian culture has been 
replaced by a ‘reality’ manufactured to support contemporary development 
objectives. Utopian yearnings for a model socialist society have been discarded in 
favour of East Asian developmentalism with ‘socialist’ characteristics. In the arenas 
where legal discourse has emerged from the shadow of political discourse, socialist 
law has become noticeably more legalistic and rule-oriented. 
The Party and state have not been able to quarantine sacrosanct socialist 
principles entirely from change. Those advocating market regulation and a 
facilitative legal system openly challenge ‘state economic management’, which is a 
central component of Party ‘leadership’. Marxist-Leninist ‘scientific’ infallibility, 
Asian Socialism and Legal Change 68 
another concept closely allied to Party ‘leadership’, is also being eroded by 
sociological arguments that law belongs in a social context and is not merely an 
instrument of Party power. For the present, however, Party ‘leadership’ over 
politically sensitive national security issues remains beyond the reach of legal 
accountability. 
This analysis locates the meaning of socialist law in ‘officially’ sanctioned 
discursive narratives. As legal thinking increasingly interacts with local ‘unofficial’ 
discourses, core Marxist-Leninist principles are giving way to new regulatory 
approaches. This trend is especially evident in the commercial arena, where imported 
laws interact and form hybrids with local norms and practices. In other social 
arenas, where political and moral discourses remain more powerful than legal 
discourse and without compelling reasons to legalise or constitutionalise political 
processes, ‘socialist law’ is likely to remain faithful to longstanding Marxist-Leninist 
concepts. 
NOTES 
1 As editor of the Supreme Court journal Tap San Tu Phap, Dinh Gia Trinh was a prolific and 
influential writer (Dinh Gia Trinh 1961). 
2 Writing in the Vietnamese Court Review (Tap San Tu Phap), several Soviet law professors set 
out the basic principles of Soviet law (Lets Noi 1961). 
3 Vietnamese writers cited V. I. Lenin in Nha nuoc va Cach Mang [State and Revolution], Chapters 
Two and Three. Lenin proposed that the working class should centralise power in their hands 
and power should be distributed on the basis of democracy. This ideology gave political and 
social meaning to democratic centralism (Dinh Gia Trinh 1964a). 
4 Interviews with Le Kim Que, President, Bar Association of Hanoi, Hanoi, 1 October 1999, and 
Nguyen Thuc Bao, Former Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Agriculture, Hanoi, 11 September 
2000. 
5 Interviews with Pham Huu Chi, former adviser to the Minister of Justice, Vice Rector of the 
Hanoi Law College and member of the Company Law Drafting Committee, 1992–94. 
6 Current legal thinking has been gleaned from political, economic, moral, cultural and legal 
discourse in Party and state publications, and also from interviews with state officials and 
academics. 
7 Interviews with Nguyen Dinh Cuong, Director of the Enterprise Department, CIEM, July 2002; 
March 2003. 
8 Most of the report was written in 2002 by John Bentley and Theodore Parnell, UNDP legal 
advisers to the Ministry of Justice. 
9 Interviews with JICA long-term legal representatives Legal Coordinator Kawazu Shinsuke 
and Judicial Expert Takeuchi Tsutomu, Hanoi, January 2002. See generally Lawrence Tshuma 
(1999:75–96). 
10 Resolution No. 48/2001/QH10 on the Ratification of the Agreement between the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam and the United States of America on Trade Relations, Annex F. 
11 Cultural discourse, understood as arguments concerning the framework that gives meaning 
and sense to people’s lives, comprises many interwoven discourse modes, such as moral, 
political and legal communication. It is treated as a separate discursive category, partly 
because it is difficult to unravel the discrete discursive modes and partly because for centuries 
the Vietnamese have evaluated their interaction with foreigners through a cultural framework. 
12 Interview with Le Dang Doanh, Hanoi, January 2001. 
13 Resolution of the Fifth Plenum of the Central Party Committee, 2001. 
14 The project was initiated by the Minister of Justice, Nguyen Dinh Loc, to overcome some of the 
problems experienced by drafting committees in reconciling borrowed law with Vietnamese 
conditions. Interview with Duong Thi Thanh Mai, Deputy Director of the Institute of Law 
69 Changing concepts of socialist law in Vietnam 
Research, Ministry of Justice, Hanoi, March 1999. 
15 Law on the Promulgation of Law Instruments (amended 2003). 
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4 
Confucianism and the 
conception of the law in 
Vietnam 
Pham Duy Nghia 
Confucianism in Vietnam originated from the Vietnamese people’s agricultural 
lifestyle and continues to influence society today. As a set of social norms, 
Confucianism not only substitutes for the law in many aspects of life, but also 
contributes heavily to the conception of the law in Vietnam. Analysing 
Confucianism’s impact will help us to understand better the role and limitations of 
the Vietnamese legal system today. 
With the growth of the market-oriented economy, legal reform in Vietnam has 
entered a new stage where emerging paradigms are challenging the outdated doctrine 
of ‘socialist legality’. Western legal models are increasingly providing the basic 
framework for new legislation, as can be seen in recently enacted legislation on 
business organisations (The Law on Enterprises 1999), contracts (The Commercial 
Law 1997, Civil Code 1995), dispute resolution, and bankruptcy (Ordinance on 
Commercial Arbitration 2003, Bankruptcy Law 1993). The increased levels of 
discussion on the Constitution, the protection of individual rights, and the need for 
a ‘socialist state ruled by law has been coupled with increasing levels of awareness 
amongst civil society’ (Amendment of the Constitution in 2001). As citizens become 
increasingly wealthy, however, they tend to become increasingly reflective of their 
historic and cultural roots. As a consequence, Confucian classic literature is enjoying 
a period of revival in Vietnam. 
Following a long period of isolation, food shortages and emigration, Vietnamese 
society is undergoing rapid change, a crucial element of which is evolution of the 
law. In this transitional stage, enforcement of the law is imperative. Legal ideas 
adopted from the West face difficulties when implemented into a society where 
traditional forces resist change. In economic, political and cultural fields, the 
divergence between the written law and its application is widely evident. While the 
Constitution protects citizens’ rights, the authorities’ wide scope for 
misinterpretation is not effectively constrained by public claims and denunciation 
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alone. For instance, the freedom of citizens to conduct business and compete fairly 
in the market faces ostensible restrictions imposed by the administrative authorities. 
Public faith in the judicial system is still limited, and the number of cases being 
heard before Vietnam’s economic courts is, in fact, decreasing every year, despite the 
steady economic growth.1 
To appreciate the current situation in Vietnam, one needs to look back to the past 
to understand the way in which the Vietnamese govern their society based on their 
beliefs and culture. Although laws to facilitate business activities are badly needed, 
they cannot substitute for the social norms that have dominated the Vietnamese 
agricultural society for centuries. Thus, when concepts such as limited liability in 
corporate law, for example, are introduced into the Vietnamese legal system, their 
application will take different forms from that in Germany or the United States. 
Thus, despite the various ways of harmonising the law and legal practice in the age 
of globalisation, one cannot ignore the impacts of tradition and cultures in forming 
the conception of the law in a given society (Örücü 1999). 
The process of legal harmonisation in Vietnam has not been smooth. One 
contributing factor is that Vietnamese legal scholars, trained in former Soviet Union 
and East Germany, are surprisingly unfamiliar with their own legal traditions. 
Textbooks used in courses at major law schools, such as General Theory on State and 
Law, define the law according to Klassenkampf—the law is considered substantially 
as a tool used by the ruling class to exploit the working class. In legal history 
courses, legal development is described to fit the Marxist vision of a society 
progressing from slavery to feudalism, capitalism and finally towards a socialist 
communist state. Students learn by rote the five different types of state and laws, 
and try to place all statutes and laws within this prescribed format. Although courses 
in the ‘History of Political Doctrines’ are taught, their aim is to introduce the evolution 
of political philosophy according to the Marxist view. 
The role of traditional law and its interaction with ethics and other social norms 
is not well researched within Vietnam. The discrepancy between the recent 
development in Vietnam and the backward style of research and teaching is a negative 
reflection, not only of the development of legal jurisprudence, but also most other 
social sciences in Vietnam (Phan Dien 2003). 
In other countries, such as Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and more recently 
China, ideas such as ‘Asian values’ and ‘Confucian society’ indicate the impact of 
traditional culture on contemporary legal and economic development. What lessons, 
if any, can Vietnam learn from the experiences of these countries? How can the 
traditional conception of the law continue to be protected and promoted as Vietnam 
moves to adopt laws based on Western models? 
This chapter seeks to discuss the role of social norms in Vietnamese society, and 
in particular the contribution of agricultural social norms to the formation of 
Confucianism. It also uses the concept of ‘Vietnam’s Confucianism’, initially 
presented by the scholar Kim Dinh (1969, 1970) to evaluate the past and present role 
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of the law and its limitations in Vietnamese society. To this end, I will try to indicate 
the extent to which traditional agricultural social norms have influenced legal 
practice in Vietnam today. 
ORIGIN AND MAIN FEATURES OF VIETNAMESE 
CONFUCIANISM 
Vietnam was, and still is, a country that depends on its agricultural industry, with 
approximately 80 per cent of the workforce employed in that sector. At the same 
time, most of the urban population still lives in, or feels a connection to, the village 
of their ancestors.2 The success and failure of any contemporary reform in Vietnam 
cannot be explained without taking into account the problems facing Vietnamese 
farmers. 
As a set of enforceable rules imposed or recognised by the state power, the law 
has never had supremacy in Vietnamese society. The social norms that govern 
Vietnamese society have been drawn largely from Vietnamese agricultural life, and 
continue to live in the beliefs of the people. The way people think influences the way 
they act; learning from their beliefs helps to explain their actual behaviour. It is 
therefore appropriate to search for the sources of Vietnamese indigenous norms in 
order to understand the present legal practice. 
From a Western perspective, with the exception of the penal rules in the traditional 
codes (Le Code 1460 and Nguyen Code 1813), the indigenous norms in Vietnam 
remain somewhat unclear, originating as they did from the interchange between 
three leading religions in East Asia—Daoism, Buddhism and Confucianism. 
Historians often view Vietnam’s culture as a mixture incorporating Chinese and 
Indian influences into the indigenous culture. Marxist materialists have little interest 
in researching and promoting such religious thinking. It is well known that Marx 
saw religion as the ‘opium of the people’ and an expression of the hope of the 
suppressed mass for a brighter future. Given that generations of Vietnamese, 
including the Communists and their followers, continue to maintain the cult for 
their ancestors, and given the increasing public interest in Daoism, Buddhism and 
other natural beliefs, it is surprising that Vietnamese religious thinking is rarely 
researched in contemporary Vietnamese Marxist literature. 
It is thus an appropriate time to rediscover the role of Confucianism in 
contemporary Vietnamese society. Following discussion about Nguyen Truong To’s 
work in the second half of the nineteenth century and the reprint of Tran Trong 
Kim’s standard work on Confucianism, a number of scholars have raised questions 
relating to the role of Confucianism in contemporary society (Tran Van Giau 1988). 
The work of Vu Khieu (1997) and Phan Dai Doan (1998) reverberated in academic 
circles as a signal for a possible change in public opinion towards the once-leading 
ideology of Vietnam: Vietnamese Confucianism. 
Confucianism is the only term known in the West for ‘Nho giao’. During the 
chaotic Spring–Autumn and Warring States period, Confucianism emerged as one 
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of many schools of thought that sought to provide order to society. Although 
Confucius was its the most famous teacher, he was not the creator of a new religion; 
the five classical works incorporated the wisdom of many generations (Tran Trong 
Kim 1971; Nguyen Hien Le 1958; Tran Le Sang 2002). During the ten centuries of 
Chinese domination in Vietnam, Confucianism was introduced into the modern- 
day areas of North and Middle Vietnam (Nguyen Dang Thuc 1967), and continued 
to exist in harmony with other religions, such as Dinh, Ly and Tran, under Vietnam’s 
first independent dynasties. During this time, the three religions used different 
‘ways’ to reach the same goals (tam giao dong nguyen). In the transition from the Tran 
to the Ho dynasty, the influence of Confucianism intensified and extended from the 
capital down to the district levels. Confucianism became the leading ideology of the 
Vietnamese monarchy from the Le dynasty, particularly under the reign of Le Thanh 
Ton (1460–97). From that time until the early twentieth century, the traditional state 
of Vietnam, the recruitment of mandarins, and the organisation of society as a whole, 
were based on Confucian values and examinations (Phan Dai Doan 1998, Nguyen 
Dang Thuc 1967). The last Confucian examinations were conducted between 1915– 
18 in Northern and Middle Vietnam respectively (Tran Truong Kim 1971). 
It is noteworthy that, as a system of rules governing people’s behaviour, the face 
of Confucianism was dynamic and constantly changing, and incorporated both 
indigenous beliefs and norms. As a result, Confucianism took different forms in 
China, Japan, Korea and Vietnam. For example, loyalty in Japan was interpreted to 
mean loyalty to only one imperial family; loyalty in Vietnam, by contrast, focused on 
loyalty to the country as a whole and on defence of the nation.3 
Vietnam’s Confucianism cannot be viewed simply as being the ideology of the 
Chinese occupiers. Long after the occupiers had gone, the ideology remained and 
expanded to generate the standard norms that would govern the society for centuries. 
In this regard, the following explanations appear most plausible 
• convergence between Vietnamese indigenous agricultural norms and 
Confucian values may have enhanced the broadening of Confucian values 
in Vietnam centuries after independence from China in 939AD 
• in comparison to Buddhism and Daoism, Confucianism offered a doctrine 
more appropriate for the ruler’s class to govern Vietnamese society 
• based on archaeological, historical and anthropological evidence, relevant 
sources indicate that the ancestors of the Vietnamese people must have 
occupied the areas south of the Yangtze River in China. Under pressure 
from the Hoa people, they moved southwards, and the resulting meeting 
and mutual integration of Vietnamese agriculture and the nomadic Hoa 
culture possibly formed the wisdom that Confucius referred to as the 
wisdom of ancestors (Dao Duy Anh 1937, 1950; Nguyen Dang Thuc 1967; 
Kim Dinh 1970). 
The scholarly works of Kim Dinh sought to trace the contribution of the 
Vietnamese people in establishing Confucian values, but what are the specific 
characteristics of Vietnamese agricultural life that contributed to this? Which features 
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dominant in Vietnamese culture helped promote the convergence of Confucianism 
with the indigenous beliefs and traditions? A number of features of agricultural life 
appear relevant 
• Collectivism. Vietnamese collectivism is distinct from communitarian 
attitudes in the West. A human being is born to be a member not only of a 
family, but a village and, in a broader sense, a member of a country. He or 
she lives in natural connection with other members of the society, as an 
integrated part of one organic body.Under such a system, the collective 
interest of society is supreme over individual interests; people who fight 
for their own interests are often viewed as selfish and egotistical (Marr 
2000). This natural mindset of collectivism is born from the common efforts 
to cultivate crops. It is a major characteristic of the Vietnamese mentality 
and, at the same time, an essential factor hindering the emergence of 
individualism in Vietnam. 
• Rule of causality. As a nation of farmers, the Vietnamese learnt the rule of 
causality (nhan-qua) very early. This rule suggests that whatever happens 
today has been caused by past events. In the views of the people, justice 
practised by the heavens is absolute and the actions of parents affect the 
destiny of their children. Accordingly, success or failure, wealth or poverty, 
peace or war are not random events; their reasons lie deep in human 
behaviour (Nguyen Tai Thu 1993). 
• Life is to endure. Living in the highly populated river deltas, struggling 
to survive under the steady pressure of the dominant neighbours in the 
North and coping with endless obstacles, the Vietnamese have learnt to 
endure life. As a result, the Vietnamese life motto is to endure all challenges. 
As the Vietnamese say, ‘if you are too clever, you will perish; if you are too 
stupid, you will also perish; but if you know how to live, you will survive 
[Khon chet, dai chet, biet thi song]’. This mentality may explain the elasticity 
and flexibility of Vietnamese people’s behaviour. 
• Harmony and consensus, not conflict. The need to maintain balance and 
harmony is stressed in all aspects of life, from family, to lineage, to village 
and state issues, and acknowledged by most Vietnamese. Although the 
man is traditionally considered head of the family, Vietnamese women 
have also enjoyed considerable equality and rights. In issues relating to 
the lineage of people with the same ancestors, decisions were usually 
made by consensus. The same principle may be seen in the structure of 
the villages, where consensus building is the major force keeping the 
village in order. Even though there were some indications of power 
struggles, instances of personal politics or cult-infused leadership were 
quite mild in communist Vietnam compared to China or North Korea. 
• Face saving and relationship keeping. As a consequence of collectivism, 
the respect and opinion of the community is crucial to the life of each 
individual in Vietnam. The success of a person is dependent their 
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trustworthiness and their ability to build and maintain relationships with 
other people. Fear of bad public opinion still  motivates the Vietnamese. 
• Respect for elders. Cultures based on agriculture have great respect for 
the elderly. This respect is reflected in decision-making in the villages, 
and frequently also in traditional law. As the demographic structure and 
socioeconomic conditions in Vietnam change, the traditional respect 
accorded to the elderly may face serious challenges. 
• Nhan-Nghia. The Vietnamese term nhan corresponds to the Chinese 
counterpart ren, and remains one of the most difficult concepts of 
Confucianism. This term can only roughly be translated into the English 
‘benevolence’. According to Tran Trong Kim (1971), the purpose of lifelong 
self-cultivation is to learn benevolence, mercy, charity and humanity. As a 
result of this lifelong learning a man will receive the ability to love and 
hate, virtues that form the kernel of his behaviour. The extent of knowledge 
of the nhan will essentially distinguish the gentleman from the uneducated. 
The Vietnamese nghia corresponds to a notion of ‘righteousness’ and noble 
obligation towards family and the community. If nhan refers to a man’s 
virtues, nghia refers to his responsibility towards other people and the 
society where he lives. This unwritten, undefined ethical rule creates the 
framework and boundaries to distinguish the Confucian gentleman (quan- 
tu) from the uneducated (tieu-nhan). Naturally, the particular ethical values 
of this rule governing human beings may change occasionally, but over 
time this rule encourages people to behave well towards others and society 
generally. 
When one considers the social norms governing the agricultural life of the Vietnamese 
people, similarities with Confucian values become apparent. Historians often 
discuss the question, first presented by Kim Dinh (1969, 1970), whether the 
Vietnamese culture contributed to Confucian values, or whether Confucianism, once 
introduced, became deeply rooted in, and a guide to, the behaviour of the Vietnamese. 
Regardless, social norms continue to govern Vietnamese society from one generation 
to another, alongside the written law. 
THE DECLINE OF CONFUCIANISM IN VIETNAM AND THE 
EMERGENCE OF SOCIALIST LEGALITY 
A class of Vietnamese Confucian scholars emerged during the first Chinese 
domination from 111 BC to 937AD, but their presence went unnoted in historical 
reports. Their role in the first independent dynasties did not seem significant, since 
the sword had more power than philosophy. The most literally educated élite class 
in Vietnam at that time was the Buddhist monks, who served as advisers to the 
courts, helped receive Chinese ambassadors, and whose temples served as 
educational centres (Nguyen Dang Thuc 1967). As the influence of Confucianism 
grew in the thirteenth century, however, the monks’ role in politics decreased. 
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Vietnamese scholars used Confucianism to fight against the Chinese occupiers 
during the wars against the Chinese Minh dynasty. Thereafter, the social prestige of 
Confucian scholars improved—mandarins were recruited based on Confucian 
examinations, and a state bureaucracy began to form based on Confucianism (Phan 
Dai Doan 1998). 
Confucianism became a political doctrine in the hands of the ruling class. Le 
Thanh Ton codified the Confucian values in books that were widely distributed to 
the villages, and private Confucian schools helped to broaden the Confucian values 
from the élite class down to all levels of the population. In addition, during its 
expansion, Confucianism also incorporated the values of other religions, such as 
Buddhism, Daoism and other natural beliefs. For this reason, even though it was 
not created as a religion, the population had already been practising Confucianism, 
albeit in an indirect manner. 
As Confucianism is a political doctrine, the following features may help to 
understand the role of the law in Confucian society. 
• Confucianism recognises the divisions within society between different 
classes—each man shall learn to act appropriately for his status in society. 
Gentlemen shall know the way to live, shall know the ‘li’ as rituals and 
rules governing relationships among people. By doing so, the man 
educates himself to become a gentleman, thus keeping his family, country 
and the state in order. The law seeks to enforce good behaviour amongst 
individuals by punishing those people who don’t know the ‘li’. Individuals 
therefore have an incentive to learn and practise the ‘li’ in a way that 
enhances social order, and the law is consequently subordinated under 
the moral rules of ‘li’. Despite some provisions in regard to property and 
contracts in the traditional codes, one can assume that the private law 
tradition in Vietnam is rather weak, suggesting that there was no need for 
such a set of legal regulations. 
• The hostility inherent in legalism was criticised as being contrary to 
Confucian principles. Confucian values, however, may be interpreted as 
arbitrary because of the lack of clear, systematic and transparent rules. 
The people were once considered to be the roots of the country and the 
ruler’s mission was to serve the people. Later, the feudal mandarins shifted 
this to focus more on the obedience of the subjects to the rulers, thus 
making the ruler like a god—the son of heaven. Moral values have their 
limitations, especially in times of economic strain. The backward-thinking 
style of Confucianism sometimes produced reactionary forces that opposed 
reform. In Vietnam, for example, reformers like Ho Quy Ly, Nguyen Hue 
and later, Nguyen Truong To, faced resistance, particularly from Confucian 
scholars and mandarins. 
• The question is not to make a choice between legalism and Confucianism, 
but rather to ‘Confucianise’ the law, as was done during the Chinese Han 
dynasty. Law reform was enhanced under the Le and Nguyen dynasties, 
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and particularly under Minh Mang. Legislation, including the formal 
requirements for lawmaking and the scope of regulation, was codified 
and standardised. Confucian values were newly underpinned by penal 
sanctions—thus Confucian values were transformed into enforceable 
norms. 
Numerous peasant uprisings at the end of the seventeenth century signalled a 
reaction to the backward thinking of Confucianism and its weaknesses in managing 
the country. 
1 The intellectual class had confined itself to the classics of Confucius and 
Mencius. The social and natural sciences were not taught. The teaching 
style, moreover, focused on rote learning, thus blocking new ideas and 
learning from Western civilisations. 
2 The ruling class—from the king to the mandarins—relied on the 
bureaucratic style of government and required absolute obedience from 
the subjects. 
3 The peasants were mentally and physically closed from the world behind 
village walls. Vietnamese society, from its rulers to the peasants, remained 
a relatively closed society until the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries. Foreign merchants settled in Pho Hien (North Vietnam) and 
Hoi An (South Vietnam) but left the country (partly because of the hostile 
policies of the Trinh and Nguyen lords toward Christianity) without being 
able to make any notable changes to the Vietnamese attitude towards the 
outside world. 
The enemy keeping Vietnam impoverished lies deep in the Vietnamese soul. 
Reformers in the nineteenth century attempted to redefine traditional values in 
order to open up the country by promoting trade, consumption and by enabling 
foreigners to invest and conduct business within the country. These benefits were 
lost, however, in the silence of the closed and traditional society. Confucianism 
heavily exploited the popular belief in the necessity of obedience to the rulers, even 
in the face of their backward thinking. Not surprisingly, when faced by Western 
civilisations, this did not succeed. 
Vietnamese intellectuals looked to foreign ideas for ways to rescue the 
independence of their country. This had already failed under French domination, 
when Vietnam was heavily exploited and suppressed by the colonialists. Having 
no chance to explore liberalism, the Vietnamese people bitterly learned of the dark 
side of capitalism. They therefore began to embrace socialism and socialist ideals 
under the influence of French colonialists. Nationalism, combined with 
Communism’s general principle of equality, essentially helped the Communists to 
succeed. Confucian values and ethical standards were frequently borrowed in the 
effort to mobilise the masses, and new interpretations were made to fit the needs of 
long-lasting liberation and a war against the foreign occupiers. 
Once in power, the Vietnamese Communists did not fight Confucianism as bitterly 
as did their Chinese counterparts, but the social prestige of Confucianism was 
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essentially destroyed. In the political sphere, Marxism–Leninism replaced the 
Confucian worldview—the puppet son of heaven abdicated its power and was 
replaced by the people’s republic, which again was replaced by the ‘dictatorship of 
the proletariat’. Heaven, gods and other supernatural forces and beliefs had no 
place in the orthodox materialism. Only recently have the people’s traditional beliefs 
enjoyed a certain amount of freedom and protection from the state authorities. In the 
cultural sphere, the ideals of a ‘new kind of socialist man’ replaced the outdated 
Confucian gentleman. Socialist collectivism replaced the Confucian three yokes 
and five relationships (tam-cuong, ngu-thuong). A political campaign against 
individualism dismantled the tradition of strong leadership in the family and 
society—the Confucian family leader (gia truong) being considered a remnant of the 
feudalism that socialist society sought to erase. 
The socialist conception of social equality destroyed the Confucian views of 
class. For example, new rich families recruiting household servants now often allege 
that their servants lack obedience, and when Vietnamese women are sent to work as 
household servants in Taiwanese families, similar complaints often emerge. This is 
not surprising given that the ‘socialist collective leadership’ did not know the terms 
‘employer and employees’. Instead, people were divided into units (don-vi), where 
everyone had the right to know, discuss and decide on issues relating to this unit. 
This characteristic may make the training of the Vietnamese workforce somewhat 
difficult. 
Yet tradition persists. The new ideology has embedded itself in the major aspects 
of society, from the rules in family matters, to business networks, through to the 
relationships with public authorities. Indications suggest, however, that the 
Confucian tradition may have changed in appearance but that the substance is still 
important in modern Vietnamese life. In the political sphere, the Vietnamese press 
and political documents sometimes use the term ‘Communist’ mandarins to refer to 
this phenomenon. In the economic sphere, the increased autonomy of state-owned 
enterprises and other institutions, and decreased control of business by bureaucrats 
and managers, have opened up the possibility of traditional, family-style governance. 
From another perspective, Marxism and Confucianism have converged in a 
number of respects; for example, the primacy of  public or common interests over 
individual interests, the broad and active role of the ruler or state to serve the common 
interests of the people, and the conception that law is just one of the tools used by 
the state to maintain social order. This also explains why the Confucian authoritarian 
style of government may also have contributed its characteristics to Asian 
Communism (Peerenboom 2002). 
Socialist legality, borrowed from the former Soviet Union, broadened its influence 
and was far more extensive than the French civil law heritage in Vietnam. In essence, 
the Soviet doctrine saw the law as a tool that the state could use to ensure socialist 
revolution. More generally, under this doctrine, the legal system existed to serve the 
interests of the working class. Such a system had to be enforced, even through 
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dictatorship of the proletariat if necessary. Under this system, the written legal 
documents defined the limits of individuals’ behaviour, the courts and justice system 
were reorganised to provide greater justice to the population, and the privileges 
available to lawyers and judges were curtailed. 
In the economic sphere, the socialist production mode was premised on the 
dominance of state-owned enterprises operating in the framework of a centrally 
planned economy. Peasants were organised into Soviet-style cooperatives, and 
private enterprise was extremely limited. In this regard, the Vietnamese state came 
close to achieving its goal—that people would only be allowed to do what was 
prescribed by the law. The economic reform occurring today in both agriculture and 
industry would have been characterised as law-breaking or ‘breaking the wall’ 
(vuot-rao) at the time of the centrally planned economy. 
During the 1990s, people wishing to open businesses had to apply for numerous 
licences in order to prove the legality of their actions, and this complex system 
remained in place until it was simplified in the 1999 Law on Enterprises. This 
liberalisation, however, was not backed by equivalent changes to contract law and 
the laws concerning dispute resolution. The power and discretion of the state 
authorities to intervene in the activities of contracting parties remained 
unconstrained. Business contracts, for example, may be declared void, often 
arbitrarily, based on outdated and conflicting regulations. 
In the political sphere, the doctrine of ‘socialist legality’ led to the liquidation of 
the Ministry of Justice, leaving only one department—‘Legality’ (Vu Phap Che)– 
within the Office of the Government. Even today, the names of some legal departments 
in certain ministries (Department of Legality, vu phap che) still refer back to the 
doctrine of that time. Under ‘socialist legality’, communal autonomy was extremely 
limited; traditional village structures were abolished and replaced by the People’s 
Committee and People’s Council, similar to the Soviet model. Distribution of funding 
and other resources was governed by a system of top-down distribution known as 
‘applications and grants’ (xin cho),4  in which the resources controlled by the local 
governments were limited. Only in recent years have local governments enjoyed 
increased autonomy. 
With the new slogan ‘socialist state ruled by law’, Soviet-style ‘socialist legality’ 
disappeared from Vietnamese legal jargon, but its effects on society are far from 
disappearing. In the justice system, judges still wait for instructions from the 
Supreme Court and are unable to develop law (make law) in cases where the written 
legal documents are silent on a particular issue. Likewise, local authorities still 
wait for circulars and official letters distributed by the ministries to implement a 
given law, thus making a law merely a set of general principles and leaving the 
administrative authorities wide discretion in interpreting it. Engaging in business 
is neither expressly allowed nor prohibited by the law, but may still be interpreted 
as illegal, as has happened in recent cases where businesspeople were essentially 
defined as tax frauds or evidencing an intention to break the law.5 
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LEARNING FROM ASIAN NEIGHBOURS: WHAT CAN 
CONFUCIANISM CONTRIBUTE TO CONTEMPORARY LEGAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN VIETNAM? 
After a century of struggle, the Vietnamese have recognised that learning from their 
Asian neighbours, Japan, China, Korea and other ASEAN countries, may bring 
more order and prosperity to their homeland than drawing from the experiences of 
the former Soviet Union or the Middle East and East Europe. Given their phenomenal 
growth in the second half of the twentieth century, the East Asian economies’ 
experiences of borrowing Western commercial laws, while also consolidating 
traditional institutions, appear to carry the most valuable lessons for Vietnam. 
The new advances in comparative economics and law show that different 
circumstances require different institutions to balance the fundamental trade-off 
between disorder and dictatorship (Djankov et al. 2003). The obstacles that prevent 
the emergence of rule of law in the former Soviet Union are distinctive from those in 
China (Stiglitz and Hoff 2002). While the ‘big bang policy’ may have led to stagnation 
and disorder in the former Soviet Union, the gradual dual-track economic reform in 
China has promised to be more successful (Sachs and Woo 1997). By consolidating 
traditional institutions to promote a market-oriented economy, Confucianism offers 
a rich source of norms and institutions that could underpin economic and social 
development in Asia in general, and Vietnam in particular. 
Traditional Confucian society is well-known as a ‘no law society’, where law 
and legal litigation do not have the same importance as in the West. The ratio of 
residents to lawyers in the United States is 400:1; 7,000:1 in Japan; and 20,000:1 in 
Vietnam (Keleman and Sibbitt 2002). Confucian ethics can substitute for some 
functions of law; hence family capitalism is preponderant in Asia, and Confucian- 
based government and collectivism substitute and supplement the law to maintain 
social order and discipline (Kheng-Boon Tan 2000; Branson 2001). 
Experiences in other Asian countries where Confucian values have been 
integrated into legal development may be of interest to Vietnam. 
• Confucian heritage. Vietnam shares the common heritage of Confucianism 
with other East Asian countries. Although Confucianism is based on the 
received wisdom of generations, it is flexible and can be redefined to meet 
the modern needs of ensuring harmony and social order. Confucian values 
and faith can help form new patterns of behaviour and thus contribute 
informally to achieving the aims of law. 
• Confucian state. The process of change from an agricultural nation to an 
industrialised nation is not possible without strong and careful state 
intervention. The Confucian state is more responsible than most Western 
states for serving the interests of the people, and is thus more focused on 
promoting export-oriented policies and certain other sectoral policies. 
This intervention encompasses a wide range of activities, from holding 
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large shares of public ownership in enterprises to controlling financial 
resources, facilitating networks and building consensus amongst business 
and government. 
• Confucian view of the primacy of public over individual interests. In 
times of economic difficulty, collective interests trump individual and 
civil rights. This approach does not deny outright that stability and 
economic growth are to some extent concerned with individual liberty, 
but, when translated into political or economic law, the Confucian views 
seem to clash with the Western concept of liberal democracy and the rule 
of law. This trade-off, however, may be of essential importance in Asia’s 
economic growth. 
• Culturally specific institutions. Law and social norms need appropriate 
institutions to transmit behavioural forms to the mass population. The 
Confucian society reproduced its own institutions to enforce the norms. 
Despite widespread adaptation of corporate forms, family-based 
management styles are still prominent, evident in the way that business 
operators in these countries frequently rely on traditional networks as a 
way of managing risk. The role of contract, dispute resolution, and 
bankruptcy laws can only be understood in this context. 
• Seeking convergence. The intense integration of Confucian values into 
the world economy as a result of globalisation emphasises the need to 
redefine these values to allow them to converge to, and exist alongside, 
other harmonised legal standards. The economic benefits that would 
follow lie in the possibilities that Western-based commercial laws offer 
for more advanced modes of organising and governing business, raising 
capital, managing risks, and enhancing transactions. The examples of 
Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and China show that these capitalist 
institutions are crucial in facilitating a market-oriented economy. The 
Japanese and Singaporean governments in particular have taken the 
initiative in adopting Western commercial law, without being coerced by 
foreigners. From fine literal translations to borrowing sophisticated 
theories, the Japanese carefully combined traditional values with Western 
liberalism, thus promoting the convergence of their cultural roots with 
foreign ideas. The translation of the Greek word for ‘economy’ into ‘serving 
the country, helping the world’, indicates a mastery in the art of borrowing 
traditional values for the new needs of modern times. It links the realisation 
of the Western ego with the Eastern sacrifice for the country, thus making 
conducting business ethically a highly honoured work. In the same way, 
Asian business schools, drawing on the long Chinese tradition of the ‘art 
of war’, describe business as being similar to military combat. It comes as 
no surprise then that, in Western eyes, the Japanese and Chinese engage 
in economic competition as though they are engaged in war. 
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CONCLUSION 
After decades of reform, the Vietnamese legal system today resembles a jungle of 
laws. It is evident that much has to be done if the mess is to be resolved. The scandal 
of the Nam Cam case and the emergence of criminal networks illustrates not only 
the weakness of the legal and juridical system, but also the unique response of the 
market economy to the lack of efficient institutions in this country. Where the long 
arm of the law cannot reach, traditional norms and structures informed by Confucian 
values continue to dominate. Confucian values, thus, may positively supplement 
and strengthen the law but may also challenge and compete with it. In the long run, 
newly redefined Confucian values may continue to establish social trust, discipline 
and order in Vietnam. 
NOTES 
1 See the Annual Report of the People’s Supreme Court, also Duong Dang Hue (2003). 
2 For updated economic data of Vietnam, see CIEM (2002). 
3 See Tran Van Giau (1998:136), and for a comparative perspective Chongko Choi (1997). 
4 ‘Xin cho’ literally means ‘ask and give’. 
5 See Report of the Working Team of the Government to Implement the Law on Enterprise, 
available at www.vnexpress.net of May 16, 2003; also the Governmental Decree No 61/1998/ 
ND-CP dated 15 August 1998 on Inspection of Enterprises. 
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instrumentalism in the 
process of reform 
Chao Xi 
Historically, the roots of the contemporary Chinese legal system are deeply embedded 
in the Soviet Union model of the socialist legal system (see Butler 1983). Even today, 
the Soviet influence can easily be identified, largely reflected in China’s constitutional 
organisation, which replicates to a significant extent that of the former USSR 
(especially in its 1936 Constitution) (A.H.Y. Chen 2000). This significance, however, 
has been fading. The economic reforms carried out in the 1980s in China were 
apparently much more dramatic and liberal than those occurring in the Soviet Union 
at that time—particularly in terms of development of the non-public sector in the 
economy and the rapid expansion of foreign investment in, and foreign trade with, 
China. Soviet legal models were not adequate for China’s attempt to create ‘socialism 
with Chinese characteristics’. An increasing number of civil and common law legal 
doctrines and institutions have found their way into recent Chinese legislation and 
exert ever-increasing external influences on Chinese legal development. 
It may be wrong, however, to conclude that the diminishing influence of the Soviet 
legal system indicates that socialist ideology will play no part in shaping the future of 
the Chinese legal system. Indeed, in an attempt to construct a new theory of law, upon 
which Chinese legal development is based, Chinese jurists have successfully discarded 
the rigid Vyshinsky-type socialist theory of law (Lo 1997). They have not, however, 
ventured further to challenge the official socialist ideology of Deng Xiaoping’s ‘four 
cardinal principles’, which sets the boundaries of legal development in China. In the 
final analysis, China is one of the few countries in the world that still upholds socialism 
as an ideological pursuit. So long as China remains a socialist country, socialism 
will continue to play a substantial role in shaping law and law-related institutions 
in China. The question to be answered is what role does socialism play? 
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This chapter attempts to present an answer to this question by examining the 
development of Chinese enterprise law, particulary in terms of enterprise/corporate 
governance. Having officially abandoned the centrally-planned economy, China is 
now embracing a ‘socialist market economy’. As part of the economic reform, state- 
owned enterprises (SOEs)—the basic unit implementing production plans and 
providing social welfare in the centrally-planned economy—are gradually being 
transformed into modern companies, the dominant vehicle for conducting business 
in the market economy. The prevalent legal instrumentalism has resulted in the 
development of Chinese enterprise law, in particular its governance aspects, 
embodying the intricate interactions between socialist ideology and economic 
efficiency in the process of reform. It is therefore of particular relevance to the central 
question of this chapter. The second part of this chapter places this analysis in 
context by briefly outlining enterprise reforms since 1978 and their economic and 
policy impetus. The third part identifies the two fundamental ideological doctrines 
of socialism in the context of enterprise reforms, namely, predominance of public 
ownership of the means of production1 and leadership of the ruling Communist 
Party. The chapter then examines how the two socialist doctrines have shaped law 
and law-related institutions in China and concludes by presenting some thoughts 
about socialism and the future of Chinese enterprise law. 
CHINESE ENTERPRISE REFORMS: A LONG MARCH TOWARD 
EFFICIENCY 
The subservience of law to policy and the instrumental use of law in China2 make 
an understanding of the Party’s policies on enterprise reforms indispensable if one 
is to comprehend the development of Chinese enterprise law. As the issue of Chinese 
enterprise reforms is one that has been explored by numerous works in various 
disciplines, I will present a brief and necessarily simplified account of the evolution 
of Chinese enterprise reform policies. 
Initial conditions of enterprise reforms 
The Communist Party of China (CPC) gained control over Mainland China and 
established the PRC in 1949. At the outset of socialist rule, private ownership 
amounted to 90 per cent of the state economy and public ownership was only of 
nominal significance. When the CPC was attempting to gain control of the country, 
the foremost task was to expand the magnitude of public ownership in the economy. 
Rigorous measures were taken to confiscate state-run enterprises owned by the 
defeated Kuomintang government, the so-called ‘bureaucratic-capital’, and 
enterprises and capital owned by ‘hostile’ entrepreneurs and governments.3 The 
national bourgeois and the private sector were, however, largely left untouched. As 
a result, a multi-ownership economy, with public ownership controlling economic 
‘lifelines’, took shape. 
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The next stage of development (1953–57) followed a debate within China’s 
leadership over economic development strategies. One side of the debate advocated 
maintaining the existing mixed ownership economy, whereas the other side called 
for transformation to a socialist economy (Gao Shangquan and Yang Qixian 1999b). 
Those favouring transformation won the day, and the first ‘Five-Year Plan’ was 
launched in 1953 to carry out ‘socialist transformation’ with Soviet assistance. The 
process of socialist transformation resulted in the state assuming control over 
virtually all industrial organisations by 1956 and restructuring them into SOEs 
governed and operated in a manner similar to those operating within the Soviet 
model of command planning.4 
From 1957 to 1965, China’s SOEs underwent huge upheavals, propelled by 
various forms of political movements and readjustments.5 The development of SOE 
policies was terminated abruptly by the onset of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, 
though restored ten years later. 
Enterprise reforms in the transitional period (1978–92) 
A historical shift in CPC policy took place in 1978. In December 1978, the Third 
Plenary Session of the CPC Central Committee was held. Among many decisions was 
that of enterprise reform. The policy orientation of initial enterprise reforms (The People’s 
Daily, 24 December 1978) separated state administration from SOE management, which 
entailed a delegation of managerial autonomy to the SOEs and their management 
(The People’s Daily, 24 December 1978). A variety of measures, including the retention 
of a proportion of profits and economic accountability, were implemented. 
These efforts barely made any improvements, largely because policy priority 
was given to reforms in the rural sector prior to 1984. Chai’s observation that post- 
Mao China adopted an incremental approach to economic reform helps to explain 
why rural reforms took place first. Reforms were first carried out in the sector where 
resistance was weakest, and then spread to those sectors where the reform measures 
were more complex and less popular (Chai 1997). Obviously, less political risk was 
involved in reforming the rural collective economy than reforming the urban 
command economy and SOEs, as the latter were associated with much more 
intractable, deep-rooted and politically explosive problems. 
Nevertheless, the task of reforming SOEs was undeniably crucial. Despite their 
overwhelming dominance in China’s economy, SOEs suffered chronically from 
inefficiency and low productivity. A majority were in debt, incurring an ever- 
increasing and staggering amount of losses, and the subsidies to keep them afloat 
were an intolerable burden on the central government (Wang 1992). On the other 
hand, the taxation system was poor, and SOE profits formed the primary source of 
fiscal revenue for the central government (Lin Zhijun 2001). Given the government’s 
dependence on SOEs for revenue, the ever-deteriorating performance of the state 
sector threatened to drag down the nation’s economy. The need for reforms in the 
SOE sector could no longer be ignored. 
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Inspired by the triumph of the reforms in the rural sector,6 the Chinese leadership 
was determined to place SOE reforms at the top of the economic reform agenda, 
focusing in particular on fostering SOE efficiency. An efficient state sector was set as 
the ultimate goal of the SOE reforms, reflecting persistence of the ideological notion 
that socialism (and hence state-led economic activity) is superior to capitalism (Deng 
Xiaoping 1994:221–3). 
The ground-breaking SOE reforms were initiated in 1984. Blaming SOE 
inefficiency on the state’s direct management of SOEs, the CPC’s ‘Decision on 
Economic Structure Reform’ (CPC Central Committee 1984) proclaimed that 
ownership and management of SOEs ‘should be appropriately separated’. State- 
owned enterprises should become independent legal entities, responsible for their 
own profits and losses (CPC Central Committee 1984). It is worth noting, however, 
that, while daily managerial autonomy was largely delegated to the SOEs, ownership 
of SOE property remained with the state and was never intended to be transferred to 
the enterprises. 
In 1988, the CPC adopted a bolder mechanism, the ‘contract responsibility 
system’, to divide state administration from SOE management. Enterprise directors 
signed contracts with their supervisory authorities, setting targets for enterprise 
performance. Tackling the enterprise inefficiency problems, once thought to be the 
panacea, resulted, however, in little improvement (Qi Duojun 2003). It seemed all 
reforms that avoided removing enterprise property from the regime of the 
monopolised state ownership ran into barriers and failed to provide meaningful 
autonomy or incentives for enterprise efficiency. 
The Chinese leadership’s concerns about SOE efficiency led them to search for 
an alternative approach to enterprise reform. The fact that stock companies serve as 
a robust engine for the prosperous capitalist economies meant that establishing a 
similar shareholding system in China was a tantalising option, but ideological 
obstacles existed. The concept of establishing a shareholding system and issuing 
stocks to the public was thought to be inconsistent with, even heretical to, socialist 
public ownership (Qian 1993). 
Starting from the mid 1980s, however, Chinese economists, building on a reference 
by Karl Marx, claimed that this corporate form developed in capitalist countries 
could also benefit the socialist economy (Wang 1992). The concept received 
endorsement from Deng, who was in favour of employing some ‘capitalist methods’ 
to build socialism (Deng Xiaoping 1994:151–3), and the policy reversal prompted 
the Chinese government to open a new path to enterprise reform. Vigorous steps 
were taken towards establishing a shareholding system, including pilot schemes to 
transform SOEs into so-called shareholding companies and the opening of stock 
exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen. 
Related to the shareholding system reform, a far-reaching ideological 
breakthrough came from the CPC Thirteenth National Congress in 1987, which 
proclaimed that China was a socialist country still in the first stages of socialism 
(Zhao Ziyang 1987). At this point, it was thought that public ownership had to 
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predominate, but a private sector could contribute production and employment 
that the state could not. This shift in policy reflected an intention to permit the 
existence of private ownership as a supplement to state ownership, which continues 
to play the leading role in the Chinese economy. Released from the stringent 
ideological restraints imposed on it, a flourishing private sector soon emerged and 
provided the resources necessary to support the shareholding system. 
Corporatisation: enterprise reforms in the socialist market economy 
Following Deng Xiaoping’s triumphant tour of south China in late 1992, the CPC’s 
Decisions on Socialist Market Economy System7 of 1993 finally cast aside the concept 
of a planned economy and marked the eventual adoption by the Chinese leadership 
of a more liberal and market-oriented reform strategy. The orientation of enterprise 
reform was declared to be establishing a ‘modern enterprise system’ with public 
ownership as its mainstay. Instead of accurately defining the vague term ‘modern 
enterprise system’,8 the 1993 Decisions delineated it as a system that has ‘clarified 
property rights, designated authorities and responsibilities, separated government 
and enterprise functions, and established scientific management’ (section 2). 
Two approaches were identified to modernise the inefficient SOE regime. The 
first approach was ‘converting SOE’s operational management mechanisms’ while 
leaving their fundamental ownership and organisational structure unaltered. It is 
indeed a continuation of the conventional line of enterprise reform. The second 
approach was corporatising SOEs, particularly large and middle-sized SOEs, in a 
gradual and realistic way (1993 Decisions, section 6). It signalled that the CPC 
officially endorsed the shareholding system as a useful instrument to reform SOEs, 
after many years of experiments, as noted above. Indeed, it was this formal 
endorsement of the shareholding system that accelerated the enactment and 
promulgation of the first national company law in 1993.9 Given that the first 
approach was simply an improved version of the already failed ‘contract 
responsibility system’ (Qi Duojun 2003:28), it is not surprising that policy priority 
was attached to the second approach—corporatising SOEs. By corporatising SOEs, 
the Chinese leadership intended to separate government administration from 
enterprise management, release the state from its unlimited responsibility for SOEs, 
raise funds to diversify SOE risks, and, consequently, improve enterprise efficiency 
(1993 Decisions, section 6). 
Notwithstanding the backing of the 1993 Decisions, fears about the capitalist 
attributes of the shareholding system remained and, from time to time, frustrated 
the CPC’s endeavours to corporatise SOEs. More radical ideological breakthroughs 
took place in 1997. In his report to the CPC National Congress, Jiang Zemin (1997) 
redefined the public sector of the economy, which included not only state and 
collectively-owned sectors, but also the state and collectively-owned elements in 
the sector of mixed ownership. The dominant position of public ownership could 
be maintained by the state sector controlling (rather than monopolising) major 
industries and key areas of the national economy. Along this line, Jiang continued 
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boldly to assert that the shareholding system is one of the forms of materialising 
public ownership, as long as the state or a collective holds the controlling share. 
This controlling position, Jiang maintained, may indeed expand control capacity 
and eventually bolster the dominant role of public ownership. 
This policy determinacy eventually paved the way for the market-oriented 
corporatisation and ownership diversification, and prompted the enactment of the 
long-awaited national securities law in 1998.10 To date, most large and medium 
SOEs have corporatised themselves, although the process has not yet been 
completed. Ownership diversification is taking place in two main forms: listing on 
domestic and international stock exchanges in the case of larger SOEs, and sales to 
domestic and foreign investors in the case of small and medium SOEs.11 
Ideology 
It has been demonstrated above that the main theme of China’s enterprise reform 
policies has been improving enterprise efficiency. This does not, however, end this 
observation; rather, it poses another question, namely, what has distinguished 
China’s enterprise reforms from those carried out in the former Soviet bloc, which 
has also been in search of increasing enterprise efficiency? It is submitted that 
China’s adherence to socialism (with Chinese characteristics) when undertaking 
enterprise reforms may help to explain the divergence of paths to enterprise reforms. 
Through various forms of mass privatisation, most Eastern European and former 
Soviet Union countries attempted to cut their ties with socialism by radically 
transforming their communist economies into market economies with ‘big bang’ 
strategies (see Coffee 1998; Stiglitz 1999). Conversely, while reforming its SOE regime, 
China has officially proclaimed its constant adherence to socialism. China has 
never radically departed from the socialist practicalities of the past. Indeed, the top 
leaders of the Party have used an efficient SOE regime and the market economy 
merely as a means to bolster public ownership and socialism. For instance, Deng 
once bluntly stated 
…taking advantage of the useful aspects of capitalist countries, including their methods 
of operation and management, does not mean that we will adopt capitalism. Instead, we 
use those methods in order to develop the productive forces under socialism. As long as 
learning from capitalism is regarded as no more than a means to an end, it will not change 
the structure of socialism or bring China back to capitalism (1995:239). 
Nonetheless, it would be wrong to assume that China’s top leaders would 
stringently and rigidly adhere to socialist ideology. On the contrary, as this chapter 
has illustrated, the Chinese leaders have taken a pragmatic and flexible stance in 
interpreting the socialist ideology in a bid to accommodate reforms aimed at 
increasing enterprise efficiency, which they believe will in turn enhance socialism. 
The interaction and tension between the concerns to increase efficiency and 
adherence to socialist ideology also help to explain the conventional observation 
that China’s enterprise reforms are a progressive and incremental process, rather 
than a significant leap forward. 
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This ad hoc interaction has a momentous bearing on legal development in China. 
Western observers have observed that law in China is still conceived as, and still 
operates as, an instrument to carry out and consolidate institutional (primarily 
economic) changes according to predetermined policies (see, for example, Epstein 
1994). This legal instrumentalism reflects the assertions of Party leaders that the 
Chinese legal system is but a means to serve and safeguard economic constructions 
(Xin Chunyun 1999) and that its development must be conducive to economic 
development (Chen Jianfu 1999). Law, as an instrument, reflects and substantiates 
Party policies shaping economic development and enterprise reforms, and the latter 
guides lawmaking and legal enforcement (Zhang Youyu and Wang Shuwen 1989). 
Given that enterprise reform policies have been the result of interactions between 
the concerns about efficiency and the pursuit of socialism, the operation of legal 
instrumentalism renders it perfectly logical for Chinese enterprise law to be shaped 
by socialism, although enterprise law also serves to foster enterprise efficiency. 
Before turning to examine how socialism has shaped the development of 
enterprise law in China, it is important to identify the socialist doctrines of direct 
relevance to enterprise law; it may not be as constructive to discuss socialism in the 
abstract sense. 
In his renowned talk in 1979, Deng enunciated that the ideological prerequisite 
of China’s economic reform was the so-called ‘four cardinal principles’, namely: 
upholding the leadership of the Communist Party, upholding the socialist road, 
upholding the dictatorship of the proletariat; and upholding the Marxist-Leninism 
and Mao Zedong Thought. In 1987, he maintained that, of the four cardinal 
principles, upholding the leadership of the Party and upholding the socialist road 
were of the utmost importance. While the principle of upholding the leadership of 
the Party is self-explanatory, the principle of upholding the socialist road seems 
vague. In Deng’s view, predominance of public ownership is one of the two 
fundamental features of the socialist road.12 When elaborating on his strategy of 
economic reform and development, Jiang Zemin (1997) also stated that ‘being a 
socialist country, China must keep public ownership as the foundation of its socialist 
economic system’. To conclude, in the context of enterprise reforms, predominance 
of public ownership and leadership of the Party are the two fundamental socialist 
doctrines that have prevailed in China since Deng assumed power in 1978.13 
These two fundamental socialist doctrines were constitutionalised in the 1982 
PRC Constitution. Article 6 of the Constitution provides that ‘the basis of the 
economic system is socialist public ownership of the means of production’ and 
thus endorses the predominant position of public ownership of the means of 
production as a constitutional principle. The Party’s leadership, together with Deng’s 
three other cardinal principles, is enshrined in the Preamble.14 It can also be inferred 
from Article 1 of the Constitution, which reads, ‘the PRC is a socialist country under 
the people’s democratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on the 
alliance of workers and peasants’, where the Party is supposedly representative of 
the working class (von Senger 2000). 
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Few have doubted China’s adherence to the fundamental socialist doctrines 
while reforming its SOE regime during the 1980s and early 1990s. However, the 
move to incorporation and ownership diversification since the mid 1990s (always 
by listing larger SOEs at stock exchanges and selling small or medium SOEs to 
private investors) has prompted some Western commentators to argue that China is 
heading toward mass privatisation (for example, Tam 1999) and an eventual 
abandonment of socialism. 
This scenario is clearly not the intention of Chinese leaders and it seems unlikely 
to occur in the foreseeable future. In a pivotal policy document setting forth the 
orientation of enterprise reforms to 2010, the Decision on Major Issues Concerning 
the Reform and Development of State-Owned Enterprises,15 the CPC reaffirms its 
guiding principles for future SOE reforms as upholding public ownership as the 
mainstay of the socialist market economy, and giving full play to the core role of 
Party organisations within enterprises. This position was recently reiterated by 
Jiang Zemin in his 2002 report to the Sixteenth CPC National Congress. 
Having identified the fundamental socialist doctrines in the context of enterprise 
reforms, that is, predominance of public ownership of the means of production and 
the leadership of the Communist Party, I will now examine the extent to which, and 
the way in which, the CPC has shaped and influenced the development of the 
Chinese enterprise law. 
PREDOMINANCE OF PUBLIC OWNERSHIP OF THE MEANS OF 
PRODUCTION 
1949–78: SOEs subordinated to the state 
Largely due to Mao’s philosophy of class struggle and, consequently, his hostility 
towards formal law, Chinese society under his rule was one in which legal nihilism 
prevailed. Apart from some basic laws enacted while heavily under the influence of 
the Soviet model of ‘socialist legality’ in the early 1950s, essentially no formal law 
existed. Having said that, however, the Measures of State-Run Industrial Enterprises 
Work (Draft)16 is, by its nature, a legal document regulating matters in relation to the 
governance of SOEs. The moderately comprehensive 1961 Measures, as will be 
illustrated below, exemplify that socialism could determine the contents of law and 
that the function of law was simply to render the highly abstract and conceptual 
ideology more concrete, substantial and operable. 
Bluntly stipulating that ‘the whole people ownership of state-run industrial 
enterprises must be firmly preserved and must not be violated’ (Para. 1, Article 1), 
the foremost undertaking of the 1961 Measures was to safeguard public ownership 
of the means of production of SOEs. To this end, the state, pursuant to the then 
prevailing socialist ideology, not only owned the means of production on behalf of 
the people, but was also directly involved in the day-to-day management of SOEs. 
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Indeed, direct management of SOEs by the state was instituted as the guiding 
principle, equal in  importance to the principle of public ownership of the means of 
production. On behalf of the state, different levels of state agencies exercised excessive 
and rigid control over the daily management of SOEs, directing their production, 
controlling their pricing, and allocating their output. State-owned enterprises 
remitted any profits to the state, which, in turn, subsidised others’ losses. 
State-owned enterprises were subordinates or, in Chinese terms, ‘appendages’ to 
the state’s administrative system and were subject to direct control by the state, as well 
as its mandatory plans.17 A SOE was supervised and directed chiefly by a ‘higher 
authority’ (1961 Measures, Para. 5, Article 4), which might be a ministry, provincial 
government or local government.18 The higher authority assigned the production 
plans to the SOEs in its control. These plans were given to the higher authority by an 
even higher level of authority. As one Western commentator vividly delineated, the 
state was one giant vertically-integrated productive firm. Ministries were divisions 
within the firm and enterprises were factories (Clarke 1992; Jiang Yiwei 1985). State- 
owned enterprises typically had minimal decision-making powers over their 
production and business management—even their monthly production plans needed 
to be verified by their higher authorities (1961 Measures, Para. 1, Article 10). 
Another manifestation of the subordinate position of SOEs was that Party 
Committee members and the management personnel of SOEs were appointed—and 
could be dismissed—by the higher authority. Indeed, SOE leadership was an integral 
part of the general governmental framework. Party Committee members and the 
management personnel of SOEs were entitled to political and economic treatment 
equivalent to cadres serving the Party and governmental agencies (Schipani and 
Junhai Liu 2002). They were held accountable to the higher authority, which took 
account of the fulfilment of the assigned production plans rather than the profitability 
of the SOE. 
1978–82: excessive state control over SOEs remained 
State ownership of the means of production was reaffirmed and direct management 
by the state of SOEs remained the norm between 1978 and 1982. The Interim 
Regulations on State-Owned Industrial Enterprises19 made it clear that SOEs should 
conduct their production and business operations under the leadership of their higher 
authority (Article 5). The latter decided on all important issues ranging from production 
quota and plans to the direction of product development (Articles 23, 28, 62, 64). 
Moreover, the SOE director and other senior executives were appointed, dismissed 
and assessed by the higher authority. State-owned enterprises were not allowed to 
make decisions that contradicted those of the higher authority (Articles 63, 66). 
1984–92: separating government from enterprises 
While state ownership of the means of production remained an unshakeable socialist 
doctrine, the Stalinist ideology of direct state management of SOEs was largely 
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abandoned. An ‘appropriate’ separation of state administration from enterprise 
management was seen as necessary to improve efficiency. 
Law was reformed to accommodate this ideological breakthrough. These reforms 
meant that SOEs were explicitly vested with significant managerial powers that 
they were not entitled to before 1984. More significantly, law attempted to provide 
legal guarantees to safeguard these managerial powers. The Law on Industrial 
Enterprises Owned by the Whole People20 prohibited any state organ or unit from 
encroaching upon the managerial powers of SOEs (Article 58). The Regulations on 
Transforming Operational Management Mechanisms of Industrial Enterprises 
Owned by the Whole People21 further equipped SOEs with legal remedies in case 
any organ or individual was to interfere with their ‘operational rights’.22 
In spite of these notable legal developments, the law still left a few crucial powers 
in the hands of the state and its agencies, that is, the higher authorities of SOEs. This 
was largely because the Chinese leaders aimed for an ‘appropriate’ rather than a 
complete separation between the government and enterprises. These crucial powers 
included issuing unified mandatory plans to SOEs; examining and approving 
important plans; and appointing or approving the nomination of the director and 
other senior executives.23 It was these powers that various governmental agencies 
took advantage of to justify their excessive interference with enterprise affairs. In 
practice, these powers severely undermined the effectiveness of the provisions that 
had granted SOEs remarkable managerial autonomy and attempted to safeguard 
their autonomy. It is therefore not surprising that a senior Chinese policy advisor 
maintained as late as 1997, that the utmost imperative mission of Chinese enterprise 
reforms was the separation of the government from enterprises (Liu Ji 1997). 
From 1993: the state as the company property owner and the majority 
shareholder 
Compared to pre-1993 national enterprise laws, the 1993 Company Law presents a 
key progression as it categorised an enterprise in accordance with its liabilities 
rather than the attributes of its owner (see Jiang Ping 1994). Moreover, the 1993 
Company Law has universal application to all companies incorporated under it,24 
and may have disallowed mandatory requirements in companies for state 
ownership of the means of production. These remarkable legal developments do 
not imply, however, that socialist ideology was abandoned in the 1993 Company 
Law. After all, the legislative backdrop of the 1993 Company Law was the 
corporatisation of SOEs (see also Art and Minkang Gu 1995), as evidenced by one of 
its legislative purposes, ‘to promote the development of the socialist market economy’ 
(Para. 5, Article 1). It is interesting to examine how the socialist ideology of 
predominance of state ownership of the means of production penetrates the 1993 
Company Law and other related regulations. 
To begin, the foremost (and conventional) issue to be addressed by company law 
is the ownership of the property and assets of a company. Given that pre-1993 
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enterprise laws invariably mandated state ownership of SOEs’ means of production, 
the 1993 Company Law represents an important step forward by incorporating the 
doctrine of corporate personality. Generally, a Chinese company has full entitlement 
to the so-called ‘property right of legal person’ created by the collective investment 
of its members. Despite the vagueness of the ‘property right of legal person’,25 this 
provision seems to conform to the essence of corporate personality in both common 
law26 and civil law.27 
However, Article 4(3) of the 1993 Company Law, which reads ‘the ownership of 
state-owned assets in a company shall vest in the state’, apparently contradicts the 
provision in Article 4(2) and casts doubt on whether the property of Chinese 
companies is genuinely distinct and separate from its members.28 Jurists have made 
efforts to interpret Article 4(3) to bring it in accordance with the doctrine of corporate 
personality (see, for example, Schipani and Junhai Liu 2002). These efforts, however, 
seem to be frustrated by the Provisional Regulations Concerning Supervision and 
Administration on State Assets in Enterprises,29 in which ‘state assets’ are defined 
as ‘the various forms of investments in enterprises by the state and rights and 
interests derived from such investments’ (Article 3). This definition may well mean 
that the property of the company (in which the state has investments) is not separate 
from its member—the state—and that the state still retains ownership of the assets 
that it has invested in companies. Obviously, the extraordinary provision of Article 
4(3) only has the effect of safeguarding the state’s ownership of the company but 
may not necessarily lead to the dominant position of state ownership. 
To secure the dominant position of state ownership in larger companies 
transformed from SOEs30 (which always take the joint-stock company corporate 
form), the state employed a legal strategy dividing shares of companies into three 
classes, namely, state-owned shares, legal person shares and social shares. State- 
owned shares are typically held by the central and local governments (represented 
by local financial bureaus, state asset management companies or investment 
companies) and by the parent of the joint-stock company (typically an SOE or a 
wholly state-owned company). Legal person shares are shares held by such domestic 
institutions as industrial enterprises, non-bank financial institutions and technology 
and research institutes. State-owned shares and legal person shares are not tradable 
on the stock exchange. Social shares are shares held mostly by individuals (including 
enterprise employees) and by private institutions in some cases. Social shares of 
listed companies are generally tradable on stock exchanges. It is apparent by 
definition that such categorisation is based on the attributes of the shareholders, a 
practice already abandoned by the 1993 Company Law. 
Official statistics show that each of the three classes account for about one-third 
of all outstanding shares of Chinese listed companies.31 It is worth noting, however, 
that these statistics merely reflect the state’s direct shareholding in listed companies, 
because they do not take the ‘state-owned legal person shares’ into account. This 
sub-category of legal person shares was introduced by the Tentative Measures 
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Concerning Administration of State-Owned Equities of Joint Stock Companies.32 
Legal person shares held by SOEs, state-owned institutions and other work units 
fall under this sub-category (1994 Tentative Measures, Article 2). State-owned shares 
and state-owned legal person shares, which are collectively referred to as state- 
owned equity in the 1994 Tentative Measures mandate (Article 2), must be in the 
position of control in joint stock companies (Article 3). This controlling position can 
be achieved by means of either an absolute control (over 50 per cent) over most of the 
listed company, or a relative control (30–50 per cent)33 over the listed companies 
with a dispersed ownership structure (1994 Tentative Measures, Article 11). 
In terms of the state-owned legal person shares, the direct and indirect 
shareholding of the state may account for a significantly higher proportion than 
one third of all outstanding shares in listed companies. A recent study has shown 
that the state is the majority shareholder in 53.6 per cent of Chinese listed companies 
and the state is in absolute control (control over 50 per cent of votes) of 24.3 per cent 
of Chinese listed companies (He Jun 1998). Another empirical observation is that 
the ultimate control of 84 per cent of Chinese listed companies is in fact in the hands 
of the state (Liu Shaojia et al. 2003). 
The state’s position as the majority shareholder, as has been observed above, 
calls for sufficient legal safeguards to protect the state’s interests in the companies. 
One of the legal strategies utilised by the Chinese legislature is vesting an 
extraordinarily wide range of decision-making powers in the shareholder’s general 
meeting under the 1993 Company Law (Article 38(103)), including managerial 
powers normally exerted by the board of directors in other jurisdictions.34 The roots 
of this corporate governance arrangement may be in the political governance 
philosophy expressed by the PRC Constitution (Schipani and Junhai Liu 2002). 
More practically, reserving vital decision-making powers exclusively to the 
shareholders’ general meeting limits the managerial power of the board of directors, 
thus potentially helping to reduce the adverse effects of any abuse of powers or 
wrongdoing by directors. This legal strategy seemed desirable in light of the ‘insider 
control’ problems and the associated problem of managerial asset stripping. It may, 
however, cause inefficiency in decision-making, as one shareholders’ general meeting 
per year would not be able to respond to the constantly changing market. 
The government’s overwhelming concerns about its own interests as the majority 
shareholder may also help to explain the 1993 Company Law’s ignorance of minority 
protection and the failure to provide practicable legal mechanisms to protect the 
minority shareholders. This lack of minority protection has resulted in widespread 
malpractice in the Chinese stockmarket, whereby the majority shareholders abuse 
their position and exploit the public minority shareholders (see, for example, 
Anderson 2000; Wei Xinjiang 2002). 
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THE LEADERSHIP OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY 
1949–78: the Party taking the paramount leadership in SOEs 
To bring the ideology of the Party’s leadership into practice, leadership of the unified 
Party at the factory level was the norm. The prevailing model was the ‘director 
responsibility system under the leadership of the Party Committee’,35 adopted at the 
Eighth National Congress of the CPC in 1956. The essence of the system was that 
the Party Committee played a monistic and all-encompassing role in SOE internal 
governance. All major enterprise decisions were to be made collectively by the Party 
Committee pursuant to the majority rule.36 The director was under the leadership of 
the Party Committee, acting as its executive.37 In practice, the Party Committee even 
deprived the directors of limited autonomy relating to enterprise production (Jiang 
1985). 
This unified Party leadership provided an institutional setting by which it 
penetrated into every corner of enterprise internal governance. Given that the Party 
Committee assumed all major decision-making powers, SOEs were in effect 
appendages not only of the state, but also of the ruling Party. Together with the 
higher authority, the Party Committee functioned to unify decision-making vertically, 
execution and control into one all-encompassing and centrally administered 
hierarchy (You 1998). 
The collective leadership represented by the Party Committee induced inefficiency 
in decision-making. The director did not have the authority to make business 
policies, while the Party Committee, which had this authority, had little interest in 
issues of daily management and in any case did not possess relevant expertise. 
Moreover, unified leadership posed a problem of accountability, that is, of failing to 
identify who should take responsibility for any losses caused by a wrong decision. 
Indeed, Deng himself was aware of the accountability problem, saying that, ‘nominal 
responsibility of the committee for decision-making means no responsibility, or 
nobody to be really responsible for decisions’ (cited in Zhang Zanlun 1987:9). 
1978–84: first attempt to apportion decision-making 
The director responsibility system under the leadership of the Party Committee was 
upheld in 1981 and 1983 (Article 1, 1981 Interim Regulations; Article 4, 1983 Interim 
Regulations). The director remained liable for decisions implemented by the Party 
Committee on enterprise production and administration. Nevertheless, attempts 
were made to reduce the influence of the Party Committee and to limit its direct 
involvement in daily management. The director was allowed to play a more vigorous 
role in two ways. First, the director was able to propose important matters to the 
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Party Committee and the higher authority for their approval. These issues included 
business policies, long-term and annual plans and appointment of senior executives. 
Second, the director was granted full powers to decide on matters other than those 
mentioned above. In addition, a so-called ‘factory-level meeting’, comprising the 
deputy director and other senior executives, was accountable to the director rather 
than to the Party Committee. This bolstered the director’s position. Theoretically, at 
least, when the director was given more decision-making power, a new decision- 
making hub slowly emerged. The state and the Party no longer monopolised the 
decision-making of SOEs (Zheng 1988). 
These legal changes marked one of the first attempts38 to establish a sound and 
clear apportionment of decision-making between governance organs in the Chinese 
legal system, a classical question addressed by all modern company laws. They 
echoed the moderate pre-1984 ideological shifts, which attempted to equip SOEs 
with more managerial autonomy. However, these legal changes were destined to 
yield only marginal results due to policy indeterminacy (Tang Guodong 1987). The 
boundaries of decision-making of the state, the Party Committee and the director 
remained blurred and, as a result, past practicalities barely changed (Wang Baoshu 
and Cui Qingzhi 1984), although the general trend pointed to weakened state and 
Party roles in SOEs. 
1984–92: power sharing between the Party Committee and the management 
The director responsibility system (not subject to the Party Committee’s leadership) 
was first endorsed in the 1984 Decisions. A circular jointly issued by the CPC Central 
Committee and the State Council in 1986 overtly claimed that 
[t]he director of an industrial enterprise owned by the whole people is the head of the 
enterprise and the representative of the ‘enterprise legal person’, assuming the overall 
responsibility for the enterprise, occupying the central position and playing the central role.39 
This delineation of the director’s role was partly reproduced in the 1988 
Enterprise Law (Article 45). Indeed, the three Regulations issued in 1986 and the 
1988 Enterprise Law all unambiguously provided for the director responsibility 
system.40 The director was empowered to decide on important matters for the SOE,41 
with the assistance of a management committee acting in an advisory manner. 
These provisions marked the end of the three decades of the Party Committee 
command system practicalities. The dominant role of the Party Committee in 
everyday factory life was greatly curtailed. The Party Committee was intentionally 
kept out of the enterprise management42 and its role was confined to conducting 
‘ideological education’ and ‘guaranteeing and supervising the implementation of 
guidelines and policies of the Party and the state’.43 It is a striking feature of the pre- 
1993 enterprise law that the Party organs were increasingly marginalised in 
enterprise production and administration. 
This legal move, which had the prima facie effect of undermining the Party’s 
leading role in SOEs, seems to be inconsistent with the ideological doctrine of the 
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Party’s leadership. Indeed, it again manifests the Chinese leadership’s pragmatic 
stance towards the interactions of enterprise efficiency and socialist ideology. It 
was indisputable that most Party cadres (including the Party secretary, the de facto 
controller of the Party Committee in SOEs) were laymen to enterprise management. 
Stringently adhering to the Party Committee unified leadership system at the factory 
level inevitably led to inefficiency. It was thus a more efficient allocation of decision- 
making to have the Party Committee focus on the areas in which it had expertise,44 
leaving the business operations to the director. A new legal regime was thus created 
at the micro factory level in which the Party Committee was accorded a core role in 
leading the factories’ political life, paralleling the management’s central position in 
leading the factories’ economic life (You Ji 1998). In the meantime, the Party’s 
leadership still manifested at a more macro level by formulating economic and 
enterprise reform policies and guidelines and by appointing and, where necessary, 
removing the director through the higher authority. 
From 1993: the Party Committee returns? 
The 1993 Company Law appears to have gone further to make sure that the Party 
Committee was not involved in enterprise management. Article 17 provides that the 
activities of grassroots organisations of the Party within companies (which always 
take the form of Party Committee) must abide by the Party’s Constitution. On the 
face of it, this provision is one that applies merely to internal affairs of the Party 
Committee. Apart from this provision, the 1993 Company Law says nothing more 
about the Party Committee’s role in the company.45 Considering the connection 
with the legislative trend of phasing out the Party Committee’s involvement in 
enterprise management, it appears that the Party Committee will play an increasingly 
insubstantial role, if any, in companies. 
However, an alternative interpretation of Article 17 also appears. First, Article 
17 may provide a solid justification for the Party Committee to exist and operate in 
the company. More significantly, by providing for the exclusive application of the 
Party’s Constitution to the Party Committee in the company, it may in effect preclude 
the application of the 1993 Company Law to the Party Committee and give the 
Party’s Constitution implicit statutory authority to supplement the 1993 Company 
Law. This interpretation of Article 17 seems more constructive if one examines the 
Party’s Constitution. 
The Party’s Constitution confers on the Party Committee in the company not 
only the power of ‘guaranteeing and supervision’, which it was entitled to under 
the previous enterprise laws, but also the power to participate in company decision- 
making, which previous legislation attempted to phase out. Article 32 of the Party’s 
Constitution46 reads 
The Party’s grassroots organisation acts as the political nucleus and works for the operation 
of the enterprise. [It] guarantees and supervises the implementation of the principles and 
policies of the Party and the state in its own enterprise and backs the shareholders’ general 
meeting, the board of directors, the supervisory board and the manager (factory director) 
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in the exercise of their functions and powers according to law. [It] relies wholeheartedly on 
the workers, supports the work of the workers’ congress and participates in the decision- 
making of major matters in the enterprise…[emphasis added] 
If the Party’s Constitution is but a set of rules applicable to the Party Committee 
and has no binding legal effect on the company, it makes one wonder what Article 
32 was supposed to achieve. Therefore, it is more sensible to understand Article 17 
as one that has the legal effect of allowing the Party’s Constitution to supplement 
the 1993 Company Law in many aspects. In this sense, the 1993 Company Law 
allows the possibility of the Party Committee in the company becoming a governance 
organ, if the Party’s Constitution so provides. 
The way in which the Party Committee may act as a governance organ, as noted, 
is determined by the Party’s Constitution. Being a set of general norms, the Party’s 
Constitution itself is silent in this regard. It is the fundamental principle of the 
Party’s Constitution, however, that the lower Party organ is subordinate to its 
superiors and must comply unconditionally with decisions, resolutions, instructions 
and directives from superiors.47 To be sure, these decisions, resolutions, instructions 
and directives are not normally deemed legally binding. Article 17 does not give 
them legal authority, but the aforementioned principle of the Party’s Constitution 
lends them authority and elevates them to become legally binding on the Party 
Committee in the company and on the company itself. It follows that the Party 
Committee may lawfully participate in corporate governance in the way that 
decisions, resolutions, instructions and directives from its superiors (in particular, 
the CPC Central Committee) prescribe. 
A momentous CPC Central Committee Circular issued in 199748, dealing with 
companies transformed from SOEs, covers the major issues relating to the extent 
and ways that the Party Committee may act as a governance organ in these 
companies. It clarifies that the ‘major matters in the enterprise’ described by Article 
32 of the Party’s Constitution refer to all matters discussed and decided by the 
shareholders’ general meeting and the board of directors. Decision-making by the 
board of directors on these matters is closely scrutinised and supervised by the 
Party Committee. To elaborate, the board of directors must solicit and show respect 
to the Party Committee’s opinions on these matters before making its own decisions. 
They then notify the Party Committee of the implementation of the decisions. The 
Party Committee may require the board of directors to rectify the decisions if it finds 
they contradict Party policies, guidelines and laws. Second, the Party Committee 
plays an active and vital part in nominating and appointing medium-level managers, 
a power that the 1993 Company Law has reserved exclusively to the general 
manager.49 More significantly, Party cadres are encouraged to be directly involved 
in the day-to-day management of the company, and the Party secretary may serve 
concurrently as the chairman of the board of directors. Other members of the Party 
Committee may become members of the board of directors, the supervisory board 
and the senior management, in accordance with law, and vice versa. 
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These measures exemplify the Party’s intention to take the leading role in, and 
steer the orientation of, the process of corporatising SOEs (1997 Party Central 
Committee Circular), by maintaining the Party’s leadership at the company level 
and directly or indirectly participating in corporate governance. Realistically, these 
measures are useful in confining the imprecise—but in practice extensive—decision- 
making power of the Party Committee and, consequently, in aiding the full 
functioning of new governance organs.50 Nevertheless, there are inconsistencies 
with the 1993 Company Law. For example, the decision-making power of the Party 
Committee overlaps those of the other governance organs, blurring the boundaries 
of decision-making of various governance organs prescribed by the 1993 Company 
Law. Moreover, it is problematic that the directors’ legal duties and liabilities are 
inapplicable to the Party Committee and its members, which virtually means the 
Party Committee is in effect a governance organ with remarkable powers but little 
accountability. These drawbacks add difficulties to the attempts of reforming the 
already defective Chinese corporate governance law regime. Building up a sound 
system of corporate governance in line with internationally recognised standards 
in China is also made very difficult. 
WHITHER REFORM? SOCIALISM AND THE FUTURE OF 
CHINESE ENTERPRISE LAW 
The efficiency-oriented Chinese enterprise reforms have been the key component of 
China’s transition from a traditional planned economy to a socialist market-oriented 
economy. In this process, an impressive body of enterprise law has emerged, with 
the recent legislation increasingly embracing corporate forms and business practices 
in the Western market economies in a bid to improve efficiency.51  However, the 
development of the Chinese enterprise law regime has involved socialist ideology 
so extensively that one Western commentator once disappointedly concluded that 
‘the state is merely changing the form, but not the substance of economic 
relationships’ (Howson 1997:172–3). This disappointment is inevitable, given that 
Chinese enterprise reforms are simply a means to bolster socialism and its economic 
foundation and that law has long been used as an instrument to implement the 
Party’s enterprise reform policies. The orthodox ideology is, no matter how far 
enterprise and legal reforms progress, the bottom line will always be there—socialism 
with Chinese characteristics must be adhered to. 
In spite of socialist orthodoxy, the fate of Chinese enterprise law may change 
owing to a number of far-reaching recent developments. First and foremost, the 
interpretation of the nature of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ may shift. As 
noted, the Chinese leaders have been pragmatic in adjusting the interpretations of 
socialist ideology to accommodate economic development. The incorporation of the 
‘three represents’ thought52 into the Party’s Constitution in 2002 and the 
promulgation of the CPC Central Committee’s Decisions on Perfecting the Socialist 
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Market Economy in 2003 may well signal such a shift. Second, China amended its 
Constitution in 1999 to endorse the principle of ‘ruling the country in accordance 
with law’. Although it is unlikely that the Chinese leadership would favour the 
liberal democratic version of rule of law (see Peerenboom 1999, 2002), the 
constitutionalisation of the rule-of-law principle may help to curtail the instrumental 
use of law in China. Finally, China’s commitments under the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) expose Chinese enterprises to increasingly fierce international 
competition, adding to the urgent need for reforms of the defective Chinese enterprise 
law regime to build a sound corporate governance system and provide sufficient 
protection to investors.53 
An amendment of the 1993 Company Law is reportedly part of the NPC legislative 
blueprint in the future. This scheduled amendment will present us with a new 
opportunity to observe the intractable interactions of socialist ideology, economic 
efficiency and legal instrumentalism in socialist China. 
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NOTES 
1 Or sheng chan zi liao, which refers to the facilities and resources for producing goods. 
2 See Lubman (1999). Legal instrumentalism and the relationship between policy and law in 
China will be dealt with in more detail later. 
3 Those who took a hostile attitude towards the newly established communist People’s Republic 
of China, in particular, the United States and its then allies. 
4 Although the Stalinist line of economic development strategy was abandoned, the Soviet 
pattern of command economy and enterprise management remained and had dominated 
China for several decades (see Howe et al. 2003). 
5 They were the 1957–61 decentralisation and Great Leap Forward, and in 1962–65 the period 
of readjustment. For a detailed account, see Riskin (1987) and Gao and Yang (1999). 
6 Deng Xiaoping, the late paramount Chinese leader, acknowledged, ‘we started the reform first 
in the rural areas. It was only after it had produced results there that we had the courage to 
launch it in the cities. In fact, the urban reform is a reform of the economic structure as a whole 
and is very risky’ (Deng Xiaoping 1994:134). 
7 Decisions of the CPC Central Committee on Some Issues Concerning the Establishment of a 
Socialist Market Economy System, adopted by the Third Plenary Session of the CPC Fourteenth 
National Congress on 14 November 1993 (hereinafter, ‘1993 Decisions’). 
8 For an illustration of the debate concerning the meaning of the ‘modern enterprise system’, see 
Wang Baoshu (2002). 
9 The Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated on 25 December 1993, and 
in effect on 1 July 1994. Hereinafter the ‘1993 Company Law’). See Yongqing Zhao (1996); 
Jiang Ping (1994). 
10 The Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated on 29 December 1998, and 
in effect on 1 July 1999. Hereinafter the ‘1998 Securities Law’). 
11 See Tenev and Chunlin Zhang (2002:1). Official statistics show that by 2002, 442 companies 
transformed from larger SOEs have become listed companies and that more than 80 per cent 
of small-sized county-level SOEs and 60 per cent small-sized city-level SOEs have been sold 
to private investors. See also http://www.sasac.gov.cn/ldjh/ldjh_0068.htm. 
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12 The other feature is common prosperity, which is related to the wealth distribution system and 
not the direct concern of this chapter. See Deng Xiaoping (1994d). 
13 Glendon, Gordon and Osakwe’s (1985) comparative work on the socialist legal tradition 
reached a similar conclusion. Of a number of elements, an uncompromising recognition of the 
supreme leadership of the Communist Party and state ownership of the dominant means of 
production and distribution were identified as two of the elements of the ideology of the 
socialist legal system. 
14 Legal scholars have, however, expressed different views on the exact force of the Preamble 
(Chen 1998). 
15 Adopted at the Fourth Plenum of the Fifteenth CPC Central Committee on 22 September 
1999. 
16 Issued by the CPC Central Committee in 1961 and implemented on a trial basis nationally 
(hereinafter ‘1961 Measures’). 
17 Para. 1, Article 4 of the 1961 Measures reads, ‘unified leadership, hierarchical governance, is 
the principle of the state’s administration on state-run industrial enterprises …’. 
18 The assignation of the higher authority depends largely on the scale of the SOE in question and 
may change over time. The larger firms are likely to be held accountable to an appropriate 
ministry. Medium and small-sized firms are supervised at a level appropriate to the market 
they serve. See Hay et al. (1994). 
19 Issued by the State Council on 1 April 1983. Hereinafter the ‘1983 Interim Regulations’. 
20 Adopted by the Seventh NPC on 13 April 1988 and came into force on 1 August 1988. 
Hereinafter, the ‘1988 Enterprise Law’. 
21 Issued by the State Council and came into force on 23 July 1992. Hereinafter, the ‘1992 
Regulations’. 
22 The 1992 Regulations, Article 22. The SOEs may choose to appeal or inform the government or 
its competent department, or go straight to the court to litigate against the organ or individual. 
23 The 1988 Enterprise Law, Article 55; Regulations on the Work of Director of Industrial Enterprises 
Owned by the Whole People (issued by the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on 15 
September 1986 and became effective on 1 October 1988. Hereinafter the 1986 Director 
Regulations), Article 9. 
24 Indeed, the State Council’s 1992 draft of company law, which proposed to apply merely to 
state-owned companies, failed to pass through in the NPC. See Bian Yaowu and Li Fei (1994). 
25 Keith and Zhiqiu Lin (2001) present an excellent elaboration of jurisprudential discourse of the 
‘property right of legal person’ in China. 
26 In English law, the fundamental attribute of corporate personality is that a company is an 
entity separate and distinct from its members, and the property of the company is clearly 
distinguished from that of its members (Davies 2003; Sealy 2001). 
27 The core element of legal personality in civil law is that the firm owns its own assets, which are 
distinct from the property of other persons (Kraakman et al. 2004). 
28 Kong Xiangjun (1994), when reviewing Article 4 of the 1993 Company Law, sharply argued 
the state has ownership over the state-owned assets. 
29 Issued by the State Council on 13 May 2003. Hereinafter, 2003 Provisional Regulations on 
State Assets. 
30 Normally, large or medium-sized SOEs were corporatised. 
31 By the end of 1998, state-owned shares totalled 86.6 billion shares, 34.25 per cent of the total 
equity of Chinese listed companies; legal person shares totalled 71.6 billion shares, 28.35 per 
cent of the total equity; tradable shares totalled 86.2 billion shares, 34.11 per cent of the total 
equity (among which A shares 24.06 per cent, B shares 5.30 per cent, H shares 4.75 per cent). 
Statistics available on the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) website: http:// 
www.csrc.gov.cn/CSRCSite/eng/esmintr.htm. 
32 Co-issued by State Administration of State-Owned Assets and State Commission for Economic 
Restructuring on 3 November 1994. Hereinafter, the ‘1994 Tentative Measures’. 
33 Notably, La Porta et al. (1999) define that a corporation has a controlling shareholder if this 
shareholder’s direct and indirect voting rights in the firm exceed 20 per cent. 
34 For example, Article 70 of Table A, 1985 UK Companies Act, provides that ‘… the business of 
the company shall be managed by the directors who may exercise all the powers of the company’. 
In practice, the shareholders of larger companies in the United Kingdom, United States and 
Germany generally delegate decision-making extensively to the board (Davies 2003). 
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35 Para 2, Article 6 of the 1961 Measures stipulates that the director responsibility system under 
the leadership of Party Committee is the fundamental enterprise governance system. 
36 The 1961 Measures, Para 3, Article 6; Paras 1 and 3, Article 62. 
37 The 1961 Measures, Para 3, Article 55; Paras 2 and 3, Article 54. 
38 The 1979 Equity Joint Venture Law also dealt with the question. 
39 Article 1, The Supplementary Circular of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council 
Concerning Carefully Carrying Out and Implementing the Three Regulations on Industrial 
Enterprises Owned by the Whole People (issued 11 November 1986). 
40 Article 1, 1986 Director Regulations; Article 2, The Regulations on the Work of Grass-Root 
Organizations of the CPC of Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People (jointly issued 
by the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on 15 September 1986 and became 
effective on 1 October 1988. Hereinafter the ‘1986 CPC Grass-Root Regulations’); Article 2, 
The Regulations on the Work of Workers’ Congress of Industrial Enterprises Owned by the 
Whole People (jointly issued by the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on 15 
September 1986, effective 1 October 1988. Hereinafter ‘1986 Workers’ Congress Regulations’); 
Article 7, The 1988 Enterprise Law. 
41 Article 47, 1988 Enterprise Law; Article 10 and 11, 1986 Director Regulations. 
42 Indeed, to ensure the independence and integrity of managerial autonomy of the director, the 
Party Committee secretary was generally not allowed concurrently to assume the position of 
director under 1986 CPC Grass-Root Regulations. 
43 Article 8, The 1988 Enterprise Law. 
44 Namely, ‘ideological education’ and ‘guaranteeing and supervising the implementation of 
guidelines and policies of the Party and the state’. 
45 In fact, this provision did not even appear in the final draft of the 1993 Company Law. It was 
the NPC Law Committee that added the provision during their deliberation of the final draft. 
Some of its members felt it necessary to make some provisions in respect of the activities of the 
Party in companies. See Xiang Chunyi’s Report of Amendment Opinions Concerning the Company 
Law (Revised Draft) and the Decision to Amend the Accounting Law to the NPC on 29 December 
1993. 
46 Amended and adopted at the CPC Sixteenth National Congress on 14 November 2002. 
47 The 2002 Party Constitution, Article 10(1). 
48 The Circular Concerning Further Strengthening and Improving the Party’s Construction Work 
in State-Owned Enterprises, issued by the CPC Central Committee on 24 January 1997. 
Hereinafter the ‘1997 Party Central Committee Circular’. 
49 The 1993 Company Law, Articles 50(7) and 119(7). 
50 Tenev and Chunlin Zhang (2002) observed that the incremental approach to enterprise reforms 
resulted in new governance organs emerging alongside the old ones, which are groping their 
way to becoming functional. 
51 One example is the introduction of the role of independent directors into Chinese listed 
companies in 2002, whereas the Chinese board structure is a two-tier one with a supervisory 
board. 
52 This calls for the CPC to represent the development trend of China’s advanced social productive 
forces, the orientation of China’s advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of the 
overwhelming majority of the people of China. 
53 Empirical studies have shown that capital tends to flow to the financial markets with strong 
investor protection and effective corporate governance. See, for example, La Porta et al. (2000). 
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6
Socialist ideology and practical
realism: the process of
compromise in Vietnam’s law on
education
Elizabeth St George
As part of the overall theme of this book, this chapter seeks to analyse how socialism
has been influential in shaping law by examining the specific example of the
Education Law of Vietnam, passed in 1998. Socialism, in its many incarnations,
played a particularly important role in the development and elaboration of the
Vietnamese Education Law, linked in part to the significance of the education sector
as the principal vehicle for the transmission of socialist theory and ideology—even
as its importance is being downplayed in other sectors. Socialism, in its various
different forms, has had a variety of impacts on the structure and content of the
Education Law. At times these have been in contradiction with the practical realities
facing the Vietnamese education sector, leading to certain contradictions within the
law itself.
While the Education Law covers all education levels, this chapter draws its
practical examples principally from developments in higher education. This sector
saw the most far-reaching changes while the law was being drafted, and was one
where developments had a strong influence on shaping the way in which many
important issues were addressed. The first section looks at the theoretical role of
law in Vietnamese socialism, and shows that this role is far from resolved. Against
this background, the chapter then goes on to look at the Education Law itself and
the references to socialism and socialist theory (particularly Marxism–Leninism) it
contains. Finally, it focuses on the issues surrounding three specific areas in the
law—those of administration, financing and the role of education itself—and argues
that, while socialist central planning and socialist theory have had a strong influence
on the shape of the law, many areas show a break from these paradigms where they
did not fit with wider social values or were contradictory to the perceived
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development path of the country. In short, this chapter argues that, while the
Education Law purports to be supporting a socialist direction, that direction is
focused very much on solving the practical realities facing Vietnamese society and
theoretical paradigms are readily altered in the face of necessity.
The question of what is socialism is a particularly complex one, beginning as it
does in political economic theory that has then been applied in practice to a number
of different societies around the world. Consequently, the term has acquired many
layers of meaning both from vigorous intellectual debate and from its concrete
application in different countries for more than a century. Vietnam is avowedly a
socialist republic, and the debate over the nature of socialism has become even more
vigorous since the official acceptance of a market economic direction at the Sixth
Party Congress in 1986. While the country has maintained the name adopted since
the reunification of the country—the Socialist Republic of Vietnam—the particular
socialist path the country should take has not always been clear and the role of law
within the country remains problematic.
This section seeks to understand the Education Law from the internal theoretical
paradigm from within which it was written. This is a double challenge, first because
a large number of people were involved in the formulation of the law, each with
their different backgrounds and perspectives on the role of the law, and second
because, while an outsider can bring important insights to a process that may not be
evident to those involved, this perspective is necessarily based on second-hand
accounts that may not fully reflect the complex considerations involved at the time.
Despite these concerns, it is difficult to explain the socialist aspects of the Education
Law fully, without reference to wider contemporary debates about the role and
nature of socialist law in Vietnam.
The dominant paradigms from which those formulating the Education Law
were operating were those of Marxist-Leninist theory, and the practical experience
of Vietnamese education leaders over the past fifty years or so of Vietnam’s history
(also based in part on a long-standing Confucian heritage, emphasising respect for
education).
In principle, all state and political activities in Vietnam must accord with the
country’s path to socialism, as decided by the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV),
on the basis of Marxism–Leninism and Ho Chi Minh thought. In other countries,
‘Marxism’ may refer not only to the writings of Marx and Engels, but also to a
plethora of subsequent literature concerning the state, labour or a multitude of other
topics, as well as the platforms of Marxist-inspired parties. In Vietnam, however,
Marxism–Leninism and Ho Chi Minh thought refer specifically to the original
writings of Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, V.I. Lenin and Ho Chi Minh, which are then
reinterpreted in light of current circumstances and the ‘objective realities’ prevailing
in the country at the time. Marxist-Leninist theory and Ho Chi Minh thought are the
affirmed foundations on which the CPV bases its platform and leads the country.
As stated at the opening to the Ninth Party Congress in 2001, the nation has a
‘precious heritage—Ho Chi Minh thought which, combined with Marxism–
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Leninism, constitutes the ideological foundation and the lodestar for all actions of
the Party and Vietnamese Revolution’ (Communist Party of Vietnam 2001:4).
The place of both education and the law within this theoretical framework is an
ambiguous one. In a theoretical system in which the driving forces of history are the
relations of production between different classes, both the law and education are
part of the superstructure, instruments that the ruling class is able to manipulate by
virtue of its position of superiority. Under capitalism, therefore, where the ruling
class is the bourgeoisie, law is an instrument that the bourgeoisie manipulates in its
own favour. ‘Law, morality, religion, are to [the proletarian] so many bourgeois
prejudices, behind which lurk in ambush just as many bourgeois interests’ (Marx
and Engels 2000 [1887]:9). Marx was also suspicious of formal education. In his one
specific reference to the subject in The Critique of the Gotha Program, he argues that
the state and the church have had a very negative impact on the education of the
people, and instead ‘...the state has need, on the contrary, of a very stern education
by the people’ (Marx 1947:42). Lenin was only slightly more positive about the role
of education. While he recognised the importance of education campaigns to educate
the masses about the nature of socialism, communism and revolution, ‘[l]ike the
state, schools were held to be compulsory institutions that obstructed a truly socialist
construction, and they should be allowed to wither away’ (Lilge 1968:560).1
Marx and Engels distinguished five principal phases of historical progression
that nations must pass through, based on their particular relations of production:
slavery, feudalism, capitalism, socialism and finally communism. According to the
CPV, Vietnam is a country ‘developing along the path to socialism’2 or, in more
detail, the Ninth Congress in 2001 asserted that ‘[t]he path forward of our country
is transitional development to socialism, bypassing capitalism, in other words
bypassing the establishment of the dominance of the production relations and the
superstructure of capitalism’.3 In practice this should mean that capitalist
characteristics—both governing through a system of laws, and developing a formal
education system—are elements that should be bypassed. In the case of Vietnam,
however, both are being strengthened.
In attempting to come to terms with this complicated and potentially contradictory
situation, Dinh Van Mau and Pham Hong Thai (2002) in their foundational text for
law school students, support the introduction of law in Vietnam by arguing that
instead of automatically asserting that law is an instrument of the bourgeoisie, it is
necessary to ask certain questions to understand the foundations on which the law
is based: ‘What is the economic basis of the law?’ and ‘Whose class interests are
best served by the law?’ (Dinh Van Mau and Pham Hong Thai 2002:210). They then
go on to argue that laws in feudal societies supported the rule of kings and religion
(Dinh Van Mau and Pham Hong Thai 2002), while the essence of capitalist law is to
reinforce the interests of the capitalist class, among other things by protecting private
property (Dinh Van Mau and Pham Hong Thai 2002) and excluding communist
parties, which represent the interests of workers, from politics (Dinh Van Mau and
Pham Hong Thai 2002). Under socialism the working class becomes the ruling
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class. Consequently, socialist law, by contrast with other forms of law, must
necessarily reflect the will of the working class. The situation presented by the
authors for Vietnam, however, does not fit this clear periodisation.
[S]ocialist law is the synthetisation of the rules of behaviour that give expression to the will
of the working class and workers under the leadership of the Communist Party, and is
decided by state offices and those with jurisdiction according to the order and the procedures
laid down by the law, in order to readjust social relations in accordance with a market
economy during the transition to socialism (Dinh Van Mau and Pham Hong Thai 2002:233).4
Although they do not mention Vietnam specifically, it is clear that the aim of the
authors is to justify the use of law in Vietnam. They are left in a quandary, however,
because they recognise that Vietnam has not yet reached the socialist stage of
development and Vietnam is supporting a market economy. From a classical Marxist-
Leninist point of view their argument is highly suspect, if not contradictory in
paradigm. In order to assert that laws in Vietnam are socialist, the authors argue
that they reflect the will of the working class, and yet at the same time they recognise
that the country has a market economy and is in transition to socialism—it has not
yet reached socialism. According to the ‘objective laws’ of Marxism–Leninism, where
the nature of the superstructure (law) depends on the relations of production and
the nature of the economy, a market economy and pre-socialism (that is, effectively
where capitalist relations are still present) are objectively highly unlikely to give
rise to socialist laws that represent the interests of the working class.
While implicitly recognising this contradiction, the authors attempt to bypass it
in order to justify the current Vietnamese situation. Although they recognise that the
law is an instrument of the state, they argue that the state is guided by the Communist
Party, which itself represents the interests of ‘labourers, peasants and other types of
labourers’ (Dinh Van Mau and Pham Hong Thai 2002:238). Consequently they
argue that the law is unlike that of capitalist countries which serves only those few
who have taken over leadership of the state; rather, the ‘socialist’ law of Vietnam
serves the will of all classes (Dinh Van Mau and Pham Hong Thai 2002:238).5
The authors not only justify the socialist nature of Vietnamese law, but also
describe its particular content. They argue that socialist law is an instrument of the
state that defines the operations and administration of the state, ensures the
participation of all people in the state, and defines the limits of power between the
different parts of the state. It also protects the different internationally recognised
human rights and, importantly, it is a means to concretise the policies of the CPV
and ensure their unified implementation (Dinh Van Mau and Pham Hong Thai
2002). Many of these concerns are present in Vietnam’s Education Law.
The authors conclude that in the transitional phase to socialism there is a need
for a system of laws so that the market economy can operate efficiently and guide the
country to a higher stage of development (Dinh Van Mau and Pham Hong Thai
2002), when implicitly laws will no longer be needed. In theoretical terms, the leading
role of the Communist Party in Vietnam is central to justifying the introduction of
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‘bourgeois’ laws. In short, socialist law in Vietnam is principally a set of instruments
by which the state manages the country in accordance with the guidance of the CPV.
While this argument represents the view of only two authors, their work, as a
basic university textbook, necessarily received high-level scrutiny and approval
before it was introduced. That their conclusions are widespread is supported by a
number of primary texts. The Ninth Party Congress documents, for instance, refer to
the law instrumentally as a means to fight corruption and bring order to the civil
service (Communist Party of Vietnam 2001), and the need to build socialist state law
under the leadership of the Party (Communist Party of Vietnam 2001).6 The Textbook
on Socialist Science, prepared by the Central Steering Committee for the Editing of
National Textbooks for the Study of Marxism–Leninism and Ho Chi Minh thought,
also emphasises the instrumental nature of laws. The fundamental aim of
strengthening the legal system it argues—including the role of the National Assembly
and the division of responsibilities in formulating laws—is to improve the
administrative results of the state and the democracy of the people.7 It also
emphasises that the democracy of the people is guaranteed by the leadership of the
CPV guiding the state (Communist Party of Vietnam 2001:272).
Taken together, the arguments presented above lead to the conclusion that socialist
law is a set of guiding rules and regulations that are formulated and implemented
by the state (consisting principally of the different ministries and their local offices)
under the guidance of the CPV in accordance with the process of political
compromise that necessarily goes into documents based on wide consensus (such
as the Documents of the Ninth Congress, national textbooks, and the Education
Law). It is also an administrative tool that serves to ensure that the policies of the
CPV are better applied than in the previous system of diffuse ordinances and
regulations, combined with an appeal to people’s morality (Dinh Van Mau and
Pham Hong Thai 2002). In no instance is there any suggestion that the law exists as
a means to ensure checks and balances within the system of governance or as an
equal partner in the sense of executive, legislative and judicial branches of state. In
practice, this situation creates a certain amount of ambiguity and tension because
the law is simultaneously intended as a centralised administrative instrument of
the Party–state, and, in the context of a burgeoning market economy, it regulates the
areas in which the market economy—in this case the schooling system—is able to
develop its own separate regulations and funding arrangements. It must walk the
line between a background of socialist central planning and the practical realities
where socialist central planning has already failed as a viable system of state
management. These contradictions were carried through into the drafting process
of the Education Law, and were evident in the final compromises that were reached.
Prior to the Education Law in 1998, education was managed by an ad hoc system
of decrees and decisions produced by different authorities concerning their
(overlapping) jurisdictions, and also by unwritten practices that were developed
over time.8 The responsibilities of higher education institutions , for example, and
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their relationship to the state were decided by the individual regulations established
on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with the general regulations governing the
founding of HEIs in Vietnam established in 1963 (171/CP, 20/11/1963). These
individual regulations were decided on application to the government by the MOET
(or other ministry or provincial government office) and the State Planning Committee,
with the submission of documents stipulating the institution’s ‘mission statement,
planned teaching program, curriculum, method of teaching, enrolment and structure’
(Minh Vu 1994:11).
Regulations concerning other issues—everything from the level of financing to
the responsibilities of teachers—were dealt with by the particular department (vu)
responsible for that area. The department would examine a problem and issue a
decision, frequently with little consultation with any other department that might
be concerned with the issue. The situation was further complicated at the provincial
and district levels with extra levels of vertical and horizontal administrative
hierarchies that administer secondary level schools and below. The decrees were
signed by the minister or vice-minister, who was supposed to act as a filter to ensure
that the decrees did not overlap or contradict each other. In fact, however, a number
of contradictory decrees continued to be promulgated, allowing the institutions
often to do much as they pleased.9 In 1995 Tran Chi Dao complained that
[t]here is a deficiency of current legal statutes that are relevant and appropriate to
management of the changing situation in Vietnam’s higher education institutions. This
lack tends to make some institutions excessively dependent on the MOET while others
exercise newly found initiative. Both patterns can affect the quality of education (Tran Chi
Dao et al. 1995:89).
Case-by-case decision-making simultaneously gave institutions the leeway to
interpret the decisions according to their interests, and created a climate of
uncertainty in which institutions were unwilling to act. As there was no formal
delineation of decision-making responsibilities between institutions and the central
government, the latter could theoretically intervene in any area it deemed important.
In the mid 1990s, for example, two national universities in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh
City were created on the basis of existing institutions. These universities were given
special powers to develop and establish their own courses and open experimental
classes in new subject areas. In practice, however, the MOET still required that all
new courses be submitted for approval before beginning operation (St. George 2003).
Effectively, the founding regulations governing the two new universities overlapped
with the general regulations governing universities as a whole, leading to confusion
and contradiction in their implementation, as well as delays in the introduction of
new courses.
The first limited attempt to bring order to the very diffuse system of regulations
in higher education appears to have taken place in 1985 with the introduction of the
Provisional Regulation on the Responsibilities, Organisation Structure and
Operation of Higher Education Institutions (17 July 1985). This regulation defined
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the general duties and responsibilities of institutions, including regular reports to
the Ministry of Education and Training (MOET) and the overseeing ministry, the
organisation structure and duties of different bodies within the institutions, and
the rights and responsibilities of students, teachers and the rector (Minh Vu 1994:11).
Following further efforts to bring some order to the regulatory framework in
education, the government continued to recognise the need for a comprehensive
system of legislation, in which the roles and responsibilities of the different decision-
makers in the education sector were clearly spelt out. The situation was finally
addressed in a comprehensive manner through the introduction of the Law on
Education. This law underwent 23 drafts before the twenty-fourth was finally passed
into law by the National Assembly, after extensive discussion, on 1 December 1998
(Tran Thi Tam Dan 1999).
The process of drafting the Education Law began in October 1995 when the
government passed a resolution for work to begin, within the broad framework of
building a nationwide system of law (Tran Thi Tam Dan 1999). The law was drafted
under the auspices of a special Party cell within the National Assembly, which
formally began operation in January 1996 (Nhân Dân, 17 May 1997:1, 3).10 It was
given responsibility for guiding the law through a process of consultation with a
wide range of groups such as the MOET, government and Communist Party agencies
concerned with education within the country, and other education specialists. The
twenty-third draft, for example, was presented to 60 of 90 members of the National
Assembly, those holding postgraduate degrees, in order for them to examine
specifically the legal aspects of the draft (Nhân Dân Internet Edition, 21 September
1998). During the process of drafting and re-drafting, regular reports on the law
were also presented to the National Assembly (Pham Min Hac 1998).
The extended process of drafting the law was undertaken to ensure a very wide
input and opinion from among those with an interest in education. The process
brought to the fore particular areas of contention among the interested parties, such
as the level of detail the law should contain, administrative procedures, and sources
of finance. The final law reflected a complex process of negotiation and compromise
between the interested parties, in which the commitment to a socialist order remained
an important concern.
In the final event, the Education Law of Vietnam passed by the National Assembly
comprises 110 articles that cover in general the aims, levels and types of education,
as well as the roles and responsibilities of teachers, students and the state with
regards to formal education from crèche through to PhD level.
Within the Education Law, four principal articles contain direct references to
socialism, Marxism–Leninism or Ho Chi Minh thought, highlighted above as the
foundational texts and guiding lights of Vietnamese socialism.11 These references to
socialism cover two principal areas: the aims of education in Vietnam and the content
of the educational curriculum at higher levels of education. The aims and principles
of education in Vietnam are contained in Articles 2 and 3. According to Article 2,
Asian Socialism and Legal Change122
[t]he aim of education is to comprehensively develop Vietnamese people through training
so that they have ethics, intellectual ability, health, an aesthetic sense and a profession,
faithful to an independent nation and socialism.12
Article 3 further reinforces the socialist nature of Vietnamese education
Vietnamese education is socialist education that is popular, national, scientific,13 modern,
and laid on a foundation of Marxism–Leninism and Ho Chi Minh thought.14
In order to support these general aims, a further specific aim of primary and
secondary education is to develop the socialist character of the Vietnamese people
(Article 23), so that they can undertake further study.15
Article 35 concerning the aims of higher education does not directly mention
socialism or socialist thought, instead this is taken up in the following article
concerning the content of higher education (including postgraduate education)
programs.
The content of higher education must be modern and developed, ensuring an appropriate
structure divided between basic scientific knowledge and specialist knowledge, as well as
containing the scientific subjects of Marxism–Leninism, and Ho Chi Minh thought (Article
36, Section 1a).16
A similar statement is repeated for the content of postgraduate education, although
with greater emphasis on developing research capability (Article 36, Section 2a).
The Education Law asserts its socialist character by committing the national
education system to building socialism in the country, as well as to creating people
who are socialist in character. It confirms that Vietnamese education is socialist in
nature, or more specifically that it is based on the teachings of Marxism–Leninism
and Ho Chi Minh thought, particularly for university and postgraduate education.
Not only is socialist theory an important basis for the national education system,
higher levels of study are also expected to contribute actively to the perpetuation
and actualisation of socialism. This is particularly evident in the Law on Science
and Technology (Luat Khoa hoc va Cong nghe). It is worth pointing out here that the
English term ‘science’ as generally used does not do justice to the multiplicity of
meanings of the Vietnamese term khoa hoc. Not only does khoa hoc refer to the study
of physical sciences, but also to higher levels of theoretical study across all fields of
enquiry. By extension it also refers to logical methods of enquiry and, further, to
research and the application of theory in any discipline. The Law on Science and
Technology, then, refers to the duty of science and technology activities as being
(among other things) to
creatively develop and apply the reasoning of Marxism–Leninism and Ho Chi Minh thought;
to build socialist reasoning and the path to socialism in Vietnam (Article 4, Section 1).17
In other words, while educational activities are required to transmit the tenets of
socialism, people conducting scientific study (or research) are not only expected to
apply them in their own research, but they are also expected to support and build
the theoretical foundations underpinning socialism itself. The important political
role of research is even more clearly inferred further on, where science and technology
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activities are strictly forbidden from being used for any activities that ‘misrepresent
or go against the line or the policy of the Communist Party of Vietnam, the laws of
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam or undermine national unity’ (Article 8, Section
2),18 where the ‘line or the policy’ of the CPV is fundamentally to bring Vietnam
along the path to socialism.19 Clearly, those involved in elaborating both the
Education Law and the Law on Science and Technology felt that there were important
links that needed to be maintained between education, research and the socialist
system in Vietnam.
Explicit references to socialism are not necessarily the norm in Vietnamese laws.
The Law on Commerce, for example, only makes explicit reference to socialism in
the name of the country, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The aims of the law given
in the introduction refer to the role of commerce as ensuring the growth of production,
improving the lives of the people, and strengthening the nation (among others),
rather than to supporting the foundations of socialism.20 The introduction to the
Labour Code (Bo Luat Lao Dong) likewise refers to one of the aims of the law as being
to implement the CPV’s policies, but makes no reference to supporting Marxism–
Leninism or upholding socialism.21
The significance of references to socialism is not only that they serve to underpin
the socialist character of the law, but that they make explicit its political orientation,
a characteristic also evident in the largest remaining socialist country, the People’s
Republic of China. The Law on Compulsory Education of the People’s Republic of
China, for example, also specifies that the law is ‘for the purpose of promoting
elementary education and the building of a socialist society that is advanced
culturally and ideologically as well as materially’ (Article 1), while further on it
expresses support for the state policy on education, which, among other things,
aims to cultivate ‘well-educated and self-disciplined builders of socialism with
high ideals and moral integrity’ (Article 3) (People’s Republic of China 1986). Even
the 2002 Law on ‘People-founded’ Schools specifies that these schools (which are
based on non-state funding) are part of the socialist education system (Article 3)
and that they serve to construct socialism in the country (Article 4) (People’s Republic
of China 2002).
By comparison, in Australian legislation on education, for example, references
to a particular political orientation are noticeably absent,22 although many of the
other educational aims put forward are virtually the same as those found in the
Chinese and Vietnamese laws, including national development,23 and the
intellectual, physical and moral development of students in general education.24
David Paris’ (1995) analysis of educational reform in the United States argues
that the liberal democratic theory on which the US school system is based in fact
creates significant difficulties for educational reform because it permits a plurality
of perspectives in the approach to, and implementation of, education policies, and
this results in a plurality of conflicting ideals guiding policy. Concretely, this means
that guiding documents on education tend to avoid presenting higher guiding
directions, in favour of setting practical milestones. Consequently, when George
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Bush (Snr) put forward the country’s new educational strategy in 1989, it was
couched in the very practical terms of particular goals to be achieved. Paris argues
that, while these goals represented consensus, they avoided the ideological
importance of education and became the foundations of conflict in subsequent efforts
to achieve these goals (Paris 1995). While Paris is referring to educational strategy
rather than education law, it is worth noting that even the 2001–10 Vietnamese
education strategy, which contains very detailed education goals (in terms of
enrolment, funding, teaching methods and so forth), nonetheless insists on the role
of education in following the country’s ideological direction by modernising the
country and building socialism (Cong Hoa Xa hoi Chu nghia Viet Nam 2001:18).
Vietnam’s law takes the opposite extreme to that highlighted by Paris for the United
States. In Vietnam, the ideological direction is clearly stated, both in the law and in
the translation of that law into policy documents, such as the Education Strategy,
which concentrates on setting particular targets to achieve educational goals, under
the guiding framework provided by the law.
In short, the Vietnamese Law on Education clearly identifies its own socialist
nature, which, by its content and concerns, also places it in line with similarly self-
avowedly socialist education laws, such as those of China. From this socialist
perspective, education is an intrinsically ideological and political activity, and
should be asserted clearly at the highest levels of legislation. During the process of
drafting the Education Law, therefore, the more contentious issues debated revolved
less around whether to include references to ideology, but rather the relative
importance that should be given to ideology and to the role of the law in defining
levels of authority and responsibility—that is, administrative and organisational
issues. They also revolved around the appropriate place of non-state funding, but
despite the suspicion with which Marx and Lenin regarded education, there was
little debate about the high level of importance that should be attached to this sector.
Administrative issues are best highlighted in a comparison of the sixteenth draft
of the law, from December 1996, and the law that was finally passed in December
1998. The introductions to the 1996 draft and the 1998 law set the contrast between
the two. In the 1996 draft, the stated purpose of the law is to define the relationship
between different organisations responsible for education in Vietnam, and their
role in achieving a modern education system. It also serves to ‘legitimate viewpoints
and directions of education renovation adopted by the Party and State’. It
concentrates on the organisation of education, against the background of current
policies, although it allows for the possibility that these ‘viewpoints and directions’
may change. By mid 1997, however, the draft law had begun to emphasise the role
of the law as being to structure the policies and work of the Communist Party and
the state in education (Giao duc va Thoi dai [Education and the Age], 1 May 1997:1,
3), and this was carried through into the law that was finally passed.
The introduction to the 1998 law is principally a Communist Party of Vietnam
policy statement, in which the importance of organisation and administration receive
only a passing mention. It stresses that the law is aimed at improving education in
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the country so that it benefits development, and it is virtually a direct copy of
statements regarding education made at the Eighth Communist Party National
Congress, held in 1996. The education law aims to
develop education, raise the effectiveness of the state in administering education, raise the
people’s intellectual standard, train human resources and groom talent to achieve the
industrialisation and modernisation of the country, to meet the needs of building and
protecting the nation, with the aim of creating a rich, strong, equitable and civilised society.
‘Industrialisation and modernisation’ in particular are the hallmark slogans of
the Eighth Party Congress.
Interestingly, an article that appeared in the Communist Party daily Nhân Dân
when the National Assembly was considering the twenty-third draft of the law
complained that the law had been given to sectoral specialists (that is, educators
from the MOET) rather than legal experts and therefore lacked legal standards and
was not in line with standardisation across the country (Nhân Dân Internet Edition,
10 November 1998). This suggests that the standardisation should comply with
broad national policies rather than sectoral objectives, which were the focus of
previous drafts.
Compared to the 1996 draft, the 1998 law envisaged a reduced role for the state,
and increased responsibilities for educational institutions. Article 105 (1996)
specifies that the state organises special schools for disabled students from crèche
through to the final year of compulsory education, while Article 58 of the 1998 law
states that ‘[t]he state founds, and encourages other organisations and individuals to
found schools and classes for disabled people [emphasis added]’. Organisations
other than the state are given an opening to take a more active role in educational
activities.
In another example, the 1996 draft specifies that the state encourages links
between educational institutions, social organisations, businesses and the society
at large (Article 95), although schools play the leading role in links between society
and education (Article 108). By contrast the final 1998 law specifies that individual
educational institutions are to establish their own regulations of operation, covering,
among other things, the relationship between the school, families and society (Article
48, para 2). In other words, the final law is far more encouraging of educational
institutions being pro-active in seeking their own relationships with the wider
community, something that would have been unthinkable under socialist central
planning.
Another area that shows a reduced role for the highest levels of the state is
postgraduate education. In 1976 the Party Central Committee established
postgraduate education in the country for the first time (QÐ 224/TTg, 24/5/1976).
At that time, matters concerning postgraduate education were to be looked after by
a specialist government committee, with the assistance of the Ministry of Higher
Education (as it was at the time). Any institutions providing postgraduate training,
which were largely research institutes rather than teaching universities, had to
report their activities to this committee, and doctoral candidates had to defend their
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thesis in front of an examination committee appointed by the Prime Minister. Topics
of research were also closely coordinated with the relevant ministry responsible for
that area of research and the government committee on education. Candidates were
expected to be strong supporters of the Communist Party and its policies, and to
‘put into practice the path and policies of the Party and government, maintain a
truthful attitude and help socialism’ (QÐ 224/TTg, 24/5/1976).
Since the early 1990s, universities have been taking a far more active role in
postgraduate education, especially at the Master level, but this has continued to
receive a very high level of interest from the central government. For doctoral-level
study, no committee is guaranteed formal oversight of their provision any longer
(although in practice it continues to exist), nor are candidates given preferential
treatment based on their involvement with the Party (although many doctoral
candidates continue to be members of the Communist Party). One of the areas of
hottest contention during the final National Assembly debates on the law was what
level of authority (minister or higher education institution rector) should be
responsible for awarding postgraduate degrees (Nhân Dân Internet Edition, 10
November 1998). The solution adopted was to maintain the status quo with regards
to PhD degrees—the minister continues to award them (Article 39), but to delegate
responsibility for Masters degrees to the rector of the university. In the 1996 draft,
the rector first had to seek approval from the Minister of Education (Article 157), but
this stipulation was dropped from the final law (see Article 39, para 3), very likely
because of the increasingly large number of students who are graduating with
Master degrees in Vietnam, which would have heavily increased the workload of
the minister or their deputy. Despite the introduction of the law, other regulations
govern the requirements and procedures for the award of postgraduate degrees in
more detail (QÐ 647/GD-ÐT, 14/12/1996; Minh Vu 1994).
That socialist nature is also in line with the dominant understanding of the role
of socialist law as an instrument by which to implement the guiding policies of the
CPV. In a close echo of the Eighth Party Congress documents and the introduction to
the law, according to the magazine Education and the Age [Giao duc va thoi dai], the
reason for establishing the law was to structure the policies and work of the
Communist Party and the state in education, and to reassert the leadership of the
Party, the administration of the state, and the participation of the people. It also
seeks to assert the responsibilities of state organisations at each level within
education, under the unified management of the state (Giao du va Thoi dai [Education
and the Age] 1997:1, 3). While the issue of division of responsibility is certainly
addressed in the law, and responsibilities of the Ministry of Education and Training
at the central level are mentioned, this division remains largely at the level of
principles, rather than specifying the concrete measures to ensure that clarification
of division of responsibility becomes a reality. For example, the individual school
authorities are under the administration ‘of all education administration offices’25
in accordance with the powers delegated by the central government (Article 44).
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The scope of authority of different levels of government (provincial, district, and so
forth) are only specified in very specific areas, such as the award of graduation
certificates and degrees (Articles 27, 33, 39). Other areas are left under the general
supervision and administration of the central government, reflecting the strong
influence of a recent tradition of socialist central planning.
In the area of curriculum, the division of responsibility remains highly centralised.
The central government, through the MOET, maintains the primary responsibility
for courses at primary and secondary levels of education, and also has significant
responsibility for higher levels. At general education levels, this responsibility is
exercised in particular through the compilation and publication of textbooks, which
are approved by a national council before being introduced (Article 25). Universities
and colleges are able to compile and produce their own textbooks in specialist areas
of teaching, after approval by a curriculum committee established by the rector of
the institution (Article 37), but only in branches of study (nganh) for which the
institution has already received permission to teach (Article 55). Given that any
new subject may be considered a new branch of learning, the distinction between
the two is not always clear, and can be manipulated by the government as well as
higher education insitutions to suit their own interests. In subject areas that are
prescribed by the MOET for all college and university degrees (such as Marxist-
Leninist theory, Marxist-Leninist political economy, national defence, sport), the
MOET is also responsible for producing the relevant textbooks and courses of study
(Article 37), and their use is further reinforced through subordinate legislation that
specifies, for example, how many hours and which chapters of the textbooks should
be studied by different groups of students.26 In fact, the only areas of education for
which the state does not produce compulsory textbooks are postgraduate education
(where supervision is exercised through the oversight of graduation theses),
vocational education, and ‘non-regular’ (khong chinh quy) forms of education, such
as literary courses, professional skills upgrading courses and courses specially
designed to meet student demands. Part-time courses, distance education, guided
study or any course leading to an award within the national education framework
must also be approved by the MOET (Article 41).
Despite many areas of the law in which the division of responsibility remain
unclear, it is clear that at an official level the development of curriculum remains a
highly sensitive and highly centralised undertaking. In other areas there is a clear
trend towards greater decentralisation of educational responsibility, in favour of
institutions, but the biggest area of contention, and the area that remains most
vague in the law is that of the decentralisation of education funding.
If the opening-up of the country and the introduction of doi moi were in part a
response to the deepening financial crisis of the late 1970s and 1980s, then nowhere
was this more evident than in the education sector, where inflation drastically eroded
teachers’ salaries, and vocational colleges and secondary specialist colleges (truong
chuyên nghiep) were forced to close (Le Viet Khuyen c1998). Practical experiments
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with fee-paying students began as early as 1986 in Ho Chi Minh City, and the first
fully non-government funded classes in higher education opened in Hanoi in 1988,
as a direct response to the crisis situation in the country (St George 2003). From a
legal perspective, these activities were in direct contravention of the 1980 constitution,
which specified that the provision of education is the prerogative of the state (Article
41), and that education must be provided free of charge (Article 60). In 1992, these
provisions were replaced in the revised constitution to allow for a system of ‘fees
and scholarships’ at higher levels of education (Article 59). In other words the
constitution was amended to reflect directly the changed practical realities of the
Vietnamese education system, at the expense of strict ideological orthodoxy.
The Education Law also acknowledges the need for outside funding of higher
educational institutions, by recognising the existence of school authorities in higher
education institutions that are public, semi-public, people-founded and private
(Article 44),27 although such institutions are not mentioned for other levels of study.
The law also encourages organisations and individuals to contribute financially to
education, for which they will receive tax exemptions (Article 91). Despite this
acknowledgement of the importance of private contributions to education, there are
no further details about the role of such funding in a state dominated education
sector, nor any references to clarify the differences between these institutions and
their relationship to the state. The final law leaves the founding of all educational
institutions up to individual government decisions, such as those that have been
used to govern the country in the past (Articles 46 and 47). This is in direct contrast
to the 1996 draft (Article 90), which clearly specifies the means for the establishment
of private institutions and outlines the responsibilities of such schools.
There are several explanations for the omission in the final law. At the time the
law was being finalised there was significant criticism of the quality of private
institutions, which were enrolling students at a tremendous rate without always
paying attention to the number of teachers, classrooms, or the need for sufficient
equipment to ensure the standard of their graduates (St George 2003). Questions
were also raised about whether non-government schools and non-regular modes of
study should really be considered part of the national unified system of education
(Cao Cuong 1998). Finally, those drafting the law discussed, to an extent, the role of
the law itself and how specific it should be.28 The result is that private education’s
role and rules of operation within the national education system remain vague and
subject to subordinate decrees and regulations. On the one hand this shows the
reluctance of central government figures to consider privately funded education as
a permanent part of the Vietnamese education system (as opposed to a temporary
measure to resolve current financial difficulties), on the other hand it reflects the
serious concern about the quality of graduates from such institutions.
In general, the issue of income generation for schools apparently remains difficult
to reconcile ideologically. Article 17 ‘forbids all actions commercialising educational
activities’,29 but at the same time Article 54 gives permission to higher education
institutions to use economic activities (hoat dong kinh te) in order to earn money for
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educational activities. The prohibition against the commercialisation of educational
activities implies both that education is in itself a non-productive activity (hence it
can be ‘non-commercial’) and at the same time that education will somehow be
contaminated if it is put on a commercial footing. Article 54, by contrast, appears to
accept the reality that the state is unable to supply the financial needs of higher
education institutions and to recognise the benefits that outside funding can bring.
Dang Ba Lam, Director-General of the National Institute for Education Development,
who was involved in the drafting of the law, agreed that the law was contradictory
to some extent on this point, but argued that the main aim of the injunction against
the commercialisation of education was a moral one.30 This, he suggested, was an
appeal to people’s moral sense not to misuse the highly respected tool of education
for personal gain. The Education Law, therefore, while attempting to bring order to
the diffuse system of rules and regulations, and better define the relationship between
the state and educational institutions, has nonetheless not abandoned the system
of regulating society by ‘appealing to people’s morals’, underscoring the background
on which the current law was built. In effect it shows a process of political
compromise, in which ideological orientations have been bent, but not entirely
forgotten, in the face of real economic necessity.
The issue of funding in education remains ideologically sensitive, as highlighted
by the contradictions in the law itself mentioned above, and emphasised even more
forcibly by the many funding issues that are left out of the law. At the same time, if
state organisation in education and education financing are two areas that show
the strong influences of ‘socialism’, then the issue of education itself is one that has
broken radically from its ambiguous status in Marxist-Leninist writing.
As outlined earlier, according to classical Marxist-Leninist theory, education is
a part of the superstructure, and its nature depends on the underlying relations of
production in the economy. Consequently, both Marx and Lenin only supported
education insofar as it raised the socialist conscience of workers. Ho Chi Minh
(1972:68–73, 89) emphasised that education needed to have a practical orientation,
to support the building of socialism in the country.
Vietnamese leaders in the 1990s have thoroughly laid to rest this hesitant attitude.
The constitution adopted in 1992 specifies that ‘[e]ducation and training is the
priority national policy’ (Article 35),31 and this assertion is repeated in the
introduction to the Education Law, and again in the Ninth Party Congress documents
(Communist Party of Vietnam 2001). In more detail, education is the means to ‘bring
into play human resources—the basic factor to develop the society, and create rapid
and stable economic growth’.32 According to the consensus represented by the
National Party Congress, education is a direct input for economic growth. In other
words, it no longer sits in a dependent relationship outside the economy, as part of
the superstructure. The Ninth Party Congress further stressed the importance of
education as the basis for ensuring that the country achieves the necessary
preconditions for advanced technology and science, which are, again, necessary
for the development of the country (Communist Party of Vietnam 2001).
Asian Socialism and Legal Change130
The greater importance placed on education is also evident in the practical
measures taken by the government to bolster education. Teachers now receive priority
salary payments compared to other public servants, and education is the only sector
to have its budget proportion fixed and approved by the National Assembly at the
high levels of 15 per cent for 2000, 18 per cent for 2005 and 20 per cent for 2010,33
planned levels that are apparently being achieved (Dang Ba Lam 2003). Student
enrolment in higher education institutions, some of the less practically oriented
areas of education, has also risen very rapidly, from 593,884 students in 1996/7, to
974,119 students in 2001/2. While the majority of students continue to study in
public institutions, the number in non-state institutions has increased significantly
as a proportion of the total, from 25,012 in 1996/7 to 100,900 in 2001/2 (from 4.2 per
cent to 10.4 per cent of total students), although this proportion has been slowly
falling since 1999/2000 (Dang Ba Lam 2003:518).
Prior to 1986, and even in 1991, National Party Congress documents tended to
emphasise the role of education in teaching socialist principles and vocational
skills, as in classical socialist writings, but during the 1990s, and particularly by
the time the Education Law was finalised, the leadership of the country had firmly
internalised international thinking about the importance of education as an input
for the development of a country (St George 2003), and concretised support for
education in practical policies and measures to support its now vital role in the
development of the country. This shows a willingness of the part of the leadership
not only to be swayed by practical realities, such as allowing private funding for
education in the wake of the country’s financial crisis, but also to be swayed by
alternative theoretical paradigms that had shown their practical importance in
other countries, in this case those of human resource development and of the
knowledge-based economies (St George 2003). In the case of the latter, this support
inadvertently tapped the traditionally high regard accorded to education in a
Confucian society, where national examinations for advancement have been held
for almost a thousand years. Within this framework, the determination to ensure
that socialism and Marxist-Leninist studies are still included in education programs,
particular at higher levels of study, can be seen as a compromise—an attempt to
maintain the trappings of a socialist education system and guard against accusations
that the Vietnamese education system might be becoming bourgeois, or capitalist.
Vietnam’s education law purports to be socialist and yet the nature of that
socialism is ambiguous. On the one hand it claims to rest on a foundation of
Marxism–Leninism and Ho Chi Minh thought, and this background is still evident
in the references to Marxism-Leninism and in the highly centralised administrative
system provided for in the law. On the other hand, the makers of the law were
confronted by a very real set of problems facing education in the 1990s, in terms of
administration, finance and the role of education itself. In administration,
institutions were hampered in their ability to adapt to a changing world because of
a highly centralised decision-making structure. In terms of finance, there was great
reluctance to accept non-state funding as a permanent feature of the education
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system, not only because of ideological and moral concerns, but also because of very
real practical concerns about educational quality, and this is evident in the great
vagueness of the law on matters of education funding. Finally, in terms of education
itself, while Marxism–Leninism treats education with great scepticism, Vietnamese
educators have also been keen to take on board international theories of education
radically different from those of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. They
have strongly welcomed international thinking supporting a strengthened role for
education in socioeconomic development, to the point where it has been enshrined
in the constitution as the ‘priority national policy’ of the country (Article 35).
In the final analysis, the socialist background of those drafting the Vietnamese
Education Law clearly shaped the issues that were (and were not) addressed in the
law, as well as the context in which the debates to finalise the law took place.
Marxist-Leninist theory and socialist central planning shaped the theoretical
perspective from which the Education Law was written, but this theoretical
background was tempered by the practicalities of Vietnamese education. While this
chapter has focused on the role of socialism in the Education Law, it is worth
remembering that the realities of Vietnamese education, as for any other sector, are
usually determined less with reference to the law, but rather on a basis that is
established through daily social interaction, personal relationships and changing
perceptions of the current problematic. Over time, these changing perceptions will
no doubt occasion further adjustments to the Education Law in accordance with
the changes to the ‘objective realities’ of socialism in Vietnam.
NOTES
1 Further information on the role of education in Marxism–Leninism and in other socialist
writings can be found in St George (2003).
2 ‘Phat trien theo con duong xa hoi chu nghia’ (Communist Party of Vietnam 2001:12).
3 The original text in Vietnamese was ‘Con duong di len cua nuoc ta la su phat trien qua do len chu
nghia xa hoi bo qua che do tu ban chu nghia, tuc la bo qua viec xac lap vi tri thong tri cua quan he san
xuat ve kien truc thuong tang tu ban chua nghia…’ (Communist Party of Vietnam 2001:21).
4 The original text in Vietnamese: ‘phap luat xa hoi chu nghia la tong hop nhung quy tac xu su the
hien y chi cua giai cap cong nhan va nhan dan lao dong duoi su lanh dao cua Dang cong san, do cac co
quan nha nuoc, nguoi tham quyen ban hanh theo trinh tu, thu tuc luat dinh, nham dieu chinh cac quan
he xa hoi, phu hop voi nen kinh te thi truong trong thoi ky qua do len chu nghia xa hoi chu nghia’
(Dinh Van Mau and Pham Hong Thai 2002:233).
5 Clearly this raises another contradiction as to how the Communist Party can represent at the
same time the interests of the working class and all other classes equally, and still remain a
Communist Party.
6 ‘Xay dung Nha nuoc phap quyen xa hoi chu nghia duoi su lanh dao cua Dang [Building a state
based on socialist law under the leadership of the Party]’.
7 The Central Steering Committee supervises the editing of national textbooks for the study of
Marxism–Leninism (The Vietnamese text is ‘Hoi dong trung uong chi dao bien soan giao trinh quoc
gia cac bo mon khoa hoc Mac-Lenin’ (Communist Party of Vietnam 2001:273)).
8 Sections concerning the drafting of the law, including comparisons with the 1996 draft of the
law are adapted from chapter 5 of St.George (2003).
9 Personal communication with MOET official, Hanoi, July 1998.
10 Other sources say that drafting of the law began well before these dates, in 1994, but this
seems unlikely (‘Vietnam Passes First Education Law’, AFP News Bulletin, 5 December 1998).
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11 A quick survey of theoretical articles in journals such as Tap chi Cong san [the Communist
Party Journal] or Phap ly va Nha nuoc [Law and the State] quickly reveal that the majority of
references to theoretical works are directly to the original works of Marx and Engels, to the
writings of Ho Chi Minh, or less often to the writings of Lenin, rather than the later body of
extensive works that now comprise ‘socialist theory’.
12 The original text in Vietnamese is ‘Muc tieu giao duc la dao tao con nguoi Viet Nam phat trien toan
dien, co dao duc, tri thuc, suc khoe, tham my va nghe nghiep, trung thanh voi ly tuong doc lap dan toc
va chu nghia xa hoi…’.
13 ‘Scientific’ (khoa hoc) refers less to the applied sciences as usually meant in English, but rather
to all higher level research. See below.
14 The original text in Vietnamese is ‘Nen giao duc Viet Nam la nen giao duc xa hoi chu nghia co tinh
nhan dan, dan toc, khoa hoc, hien dai, lay chu Mac-Lenin va tu tuong Ho Chi Minh lam nen tang’.
15 The original text in Vietnamese is ‘Muc tieu cua giao duc pho thong la…nham hinh thanh nhan cach
con nguoi Viet Nam xa hoi chu nghia, xay dung tu cach va trach nhiem cong dan…’.
16 The original text in Vietnamese is ‘Noi dung giao duc dai hoc phai co tinh hien dai va phat trien, bao
dam co cau hop ly giua kien thuc khoa hoc co ban voi kien thuc chuyen nganh va cac bo mon khoa hoc
Mac-Lenin, tu tuong Ho Chi Minh…’.
17 The original text in Vietnamese is ‘Van dung sang tao va phat trien ly luan cua chu nghia Mac-Lenin
va tu tuong Ho Chi Minh; xay dung ly luan ve vhu nghia xa hoi va con duong di len chu nghia xa hoi
cua Viet Nam…’.
18 The original text in Vietnamese is ‘Loi dung hoat dong khoa hoc va cong nghe de xuyen tac, chong
lai duong loi, chinh sach cua Dang Cong san Viet Nam, phap luat cua Nha nuoc Cong hoa xa hoi chu
nghia Viet Nam; pha hoai khoi dai doan ket dan toc.’
19 The original text in Vietnamese is ‘Dang khang dinh chu nghia Mac-Lenin va tu tuong Ho Chi Minh
la nen tang tu tuong va kim chi cho hoat dong cua minh’ in Central Steering Committee for the
Editing of National Textbooks for the Study of Maxism–Leninism (2002).
20 Luat Thuong mai 1997 [Law on Commerce 1997]
21 Luat 35/2002/QH10 cua Quoc Hoi sua doi bo sung mot so dieu cua Bo Luat Lao dong
[Labour Code of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam—Amended and Supplemented in 2002].
22 See, for example, Commonwealth of Australia, Higher Education Funding Act 1988, Article
2a.
23 See the Compulsory Education Law of the People’s Republic of China 1986, Article 3; and the
Law on Education (1998) of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Article 2.
24 See the New South Wales Education Act (1990), Article 6.1A; and Socialist Republic of
Vietnam (1998), Law on Education (1998) of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Article 23.
25 The original in Vietnamese is ‘cac co quan quan ly giao duc’.
26 See, for example, Quyet dinh so 19/2003/QD-BGDDT ngay 8/5/2003 cua Bo truong Bo
Giao duc va Dao tao  ve viec ban hanh De cuong mon hoc: Triet hoc Mac-Lenin; Kinh te chinh
tri Mac-Lenin (khoi nganh kinh te – quan tri kinh doanh) va Kinh te chinh tri Mac – Lenin (khoi
nganh khong chuyen kinh te – quan tri kinh doanh) trinh do cao dang [Decision No.19/2003/
QD-BGDDT, dated 8/5/2003, of the Ministry of Education and Training on the promulgation
of the subject: Marxist-Leninist theory, Marxist-Leninist political economy (for economics and
business management branches), and Marxist-Leninist political economy (for non-economics
and business management specialisation branches) at the college level]. Similar decisions for
other branches and subjects appear in the same edition of the national gazette, Cong Bao No.
45, 1 June 2003.
27 The difference between these four types of institutions has become increasingly unclear over
time. One of the proposed amendments to the Education Law to be put to the National
Assembly in 2004 includes reducing the number of types of institutions to two—public (to
include semi-public) and private (including ‘people-founded’). Personal communication with
Dang Ba Lam, Director-General, National Institute for Education Development, Hanoi, 22
May 2003.
28 Personal communication with Dang Ba Lam, Director-General, National Institute for Education
Development, Hanoi, 22 May 2003.
29 The original text in Vietnamese is ‘Cam moi hanh vi thoung mai hoa hoat dong giao duc’.
30 Personal communication with Dang Ba Lam, Director-General, National Institute for Education
Development, Hanoi, 22 May 2003.
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31 The original text in Vietnamese is ‘Giao duc va dao tao la quoc sach hang dau’.
32 The original text in Vietnamese is ‘phat huy nguon luc con nguoi - yeu to co ban de phat trien xa hoi,
tang truong kinh te nhanh va ben vung’ (Communist Party of Viet Nam 2001:108–9).
33 Communist Party of Viet Nam (2001), and Personal communication with Perran Penrose,
UNDP consultant, Hanoi, 3 June 2003.
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Legal education in transitional 
Vietnam 
Bui Thi Bich Lien 
The launch of doi moi (literally meaning ‘Renovation’) has resulted in numerous 
unprecedented changes in Vietnam during the last decade and a half. Moving from 
a centrally planned society to a market-oriented society, the state has defined law as 
an important tool to govern society and promote economic development. This 
transformation process poses great challenges for Vietnam’s legal system, as the 
ambitious targets set by doi moi need to be facilitated by qualified legal professionals. 
In this context, legal education plays a critically important role. Although it is 
undeniable that law schools have made significant improvement in terms of teaching 
and establishing their prestige in society, the pace does not seem fast enough to 
accommodate legal reform (Legal Needs Assessment Report, 2002). Many 
practitioners think that the ever-increasing numbers of graduating law students 
lack the improved professional skills required to serve a transitional society. Despite 
a number of reform programs, the quality of legal training in Vietnam remains 
moderate. 
This chapter analyses the status of Vietnam’s contemporary legal education 
system, examining the influence of socialist legal doctrines on legal training, and 
attempts to evaluate the factors that induce resistance to reform. 
The chapter starts with a brief description of the law school system and the law 
curriculum of Vietnam, with special attention on the legal theory subject and its 
significance to the entire course of study. The teaching and evaluation methods and 
their consequences are then examined. The efforts to reform legal education are 
explored, including formal programs launched by the national government and 
international donors and informal initiatives of law teachers. I will only discuss 
legal education at the tertiary level, focusing on Hanoi Law University and its 
135 
Asian Socialism and Legal Change 136 
training program as this is the largest training institution which plays a prominent 
role in legal education in Vietnam. Apart from written sources, my analysis is based 
on various informal interviews with law professors, law students, state officials 
and legal practitioners. 
LAW SCHOOL SYSTEM IN VIETNAM 
A brief history 
Unlike other socialist countries with a relatively long tradition of law teaching 
(Macdonald 1980; Tay and Kamenka 1986; Gostynski and Garfield 1993),1 legal 
education in Vietnam has a brief, discontinuous history. During the French colonial 
period, public education was only accessible to a small élite group in large urban 
areas (Kelly 2000). A law school was established in 1941 with very limited enrolment 
of Vietnamese students, but there is no evidence that these early law graduates 
served in the legal education system after their graduation.2 The harsh period of 
war did not allow the government in the North to place emphasis on its legal process 
and training. There was a judicial training school that belonged to the People’s 
Supreme Court, but it only focused on training judges on a small scale. The Ministry 
of Justice even had to close. 
It was not until a few years after reunification that the Ministry of Justice was re- 
opened and the Hanoi Law University (Dai Hoc Phap Ly Ha Noi, later renamed Dai 
Hoc Luat Ha Noi) was established as the first formal tertiary law school (see Sidel 
1993). There was a law university in the South before 1975 (Dai Hoc Luat Khoa Sai 
Gon), but in 1976 it was merged with other schools of the old Saigon regime to form 
the Economic University of Ho Chi Minh City. This new university did not provide 
formal law training again until 2001. In 1989, Hanoi Law University opened its 
campus in Ho Chi Minh City. The founding teachers of this branch were sent from 
the North and were previously trained in the Eastern bloc. This campus was then 
separated from Hanoi Law University and became an independent law school of 
the South, the Ho Chi Minh City Law University (HCMCLU).3 As part of the changes 
brought by doi moi, law has become fashionable and many other institutions offering 
legal training have flourished. 
In summary, legal education in Vietnam is a relatively new area and is largely 
disconnected from the previous non-socialist legal training. As a part of the national 
education system, it follows the mainstream track set by the Party and government 
for education and is consequently targeted at serving the socioeconomic development 
of the country. According to the Education Development Strategy for 2001–10,4 
Vietnam aims to build a modern, scientific education system that is nationalistic in 
nature with a socialist orientation, based on the foundation of Marxist-Leninist 
theories and Ho Chi Minh’s thought.5 Education’s objective is to provide qualified 
human resources for the country’s industrialisation and modernisation process. 
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The law schools and law teaching 
The current system of law schools and law teaching in Vietnam is complicated and 
operates under a number of different forms of administration. 
Until the end of the 1980s, Vietnam copied the Soviet education model (Financial 
Times Information 2002), including two main types of universities (Kelly 2002). The 
first type, ‘specialised universities’, such as Hanoi Law University and HCMCLU, 
focus on a single area of study. These universities are established specifically to 
train law graduates. Hanoi Law University is the largest law training institution in 
Vietnam and a subordinate body of the Ministry of Justice. Meanwhile, HCMCLU is 
under the administration of the Ministry of Education and Training (MOET) (Hanoi 
Law University 2002), and has quickly established its reputation in the South since 
becoming independent from Hanoi Law University. 
Apart from Hanoi Law University and HCMCLU, universities exist that 
specialise in other disciplines but which also include a law subject in the curriculum 
for their non-law students (Hanoi Law University 2002).6 These universities have a 
team (To) of law lecturers (often a small team) and the courses they teach only 
provide basic introductions to law.7 
The second type of universities are ‘multi-disciplinary’ and offer degrees in 
different areas, including law. These universities have a Faculty of Law (Khoa Luat), 
most of which were established very recently.8 
In addition, there are other legal training institutions administered by a research 
institute or judicial body. These institutions may offer postgraduate law education 
or focus on legal professional skills training. For example, the Institute of State and 
Law (under the National Centre for Social and Human Sciences) and the Faculty of 
State and Law (under the Ho Chi Minh National Political Academy) are authorised 
to conduct postgraduate law education. Meanwhile, the Higher School of Procuracy 
(under the People’s Supreme Procuracy) and the Legal Professional Training School 
(under the Ministry of Justice), later renamed the Judicial Academy, train judges, 
private lawyers and procuracy cadres. 
In the early 1990s, Vietnam adopted new forms of tertiary education. ‘People- 
founded universities’ (dai hoc dan lap) and ‘open universities’ (dai hoc mo) were 
established as a part of the education reform program. Some of these universities also 
took part in legal education, but most of their resources, such as lecturers and materials, 
were drawn from other state law universities on a contractual basis. This type of 
law training, however, soon ceased because of government concerns over quality. 
Law programs 
Law training institutions in Vietnam offer a variety of programs, which can be 
categorised into three main groups. 
The first category is applicable to regular full-time students (sinh vien chinh quy 
dai han) who engage in undergraduate education. After completing a four or five 
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year course, students receive a formal Bachelor of Laws degree (bang dai hoc chinh 
quy). Despite tough competition for admission, the number of students enrolled in 
these courses has increased markedly.9 In response to the recent popularity of offering 
several university degrees, some law training institutions have initiated ‘second 
degree courses‘ (often known as ‘lop bang hai’) that provide formal Bachelor of Laws 
degrees for students who have a degree in another field.10 These courses are often 
shorter than the regular program and students are not required to attend classes on 
a daily basis. 
The second category is ‘in-service’ (tai chuc) education.11 Similar to the Chinese 
model (Depei and Kanter 1984), in-service training was initially designed for state 
officials who had not previously undertaken formal education. Students continue 
to work and attend classes on a part-time basis. They also receive a Bachelor of 
Laws degree that is specifically issued for in-service courses (bang dai hoc tai chuc); 
such a degree is essential to ensure promotion and job stability. These courses have 
been expanded to non-state participants due to the decreased demand in the state 
sector recently. In-service training has been acknowledged as a helpful way to 
upgrade state officials’ knowledge of basic laws and make legal education more 
accessible to the population. The popularity of this law degree,12 however, has 
induced some doubts about its quality. The number of courses is excessive for law 
teachers, leaving them no time to prepare and update their materials. In addition, a 
less-valued degree (Certificate of Higher Education in Law or ‘bang trung cap luat’) is 
available for students who only have a basic educational background. 
The third type of law program is postgraduate education, which was initiated in 
1986 by the Institute of State and Law. Since then, some other institutions, such as 
the Hanoi Law University, have also begun providing Master and Doctoral degrees 
in law, and the number of postgraduate students has promptly increased.13 Many, 
however, hold the view that this upgrading program does not mean that legal 
academia in Vietnam is developing. Postgraduate students are concerned that 
curricula are very similar to those used in the undergraduate programs, and that 
the courses do not provide them with improved research skills and methodology. 
Law curricula 
The fact that there are different training institutions providing different law courses 
does not mean that the law curricula vary. The tension between the increasing 
demand for a law degree and the lack of resources makes legal teaching heavily 
dependent on a relatively small number of law teachers and the materials prepared 
by them. By the end of the 1980s, and during the 1990s, lecturers from Hanoi Law 
University were intensively mobilised to teach law courses throughout the country. 
Law textbooks published by Hanoi Law University have also been used widely in 
other institutions. Although there have been moves to diversify, most of the law 
schools still share the same syllabus. As such, I will limit my discussion to the 
undergraduate curriculum studied by full-time students at Hanoi Law University, 
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due to its popularity.14 I will not refer to the curricula for in-service training,15 
postgraduate and other legal training courses. In addition, my analysis will focus 
on particular subjects in the curriculum that reflect how socialist legal theories 
affect the style of law teaching. 
Although the length of the course has been changed from time to time,16 the 
substantive teaching has not materially changed during the last decade. It looks 
similar to the curricula followed in other socialist law schools.17 Marxist-Leninist 
studies remain compulsory and Soviet legal doctrine decides the design of the entire 
curriculum. It should be noted, however, that many new subjects have been added 
to the training program in an effort to bring law education closer to the market place. 
The program consists of two phases: fundamental training (dao tao co ban) and 
specialised training (dao tao chuyen nganh). 
The fundamental training period is mandatory for all law students. For social 
and humanities studies, it adopts the MOET standards, which obviously have a 
socialist orientation. Following the introduction of the Education Development 
Strategy, the prime minister issued a decision in 2002 requiring all universities to 
invest more human and financial resources in the teaching of Marxist-Leninist 
theories and Ho Chi Minh’s thought. It reconfirms that study of Marxist-Leninist 
philosophy, political economy, socialist science and history of the Communist Party 
of Vietnam are compulsory for all university students. From 2004, law students 
learn the new subject of Ho Chi Minh’s thought.18 Fundamental training in the law 
schools includes all these topics. 
Apart from Marxist-Leninist studies, some other subjects, including physical 
education (the duc), national defence education (quan su) and foreign languages, are 
also taught in this first phase. The time allocated for fundamental training is 
approximately 30 per cent of specialised legal training (Hanoi Law University 
2002).19 
The specialised legal training focuses on teaching law and other law-related 
topics. Students learn Marxist-Leninist theories on state and law (ly luan nha nuoc va 
phap luat) and all law branches (nganh luat). Each law branch constitutes a mandatory 
subject. Examples include constitutional, administrative, criminal, civil, economic 
and labour law.20 In addition, supplementary and optional subjects are offered 
separately to students of different departments21 depending on their ‘specialisation’ 
(chuyen nganh). Most of these subjects are closely related to the development of a 
market economy. For example, students in the economic law department take business 
administration, auditing or securities laws, while students in the international law 
department study international trade law and international settlement. Although 
these additional subjects themselves are still influenced by socialist ideologies, the 
fact that they are included in the curriculum shows a compromise between socialist 
orientation and a reaction to market needs. 
At the end of specialised training, students are sent to different institutions and 
organisations for an internship to gain some practical experience.22 
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The fundamental training phase is generally controlled by the MOET, while 
Hanoi Law University has more power in specialised training. Following the 
timeframe set by the MOET, Hanoi Law University decides on the number of law 
topics that can be taught and the time allocated to each topic. Changes to the law 
curriculum, such as the introduction of new subjects or expansion of teaching time, 
must be approved by the Science Committee (Hoi Dong Khoa Hoc) of Hanoi Law 
University and the Ministry of Justice. 
THEMES OF STATE AND LAW 
Themes of State and Law [Ly Luan Nha Nuoc va Phap Luat] provides background 
knowledge on state and law for all law students and is regarded as the conceptual 
framework in which law is analysed (Le Minh Tam 1998a). As such, it is intended 
to establish a foundation for law students to deal with legal issues. 
The main source of materials used for teaching and studying is a textbook of 
Themes of State and Law. Although it has been updated and revised many times and 
is now much more comprehensive than it was ten years ago, some basic concepts 
remain unchanged. Notably, the class nature of state and law, and the approach 
that law is an instrument of the state to govern society, have been reaffirmed.23 In 
addition, Party leadership is among the guiding principles that controls state 
governance and lawmaking activities (Le Minh Tam 1998c). 
Students are taught that the most important function of the state is to manage the 
economy (‘quan ly nha nuoc ve kinh te’).24 State economic management is regarded as 
a part of the class revolution during the transitional period (‘dau tranh giai cap trong 
thoi ky qua do’) to protect the working class from exploitative capitalism. To fulfil this 
task, the state employs plans (‘ke hoach’), builds up a ‘mechanism of economic 
management’ (‘co che quan ly kinh te’) and owns essential production tools (‘tu lieu 
san xuat chu yeu’), including land (Le Minh Tam 1998d).25 Since the subject is taught 
to law students soon after they enter law school, when their legal knowledge is still 
limited,26 these ideologies of state economic management are often well rooted and 
continue to develop during the four-year course. 
As mentioned earlier, Themes of State and Law divides the legal system into 
independent law branches (nganh luat doc lap). This theory has been the core element 
that forms the law curriculum. It is based on Marxist arguments of the relationship 
between the superstructure and infrastructure. Social relations (quan he xa hoi) that 
are subject to law adjustment (known by legal scholars and law students as ‘objects 
of adjustment’ or ‘doi tuong dieu chinh’ ) are part of the infrastructure, while the law 
belongs to the superstructure. 
Once social relations are governed by laws, they become ‘legal relations’ (quan he 
phap luat). Social relations occurring in a particular field, such as labour or finance, 
share certain common features. Therefore, they can be categorised into the same 
group. As a consequence, the laws governing such groups are similarly categorised. 
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Two standards are used to define the independence of a law branch, namely ‘objects 
of adjustment’ and ‘methods of adjustment’ (phuong phap dieu chinh) (Le Minh Tam 
1998f:393–94). 
The most noticeable disadvantage of this classification theory is that it understates 
the complexity of the legal system. The ‘independent law branch’ approach has, to 
some extent, isolated the ‘branches’ of law from each other.27 As learners, law students 
tend to be attached to simple formulas and channel all legal issues into one (or a 
few) of the laws that they know. This, in turn, affects their ability to identify a matrix 
of legal matters that are often associated with social relations. For example, students 
learn about companies and administrative procedures to set up such entities under 
economic law. They then learn about land law, tax law and labour law as separate 
subjects. This way of teaching fails to make students aware that the existence of a 
company not only involves its establishment formalities, but also involves a series 
of other complicated legal issues such as land, tax and employment. The 
compartmentalisation does not prepare students to offer clients practical advice. 
Students also face great difficulties dealing with other aspects of the legal system 
that do not fall into any of the standard law branches, such as import and export 
regulations and customs laws. Even law teachers tend to limit their knowledge to 
their ‘specialised’ topics and the series of issues that are set for teaching within 
those topics. For example, land law teachers would generally not be interested in 
researching how land is taxed, as that issue is dealt with by finance law teachers. 
Classification theory is also a source of confusion and ambiguity. Legal scholars 
informally admit that there are numerous social relations that cannot be categorised 
into any of the current law branches. Even some traditional legal relations, such as 
contracts, have new forms.28 As such, law teachers struggle to invent some common 
features that can represent ‘objects of adjustment’ of a law branch and maintain 
their ‘independence’ from each other. 
It is even harder to justify the ‘methods of adjustment’ proposition. There are 
only two ‘methods of adjustment’ that apply to the entire legal system, namely the 
‘compulsory method’ (phuong phap menh lenh) and the ‘equal method’ (phuong phap 
binh dang). It is believed that the ‘compulsory method’ is suitable for governing 
vertical legal relations in which the state is one party, such as administrative or 
criminal laws. On the other hand, the ‘equal method’ is applied to horizontal relations 
in which the parties enjoy equal status, such as civil law. Since doi moi, all law 
branches that govern economic activities employ both methods. Therefore, the second 
element that determines the ‘independence’ of these branches arguably no longer 
exists. Although legal writing and teaching has focused less on the reasoning behind 
the categorisation of the legal system,29 classification theory is still a part of the 
formal teaching program, so it continues to generate confusion among teachers and 
learners. 
Themes of State and Law seems to mitigate the interweaving of law and other 
social spheres. The relationship between law and politics, economics and morality 
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is only briefly addressed (Le Minh Tam 1998d)30 and is not mentioned again in 
other law subjects. Thus, students encounter ideologies of instrumentalist law and 
state management most frequently since these issues are repeated throughout the 
course. This is another weakness of legal education, since students do not learn 
about the sophistication of the legal and political system and how law interacts 
with economic and political development. 
Themes of State and Law does not yet reflect the ‘nationalism’ feature. There has 
been a series of scholarly discussions about Ho Chi Minh’s thought on state and 
law, but none of this discussion has been introduced to law schools since law 
teachers are not yet ready. It is expected that this issue will be covered by the new 
subject of Ho Chi Minh’s thought and will be taught by teachers of political science.31 
As such, socialism remains a dominant feature of state and law doctrines. 
The following sections will use some law ‘branches’ as examples to examine 
further how themes of state and law are incorporated into other law subjects. 
Although there are currently more than a dozen law branches, a standard model 
applies to all of them. The first one or two lessons are devoted to providing a theoretical 
basis to students. This introductory session presents an overview (khai niem) of the 
subject and sets out its scope. Largely based on classification theory, it shows how 
branches are independent from others. 
Land law 
Land law is claimed to be different from other laws (in particular civil and economic 
law) because it has its own ‘objects of adjustment’ and ‘methods of adjustment’. 
The ‘objects of adjustment’ have two salient features. First, land is a ‘special 
commodity’ (hang hoa dac biet) and therefore social relations concerning land (quan 
he dat dai) are not subject to civil law that governs regular property. This original 
concept of ‘land as a special commodity’ is intended to preserve state ownership of 
land. It remains ambiguous and unclear, as there is insufficient explanation of what 
makes land a ‘special commodity’. Second, land relations are not a type of economic 
activity since the management and use of land is for community interests rather 
than for making a profit. Thus, they are not ruled by economic law either. ‘Methods 
of adjustment’ is a combination of the ‘compulsory method’ and the ‘equal method’ 
(Tran Quang Huy 2001a:12–16). 
The application of the classification theory to land law is confusing because 
there are certain ‘land relations’ that do not fit into the ideological framework of 
‘objects of adjustment’. For example, it is hard to explain why land transactions are 
not economic activities when they are subject to capital gains tax. In addition, its 
‘methods of adjustment’, as noted earlier, are not different from those of other law 
branches and therefore cannot be referred to as a distinguishing feature of land law. 
Land law also embodies the fundamental principle of Marxist theory that land 
belongs to ‘the people’. Two entire chapters are devoted to state ownership and 
management of land (quan ly nha nuoc ve dat dai) (Tran Quang Huy 2001b:47–76, 
2001c:77–110). These chapters reaffirm the themes of state and law and build up the 
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important ideology of state management in relation to land. On the other hand, land 
law is extended to include a number of lessons on land transactions in recognition 
of the realities of the market. However, land law teachers rarely question the 
contradiction between ‘state management’ and the largely uncontrolled land market 
in their teaching. 
Finance law and banking law 
These two subjects are an interesting example of how legal theories and the law 
curriculum have been adjusted to address economic reform. In the past, they were a 
single law branch under the name of finance law. Under the central planning regime, 
finance law governed vertical relations, including budget and tax laws. There were 
also some insurance and banking regulations but all the insurance companies and 
banks were state-owned. 
The doi moi policy and changes in the financial services sector meant that the 
classification theory was no longer relevant to this law branch. New horizontal 
relations such as commercial insurance and commercial loans have emerged, 
prompting law teachers to create a new subject of banking law. The reasoning for 
this split, however, was still based in the traditional themes of state and law. It was 
seen that banking law needed to be ‘independent’ because it has its own ‘objects of 
adjustment’ that differ significantly from those of finance law. 
Finance law was designed to govern a mixture of vertical and horizontal relations 
including budget and tax, corporate finance and insurance.32 Since it is difficult to 
find common features that represent these groups, scholars changed the approach 
to list them all as ‘objects of adjustment’ of finance law. A similar path was adopted 
for banking law. Although banking law has been made a new subject, law teachers 
informally and reluctantly acknowledged the unconvincing theoretical basis for its 
independence. Finance law later was further split into four separate topics; namely, 
tax law, budget law, commercial insurance law and securities law. All these subjects 
are still handled by the same team of finance and banking law teachers. However, 
the concept of ‘methods of adjustment’ is deliberately silent in the teaching. 
As with land law, students learn about state management in the finance and 
banking sectors (quan ly nha nuoc trong linh vuc tai chinh va ngan hang).33 Although it 
is not entirely clear, state management is usually referred to as the theoretical basis 
of almost any exercise of state power. For example, the state management function of 
the State Bank of Vietnam was invoked to explain why the bank should issue 
regulations setting a ceiling rate for offshore loans. Later, when the ceiling rate was 
removed, justification was attributed to the bank’s discretion to create a more liberal 
lending policy for the purpose of state management at that time. 
If Themes of State and Law introduces the first basis for state management, other 
law subjects work to consolidate it. When law students reach their final years, the 
concept has become firmly established. They tend to utilise it to justify virtually all 
legal issues that arise from state intervention into social relations and, significantly, 
tend to develop a mentality that assigns priority to state rights and devotes insufficient 
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attention to other parties’ interests. In a moot tax case, for example, a student 
representing—and supposedly defending—a taxpayer, apologised to the tax 
authority because he felt the principle of state management was being violated. 
Design of curricula and course materials 
Law curricula for the specialised training phase are prepared by law schools. The 
first generation of law teachers—now quite senior—was trained in Eastern Europe 
and is currently the primary force in designing the curricula and writing the 
textbooks. Due to the lack of resources during the 1980s and early 1990s, course 
materials, especially the socialist legal doctrines and concepts, were prepared 
according to law teachers’ overseas experiences. 
Following doi moi, Themes of State and Law and other economic law subjects 
have been updated to address economic reform. However, changes in law curricula 
and course content have been relatively slow compared to other disciplines such as 
economics or other social sciences. Arguably, this can be attributed to the fact that 
the conceptualised understanding of law—according to which the law is supposed 
to demonstrate and cement the Party’s policies—remains unchanged. As such, the 
Themes of State and Law have mainly been developed on the basis of Party policy 
documents. Since the Party’s policies promote a socialist legal system (he thong phap 
luat xa hoi chu nghia) in Vietnam, Soviet legal orthodoxies are employed to serve this 
purpose. For both law teachers and law students, law is an integral part of politics, 
and the study of state and law is incomplete without referring to the Party’s 
resolutions.34 
Despite awareness of the need objectively to re-examine the relevance of Soviet 
legal doctrines in a market economy, law teachers refrain from challenging these 
entrenched theories. They tend to ‘reform’ the technical rather than the theoretical 
aspects of law teaching. This tendency is partly due to the lack of proper research 
skills and methodologies. However, in many cases teachers are reluctant to touch 
upon theories because of concerns over political sensitivity. In certain situations 
where Soviet doctrines appear to be particularly irrelevant, they avoid them by 
focusing on the practical issues. 
While law teachers and scholars were free to adopt Socialist legal writing to 
prepare their teaching materials, they used legal materials from Western market 
economies for different purposes. In the latest version of the Themes of State and Law 
textbook, some brief references to US constitutional writing were inserted as examples 
to illustrate Soviet concepts of state and law. Experience of other Western legal 
systems has also been sought, but the focus has been on neither doctrines nor 
concepts. 
For example, when banking law was split from finance law, teachers with 
Australian and British educational experience were consulted on the question of 
how banking law is treated in these countries. Banking law eventually became an 
independent subject for teaching partly because of the adoption of a model learned 
from other developed legal systems (Vo Dinh Toan 2002). However, the classification 
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theory was still used to justify this movement, and references for banking law still 
include Soviet legal writing from the 1950s and the 1970s (Vo Dinh Toan 2002). Law 
teachers are urged to introduce the Western experience in certain areas of banking 
law, such as bank guarantees or syndicated loans, but they are also required to 
teach the principle of state management of the banking system. It is therefore clear 
that reformists are reluctant to move away from the politically dominant theme. 
Collective decision-making is another factor that may have contributed to 
resistance to reform of curricula and course materials. Each law subject is often 
taught by a group of law teachers who work independently to prepare their lecture 
notes and reference materials. Such materials, however, are required to conform to a 
standard textbook. New ideas or approaches need to be discussed and approved by 
the whole team in order to ensure consistency and consensus. While this system 
aims at compromise and harmonisation, it discourages the introduction of radical 
views, because their introduction is usually a source of conflict. Teachers tend to 
avoid presenting individual opinions or controversial views to students because it 
may cause colleagues to lose face, or expose the team’s internal inconsistencies 
publicly. 
Teaching and evaluation 
Teaching methodology. Most universities in Vietnam, including law teaching 
institutions, apply the traditional lecturing style. This method is characterised by 
one-way communication in which the teachers deliver their lectures while students 
take notes. There is virtually no interruption for questions or comments from students. 
Lectures are usually long and classes are large.35 Junior lecturers are required to 
attend a course on teaching methodology and skills when starting their careers, 
and the instructors for this course are from a pedagogy school that emphasises one- 
way communication and discourages student participation. 
Teachers prepare their own lecturing materials, but such materials need to follow 
standard textbooks to ensure consistency in terms of structure and content. Radical 
and active teachers may search for external sources such as Western law or even 
materials used by the Saigon Law School before 1975, but access to these sources is 
often limited and depends on individual initiative. Most of the law lessons are 
based on legislation and, as such, can easily become outdated once the legislation 
changes. Although considerable investment has been put into upgrading teaching 
and learning facilities, legal updates are often received late by law school libraries. 
Teachers tend to use their own personal relationships with state officials to obtain 
new legal documents. 
Seminars are also arranged in parallel with lectures. As part of wider reform 
efforts, the time allocated for seminars has been increased and classes made smaller36 
to give students more opportunities to take part in discussion (Hanoi Law University 
2002). This form of teaching is also not very effective, however, as student 
participation in discussion is often limited. In a typical seminar, teachers have to try 
hard to get students to speak. This may reflect Vietnamese cultural norms—in 
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Confucian societies, where education is highly appreciated, students are taught to 
respect teachers and their opinions. After many years spent in school, they fall into 
the habit of obeying teachers and following their instructions, and, as a consequence, 
tend to be shy of presenting their own opinions in public. For those who are confident 
and outspoken, there is a concern that their perspectives may not be the ‘right’ ones. 
Generally, a seminar is not a forum where students learn how to debate and 
argue. Rather, it is a modified form of lecturing in which students wait for the right 
answers and resolutions from teachers. In other words, students rarely work towards 
a solution for legal problems and their contribution to the outcome of a seminar is 
minimal. Hypothetical cases are included for discussion, but tend to be relatively 
simple. Court cases are not yet available from public records, therefore teachers 
have to be inventive with their own cases. 
The biggest disadvantage of this teaching style is that it produces passive learning. 
Neither the lectures nor the seminars train law students in the problem-solving and 
analytical skills that are essential for the legal profession. Although reformists have 
called for the launch of new teaching methods that focus more on skills training, law 
teachers are confused and torn between traditional lecturing and case studies.37 Like 
students elsewhere, students in Vietnam are most concerned about how to pass exams. 
As the exam scheme (discussed below) focuses on rote learning, students are forced 
to develop memorising skills. Creative and independent thinking is not promoted 
and most law graduates are still needlessly immature in this respect after graduation. 
Another noticeable shortcoming is the big gap between what is taught at law 
schools and what is required in legal practice.38 Although many law teachers are 
admitted to the bar, only a small number have actually represented clients before the 
courts or engaged in providing legal consultancy services.39 The new regulations 
affecting lawyers have worsened the situation because the legal profession and law 
teachers are separated indefinitely. According to these regulations, government 
officials cannot become members of the bar, apparently to avoid conflicts of interest, 
and those who represent state power cannot simultaneously serve private clients. 
Since law teachers also have the status of civil servants, they are not allowed to join 
the bar. From 2004, all law teachers who had previously been admitted to the bar 
were to quit the bar if they wished to stay with universities.40 
There have been some arguments that the current methodology applied to law 
teaching in Vietnam has been influenced by the French style inherited from the 
French civil law system. However, law teachers who graduated in the Eastern bloc 
reported that the current teaching style in Vietnam is exactly what they experienced 
in other socialist law schools. 
Although law teachers and students have informally admitted the ineffectiveness 
of the current teaching methodology, there has been no focus on developing legal 
trainers’ skills. Analysis in the next section will show that legal reform programs at 
both national and institutional levels assign only an insignificant position to legal 
education. Meanwhile, government policy on tertiary education demonstrates a 
contradictory approach to the issue of teaching methodology. Unprecedented by- 
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laws for universities have been issued to promote decentralisation, but at the same 
time a certain degree of control has been retained.41 On the one hand, the recent 
Decision No. 153 entitles lecturers to choose teaching materials and teaching 
methodology freely in order to promote their individual ability and quality of 
teaching. On the other hand, teachers are obliged to teach in accordance with 
curricula and course content designed by MOET and universities.42 
Since law belongs to the superstructure and is regarded as a state instrument to 
govern society, the exercise of law is not seen as part of the economic base. Rather, it 
is a demonstration of state power. Therefore, the concepts of ‘legal profession’ (nghe 
luat su) and ‘legal services’ (dich vu phap ly) are barely mentioned in legal teaching. 
This ideology fits with the current institutional structure, where lawyer skills are 
only taught in a special course which is designed for legal professional training.43 
In addition, professional qualities are often matched with political qualities as law 
and politics overlap. 
The ‘general objective’ (muc tieu chung) of legal training at Hanoi Law University 
is defined as follows. 
The law program aims at training law graduates with political and moral qualities and 
consciousness to serve the people. Law graduates should have knowledge and capacity to 
perform their jobs. In addition, they should have good health to meet the demands of the 
country’s modernisation and industrialisation process. They should also contribute to the 
building of a law-based state, aiming at prosperous people, wealthy nation and civilised 
society [emphasis added]. 44 
The ‘political and moral qualities’ are positioned as primary targets for legal 
education. In addition, the requirement that law graduates should have 
consciousness to serve the people implicitly refers to a socialist state which is ‘of the 
people, for the people and by the people’, as defined in the constitution.45 Other 
references to modernisation and industrialisation only operate at a high level and 
thus do not present any particular policy instructions to law teaching. 
To achieve this general objective, the policy draws certain specific objectives 
(muc tieu cu the) for legal education 
• to provide students with fundamental, comprehensive knowledge about 
law and the legal system 
• to provide students with other law-related social knowledge 
• to equip students with scientific mentality and approaches to resolve 
theoretical and practical legal problems 
• to form preliminary concepts about legal expertise in different areas 
• to acquaint students with the operation and activities of different 
institutions so that when they graduate they will be equipped with 
fundamental legal and practical knowledge, and be able to find and resolve 
common problems that arise in specialised areas in which they are trained. 
In addition, they will have a foundation to pursue a higher degree in law. 
It is a common understanding among law teachers that ‘fundamental knowledge’ 
(kien thuc co ban) is limited to the theoretical (ly thuyet), rather than the practical side 
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of law and, as such, does not relate to the development of professional skills. They 
argue that law graduates will develop their own problem-solving skills once they 
start their careers and deal with law in practice. Although the policy requires training 
in ‘practical skills’ (ky nang thuc hanh) for students, it simply refers to a preliminary 
understanding of how institutions (co quan, to chuc) operate in practice. In the 
Vietnamese context, these institutions often mean state organisations such as the 
court, the inspector office or state-owned institutions. Practical skills are in fact 
gained when students perform a brief internship in such institutions, rather than in 
the law school. In addition, the skills acquired frequently concern the exercise of 
state power using law. 
The comprehensive report about legal education in Vietnam completed by Hanoi 
Law University in 2002 also mentions the need to target professional skills training 
for law students. Its main focus, however, is the curriculum and no reference is 
made to teaching methodology. 
Exams and assessment 
The assessment methods applied in legal education share some common problems 
apparent in the entire education system of Vietnam. The borrowed Soviet model, 
spoilt by the local achievement-craving mentality, often leads to dishonest evaluation 
(Financial Times Information 2002). Different kinds of exams have been trialled, but 
none seem to be effective in ensuring quality and fairness. In traditional closed- 
book exams, copying and plagiarism are rampant as students are challenged to 
memorise large volumes of materials in a few days and seek ways of avoiding this. 
Open-book exams were trialled, but most papers were returned with the same 
answers. Oral exams have recently been promoted in a reform effort (Hanoi Law 
University 2002), but the result has not been overly different and the experiment 
discomforted both students and teachers. As with closed-book exams, students 
memorise huge amounts of material, including textbooks, lecture notes and 
legislation for the oral exams, where they are given a brief time to answer a few 
questions that constitute a very small part of what they have worked hard to 
memorise. The teachers, on the other hand, are required to follow a series of 
assessment instructions which are difficult to apply in practice. Despite strict rules, 
informal lobbying for good grades is common in both written and oral exams. 
LEGAL EDUCATION REFORM 
National reform 
At the national level, attention to law training reform appears to be modest. In 
addition, the Party’s policy for reform focuses more on management and control 
than on accommodating legal education to legal and economic development. 
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Resolution No.08/NQ-TW introduced by the Politburo in January 2002 is an 
important policy document that sets out a series of institutional reforms for the legal 
sector. However, it only briefly mentions legal education as a part of the capacity- 
building program. In particular, the resolution requires tertiary law training to be 
concentrated in Hanoi Law University and HCMCLU, and calls for unification of 
curricula and law textbooks. The objective of this reform is to ensure that law 
graduates will have a firm political view (quan diem chinh tri vung vang), high values 
of morality (pham chat dao duc tot) and be professionally qualified. It is unclear how 
the institutional and curricula restructuring will help reach this objective. 
Following the resolution, the prime minister issued Directive No.10/2002/CT- 
TTg in March 2002 with instructions for implementation, prodding the MOET and 
the Ministry of Justice to restructure legal training institutions, with a focus on 
Hanoi Law University and HCMCLU. In addition, it instructs the two ministries to 
work on a proposal to unify law curricula and textbooks nationwide. The directive 
does not provide further guidance, and it is up to the discretion of the two ministries 
to fulfil the instructions. 
Restructuring the curricula is one of the first steps that the Ministry of Justice 
and Ministry of Education have taken to implement the program, with a committee 
of experts having been formed to work on the issue. Reformists within the group 
have suggested a modernised curriculum with a Western influence. This approach 
faces certain tensions and concerns as the majority of the committee were either 
trained in Eastern Europe or were locally educated. In addition, it exposes some 
groups of teachers to unfamiliar topics while others have to reduce their lecturing 
time.46 For example, there was a proposal that the commercial law subject should 
also cover insurance regulations. Meanwhile, commercial law teachers have never 
taught insurance law, as it is regarded as a part of finance law. 
In addition to the judicial reform program, the government of Vietnam, following 
recommendations made by the International Consultative Group in December 2000, 
established a national inter-agency team to conduct a comprehensive Legal Needs 
Assessment of the country’s legal system. It was intended that the Legal Needs 
Assessment would serve as a basis for developing a strategy for the development of 
Vietnam’s legal system through until 2010. The inter-agency team, led by the Ministry 
of Justice, was divided into small groups researching different areas of the legal 
system, including law training. 
The Legal Needs Assessment Report acknowledged the importance of legal 
education by positioning it as a crucial component of the legal system. Based on the 
examination of the current status, achievements and shortcomings of legal education, 
the report provided a set of goals to develop the national law-training regime in the 
next ten years, as well as an action plan to reach such goals. It was the first time that 
the country’s legal education system and its role in legal reform had been evaluated 
nationally.47 The Legal Needs Assessment was rejected after several rounds of reviews 
and revisions, however, and a new policy document, the Legal System Development 
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Strategy, was introduced in early 2003. Unlike the Legal Needs Assessment, the 
Legal System Development Strategy takes the same approach as Resolution No. 8 
and places negligible importance on legal education reform. There has been no 
formal explanation for this shift of focus.48 
Development projects supporting legal education 
Since the early 1990s, reform of Vietnam’s legal sector has become attractive to 
international donors. Many projects have been specifically designed to support 
legal education. 
Together with projects in the area of administrative reform,49 projects promoting 
law reform are subject to special governmental control. Regulations on management 
of international cooperation in the legal sector50 set out a number of principles for 
such cooperation. Among other things, law projects must be implemented on the 
basis of ensuring national sovereignty and respecting local culture. In addition, 
they should fit within the socioeconomic development policies of the Party and the 
state. The regulations also establish appraisal and approval procedures for all law 
projects, including those on legal education. Training institutions like Hanoi Law 
University are not allowed to have direct relationships with international partners 
without going through the Ministry of Justice. This filtering regime has resulted in 
a limited number of projects supporting legal training during the past decade, in 
comparison to other disciplines. The new by-laws for universities51 have liberalised 
this aspect by authorising local universities to set up cooperation programs directly 
with foreign partners. It is, however, unclear how the conflict between this new by- 
law and the old regulations will be resolved.52 
When foreign assistance actually occurs, its impact on local legal education seems 
to be insignificant. For example, Hanoi Law University, as the largest law training 
institution in Vietnam, hosts a ‘Vietnam–France Law House’ (Nha Phap Luat Viet- 
Phap) on campus, which provides library facilities for French language readers and 
organises seminars on various legal topics. However, the influence of the House 
seems to be modest given the small French-speaking population in the school. The 
use of materials and ideas that arise from the seminars is also limited as teachers are 
still bound in their teaching by the Soviet legal theories and standard textbooks. 
Perhaps the most noticeable foreign project is that provided by the generous 
Swedish International Development Agency. A formal cooperation program has 
been established between Hanoi Law University, HCMCLU and a Swedish university 
to improve curricula, teaching capacities and facilities. Seminars have been held 
and a number of Vietnamese law teachers have gone to Sweden for short and long- 
term training.53 Nonetheless, the project remains remote to the educational life at 
Hanoi Law University. Workshops on teaching methodologies were held but only 
attended by a small audience of lecturers. After several years in operation, the 
project’s contribution to the improvement of curricula and teaching quality at Hanoi 
Law University seems to be modest given its relatively large size. These facts have 
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yielded some concerns about the effectiveness of foreign assistance in Vietnam. As 
Zamboni (2001) noted, this kind of project needs to invest more resources to 
investigate and scrutinise the actual conditions of the local counterparts. 
In addition to formal projects at Hanoi Law University, a number of teachers 
have benefited from other scholarship programs and have been trained at Western 
universities. Despite their experience, they remain inactive  not influential on their 
return due to a number of concerns. 
Other reform efforts 
Apart from the above top-down programs, some bottom-up changes have also 
emerged, better reflecting local conditions. Examples below of reforms to the curricula 
and teaching methods are taken from Hanoi Law University. 
At Hanoi Law University, more activities have recently been added to the formal 
teaching program to engage students in public discussion and debate. Moot courts 
(phien toa tap su) and quiz competitions (cuoc thi)54 are organised occasionally. Some 
new research centres have been established to promote research activities, such as 
the Centre for Commercial and Investment Law (Trung Tam Phap Luat Thuong Mai va 
Dau Tu) within the Department of Economic Legislation. However, the activities of 
these centres remain limited as they are not set up as independent units and are 
therefore not free from control of the department. A new Centre of Comparative Law 
was also established at university level, but it has experienced difficulties due to a 
lack of staff and other resources. 
A minor project initiated by the Department of Economic Legislation studied the 
needs of reforming economic law (luat kinh te). The question posed by the organiser 
was whether ‘economic law’ should retain its current name or whether it should 
have a new name that better reflected its substance. The two alternative names 
chosen were ‘business law’ (luat kinh doanh) and ‘commercial law’ (luat thuong mai). 
In addition, researchers were asked to consider the content of economic law. Diverse 
opinions expressed in a workshop that reported the results of the project showed 
how, within the context of legal academia, the traditional Soviet idea of economic 
law was being challenged by market influence. Though consensus was reached on 
the importance of reforming the subject, scholars presented different views and 
perceptions on the issues. Some supported the removal of the name ‘economic law’ 
by looking at the experience of the neighbouring Chinese. Senior scholars who were 
trained in the former Soviet Union described how the idea was imported into Vietnam. 
They believed that ‘economic law’ was a mistranslation of Soviet terminology during 
that transplantation process. A Western approach to commercial law was also 
introduced as a suggestion for reform. A more pragmatic view cautiously warned 
that attention should be paid to substance rather than terminology, to avoid the 
common problem of ‘new jar, old wine’ (‘binh moi, ruou cu’). According to these 
scholars, it was more important to apply new teaching methodologies and make the 
subject more practically applicable rather than simply change its name.55 
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The frequently mentioned reform idea of ‘modern teaching methodology’ (phuong 
phap giang day hien dai) also engages a number of radical law teachers in the search 
for such a method. Collectively or individually, they have tried to experiment with 
case studies in their teaching. A survey on teaching methodologies was conducted 
by the Department of Economic Legislation of Hanoi Law University to gather 
teachers’ (mostly junior lecturers) opinions on the issue. Following the survey, a 
workshop was held to report on the results. Since this event was not formally initiated 
by the Department or Hanoi Law University, the organisers looked to the Youth 
Union as a sponsor. 
The workshop stirred hot debate about the definition of a ‘case study’ (phuong 
phap tinh huong) and the ‘regular’ or traditional way of teaching (phuong phap thong 
thuong). Since most junior teachers are locally trained and have never been exposed 
to Western training, they were confused about case studies. There was a question 
whether illustrating examples used in a lecture is a form of case study. Others asked 
whether a single case should cover most of the legal issues addressed by a law 
subject. For example, should a single labour case include employment, compensation, 
strike and dispute settlement issues. Obsessed by the power of modern technology, 
many believed that the use of slides and projectors is also a new method for teaching 
(so-called ‘projector method’ or ‘phuong phap den chieu’). Although the workshop 
was only an informal reform effort that did not attract much attention from the 
University authority, it represented the real needs of those who participate in legal 
education on a daily basis. 
CONCLUSION 
Observers have been concerned about the failure of legal education in Vietnam 
during the last one and a half decades. Only three to four per cent of law graduates 
are finding work in the legal system (Quinn 2002), ringing alarm bells about the law 
training reform process. 
The above analysis has indicated how traditional Soviet legal doctrines and 
teaching methods affect the quality of training. While state authorities and legal 
practitioners deal with market participants on a daily basis, law schools are still 
largely isolated from the process of economic and legal development. Legal academia 
remains an ‘island’ where socialist legal ideologies largely dominate. These 
ideologies, associated with a traditional lecturing style, have equipped law students 
with rigid ideas about instrumentalist laws and the skill of rote learning. Current 
curricula still lead law students to simplify the legal system according to the Soviet 
model and elevate the importance of state control, no longer appropriate in a diverse, 
market-oriented economy. 
The analysis has also shown a conflict between the mandatory teaching of 
socialist legal doctrines and the need to bring legal training closer to the market 
place. Reform has been made difficult by a variety of factors, including insufficient 
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policy support, a Soviet institutional structure that promotes collective decision- 
making, and factors arising from the local culture. 
Law students are not trained to practice in the legal profession. Established 
ideas about the various uses of law equip students with extensive knowledge of 
how the state can employ law to manage society, but impedes students’ capacity to 
learn about non-state interests and perspectives. Young graduates nowadays are 
more attracted to the private sector (Nguyen 2002), but often face confusion and 
great difficulties when starting their careers owing to the nature of their training. 
The state sector, with its entrenched psychology of ‘state economic management’, 
provides the ideal environment for such law graduates (AusAID 2000). Gillespie 
has noted that the collision of ‘state economic management’ ideas with forces for 
market liberalisation is creating tensions (Gillespie 2002). While the private sector 
demands greater market access, ministries and local authorites have sought to subvert 
government reforms and retain power by inventing new forms of control and 
intervention.56 The new generation of law graduates will be integral to this process 
in the future, holding the potential to slow or advance the reforms as they see fit. 
It has been widely agreed that better legal education could ease the tensions. 
Improving teaching methodologies and skills for law teachers is a crucial issue that 
deserves more serious attention from policymakers. Detailed research of teachers’ 
needs, and formal courses to address them, is likely to yield the best solutions. Such 
courses should aim at building up the analytical and problem-solving skills of law 
teachers because creative thinking amongst students will certainly not be promoted 
if the teachers themselves are not creative thinkers. Once the teachers’ skills are 
upgraded, law students will immediately benefit from the improvements. 
Established legal ideologies are not easily changed, but a training program 
(including curricula and course materials) with an orientation toward practice could 
make such ideologies less dogmatic. This approach also fits with the trend of the 
contemporary legal system towards a more pragmatic and rational approach, which 
would gradually help to improve the quality of legal education and thus reach the 
ambitious goals of reformers. 
NOTES 
1 Some law schools were established in China in the nineteenth century, and legal education in 
Poland dates back to the fourteenth century. 
2 Mr Ngo Van Thau was one of a few professors at the Judicial Training School during the 1960s 
who speaks fluent French and often refers to French legal materials in his research work. 
However, his knowledge of the French legal system was obtained through self-learning rather 
than formal education. Interviewed in Hanoi, 2001. See also Sidel (1993). 
3 In 1990, a small Faculty of Law was formed at the Ho Chi Minh City University by a group of 
Saigon attorneys who practised in Saigon before 1975. However, the curricula of this Faculty 
did not appear very different from other law schools. In addition, the Faculty itself is a 
controversial institution and not an influential participant in the local legal education market 
(Sidel 1993). 
4 Decision No. 201/2001/QD-TTg dated 28 December 2001 of the Prime Minister Approving 
Education Development Strategy 2001–2010. 
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5 In Vietnamese: ‘Xay dung nen giao duc co tinh nhan dan, dan toc, khoa hoc, hien dai, theo dinh huong 
xa hoi chu nghia, lay chu nghia Mac-Lenin va tu tuong Ho Chi Minh lam nen tang’. 
6 These include the National Economic University, Ho Chi Minh City University of Economy, 
University of Civil Construction, University of Commerce, University of Foreign Trade, University 
of Finance, University of Maritime and Vinh University (see Hanoi Law University 2002). 
7 For example, the law team of Vinh University only has 3 lecturers. The Ho Chi Minh City 
University of Economy, in its ambitious expansion, is an exception in upgrading its law team 
(To) to faculty level (Khoa). 
8 These include the Law Faculty of the Hanoi National University, Law Faculty of Can Tho 
University, Law Faculty of Da lat University and Law Faculty of the University of Science of 
Hue (see Hanoi Law University 2002). 
9 There has been no formal survey that shows how fast the number of law graduates has 
increased during the last 15 years. Legal education has indeed become a ‘phenomenon’ and as 
a consequence, law training institutions have mushroomed. For example, in 1988, the Hanoi 
Law University had approximately 130 students enrolled in the undergraduate program. By 
December 2001, the University alone had issued Bachelor of Laws degree to 10,000 full-time 
students and 4,000 others were awaiting completion of their degrees (Hanoi Law University 
2002). This is an impressive figure in light of the University’s 22 years of education (Legal 
Need Assessment Report 2002). 
10 For example, by the end of 2001, Hanoi Law University had 168 students enrolled in this type 
of course (Hanoi Law University 2002). The number has increased recently. 
11 Hanoi Law University issued 18,000 ‘tai chuc’ degrees by the end of 2001 and 7,000 others were 
in the process of completing the same degree (Hanoi Law University 2002). 
12 Twenty-two years after the first formal law training institute was established, the country had 
62,236 Bachelors of Laws nationwide (Legal Needs Assessment Report 2002). 
13 By the end of 2001, Hanoi Law University alone had trained 314 LLM students (329 others 
were master candidates), 19 PhD students (55 others were PhD candidates). It set an ambitious 
target that, by 2005, 70 per cent of the lecturers (232) would have an LLM, and 80 per cent 
would have that qualification by 2010 (with 50 per cent having a PhD) (Hanoi Law University 
2002). 
14 Newly opened schools, such as the Law Faculty of Can Tho University, seem to have more 
flexible curricula. However, the scale of these institutions is relatively small and the materials 
are still largely based on those prepared by Hanoi Law University and HCMCLU. See further 
Hanoi Law University (2002). Description of curricula applied in various law teaching 
institutions is also available in Sidel (1993). 
15 The curriculum for in-service training is in fact an abbreviated form of the one used for full- 
time students. 
16 The length for an undergraduate course is four to five years. 
17 For an example of curricula used in China, see Tay and Kamenka (1986). For Polish curricula, 
see Gostynski and Garfield (1993). 
18 Decision No. 494/QD-TTg, dated 24 June 2002, of the Prime Minister. The MOET later issued 
an official letter that provides guidance to implement this Decision (Official Letter No. 7821/ 
CTCT, dated 5 September 2002). In addition, a series of MOET decisions set outlines for the 
subjects of Marxist-Leninist studies and Ho Chi Minh’s thought. 
19 Lecturing time is approximately 1,265 hours for general training and 3,265 hours for law 
training (Hanoi Law University 2002). 
20 There are 13 law branches under the current system, among which banking law and environment 
law have been newly created. International law (including public and private law) is not 
regarded as a branch of domestic law, but rather as an independent law subject. See details in 
Le Minh Tam (1998e:399–403) and further discussion on the classification theory below. 
21 There are four departments (Khoa) at the Hanoi Law University: Administrative Law (Phap 
Luat Hanh Chinh), Economic Law (Phap Luat Kinh Te), Judicial Studies (Tu Phap), and 
International Law (Phap Luat Quoc Te). 
22 After completing the internship, the students are required to submit a brief report and then 
take a final exam. Internship is waived for those with good grades, who instead submit a 
graduate thesis. 
23 The definition of law is as follows: ‘Law is a system of norms that are codified and enforced by 
the state. It represents the will of the ruling class and is an instrument to adjust social relations 
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(phap luat la he thong cac quy tac xu su do nha nuoc ban hanh va bao dam thuc hien, the hien y chi cua 
giai cap thong tri trong xa hoi, la nhan to dieu chinh cac quan he xa hoi)’ (Le Minh Tam 1998b:64). 
This definition has been used for the last one and a half decades. 
24 It is said that before reunification, the most important function of the state was national 
defence. This change in priorities shows that the state is now more concerned with economic 
development than national defence. 
25 This concept of ‘state economic management’ has been renewed from time to time following 
Party policy reform. Most of the theory is drawn from Party resolutions. 
26 The subject is often scheduled for first year students. 
27 Legal scholars have tried to note the ‘relative nature’ (tinh chat tuong doi) of this classification 
and the interconnection between social relations. 
28 For example, a joint-venture contract between a foreign investor and a Vietnamese entity. 
29 Themes of State and Law contains only a few sentences naming the grounds to categorise law 
branches, without further analysis (Le Minh Tam 1998f). 
30 The textbook is 559 pages long. Only four pages are dedicated to analysis of the relationship 
between law and other social spheres. 
31 The MOET’s design for the subject of Ho Chi Minh’s thought includes one lesson on Ho Chi 
Minh’s thought about state and law. 
32 As part of ongoing reform, finance law was split into three smaller subjects at the end of 2004, 
namely budget law, tax law and insurance law. 
33 State management of land, finance and banking are all subsets of ‘state economic management’. 
34 The Party’s resolutions are the main source of references for Themes of State and Law. In fact, 
students learn about the development of state and law concepts through changes in Party 
policies. 
35 One lecture often lasts for the whole morning or afternoon (four and a half hours), with a ten- 
minute break every hour. Starting in Autumn 2001, one morning or afternoon session was 
divided into two subjects at Hanoi Law University. Lectures are often conducted in big halls, 
containing 100–200 students or more. Depending on the subject, one teacher may have to 
teach up to 20 hours per week. 
36 They are, however, still large, with 70–80 students each. 
37 This issue will be discussed at greater length below. 
38 It should be noted that this is not only a legal education problem, but rather, a shortcoming of 
the entire Vietnamese education system. As an article in the Financial Times Information 
commented: ‘teachers often paid too much attention to theoretical knowledge while neglecting 
practical application. Research institutes within universities and colleges were viewed as ivory 
towers that were isolated from both training activities and the real demand of the country’s 
social and economic development’ (Financial Times Information 2002). A senior official has 
also remarked on the situation that: ‘science is up in the air, while life is down to earth’ (khoa hoc 
tren troi, cuoc doi duoi dat), Available online at Vietnam Net, http://www.vnn.vn/442/2003/ 
3/5081/. 
39 Before the new regulations on lawyers were issued, a good network of personal relationships 
could make it relatively easy for law teachers to join the bar. 
40 Articles 8 and 42, Ordinance on Lawyers, dated 25 July 2001. 
41 Decision No. 153/2003/QD-TTg, dated 30 July 2003, of the Prime Minister Issuing By-Laws 
for Universities. 
42 Article 46(2), Decision No. 153/2003/QD-TTg, dated 30 July 2003, of the Prime Minister 
Issuing By-Laws for Universities. 
43 Decision No. 34/1998/QD-TTg, dated 11 February 1998, of the Prime Minister Setting up 
Legal Professional Training School. This school was established to provide on-the-job training 
for certain court positions, including judges. It was also extended to include courses on lawyer 
skills for those wishing to join the bar as private lawyers. 
44 Decision No. 762/DT, dated 29 July 1999, of the Hanoi Law University Promulgating 
Curriculum for the Official Training Program at the Hanoi Law University. 
45 Article 2, 1992 Constitution. 
46 This proposed curricula readjustment would have certain economic consequences because 
teachers’ income will decrease if they are given less lecturing time. 
47 It has been acknowledged that the Legal Needs Assessment was an unprecedented government 
effort to assess the needs of the legal system in general, and legal education in particular. It 
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showed the serious commitment of leaders to improve the country’s legal system in order to 
facilitate economic and social development (McKinley 2002). 
48 Informal interview with Ministry of Justice official and UNDP consultant. 
49 Regulations on Control of International Co-operation in the Field of Administrative Reform 
were issued in conjunction with Decree No. 03/1999/ND-CP of the Government on 28 January 
1999. 
50 Decree No. 103/1998/ND-CP dated 26 December 1998 of the Government on Management of 
International Cooperation in the Legal Sector. 
51 Decision No. 153/2003/QD-TTg dated 30 July 2003 of the Prime Minister Issuing By-Laws 
for Universities. 
52 The Law on Promulgation of Legal Documents (Article 80) provides a number of principles to 
interpret legal documents with conflicting provisions. It is unclear how such principles are not 
applicable in this case. 
53 See http://www.undp.org.vn/projects/legal/nofive/ and http://vnexpress.net/Vietnam/ 
Xa-hoi/Giao-duc/2001/. 
54 Quiz competitions have become a popular social activity in contemporary Vietnam. At Hanoi 
Law University, a law-teaching unit (to) may have a quiz competition for law students focusing 
on the subject taught by that unit. Such events are often jointly organised with the Youth Union 
(Doan Thanh Nien) or Students Union (Hoi Sinh Vien), as these organisations are in charge of 
social activities for students. 
55 Seminar on Reforming Economic Law, Hanoi Law University: Summer 2002. 
56 For further discussion on the implications of ‘state economic management’ and bureaucratic 
culture, see AusAID (2000). 
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Vietnamese jurisprudence: 
informing court reform 
Pip Nicholson 
In April 2002 the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) finalised its Resolution of the 
Political Bureau on Forthcoming Principal Judiciary Tasks (‘Resolution 8’), a policy 
paper identifying priorities for Vietnamese legal reform. Subsequently, the Vietnamese 
Party–state issued laws to reform the courts, responding specifically to the needs 
identified in Resolution 8.1 The question emerging from this policy paper and the 
subsequent reforms is whether, or to what extent, this latest round of court reforms 
reflects contemporary Vietnamese theorising on the role and function of law and the 
courts. 
At the heart of this question hovers a larger question. In its transition from a 
planned economy to a socialist-oriented market economy, the Vietnamese Party– 
state appears relatively certain about the nature of mixed market economy it envisions 
and seeks. While not abandoning the role of the state, the Vietnamese Party–state 
seeks to enable a mixed market–public sector economy (Van Arkadie and Mallon 
2003). This requires a radical reduction in the role of the state in terms of market 
planning, production and employment and the take-up of production and 
employment by the private sector (Fforde and Vylder 1996; Beresford 1997). 
It is not clear that the same vision exists with regard to the shape and form of the 
Vietnamese legal system, which is apparently radically changing to accommodate 
the changing economic conditions. While the economic base changes, it is suggested 
that the Party–state has not yet articulated an equivalently detailed vision for the 
form or shape of the transitional legal system. This chapter aims to explore whether 
a role for the courts has been articulated and whether the reforms reflect this. 
This chapter does not consider the question of whether transitional legal systems 
will inevitably emerge as systems committed to the Anglo-European US liberal legal 
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order. The story of Vietnamese legal reform in the context of global harmonisation 
debates is another tale. Instead, it focuses on the question of what, if any, role and 
place has been ascribed to the courts in the transitional Vietnamese state. In particular, 
is it that the courts will be theorised as continuing instruments of the Party–state or 
will they be increasingly positioned as independent of Party and/or state 
mechanisms? 
Finally, in discussing legal reform and legal theory it is important to note that 
they are not causally connected; that is, legal theory does not necessarily inform 
legal reform or vice versa. Instead, it is perhaps better to understand the exchange 
between legal theory and legal reform as a dialogue. Further, legal reform may 
anticipate change and document past changes. By analogy, Vietnamese constitutional 
reform is thought often to reflect underlying changes already given effect and to 
foreshadow changes not yet implemented (Vu Dinh Hoe 1995). 
RESOLUTION 8 
Resolution 8 of the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam 
released on 2 January 2002 needs to be understood, not as the blueprint for law 
reform, but as the first step in the process of developing a blueprint for law reforms 
across Vietnamese legal institutions.2 Resolution 8 provides insight into the direction 
of legal reform and how challenges are to be addressed. It should, however, be read 
as a work in progress rather than firmly establishing the trajectory of law reforms. 
Further, it is very important to clarify terminology. Resolution 8 reflects upon 
and prescribes changes for ‘cong tac tu phap’, usually translated as ‘judicial work’. 
In the Vietnamese context a reference to ‘judicial work’ is a reference not only to the 
work of judges and court staff, but also to the work of all organs that feed into the 
courts. Therefore, for example, the work of the procuracy (kiem sat), police (cong an) 
and investigators (canh sat) all falls within the Vietnamese term ‘judicial work’. It 
could perhaps be better translated as ‘justice work’, but that is not the term ordinarily 
used. To avoid confusion, where the term ‘cong tac tu phap’ is used, it will be translated 
as ‘court-related work’. This distinction is adopted to identify when a reform targets 
the courts and when it is pitched more generally to court-related bodies.3 
Resolution 8 commences with a sustained critique of court-related work.4 It argues 
that court-related institutions have historically failed the community by making 
‘unfair judgments’ (particularly of innocent people), failing to convict criminals, 
and generally reducing the trust of the people in courts and the Party. Further, it is 
implicit that the courts have also, at least partly, failed the Party, where they fail to 
implement the Party line. Following this frank general condemnation of the courts 
and court-related institutions, the Resolution proceeds to make five particular 
criticisms of the Vietnamese legal system. Briefly, these criticisms are that 
• there are insufficient judges. Further, the judiciary is morally weak, lacks 
courage and is technically poorly trained 
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• there remains a lack of uniformity in the organisation and perceptions of 
the function and responsibilities within court-related agencies and 
institutions are unclear (although this has somewhat improved recently) 
• the working conditions (including salaries) within court-related agencies 
and institutions are very poor. In particular, District Court judges have 
poor working conditions5 
• the laws relating to the court-related agencies and institutions are 
fragmented, inconsistent and incomplete and need to be reworked. Further, 
dissemination and education concerning relevant laws needs to be 
improved 
• The government and the Party remain insufficiently involved in the 
theoretical research and practical performance of the court-related agencies 
and institutions. 
Following this robust self-criticism by the Party–state of its court-related agencies 
and institutions, including the court system, the policy paper establishes a 
‘Directions’ (quan diem chi dao) section, providing a framework or paradigm within 
which more detailed reforms are to be made. 
The first comment made in Part A of the ‘Directions’ section of Resolution 8 
explains that it is the role of the courts (and other agencies) to follow and implement 
Party policy. In particular, the court-related agencies must give effect to political 
tasks in the relevant period (cac nhiem vu chinh tri trong tung giai) and ensure the 
power of the state is united (bao dam quyen luc nha nuoc la thong nhat doan). In addition 
to being charged to give effect to the Party line, all court-related institutions are 
required to implement legislative, executive and judicial instructions. This section 
concludes by reminding the reader that Vietnam is a socialist law-based state of the 
people, from the people and for the people (nha nuoc phap quyen xa hoi chu nghia cua 
nhan dan, do nhan dan va vi nhan dan). Subsequently, this section calls for society to 
participate in court-related work. This appears to be an implicit restatement of a 
commitment to popular justice: a concept to which the Party officially committed in 
the mid 1950s when it embraced Soviet-style reforms to the existing ‘bourgeois’ 
legal system (Nicholson 2000). 
The remainder of the ‘Directions’ section is less preoccupied with the broader 
role of court-related institutions and focuses on aspects of courts that need to be 
developed. For example, courts are to settle cases in a timely fashion, especially 
where serious criminal matters or offences against the state are involved, and there 
is a call for modernised, ‘transparent’, stable and ‘strong’ legal institutions. 
Having set the framework for reform of court-related institutions, Resolution 8 
proceeds to set out the mission or operational plan for these bodies (nhiem vu trong 
tam). This is the longest section of the policy, comprising eight parts, each of which 
proposes a specific reform. The proposed reforms reflect the critique of court-related 
agencies made at the outset of Resolution 8 and the general tenor of reforms set out 
in the ‘Directions’ section. 
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The eight reforms to court-related work set out in Resolution 8, Part B, are6 
• to enhance the quality and increase the responsibilities of those charged 
with implementing court-related work 
• to give effect to Party policy on the reform (cu the hoa), organisation and 
renovation (doi moi) of court-related work 
• to develop a transparent (trong sach), strong and stable (vung manh) court- 
related system 
• to invest in the facilities necessary to enable completion of assigned tasks 
• to enhance the ability of political organisations to oversee court-related 
work 
• to increase the explanation of, instruction in, propaganda about, 
dissemination of, education in, and research about, law 
• to strengthen international cooperation concerning court-related work 
• to strengthen the leadership of the Party over court-related work. 
Having set out the general parameters of Resolution 8, this chapter now identifies 
the extent to which each of the reforms affects the Vietnamese court system. 
Enhancing quality and responsibility for court-related work 
Section B(1)(C) of Resolution 8 charges the courts to guarantee citizens equal 
treatment before the law (deu binh dang truoc phap luat), real democracy (thuc su dan 
chu)7 and objective treatment (khac quan) (Resolution 8, section B(1)(C)). Further, it 
notes that judges and people’s assessors must be independent and need only obey 
the law (Resolution 8, section B(1)(C)). Following this statement of the role and 
function of the courts, court personnel are instructed to determine cases on their 
merits in a timely manner after testing the evidence (Resolution 8, section B(1)(C)). 
To this end, the courts are instructed to enable the full participation of lawyers 
before trial, during collection of the evidence, and during hearings (Resolution 8, 
section B(1)(Dz)). Further, courts are instructed to cooperate with other agencies to 
enhance the enforcement of judgments (Resolution 8, section B(1)(E)). 
Section B(1)(dz) of Resolution 8, addressing the hearing and determination of 
cases, is a request to court-related agencies to ‘reconsider’ the death penalty. In 
particular, the institutions are asked to investigate the possibility of restricting its 
use (Resolution 8, section B(1)(Dz)). 
Party policy on the reform, organisation and renovation of court-related work 
Section B(2) addresses concerns relating to the implementation of prior Party 
resolutions on court-related reform by targeting specific courts. In particular, the 
District Courts (Vietnam’s lowest courts) are to be strengthened, an investigation 
into whether it is appropriate to expand the jurisdiction of the Administrative Court 
is proposed, and the possibility of establishing a family court is mooted (Resolution 
8, section B(2)(C)). 
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Further, many reforms are directed at the Supreme People’s Court, Vietnam’s highest 
court. In particular, the Supreme People’s Court is to manage the organisation of local 
courts and to supervise the professional development and the provision of guidelines 
to lower courts. Further, it is empowered to comment on the duties of court staff. The 
president is to appoint judges to the Supreme People’s Court. By implication, the 
Supreme People’s Court is to be given the power to appoint all judges of lower courts 
(Resolution 8, section B(2)(C)). This package of reforms suggests the repositioning of 
the courts to be less influenced and managed by the Ministry of Justice and president. 
Before the reforms giving effect to Resolution 8 were introduced, the Ministry of 
Justice determined the budget for the courts and the number of judges, and was at 
least partly responsible for judicial training.8 I have argued elsewhere that, when 
read together, the subsequent reforms implemented to give effect to Resolution 8 
indicate a ‘self-managing’ court system (Nicholson and Nguyen Hung Quang, 2005). 
Developing a transparent, strong and stable legal system 
The third reform objective, set out in section B(3), calls for the development of 
‘transparent, strong and stable judicial personnel’. Also, all court-related agencies 
are called upon to increase the educational qualifications and political, moral and 
professional standards of their staff (Resolution 8, section B(2)(C)). This section 
particularly seeks the promotion of candidates with appropriate political and moral 
fibre and seeks more transparent, timely and democratic appointment procedures 
(Resolution 8, section B(2)(C)). 
This same section makes clear that the position of people’s assessors (hoi tham 
nhan dan) or jurors should be investigated. In particular, Resolution 8 seeks review 
of the selection, role in court, training and management of jurors (Resolution 8, section 
B(2)(C)). In effect, jurors’ function is not to be taken for granted and is to be reappraised. 
As a result of the generic nature of this document, in that it targets all court- 
related institutions and personnel, it is hard at times to be sure that the reforms 
apply to courts. Section B(3) is particularly ambiguous because courts are never 
specifically identified in association with any of the posited reforms. For example, it 
is not clear whether the proposal for the rotation of staff applies to courts, nor is it 
clear that the call for the annual review of the work performance of court-related 
personnel applies to judges. 
Enhancing infrastructure 
Likewise, there is no particular mention of judges or courts in section B(4), which 
advocates the improvement of facilities and wages for court-related personnel 
(Resolution 8, section B(2)(C)). It appears implicit that the general call for the 
completion of building works and the reappraisal of salaries and allowances applies 
to judges as much as other agencies such as the police but, again, they are not 
specifically mentioned. 
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Enhance participation in and oversight of court-related work 
Section 5 of Resolution 8 commences with a statement of the need to attract community 
support for reform. It then urges the National Assembly and local People’s Councils 
to oversee the work of courts. In particular, the National Assembly and local People’s 
Councils are to monitor the decision-making and enforcement of judgments and to 
supervise the development of normative legal documents by court-related agencies 
(Resolution 8, section B(2)(C)). It is not made clear to what extent these bodies would 
oversee the development of case notes and jurisprudence affecting courts (Luu Tien 
Dung 2003).9 
In addition, section B(5) recommends development of the existing alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms. In particular, it advocates that mediation and 
arbitration be adopted in the hope that fostering these alternatives will reduce the 
burden on courts and promote the prompt resolution of disputes. 
Increase the explanation of, instruction in, propaganda about, dissemination of, 
education in and research about law 
Section B(6) identifies the need to reform the laws on procedure and enforcement of 
judgments, recommending research, explanation and education relevant to court- 
related services. The Party urges an increase in the number of mobile hearings to 
maximise the flow of information concerning courts (Resolution 8, section B(6)). 
There is little else in this section that directly touches on the role of courts. However, 
it is again implicit that the courts would be caught by a general policy preference for 
greater legal propaganda and that they would be expected to contribute to this. 
Strengthen international cooperation 
The penultimate section B(7) of the policy paper seeks the strengthening of 
international cooperation by all court-related bodies, and various issues are identified 
for additional research. Of particular interest is the Party’s request for comparative 
research that considers the question of the sovereignty and security of Vietnam and, 
by implication, its court system. The Resolution also advocates comparative research 
on training and crime prevention. 
Strengthen the leadership of the Party 
The final section of the operational plan (section B(8)) restates that the Party ‘shall 
lead’ (lanh dao) all court-related agencies. In particular, three main areas are identified 
for Party leadership: politics, organisation and personnel. The posited aim in this 
regard is to ensure compliance with the Party’s policies and state laws. It is also 
noted that Party membership should be increased and that courts should ‘use the 
correct employees’. It appears that the Party is here urging the maximum use of 
Party members in court-related agencies, including courts. 
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Reading the reforms together 
It is hard to know whether any significance should be attached to the order of these 
reforms. They appear to move from the legally-specific to the contextual. I do not 
think they should be read as indicating a lesser role for Party leadership simply 
because comments about this ongoing feature of Vietnamese court culture appear at 
the end. Rather, this may fall at the end of the section on reforms as it is merely a 
restatement of the points made in the prior ‘Directions’ section of the Policy Paper. 
Implementation 
Part III of Resolution 8 provides an implementation plan. In broad terms, this seeks 
to centralise the implementation of this Resolution and to enable various stakeholders 
to contribute. In particular, the leadership of Communist Party committees in each of 
the Supreme People’s Procuracy, Supreme People’s Court, Ministry of Justice, Police, 
Military and Commission on Internal Affairs of the CPV are called upon to assist. 
The policy summarised 
In summary, Resolution 8 reiterates the leading role of the Party in court-related 
work. This is stressed both at the beginning of the policy paper and at its conclusion. 
Yet within this overarching statement, it is also said that citizens should be treated 
equally by courts and judges and that people’s assessors are to be independent and 
subject only to law. The Resolution also requires the National Assembly and People’s 
Councils to oversee the work of court-related agencies. In this way, the policy seeks 
to balance the role of the Party, the state and its laws, and the public or society. 
Moving from the general to the particular, the policy paper canvasses various 
specific reforms. It requires that the lowest and highest courts within the Vietnamese 
court hierarchy, the District and Supreme People’s Court respectively, be 
strengthened. It urges legal institutions to circulate information about their work 
more widely and, in particular, to make greater use of mobile courts. It also calls for 
the greater use of mediation and arbitration to resolve disputes. 
In terms of personnel, Resolution 8 calls for the appointment of better-educated 
staff with good ethical and political credentials. By implication, these appointees 
are also to be Party members or, at the very least, endorsed by the Party. The policy 
paper also seeks greater transparency in the appointments process and an increased 
role for the Supreme People’s Court in court appointments and management. 
Following the Resolution, the president is only to appoint judges to the Supreme 
People’s Court, with the Chief Justice of the Supreme People’s Court now appointing 
all other judges, albeit with local agencies playing a large consultative role. Salaries 
and working conditions are also to be enhanced. 
Finally, the Resolution seeks investigation of 
• the role of the people’s assessors 
• the possibility of a family court 
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• the possibility of expanding the jurisdiction of the Administrative Court 
• the possibility of limiting the death penalty 
• comparative research on the role and place of courts in terms of state 
sovereignty. 
INTERPRETING RESOLUTION 8 
As noted above, not all reforms outlined in Resolution 8 necessarily target the 
courts.10 Therefore, to assist with interpreting Resolution 8 in this context, it is 
necessary to see where those reforms targetting courts have been implemented in 
the subsequent legislative package introducing court reforms.11 A brief consideration 
of the key features of the legislation affecting courts is set out below to give some 
insight into how the Party–state has interpreted its own policy recommendations. 
The core features of legislation affecting people’s courts introduced in the 2002 
Law on the Organisation of People’s Courts are that 
• judges must have a Bachelor of Laws Degree, have attended adjudication 
training, and have had legal experience (Article 37). 
• with the exception of the Chief Justice and judges of the Supreme People’s 
Court, all appointments, removals and dismissals of judges to provincial 
and district courts will be made by the Chief Justice of the Supreme People’s 
Court on the advice of especially constituted Judicial Selection Councils. 
Appointment, removal and dismissal of Chief Justices and Deputy-Chief 
Justices of provincial and district courts will be by the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme People’s Court, acting on the advice of the relevant People’s 
Council (Articles 25 and 40). 
• there will no longer be a Supreme People’s Court Justice Committee 
(Article 24). 
• people’s assessors will be elected by local People’s Councils on the 
recommendation of the relevant Fatherland Front organisation (Article 41). 
• people’s assessors can be dismissed by the Chief Justice of the court to 
which they have been elected with the agreement of the relevant Fatherland 
Front committee (Article 41). 
• the Standing Committee of the National Assembly will determine court 
budgets acting on the advice of the Chief Justice of the Supreme People’s 
Court (Article 44). 
• the number of judges and people’s assessors will be determined by the 
Standing Committee of the National Assembly on the advice of the Chief 
Justice (Article 42(1)). 
• the Supreme People’s Court, in conjunction with local people’s councils, 
will be responsible for the management of local People’s Courts (Article 17). 
• the need to develop information technology to help the courts do their 
work is explicitly recognised (Article 46). 
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The specific recommendations made in Resolution 8 have been taken up by the 
2002 Law on the Organisation of People’s Courts.12 While the list of amendments 
looks very impressive, I have argued elsewhere that in some respects the changes 
are more apparent than real.13 For example, the Chief Justice’s new powers to appoint 
judges to lower courts do not decrease the Party’s grip on judicial appointments 
(Nicholson and Nguyen Hung Quang, 2005). In particular, candidates for judgeships 
still have to produce a letter in support from the Chief Judge and the Head of 
Organisation and Personnel of the Provincial People’s Court of the province to 
which they apply.14 If they apply to a district court, support for the appointment 
needs to be supplied by the relevant Provincial People’s Court. Further, candidates 
need to demonstrate that they have a political theory diploma.15 
This, however, is not a story of court reform but a story of the intersections and 
conflicts between the role and place ascribed to law and the role of the courts in 
transitional Vietnam. It is therefore not necessary here to examine in detail the features 
of the recently legislated reforms (Nicholson 2003). The question remaining for this 
part of the chapter is to characterise the nature of the court’s role as it is set out in 
Resolution 8 and then see to what extent this diverges from, or is reflective of, the 
role ascribed to law in contemporary Vietnam. 
One of the most interesting aspects of Resolution 8 is the tension around the 
Party–court relationship. On the one hand, the courts are explicitly under the Party’s 
leadership including by virtue of the fact that appointments to the courts ought to be 
Party members with demonstrated political credentials (Nicholson and Nguyen 
Hung Quang, 2005).16 On the other hand, courts are to be independent and obey 
only the law. How can these apparently contradictory statements be reconciled? 
If one reads this from a Western perspective imbued with notions of judicial 
independence, it is not possible to reconcile the policies. The courts as described are 
intended to enable Party policy, with the judiciary and court personnel being members 
of the Party. Concurrently, these political functionaries are to be officers of the court, 
whose role is to enforce only the law. To those schooled in the requirement that 
judges have no allegiance other than to the law and the fair determination of disputes 
before them, free from interference from any other party, body or individual, this 
dual loyalty required of Vietnamese judges is not tenable. 
This raises the question ‘what is “law” in Vietnam?’  In socialist states, law is 
traditionally seen instrumentally—it is the force that gives effect to Party policy, 
whether that be through a legal instrument or policy. One of the best characterisations 
of Vietnamese law offered by a Western researcher describes it as follows 
the underlying notion of law is not so much that of an immutable order to which all should 
bow, but rather that of an important element of the way in which the Party line is implemented 
(Fforde 1986:62). 
This matter is taken up in greater detail below, but for present purposes, law has 
to be seen as the Party line which may be (and today, more often is) enacted via legal 
instruments passed by those with state legislative authority. 
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One reconciliation of this apparent conflict is to see courts as independent of 
Party interference, but not of Party influence (Gillespie 2003). Put another way, 
courts are to be guided by Party policy and to see its implementation as one of their 
objectives, but Party members ought not influence particular proceedings. 
Under this approach, courts can concurrently be bound by law and receive 
Party guidance, particularly if it is accepted that guidance from the Party assists 
with the interpretation of laws. Many Vietnamese laws are expressed in general 
terms only and their interpretation is open. The Party can then illuminate and 
explain how laws are to be implemented. For example, Article 37 of the Law on the 
Organisation of People’s Courts sets out that 
Vietnamese citizens who are loyal to the Fatherland and the Constitution of the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam, who have good qualities and virtue, are incorrupt and honest, 
determined to protect the socialist legislation, have the Bachelor of Laws Degree and have 
been trained in adjudicating operations, have engaged in practical work for a period of 
time prescribed by law, have adjudicating capability and have good health to ensure the 
fulfilment of assigned tasks may be selected and appointed to work as judges.17 
In this list of attributes required of judges, there are various undefined and 
imprecise terms. Just to take two examples, it is not clear how ‘loyalty to the 
Fatherland and the Constitution’ is to be interpreted, nor how ‘adjudicating 
capability’ is to be construed. 
Various commentators have suggested how they ought to be read. For example, 
in relation to ‘adjudicating capability’, the Chief Justice of the Hanoi People’s Court 
has written that those who have completed a course at the Legal Professional 
Training School have the requisite judicial capacity. Further, he has also suggested 
that judicial capacity should be interpreted to mean a preference for mature or older 
candidates (Nguyen Van Hien 2001). We see that a senior judicial officer explains 
how these criteria are to be interpreted; presumably because he is empowered, as a 
senior judge, to speak both on behalf of the court and also on behalf of the Party. Yet 
this is not the final word on this point. The Party retains the right to clarify this at 
any time in a variety of ways—for example, by policy statement endorsing a circular 
between courts, or more informally through consultation with senior Party figures 
from the courts, the National Assembly or the Party itself. 
A further tension evident in Resolution 8 surrounds the balancing of individual 
and collective rights. Resolution 8 exhorts the courts to treat all persons equally 
(Resolution 8, section B(1)(C)).On the face of it, this is a call for equal treatment by 
the courts of all people before it and could form the basis of an argument that 
individual litigants have rights equal to those of the state or the collective. This 
echoes the 1992 Constitution, which provides that ‘all Vietnamese citizens are equal 
before the law’ (Article 7). Concurrently the judiciary is instructed to follow Party 
leadership and is reminded that it is subject to the ‘supervision’ of local democratic 
institutions such as People’s Committees and, in the case of the Supreme People’s 
Court, the National Assembly. Accountability to the National Assembly is also 
constitutionally enshrined (Article 135, 1992 Constitution). 
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Again this tension needs to be contextualised. In practice, this reference to equal 
treatment can not be read as a statement of the individual rights of claimants or 
defendants, but a statement that all those before the courts ought to be judged by the 
same policies and laws.18 That is, this statement cannot be read as abandoning the 
value placed on the collective interest in the Vietnamese context, but must be 
interpreted to say that those in proceedings before a court must be equally subject to 
the same sets of values, policies and laws. Again, what is being set out is not that 
courts will only be bound by law, but that courts should be consistent in their 
evaluation of cases which in turn requires consistency in understanding laws and 
the direction of Party leadership. 
Resolution 8 also calls for greater community knowledge of court work. To this 
end, one concrete proposal is that courts should increase the number of mobile 
hearings (Resolution 8, section B(6)).19 While this may increase the public scrutiny 
of hearings, it will not enable the public to understand how cases are decided. 
Although Resolution 8 calls for the formation of normative legal documents, it does 
not make any specific recommendation with respect to that process. 
Court judgments have not to date been a great source of normative legal principles. 
As with many civil law systems, why it is that a particular case is determined in a 
particular way is not evident from the written record. Further, judgments are not 
publicly available. For example, in criminal cases, judgments record the names and 
background of the parties, the charges and whether they have been found guilty.20 
The evidentiary basis for the conviction is not recorded.21 When explaining 
sentencing, the judgments include an analysis of the moral and political credentials 
of those being tried, explicitly linking these to the imposition of lenient or harsh 
penalties.22 It is not clear from Resolution 8 how the balance between increasing the 
role of law and maintaining popular justice is to be achieved.23 
Finally, Resolution 8 appears to promote the role of lawyers (both advocates and 
prosecutors). It instructs judges to enable lawyers to participate fully in pre-trial 
and trial work (Resolution 8, section B(1)(C)). How this would affect the outcome in 
a trial is not clear. It has been common practice in Vietnam for the procuracy to meet 
with the judges and determine the outcome of cases before trial. Enhancing the role 
of lawyers raises the possibility of the judge allowing more adversarial-style advocacy 
in court (ordinarily associated with the common law tradition). Further, it could 
indicate a shift from predetermined resolution of cases to testing the evidence before 
deciding the case.24 
Promoting the work of lawyers may suggest that the state seeks to foster public 
trust in the emerging court system by way of empowering the advocate. Just as Mark 
Sidel has noted that it is too simplistic to talk of Party instrumentalism in the context 
of Vietnam’s constitutional reforms, it may be the case that the relatively greater role 
accorded to lawyers in court could produce tensions (even contests) about the proper 
resolution of cases and enable explicit or implicit criticism of Party policy in court 
(Sidel 2002). Thus the court (the Party–state) may eventually negotiate the outcome 
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of cases with lawyers (many of whom are privately employed and not Party–state 
functionaries).25 This appears highly experimental in a state where the control of 
courts has, until recent times, been absolute. 
It appears, therefore, that Resolution 8 opens up the possibility of quite radical 
legal change. Although it appears significant, the principle of court independence, 
mediated by Party leadership, is perhaps the least radical feature of this policy. The 
potentially more fundamental changes lie in the enhancement of the role of law and 
of the legal profession, including prosecutors. The Party–state may conceive that by 
retaining Party leadership of the institution, and particularly by reinforcing its tight 
control over the selection of personnel, changes to the primacy of law and the 
profession can be incrementally implemented. Alternatively these potentially radical 
changes might reflect either a new vision giving law a more central and stronger 
role in regulating social relations (but perhaps not state–society relations?) or simply 
an experimental phase exploring such possibilities. 
CONTEMPORARY VIETNAMESE DEBATES ABOUT THE ROLE 
AND PLACE OF LAW 
The question is then to what extent the changes introduced in Resolution 8 reflect a 
theorised understanding of law within Vietnam. This involves some exploration of 
the role and place of law in Vietnam generally and, more particularly, the role the 
courts play within any general conception of the role of law. 
This part of the chapter will outline the key concepts used to describe the political 
and legal theories underpinning the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (1945–76) 
and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (1976 to the present day). The core concepts 
introduced are ‘democratic centralism’, ‘collective mastery’, ‘socialist legality’ and 
‘rule-based state’ (sometimes erroneously translated as rule of law). The role and 
place of socialist and revolutionary morality and how valuing moral precepts affects 
or interacts with the role and place of law is also briefly discussed. It will then be 
possible to revisit Resolution 8 and see how it reflects or diverges from established 
Vietnamese legal thinking. 
The discussion is organised chronologically to reflect the emergence of Vietnamese 
legal theory and divided into the time periods: 1945–59, 1960–76 and 1986–2003. 
The period 1976–86 is not a particular focus as it can largely be viewed as a period 
of consolidation rather than change, with the North exporting its views and practices 
to the South of the country in post-unification Vietnam (Gillespie 2004).26 
The role and place of Vietnamese law has been dynamic over time. Initially the 
communist state had a fairly instrumentalist view of law. Theorising was mainly 
political, looking at the role of ‘democratic centralism’ (tap trung dan chu) and the 
role of law as an administrative mechanism, coexisting with, but not binding, political 
leaders and policymakers. In the DRVN over the period 1960–76, socialist legality 
(nguyen tac phap che xa hoi chu nghia) gained increasing currency. In more recent 
times, and particularly since the 1991 Seventh Party Congress, the Party–state 
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arguably has endorsed, while not clearly identifying the features of, a law-based 
state (nha nuoc phap quyen) and a socialist law-based state (nha nuoc phap quyen xa hoi 
chu nghia). The role of collective mastery (lam chu tap te) in the contemporary period 
is harder to isolate. 
In the Vietnamese context it is not possible to talk of the state without talking about 
the Communist Party of Vietnam (Fall 1956; Huynh Kim Khanh 1982). The Party is 
at the epicentre of Vietnamese politics and remains responsible for the official 
enunciation and implementation of all policy changes. The Party dates back to the 
early 1930s, although it was officially disbanded between 1945–51 and renamed on 
several occasions, ultimately carrying the name the Communist Party of Vietnam 
(Dang Cong San Viet Nam) from 1976 (Weggel 1986).27 Between the 1930s and 1976 
the personnel at meetings and congresses essentially remained the same, indicating 
that, whatever the appellation, the core group of leaders who identified with the 
original Indochinese Communist Party continued at the helm until unification (Klein 
and Weiner 1959). Thayer has commented on the increasing trend of younger and 
better-educated Party members in the National Assembly, but while new figures are 
emerging within state institutions, continuity with the past remains (Thayer 2002). 
Through its extensive nomenklatura system, the contemporary Communist Party of 
Vietnam continues to ensure that all significant office holders of the state are Party 
members (Gillespie 2002). For example, 90 per cent of judges are said to be Party 
members (Nicholson and Nguyen Hung Quang, 2005). Similarly, Thayer estimates 
that the current National Assembly comprises around 90 per cent Party members 
(Thayer 2002). It is not possible to separate the Party from the state. State functionaries 
are Party members, and as a consequence bear all the obligations that membership 
of the Party involves.28 It is for this reason that the term Party–state is used. 
Although the Party–state is the dominant political force in Vietnam, it is an 
organisation where various political views are expressed and debated. For example, 
it is widely known that Party members have preferences ranging from transition to 
a multi-party state to retaining strong one-Party leadership.29 
While Vietnamese jurisprudence is closely linked to that of the old Soviet Union 
and arguably not isolated from that of the People’s Republic of China, it is not a 
replica of either.30 From 1945 to the early 1970s, Vietnam was most influenced by 
Soviet jurisprudence (Nicholson 2000). In more recent times, while the extent to 
which the Chinese and Vietnamese converse about legal theory remains unclear, it 
is known that exchanges occur (Sidel 1998). 
Morality and law 
Much has been written about the marginal role of law in Vietnam (Sidel 1997; 
Gillespie 2001a; Nicholson 2000). Broadly speaking the argument is that custom 
and morality (Confucian and Socialist)31 played a major role in shaping Vietnamese 
social mores and that law existed largely as a punitive instrument of the state, rather 
than as the basis for social interaction. This chapter does not address the question of 
whether law is more relevant in contemporary Vietnam. This is a subject for another 
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study. Yet the fundamental significance of morality is raised to protect against any 
misconception that the role of law has changed to such an extent that morality is no 
longer relevant. Without significant studies of legal consciousness this matter cannot 
be resolved, but studies among local Vietnamese businesses indicate that the 
relevance of law remains marginal (Bergling 1999; McMillan and Woodruff 1999). 
Early days: war and legal instrumentalism 
Between 1945 and the late 1950s, during which period the DRVN defeated the 
French and the country was partitioned, the role and place of law was contested.32 
Arguably, Ho Chi Minh never anticipated governing without the assistance of law.33 
He wrote of the excesses of colonial court systems (Ho Chi Minh 1961:96–102), but 
did not foreshadow a society without law or legal institutions (Nguyen Ngoc Minh 
1985). Ho Chi Minh argued convincingly that the French were able to maintain one 
law for the Vietnamese and another for their own subjects (Hooker 1978). Ho’s 
trenchant criticisms of the French administration of justice, which describe the scales 
of justice being permanently skewed against the local population of Vietnam, was 
not a critique of law in general (Ho Chi Minh 1961).34 
Lawyers debated the uses to which the new DRVN government put law and 
legal institutions (Sidel 1997a). These discussions were at their most divided and 
outspoken during the publication and then banning of the Nhan Van (Humanity) 
and Giai Pham (Beautiful Literary Work/Masterpiece) periodicals. These two 
publications were circulated in 1956 and contained some extremely direct critiques 
of the uses to which law had been put by the Viet Minh leadership. For example, 
three categories of critique were undertaken by Nhan Van: freedom and democracy; 
legality, human rights and the strengthening of institutions; and opening up all 
legal thought and research (Boudarel 1990). Those that spoke out on these issues 
did so without circumlocution or delicacy, as demonstrated by the following passage. 
It is the absence of legislation that favours abuse of power and authoritarianism (Boudarel 
1990:165–6).35 
This extract is taken from an article dealing with the errors of the land reform 
campaign36 and the ‘contempt for legality’ prevailing, so it was argued, in Vietnam 
at this time (Boudarel 1990). 
The government was exhorted to put a stop to these expressions of dissent; the 
request that the publications be closed down was printed in the official newspaper. 
We demand that the authorities take definite measures against Nhan Van. The souls of the 
young students are still as pure as a white page inscribed with beautifully bright pictures 
of our regime, our future and our happiness. We want to be given healthy thoughts and are 
determined to oppose anything which stands in the way of our advancing steps.37 
By 1960, the Party had closed down the publications and a series of trials ensured 
that the major players were incarcerated (Boudarel 1990).38 
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The organisational basis of the DRVN shortly after the revolution is perhaps 
best described by the term ‘democratic centralism’.39 When describing the features 
of the newly introduced Vietnam Workers’ Party in 1951, Ho Chi Minh wrote ‘As 
regards its organisation, it adopts the system of democratic centralism’ (Ho Chi 
Minh 1994:127). In short, democratic centralism in Vietnam meant that all office 
holders and Party representatives were elected and each organisation was 
accountable to the higher equivalent body.40 For example, a District People’s 
Committee was responsible to a Provincial People’s Committee and a local court 
was accountable to the next highest court. Ultimately most organisations were 
accountable to the Party via the National Assembly, Ministries or the Party 
committees at local and regional levels.41 It was only through such accountability 
and central control (also referred to as ‘iron discipline’) (Ho Chi Minh 1994:127)42 
that the Party could hope to enforce its policies effectively. This approach was 
justified on the basis that it enabled grassroots involvement (through election) in 
the democratic process,43 but also that once the ‘correct’ policy had been determined 
(one that benefited the ‘masses’)44 implementation would be centrally coordinated. 
Failure to implement according to instruction carried with it censure (Truong Chinh 
1994). In relation to the courts, this basic principle was an ideal to which the courts 
aspired, but implementation was problematic. As we shall see, democratic centralism 
has been retained as an organising principle to the present day. 
The regime’s supporters during the period 1945 to 1959 propounded an 
instrumentalist view of law without explicitly theorising about socialist legality 
(see below; and Sidel 1997a).45 No separate narrative emerges from the available 
sources for the period that explicitly relies on socialist legality to connect law, 
socialism and the new nation.46 
The perception that law was more commonly viewed instrumentally rather than 
theoretically (except by its detractors) rests on several commentaries on Vietnamese 
legal development and the nature of the debates between intellectuals and Party 
figures over this period. For example, Nguyen Nhu Phat, a theorist with the Institute 
of State and Law, writes 
The Communist Party of Vietnam is a political party which gained society’s almost 
absolute confidence and is able to call on the support of all people. Moreover, in the first 
years of the people’s democratic system, the distinction between the leadership of the 
Party and the administration of the state was out of the question because the state could 
not be present everywhere in the country and secret Party cells had to play the role of the 
state (Nguyen Nhu Phat 1997:398). 
Nguyen Nhu Phat portrays Vietnamese law in the early period of the revolution 
as reflecting the domination of political expediency and practical considerations. 
In effect, the State Plan (or policies) was the law. Legal jurisprudence was relegated 
to a critique of practice (Nguyen Nhu Phat 1997). The Nhan Van/Giai Pham experience 
reinforces this perception. Not surprisingly, the socialist legal debates did not 
immediately take hold in war-torn Vietnam. 
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A unified DRVN: the policy–law dichotomy 
There was not one view of law between the defeat of the French in 1954 and 
unification of the country in 1976, but the outspokenness of the Nhan Van/Giai Pham 
period did not resurface (Nicholson 2000). The publications of the Supreme People’s 
Court explicitly condemned it.47 Instead, this period witnessed the development of 
a legal studies group (to luat hoc) debating law. The legal studies group originally 
convened under the auspices of the Social Sciences Division of the State Sciences 
Committee, later forming the genesis of the Institute of State and Law (Sidel 1997a). 
According to Mark Sidel, this group, comprising scholars and non-communist 
intellectuals, included ‘leading voices for legal reform’ (Sidel 1997a:16).48 
One of the key tensions for the emerging system of administration was the 
relationship between law and policy. All too often, policy was not enacted as law 
and yet Party–state officials were expected to implement both. Policy was at least as 
significant as luat (law) (Sidel 1997a). For example, law could be used interchangeably 
with policy (Le Duan 1994).49 As a result, the importance of policy (or the State Plan, 
as it was also referred to) cannot be underestimated. As we saw above, Fforde aptly 
characterises law as ‘an important element’ of the Party line, but it was not 
authoritative at this time (Fforde 1986:62). 
Nguyen Nhu Phat expresses the view, in the context of economic contracts, that 
the State Plan operated as law when he writes 
[i]n the old regime, planning was the main instrument used by the state to administer the 
national economy. That is to say that planning but not law was the main and most 
important factor. Planning would always prevail over law. Any conflict between the law 
and the planning would be resolved in ‘favour’ of the planning. Generally speaking the law 
was only a subsidiary instrument while the policy and resolutions passed by the Party, 
administrative commands and planning documents were the main instruments in governing 
economic activities (1997:398). 
Yet there was debate about the application of policy that was intended to be law, 
but was not yet enacted. A Vietnamese lawyer writing in 1964 talked of the need to 
enforce laws, distinguishing them from policies. 
The policies of the Party must go through a process of explanation and elucidation so that 
the people will understand them clearly, support them and by their self-awareness carry 
them out. These policies must also pass the National Assembly, the government Council 
and other government organs before being enacted into law and before being backed by the 
authority of the government (Truong Tan Phat 1964:2). 
This more legalistic approach, requiring that policy be enacted as law in order to 
be enforceable, is rarely so clearly stated in major public speeches.50 More commonly, 
the terms ‘policy’ and ‘law’ are used interchangeably or ambiguously (Sidel 1997a).51 
For example, in this period the role of the Party was developed and entrenched via 
active promotion of its work and by training its members—a strengthening of the 
Party, as Truong Chinh (1994:605) described it when he wrote that ‘[i]n Party building 
we stress both ideological and organisational aspects’. In short, the Party aimed to 
raise the calibre of members through training. In 1968, all cadres were to be schooled 
in the ‘four-good’ principles. The second of the four tenets was 
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[g]ood at helping the people in obeying the law and in the implementation of Party and 
state policies (Truong Chinh 1994:606).52 
This statement suggests that policy, after it became law, was what the people 
had to obey. Yet both law and policy must be ‘implemented’. Truong Chinh did not 
address the issue of whether policy and law were interchangeable or what happened 
if they differed. 
Le Duan (1994:452) writes that 
[f]ormerly the Party line and policies penetrated the masses and were implemented through 
propaganda and agitation work with regard to each person or each group. Today besides 
these methods which we must apply even more effectively, broadly and adequately, we 
must also use large-scale organised measures…This can be done only through state laws 
which reflect the interests and the will of the working people. 
This statement, made in 1973, advocates the passage of policy into law. This 
approach is echoed in contemporary Vietnam. One typical call for a law-based state 
refers to earlier times when ‘it seems that for a while we emphasised building a 
society by means of the “rule of morality” and thus somehow neglected the law’ 
(Nguyen Nham 1997:3). 
Despite a clearer articulation of how the emerging socialist state would be 
administered (democratic centralism with the Party at the epicentre of politics), the 
state’s policy priorities were variously implemented via laws or policies or both. In 
effect, the debate about the role of law and policy continued, but law was not necessary 
to state-sanctioned decision-making (Sidel 1997a). 
It is relevant here to consider how the Vietnamese courts themselves conceived 
their role.53 The Chief Judge, in an article summarising the Supreme People’s Court’s 
Five-Year Plan 1961–65, commenced by referring to the Third Communist Party 
Congress, held in September 1960. He noted the comments made at that Congress 
on the relationship between Party and state ‘in the transitional stage towards 
socialism in the North’ (Pham Van Bach 1961b:1). He argued that the Party’s role in 
the leadership of the state was paramount 
[t]o unite the entire people, bring into full play our people’s ardent country-loving spirit, 
traditions of brave fighting and hard work, at the same time to reinforce the solidarity 
among the socialist countries headed by the Soviet Union, to create favourable conditions 
for the North to march speedily, strongly and firmly towards socialism, build a comfortable 
and happy life in the North and consolidate the North as a steady base for the struggle for 
the country’s unification, thus making a contribution to strengthening the socialist camp 
and the defence of peace in Southeast Asia and the world (Pham Van Bach 1961b:1). 
The Chief Judge reiterated the Third Party Congress’ view that the People’s 
Democratic Administration, of which the court was a part, must ‘fulfil the historic 
task of the proletariat’s dictatorship’ and to that end implement socialist reformation 
in the areas of agriculture, industry, economic policy and cultural change (Pham 
Van Bach 1961b:1). Chief Judge Pham Van Bach pointed out that the ‘position, role 
and political responsibilities of the People’s Court are not separable from position, 
role and political and economic responsibilities of the People’s Democratic State’. 
In turn the state’s responsibilities were ‘pointed out clearly in the political report of 
the Party Central Committee’ (Pham Van Bach 1961b:2). Here the connection between 
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Party and court is at its most clear. The Chief Judge has drawn the connections so 
that no reader could doubt that the role of the courts was, ultimately, to implement 
state policy. 
Having outlined the court’s political role the Chief Judge proceeded to connect 
the court’s work with the five-year plan (Pham Van Bach 1961b). He urged the work 
of the court to assist the revolution; to defend the social order (which included 
economic policies); to educate the masses to fight against acts violating the law, 
policy and disciplines of the state; and to promote the people’s democratic legality. 
This call to arms also stipulated that the role for the courts was to implement state 
policies as well as state laws (Pham Van Bach 1961b). 
To implement the Party’s policies effectively, court officials were told 
[w]e must be fully aware of the role and effectiveness of the People’s Court in contributing 
to the furtherance of the entire revolutionary work…apply properly the line and policy of 
the Party and state, always heighten the People’s Court characteristic of true democracy, 
apply strict basic principles guiding the work of adjudication, organise trials according to 
the Law on the Organisation of People’s Courts and ensure careful, correct and lawful 
adjudication which always enjoy sympathy and support of the people (Pham Van Bach 
1961b:6). 
Judges and assessors were thus instructed not only to apply state and Party 
policies, but also the Law on the Organisation of People’s Courts when organising 
trials. This law set out the basic elements of a fair trial, the role of assessors and 
judges, and the meaning of an open court. The statement suggested that careful and 
correct adjudication required the judge and people’s assessors to apply policies to 
produce lawful adjudication acceptable to the masses. 
In summary, this publication explained to court officials that they had to 
implement state policies and rely on senior courts and training as the basis for 
understanding those policies. Pham Van Bach reiterated that officials must 
understand that their work was political and that both the Party and the community 
must endorse it. He sought to inspire pride in the work of the courts as institutions 
linked to the fortunes of the war-dominated country. The role of the Supreme People’s 
Court was to show leadership, and in so doing, reflect the Party’s policies. 
Throughout the 1960s, a judicial conference was held annually to reinforce the 
duties and responsibilities of judges. The Supreme People’s Court issued a report 
on the conference’s conclusions. The issues raised in the Chief Judge’s first Five- 
Year Plan for the courts, outlined above, were echoed over the years. The central 
political role of the courts was reiterated.54 It was the duty of the Supreme People’s 
Court to foster the upholding of socialist legality by lower courts.55 However, it was 
pointed out that there was not always agreement among senior judges about what 
the law ought to say or, where it existed, how it ought to be interpreted.56 
This exploration of the policy–law dichotomy in Vietnam is one way of unpacking 
what is meant by socialist legality. It demonstrates that law is not binding or 
immutable, but rather a support to, and manifestation of, the Party line. In particular, 
law does not override policy, but exists to give it effect. As an element of the Party 
line, law is therefore not binding on Party members who would have a better 
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appreciation of the Party’s intentions and how they should be implemented in particular 
settings. For example, a judge writing about how law and policy interacted explained, 
At present the people’s courts only apply the new laws of the people’s power. In the event 
of there being no legislative text they follow the principle of analogy or simply the general 
political line of the revolution (Le Kim Que 1974:99). 
In a similar vein, Gillespie explains that socialist legality characterises policy as 
the ‘soul and spirit (linh hon) of the law’ (Gillespie 2004:150). Further, Gillespie 
argues that socialist legality conflated legalism and ‘state discipline (ky luat nha 
nuoc)’ with the result that ‘violations of the law were considered revolutionary 
betrayals’ (Gillespie 2004:150). 
From 1959 to 1976, a subtle change emerged. In effect, socialist conceptions of 
law were introduced and promoted. In particular, the Supreme People’s Court 
articulated a clear commitment to socialism and socialist legality, which saw law as 
a vehicle for Party–state policies, inferior to the Party line where conflicts occurred. 
The press and the leadership criticised capitalist legal systems for working only to 
the advantage of the bourgeois classes.57 In Vietnam a socialist legal system was 
endorsed where law was neither independent of, nor binding on, the Party–state. 
Legal theory in the contemporary period 
Thus far we have seen the Party–state construct theories concerning the interaction 
of the Party and its laws and legal institutions (socialist legality) and the mechanism 
by which all organisations are to be held accountable to, and led by, central Party 
institutions (democratic centralism). What remains unexplored is theory indicating 
the Party’s relationship with the people.58 
Through the revolutionary period the Party–state positioned itself as giving 
effect to the ‘mass’ line.59 Its leadership was ‘of the people, from the people and for 
the people’ (nha nuoc phap quyen xa hoi chu nghia cua nhan dan, do nhan dan va vi nhan 
dan). This principle of Party leadership giving effect to the will of the people is 
captured in the two DRVN constitutions of 1945 and 1959 and their two SRVN 
successors of 1980 and 1992.60 However, the principle of ‘collective mastery’ (lam 
chu tap the) was not articulated as a concept until the ‘euphoria surrounding 
reunification in 1975’.61 Gillespie argues that at this time the state explicitly 
acknowledged the ‘mastery’ of the working peoples, and posited the interests of the 
state and individual as one—the political leadership existing to reflect and enable 
the worker–peasant alliance.62 
As Gillespie notes, the classless society envisioned by Vietnamese collective 
mastery is predicated upon social harmony and group effort. In presenting it this 
way, the doctrine removes private ‘space’ for talk and debate outside the state- 
sanctioned domains of collectives and state bureaucracies. Further, Gillespie notes 
that the doctrine was ‘hostile to private legal rights’ (Gillespie, Chapter 3). How the 
doctrine accommodates the transition from socialist legality to law-based state (set 
out below) remains unclear. 
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In 1991, the Seventh Party Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam adopted 
‘nha nuoc phap quyen’, variously translated as ‘state-legal-rights’ or ‘law-based state’. 
As Gillespie points out, this is a Vietnamese adoption of the Russian concept ‘pravovoe 
gosudarstvo’, in turn reflecting the German principle of ‘Rechtsstaat’ (Gillespie, 
Chapter 3). In each case, the principle has the ‘state posited as the highest, if not the 
only source of law’ (Gillespie, Chapter 3). In the Vietnamese context, nha nuoc phap 
quyen means that the state will not only be the source of law but also be bound by 
law. This was the basis of the very fundamental constitutional changes made in 
1992, which saw the introduction of an amended Article 4 to include a statement 
requiring Party members to be bound by the law.63 
The introduction of ‘law-based state’ as a conceptual basis for the place and role 
of law in contemporary Vietnam has not replaced socialist legality as the current 
orthodoxy. Instead, the two concepts of law coexist and fuse to produce ‘socialist 
law-based state’ (nha nuoc phap quyen xa hoi chu nghia) (Gillespie 2004:152). Two 
issues emerge. What is meant by the state in this context? Further, to what does the 
term ‘law-based’ refer? 
As we have seen, it was not possible to conceive of the Vietnamese state without 
admitting the leadership of the Party, which remains the situation today. For example, 
the most recent round of constitutional amendments did not change the leadership 
role ascribed to the Party in 1992.64 Resolution 8 also restates the Party’s leadership 
role. 
The extent and limits of the term ‘law-based’ are less clear. One view is that the 
Vietnamese Party–state has repositioned law as the ‘highest’, if not ultimately the 
sole source of, binding instrument. This view is supported by the fact that the 
Party, through the Constitution, is said to be bound by law.65 More particularly, it 
envisions law ultimately becoming superior to policy.66 Yet as a matter of practice 
law remains subordinate to Party policy, particularly given the reliance on policy 
to interpret law. 
Socialist legality and law-based state compared 
Table 8.1 summarises, albeit briefly, the similarities and differences between socialist 
legality and the law-based state at a broad conceptual level. In an attempt not to 
confine the comparison to Western liberal notions of law, a range of indicators have 
been listed to tease out what each of the concepts reflects. This categorisation 
generalises change across jurisdictions, institutions, localities and experiences. It is 
therefore vulnerable to critique as it might misrepresent changes in particular sites. 
This analysis demonstrates that, whereas socialist legality sees law and legal 
institutions existing to give effect to a socialist conception of a Party-led state, the 
law-based state (or at least its socialist variant) envisages a shift from an instrumental 
role for law (and courts) to a situation where law exists to regulate social relations 
and where legal institutions are increasingly self-managed, although within the 
auspices of Party leadership. The law-based state does not posit state institutions 
179 Vietnamese jurisprudence: informing court reform 
as autonomous of Party influence, rather it reconfigures Party influence. The Party 
remains the dominant influence, mediated by an ancillary set of duties to the law. 
Yet, as we shall see, this remains more fluent in the abstract than it does in practice. 
RESOLUTION 8 AND LEGAL THEORY 
Returning to Resolution 8, we see that the reforms affecting courts can be summarised 
as follows 
• increasing the role of the Supreme People’s Court in the management of 
lower courts 
• giving the Supreme People’s Court power to appoint judges 
• increasing the technical competency of judges 
• increasing the public’s knowledge of the work of courts 
• increasing the role of lawyers/prosecution in court advocacy 
• investigating the role and function of the administrative court, family 
court, people’s assessors, as well as of the death penalty, state sovereignty, 
legal practice and international cooperation. 
The central tenet of Vietnamese jurisprudence (or political-legal theory) has moved 
from socialist legality to the emerging conception of the law-based state. The core 
feature of the law-based state is its attempt to characterise the law as a phenomenon 
that binds the state. The law, however, is always subject to interpretation and thus 
what is drawn upon to determine its meaning might be law or policy that has not 
yet been, or may never be, enacted. 
In Vietnam, the notion of a law-based state does not sit alone, but is accompanied 
by other legal doctrines, in particular, collective mastery and democratic centralism, 
each of which, while dynamic, also affords continuity with Vietnam’s legal history. 
Yet neither of these doctrines has been fundamentally revisited or rejected since the 
reconceptualising of the state as ‘law-based’. 
COMMENT IN CLOSING 
Resolution 8 appears largely to give practical effect to recent Vietnamese 
theorising. Its most significant changes potentially enable the courts to manage 
their own staff, professional development and guidelines (Nicholson 2003). In other 
words, as a legal institution, the courts are uncoupled from the executive arm of the 
state and given autonomy to implement Party direction. This is evident in the Supreme 
People’s Court’s greater control over budgets and staff selection and the project of 
developing a trained, technically competent judiciary. 
As noted in both Resolution 8 and the shift to law-based state, the Vietnamese 
leadership does not countenance a diminishing role for the Party. The Party retains 
a very tight grip on who will be appointed by the Supreme People’s Court to lower 
courts (Nicholson and Nguyen Hung Quang, 2005). The requirements ensure that 
local and central branches of the Party vet all judicial candidates. Further, every 
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appointment is revisited every five years. Without security of tenure it is very unlikely 
that judges will ignore Party direction generally or in particular cases. 
The areas that Resolution 8 nominates for further investigation indicate that the 
Party–state either does not have a comprehensive blueprint for legal change or 
wishes to see legal changes introduced incrementally.67 In particular, it is currently 
too difficult to reformulate the role of people’s assessors and the Administrative 
Court in a state where the mass line and Party leadership have not been abandoned. 
In other words, the Party leadership is not prepared to remove lay representatives 
from trials (although they have disappeared from the Supreme People’s Court) and 
radically expand the review of administrative decisions. Each of these reforms could 
potentially see the Party’s leadership diminished. 
By avoiding reforms to the system of people’s assessors and administrative 
review, the leadership of the Party and its claims of representing the ‘masses’ via 
democratic centralism and collective mastery are left largely intact. This arguably 
reflects their connection with the socialist/collective and popular notions of justice. 
For example, the socialist state, having introduced people’s assessors to democratise 
and popularise the law and the courts, may find it difficult to remove them. Therefore 
potential people’s assessors reforms (such as better training or even abolition) have 
not yet been implemented despite criticism of the lack of technical competence by 
lawyers. Instead, their role is to be ‘investigated’. In a similar vein, widening the 
scope of administrative review could threaten the leadership of the Party as it could 
enable challenges to the Party–bureaucracy’s discretionary decision-making. Again, 
rather than challenge the leadership of the Party by expanding review of 
administrative action, it is left for future debate. 
While the notion of law-based state is not entirely consistent with either 
democratic centralism or collective mastery, precisely because it envisages the Party– 
state being bound by law and not able to respond as directly as now to pressures 
and policies from the Party and state, this conflict has not been taken up by Resolution 
8. Yet again, Resolution 8 appears consistent with Vietnamese theoretical 
understandings of law where this tension is not widely debated. 
Finally, as we have seen, Resolution 8 specifically promotes the role of the lawyer 
in the emerging law-based state. The socialist law-based state implicitly requires a 
repositioning of lawyers as it is consistent with a move from political discretion to 
law-based decision-making. It appears on the face of it, however, that an active 
private legal profession could challenge the Party–state’s hold on the synergies 
between Vietnamese legal theory and policy review. An activist group of lawyers 
could potentially push for legalisation of institutions and practices in Vietnam, 
which could fracture the delicate balance between socialist conceptions of law and 
justice and institutional renovation currently in place. Only time will tell whether 
the nascent Vietnamese legal profession will act as a catalyst for more dramatic 
legal change or whether they will work closely with the Party–state to reshape 
Vietnam’s legal system further. The policy should be read as an ideological 
endorsement of incremental and cautious change. 
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This chapter commenced by asking whether the latest Party policy statement on 
‘judicial reform’ reflected contemporary Vietnamese legal theory. As we have seen, 
in the main it does. The orientation of Resolution 8 accords with the emerging 
doctrine of a law-based state. More particularly, we have seen that the policy direction 
for courts—that they be self-managed, bound by law and also implementing law— 
echoes the notion of a Vietnamese state based on law. At the same time, both the policy 
paper and the doctrine of ‘law-based state’ assume the continuing supremacy and 
leadership of the Communist Party of Vietnam. In conclusion, Resolution 8 appears 
largely consistent with Vietnamese jurisprudence. It reflects Vietnam’s adoption of 
the socialist law-based state while containing the same ambiguities evident in legal 
theory about the role and place of the masses and Party-state leadership. 
This chapter also raised a larger question at the outset; namely, the extent to 
which Vietnam has conceived of the role and place of law in post-doi moi Vietnam. 
While it is harder to answer this question solely on the basis of an analysis of one, 
albeit major, recent policy, it appears that the Party–state has adopted cautious 
incrementalism and experimentalism in its reshaping of law and legal institutions. 
Vietnamese pragmatism is once again evident. 
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NOTES 
1 Law on Organisation of People’s Courts, 2 April 2002 and Ordinance on Judges and Jurors of 
People’s Courts, 11 October 2002. See also Inter-circular No. 05/TTLN of the Ministry of 
Justice and SPC, dated 15 October 1993, Providing Guidelines on Ordinance on People’s 
Judges and Jurors 1993 and Resolution 131/2002/NQ- UBTVQH11 On Judges, People’s 
Assessors and Prosecutors, dated 3 November 2002. 
2 Comment made by conference participant Nguyen Chi Dung, at the Law and Governance: 
Socialist Transforming Vietnam conference, Melbourne, 13 June 2003. 
3 This chapter will not follow the reforms affecting other court-related agencies such as the 
police or the procuracy. 
4 The settlement of CPV policy would have involved circulation of drafts of the policy to 
relevant organs, including the heads of Party cells in law-related institutions. Once the document 
was settled, it would have been circulated to all relevant agencies and the membership of Party 
cells within these. This policy can also be purchased from the Party publisher and bookstalls. 
5 Not only are the working conditions poor (for example, offices are too small) but the facilities 
are old. 
6 As set out earlier, this chapter looks only at the policy’s effect on court work, and not at its 
implications for other legal institutions such as the police, the investigators or the procuracy. 
7 Real democracy is the literal translation of thuc su dan chu. In the Vietnamese context it 
connotes equal rights for individuals. 
8 For a general discussion of the Vietnamese court system in the 1990s, see Quinn (2002) and 
Nicholson (2001). 
9 Dung reminds us that Article 6 of the 1992 Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRVN) Constitution 
gives the National Assembly and its Standing Committee supremacy. Further, Dung (2003) 
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argues that this entails a reporting function to the National Assembly and the relevant People’s 
Council. 
10 See Directive No 10/2002/CT on the implementation of the Political Bureau’s Resolution No. 
8 for a general implementation plan. 
11 Law on Organization of People’s Courts, 2 April 2002; and Ordinance on Judges and Jurors of 
People’s Courts, 11 October 2002. See also Inter-circular No. 05/TTLN of Ministry of Justice 
and SPC, dated 15 October 1993, Providing Guidelines on Ordinance on People’s Judges and 
Jurors 1993; and Resolution 131/2002/NQ- UBTVQH11 On Judges, People’s Assessors and 
Prosecutors, dated 3 November 2002. 
12 See also Ordinance on Judges and Jurors of People’s Courts, 11 October 2002; Inter-circular 
No. 05/TTLN of Ministry of Justice and SPC, dated 15 October 1993, Providing Guidelines on 
Ordinance on People’s Judges and Jurors 1993; and Resolution 131/2002/NQ- UBTVQH11 
On Judges, People’s Assessors and Prosecutors, dated 3 November 2002. 
13 In particular, implementing legislation has waived the requirement that judges have a Bachelor 
of Laws Degree. 
14 Circular No. 01/2003/TTLT/TANDTC-BOP-BMV/UBTWMTTQVN Guiding the 
Implementation of a Number of Provisions of the Ordinance on Judges and Jurors of the 
Supreme People’s Court, The Ministry of Defence, The Ministry of Justice, The Ministry of the 
Interior and The Vietnam Fatherland Front Central Committee, dated 1 April 2003 (‘Circular 
01’), Chapter III, Article 2, Step 3. 
15 Step 4, Article 2, Chapter III, Circular 01. 
16 This position is clear in the legislation passed to give effect to this policy. In particular, judges 
seeking appointment need a letter of support from the Party Cell of the court to which they seek 
appointment and a Political Knowledge Certificate from the Central Political Training Institution. 
17 Translation from Cong Bao, the Official Gazette, No. 25, of 5 June 2002. 
18 Many parties bemoan the lack of equal treatment. For example, it has been explained to the 
author by a Ministry of Justice official that the great challenge to the enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards in Vietnam is usually they are to be enforced against state-owned enterprises. 
Thus, courts charged with establishing the ‘legality’ of foreign awards do not treat the interests 
of the parties’ ‘equally’. State policy to protect state-owned enterprises (and the stability they 
bring through employment) is given priority by the courts. Interview by author, Hanoi, 11 
October 2003. 
19 Since 1959, when the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRVN) as it then was established its 
official court systems, mobile hearings have been a feature of court work (Nicholson 2000). 
20 For example, the judgment resulting from the 1997 trial of Tran Thi Chieu and Bui Van Tham 
for corruption does not indicate the basis upon which either Chieu or Tham were found to have 
breached the Criminal Code. Judgment No. 233/HSST 22 February 1997 of the Hanoi People’s 
Court. 
21 Neither do jury trials in common law systems record the evidentiary basis of the conviction. 
22 See Judgment No. 233/HSST of the Hanoi People’s Court, 22 February 1997. 
23 The lack of reasons has several consequences. First, it is very hard for courts and lawyers to 
appeal or review cases when they are not able to understand the reasons behind judgments 
and particularly if they do not have access to the prosecution documents. Second, it is hard for 
higher courts to instruct lower courts on the basis of judgments alone. This then provokes a 
need for case summaries to be written and circulated, a need which has traditionally been met 
through publications in the Court’s Journal and more recently by case summaries prepared for 
the sole purpose of transmitting how to adjudge cases. See Nicholson (2000) on the use of the 
court journal. On the use of case summaries in civil and economic cases, see Gillespie (2003). 
24 Both lawyer Nguyen Hung Quang and legal journalist Nguyen Hien Quan (currently a doctoral 
student at the University of Melbourne) have pointed out to me that lawyers have played an 
adversarial role in the Nam Cam trial, reflecting an experiment by the state to allow advocates 
to test the evidence publicly in open court. 
25 Changes to the regulation of lawyers are in fact reinforcing this distinction by requiring state 
lawyers not to work in private practice. Discussion with Pham Duy Nghia and Bui Bich Thi 
Lien in Canada, April 2003. 
26 Gillespie notes that whether revolutionary thinking should dominate legal thinking was on the 
agenda in conferences before 1986, but that no decision was made to change the status quo 
during these earlier debates. 
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27 It is commonly asserted that the Party continued to operate even after its official dissolution 
in 1945. This position is supported when Tran Thi Tuyet (1997:25) writes ‘in fact it withdrew 
into secret’. 
28 Statute of the Communist Party of Vietnam, 2001. 
29 Conversation with lawyers in Hanoi over the period 1992–2002. 
30 For example, the Supreme People’s Court Journal over the period 1960–76 draws very little on 
Chinese jurisprudence while it borrows heavily from the USSR, devoting sections to translation 
of Soviet jurisprudential terms (Nicholson 2000). With the collapse of the Chinese legal system 
during the anti-Rightist campaign launched in 1957 and the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), 
Vietnam received little Chinese leadership on law and legal development during this period 
(see Leng 1967). 
31 Shaun Malarney (1997) traces the continuities between Confucian and socialist ethics. 
32 This discussion of the role and place of law after the Declaration of Independence in Vietnam 
until unification of the country in 1976 is drawn from Nicholson (2000). 
33 This contrasts with the position in the USSR where during the early days of the revolution legal 
philosophers conceived of law withering away (Nicholson 2000). 
34 Truong Trong Nghia similarly characterises Ho Chi Minh’s attitude to law in ‘The Rule of Law 
in Vietnam: Theory and Practice’ available at http://www.mcpa.org. He argues Uncle Ho was 
committed to the Rule of Law. Laws were passed early in the life of the new regime. For 
example, in 1946 they passed laws to establish the Military Court with powers to try civilians 
and military figures for treason. 
35 Here Boudarel is quoting from an editorial written by Nguyen Huu Dang (1956) in the fourth 
issue of Nhan Van. 
36 Between 1953 and 1956 Vietnam introduced a land reform policy closely modelled on the land 
redistribution policies of China. See generally White (1981). 
37 Nhan dan, 1956, Hanoi, 13 December; reprinted in Hoa Mai (ed) The Nhan Van Affair, pp. 161– 
162. This material is cited by Turner (1975:158–9). Turner notes that the article was written by 
students of the Hanoi–based Nguyen Trai School at the instigation of the Vietnam Workers’ 
Party. 
38 Boudarel notes that five main players (Nguyen Huu Dang, Luu Thi Yen, Tran Thien Bao, Phan 
Tai and Le Nguyen Chi) were tried and that all received periods of imprisonment followed by 
a period of national indignity when they were not permitted to leave their homes. 
39 This organising principle is also reflected in the 1959 Constitution and its inclusion in Article 
4 was specifically referred to by Ho Chi Minh (1961:416) in his ‘Report on the Draft Amended 
Constitution’ to the National Assembly in 1959. Ginsbergs (1963:209) points out that the 
DRVN was the first communist state to include democratic centralism in its constitution. For 
a discussion of Soviet democratic centralism, see Butler (1983); Hazard (1969); Gryzbowski 
(1962); Ioffe (1985); Ioffe and Maggs (1983). 
40 Article 10, Statute of the Vietnam Workers’ Party, 1960. This legislation is referred to here, 
although it was not introduced until 1960, because it reflects the practices that emerged in the 
preceding years of the administration. In many cases, as we shall see, formal laws were 
introduced after a period in which that which was introduced had already been operative. See 
also Gainsborough (2003). 
41 The Party ceased to exist between 1945 and 1951, but once reformed its membership comprised 
major office holders such as the president and prime minister (Ho Chi Minh) and ministers. For 
example, the Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs and the Commander in Chief of the 
Armed Forces were all Party members. See Fall (1956). 
42 Ho Chi Minh (1994:119) also refers to Stalin’s leading role in this regard citing Stalin’s argument 
that ‘close control’ can help the Party to ‘avoid many grave mistakes’. 
43 Gillespie (2003) notes that this is the foundation of socialist democracy: where, borrowing 
from Lenin, the working class have to ‘centralise power in their hands’. 
44 Preamble, Statute of the Vietnam Workers’ Party, 1960. Here the word ‘masses’ is used because 
of its use in the Statute. However, it will also be used throughout this chapter when a reference 
is made to Vietnamese people who were members of the agricultural or labouring classes. It is 
an overtly political word used throughout Vietnamese writing to refer to the previously 
oppressed, but soon to be liberated, classes of Vietnamese society. Use of the word assists the 
reader to understand the militant political milieu in which this story was unfolding. 
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45 The understanding that law had a role to play in the revolution seems to have been spoken 
about by lawyers and politicians, but it is hard to ascertain how it was more generally debated. 
46 Compare this with the situation in the Soviet Union, Nicholson (2000). 
47 Editors, Justice Journal, Vol. 1, 1964, pp. 1–4 (in Vietnamese). 
48 In particular, Sidel cites Vu Dinh Hoe (previously Minister for Justice, a non-communist 
lawyer) and Tran Cong Truong as leading figures campaigning for legal reform. 
49 Here law is used to refer to economic principles (‘objective economic laws’). 
50 The tone of the article is legalistic rather than critical. This distinguishes it from the articles 
published in Nhan Van (Humanity) discussed previously. 
51 As mentioned previously, Sidel describes the activities of the Legal Studies Group in the 1960s 
and early 1970s, pointing out that legal scholars debated the role of law throughout the period. 
52 The other three tenets were ‘good at guiding production work and fighting’; ‘good at caring for 
the masses and integration with them’; and ‘good at strengthening the work of the Party’. 
53 The ensuing discussion is drawn from Nicholson (2000). The DRVN officially established a 
‘court system’, as opposed to a system of regionally administered courts, in 1959. 
54 Chief Judge of the Supreme People’s Court (1967) Editors, Conference Summary, p. 3 [in 
Vietnamese]. 
55 Chief Judge of the Supreme People’s Court (1967) Editors, Conference Summary, p. 3 [in 
Vietnamese]. 
56 Chief Judge of the Supreme People’s Court (1968), Conference Summary, p. 25 [in Vietnamese]. 
57 For example: Unsigned Article (1961:4). See also comments made by Ho Chi Minh (1924:772), 
as cited in Turner (1975:137). 
58 Before proceeding, I wish to acknowledge the work of John Gillespie in mapping contemporary 
Vietnamese socialist legal thinking. Much of the Vietnamese legal theory relied upon in this 
section is directly drawn from his more recent, and as yet unpublished, work. 
59 Gillespie (2003) notes that this is the foundation of socialist democracy—according to Lenin’s 
thought, the working class have to ‘centralise power in their hands’. 
60 For analysis of the Northern Vietnamese Constitutions, see Duiker (1992); Marr (1995); 
Nicholson (1999). 
61 The 1976 unification Constitution is the most explicitly socialist of all Vietnam’s Constitutions, 
as evidenced by its preamble. See also Nicholson (1999); and John Gillespie’s chapter in this 
publication. 
62 John Gillespie's chapter in this publication. 
63 Article 4, SRVN Constitution 1992. 
64 Article 4, SRVN Constitution 1992, as amended in 2001. 
65 Article 4, SRVN Constitution 1992, as amended in 2001. 
66 Certainly this is suggested by Resolution 8. 
67 This comment is not intended to detract from the very great pace of legal change in Vietnam 
since the adoption of the renovation (doi moi) policy. In interviews by the author in June 2005, 
it was suggested that the Politburo has approved the legal reform strategy. It is yet to be made 
public. 
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9 
Ideology and professionalism: 
the resurgence of the Vietnamese 
bar 
Nguyen Hung Quang and Kerstin Steiner 
The legal profession is crucial to a democratic society and is one of speciality. The legal 
profession is, primarily, necessary to ensure the constitutional rights of the citizen, the right 
to be protected, and the right to defense counsel where rights and interests are violated. 
Nguyen Dinh Loc (2001) 
Minister of Justice 
In the cause of building a socialist state based on rule of law, the Communist Party 
of Vietnam and the Government of Vietnam have issued a number of resolutions, 
directives and legal normative documents to improve the state apparatus and laws 
(Hoang The Lien 2002). In early 2001, as part of the legal reform process, the Politburo 
of the Party Central Committee issued a resolution on future reforms to the judicial 
branch,1 laying the foundation for legal reform in Vietnam and resulting in a number 
of legal normative documents being passed. These documents regulated judicial 
activities and generally supported the aim of building a law-based socialist state in 
Vietnam. 
This chapter seeks to analyse how individual lawyers and their organisations 
can be strengthened and consolidated as part of Vietnam’s legal reform. In order to 
address this issue, the chapter will first explore the history of lawyers in Vietnam. It 
examines the different points of view and attitudes of governmental organisations 
and judicial organs towards legal practitioners. It then continues with a case study 
of the Nam Cam case—the largest and most infamous criminal case in Vietnamese 
legal history—to illustrate the shortcomings of the current legal reforms. The chapter 
concludes by arguing for further changes to secure the role of lawyers in judicial 
reform. 
191 
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THE HISTORY OF LAWYERS IN VIETNAM 
Prior to the August Revolution 
Lawyers, also known as thay cai (‘defence counsel’), appeared in Vietnam with the 
French introduction of the court system (Nguyen Van Tuan 2001; Le Kim Que 2003). 
Before then, people only hoped for justice den gioi soi xet (‘God willing’)2 in feudal 
courts (Le Kim Que 2003). The feudal system did not recognise the role of defence 
counsel, especially under a Confucian social order which views the King as the son 
of God and the Mandarin as the parent—kings and mandarins did not accept the 
protestations of their people, their servants, or their children. In some dynasties, 
however, those who possessed certain legal knowledge occasionally helped people 
draft claims or advised them on petition or court procedures. Recent scholarship 
sees this as a preliminary form of the ‘lawyer’ profession (Tan Van Tai 2002), but it 
really only occurred on an ad hoc and unprofessional basis. 
After the French colonial government conquered southern Vietnam in 1862, it 
established a French court to adjudicate French citizens (Le Kim Que 2003). Initially, 
lawyers had to be naturalised as French, but this restriction was gradually lifted to 
include Vietnamese who held French citizenship (Le Kim Que 2003). By 1884, when 
the French had colonised southern Vietnam completely and asserted their dominance 
over Central and North Vietnam, Vietnamese who held a Bachelor of Laws degree 
were permitted to practise as lawyers (Phan Huu Thu 2001). On 25 May 1930, the 
French colonial government issued an Order on the Establishment of the Bar 
Association that permitted bar associations in Hanoi and Saigon for the first time. 
This order officially recognised the existence of lawyers in Vietnam and provided 
that Vietnamese lawyers could appear before court if they 
• held a Bachelor of Law degree 
• had served at least  five years’ apprenticeship in a lawyers’ office 
• had passed the exam and been admitted to the bar association 
• taken an oath to abide fully by the law and be loyal to the French 
government (Phan Huu Thu 2001). 
Once accepted, these lawyers were allowed to open their own practice and receive 
clients. 
It is self-evident that lawyers during the French colonial period had to respect 
the colonial government, as it was nothing but a replica of the homeland government. 
The laws implemented in southern Vietnam were transplanted French laws while 
those implemented in Central and North Vietnam were strongly influenced by French 
law (Durand 2002; Tran Thi Tuyet 2003; Nguyen Phan Quang and Phan Van Hoang 
1995; Pham Hung 2000). This also explains the success of some lawyers in defending 
Vietnamese revolutionaries in the colonial courts (D.T. 2002). 
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After the August Revolution (1945–87) 
Immediately after occupying Northern Vietnam, the revolutionary government 
started to reorganise the judicial system. In October 1945, President Ho Chi Minh 
issued the Order on the Lawyer Organization.3 This order was the first document of 
the revolutionary government to recognise the existence and role of lawyers in the 
judicial system, representing a significant move towards compliance with the real 
situation in Vietnam at the time. Restrictions placed by the colonial government on 
the admission of lawyers to practise were loosened (Nguyen Van Tuan 2001; Phan 
Huu Thu 2001; Nguyen Dinh Loc 2001). The right of the defendant and the accused 
to present their case was established immediately after the first Order on 
Establishment of the Revolutionary Government Court was issued.4 These were 
important documents in the initial stage of the revolutionary government as they 
recognised the existence and necessity of lawyers in the revolutionary state 
apparatus. 
The first Constitution of Vietnam reinforced this right by stating that it was an 
‘important democratic right of the accused’ to be legally represented in criminal 
proceedings.5 Hence, it assumed the existence of a legal profession capable of 
fulfilling this task. Since Vietnam was a revolutionary state at that time, the 
safeguarding of this right proved to be a challenge for the new revolutionary 
government. Trained lawyers were mostly educated in the French legal system and 
had sworn allegiance to the French colonial government. However, some lawyers 
remained in Vietnam or returned from France and became members of the new 
Vietnamese government (Nguyen Phan Quang and Phan Van Hoang 1995; Pham 
Hung 2000). These lawyers made significant contributions to the rebuilding of 
Vietnam and also ensured that the legal profession continued to exist during the 
transition period. Still, there were not enough trained lawyers to ensure that all 
accused were legally represented and defended at trial, prompting President Ho 
Chi Minh to issue an order in 1949 that allowed those accused to nominate a citizen 
who was not a lawyer as defence counsel subject to approval by the chief judge.6 
This led to the development of the new concept of bao chua vien nhan dan (‘people’s 
advocate’), very similar to that of certificat de citoyennet (‘citizen certificate’) during 
the 1798 French bourgeois revolution. At that time, the French Revolution abolished 
bar associations, arguing that citizens had the right to defence. In order to defend 
others, they only needed a certificat de citoyennet (see Le Kim Que 2003). 
On 12 January 1950, the Ministry of Justice issued a decree providing details to 
President Ho Chi Minh’s Order stating the conditions by which a citizen could 
become a people’s advocate (Nguyen Van Tuan 2001): the person had to be a 
Vietnamese citizen, at least 21 years old, of good morality, with no prior criminal 
convictions. 
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At the beginning of every year, the provincial resistance and administrative 
committees, together with the provincial chief judge, would develop a list—which 
the chief judge could alter at his discretion—of the qualified citizens who had agreed 
to appear as people’s advocates before the court. This list would then be posted at 
the local court offices (Nguyen Van Tuan 2001). The incomes of lawyers and people’s 
advocates differed—the people’s advocate received an allowance from the court 
budget while lawyers received fees from the defendant or the defendant’s relatives.7 
Furthermore, people’s advocates, unlike lawyers, had no obligation to pay personal 
income tax.8 Together these conditions ensured that poor people could access 
representation by defence counsel during court trials. This is possibly the most 
outstanding achievement of the revolutionary government in the initial stage. 
People’s advocates continued to exist and were further asserted through Circular 
No. 101/HCTP of the Ministry of Justice, 29 August 1957. Circular No. 101 clearly 
stated that ‘While there are no adjustments to the “people’s advocate” institution, 
the Order No. 69 dated 18 June 1949 and Decree 01/ND-NY dated 12 January 1950 
on the “People’s Advocate Organization” shall continue to be implemented’ (Nguyen 
Van Tuan 2001:74). 
After North Vietnam was liberated in 1955, the Vietnam Lawyers’ Association 
(VLA) was established to encompass everyone working in the legal field.9 The 
association’s membership therefore comprised not only lawyers but also people 
working within the legal sector at state institutions (Pham Hung 2000). Since the 
VLA’s main purpose was to serve state policies (Pham Hung 2000) and to provide 
defence counsel if requested by the court, it cannot be regarded as comparable with 
a professional organisation like the bar association in Western legal systems. 
The 1959 Constitution established the court and prosecutorial systems, and the 
Ministry of Justice was eliminated. The administrative judicial work, including the 
advocate’s work, was assigned to the Supreme People’s Court (Pham Hung 2000). 
A pilot law office, the Van phong Luat su Ha noi [Hanoi Lawyer Office], was established 
in 196310 to ensure the constitutional right to defence. In its early years, the Hanoi 
Lawyer Office 
• defended the accused in criminal cases and protected the legitimate rights 
of the parties in civil cases before the courts 
• provided legal advice to the people and the cadres 
• helped people draft petitions and other legal documents such as contracts 
and covenants 
• contributed to legal propaganda through the court proceedings (Pham 
Hung 2000). 
Despite the name ‘Law Office’, however, the organisation in fact comprised only 
people’s advocates and operated as an administrative body under the direct 
administration of the Supreme People’s Court (Phan Huu Thu 2001). The people’s 
advocates were civil servants and received their salaries out of the state budget 
(Hanoi Bar Association 2002). It can, therefore, be said that in the period between 
1960 and 1980, the legal profession virtually did not exist as it had been replaced by 
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that of the people’s advocates (Nguyen Van Thao 2001). Furthermore, people’s 
advocates acted only in cases dealt with by the courts. In cases conducted by the 
Resistance, Administrative and Land Reform Committees, adjudicating matters 
where people protested against the revolution or were carrying out land reform, 
participation of the people’s advocates was not necessary. The operations of those 
committees were indeed far more forceful than the courts (White 1981; Nicholson 
2000). This caused Vietnamese society to perceive lawyers as limited only to criminal 
defence in court proceedings (Phan Huu Thu 2001). 
The 1980 Constitution provided for the establishment of an organisation for 
lawyers, the first such provision since the revolution (Phan Huu Thu 2001; Nguyen 
Dinh Loc 2001). It was set up after the reunification of Vietnam and, taking into 
account the different habits of the people in the south of Vietnam—where people 
had long used lawyers to protect their rights in court—reaffirmed the defendant’s 
right to defence as stated in the previous constitution.11 The new constitution thus 
formed the legal foundation to pass more laws with respect to the organisation of 
lawyers in Vietnam (Nguyen Van Tuan 2001; Hanoi Bar Association 2002:19) and 
harmonised the two systems of using lawyers’ services. 
After the Ministry of Justice was re-established, the management of lawyers was 
transferred from the government’s Legal Committee back to the Ministry of Justice.12 
The need to promulgate a legal document on the organisation of the legal profession 
began to take shape. Before issuing a legal document on the organisation of lawyers 
and defence work, the Ministry of Justice had to consult with the Supreme People’s 
Court, the Supreme People’s Procuracy as well as some other state authorities 
(Nguyen Van Tuan 2001). This legal document served as the legal foundation 
establishing a number of local doan bao chua vien nhan dan (‘people’s advocate 
organisations’). By the end of 1987, over 30 provinces and cities in Vietnam launched 
their own people’s advocate organisations consisting of over 400 people’s advocates. 
These continued to operate until the 1987 Ordinance on Lawyer Organisation was 
passed (Nguyen Van Tuan 2001). 
Following promulgation of the Ordinance on Lawyer Organisation (1987–2001) 
The Ordinance on Lawyer Organisation was enacted on 18 December 1987 and 
provided further details on lawyers’ organisations. This ordinance was sought to 
revitalise careers as lawyers in preparation for the socioeconomic reform process in 
Vietnam (Nguyen Van Tuan 2001; Phan Huu Thu 2001). By 1989, 16 bar associations 
had been established, replacing the former people’s advocate organisations (Nguyen 
Van Tuan 2001). To boost the establishment of local bar associations, the Ministers’ 
Council (now called the ‘government’) issued on 21 February 1989 Decree No. 15/ 
HDBT on the Regulations of Bar Associations. The Ministry of Justice issued a 
document detailing this decree.13 Under these regulations, 61 bar associations with 
82 branches had been set up by 30 September 2001, covering all provinces and cities 
in Vietnam. These bar associations comprise approximately 2100 practising lawyers 
(Nguyen Dinh Loc 2001; Nguyen Van Tuan 2001). 
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Increasing professionalism is also reflected in the number of lawyers currently 
holding a university law degree. The figure increased from 60 per cent in 1989 to 85 
per cent in 2001 (Nguyen Van Tuan 2001). The number of qualified judges and 
prosecutors, however, trails the figure for lawyers (Nicholson and Nguyen Hung 
Quang, forthcoming).14 
The 1987 Ordinance on Lawyer Organisation has had limited success in 
changing people’s attitudes towards the legal profession (Nguyen Van Thao 2001). 
In fact, the ordinance hindered lawyers’ careers by stipulating governmental 
administrative control over lawyers (Nguyen Van Thao 2001). This control 
encompassed all aspects of lawyers’ practice such as opening a legal practice and 
forming partnerships, thus denying activity, independence and freedom to practising 
lawyers (Nguyen Van Thao 2001; Nguyen Van Bon 2001). The practice of assigning 
cases and setting fees through the bar association’s management serves further to 
restrict lawyers in their practice. The bar association charged an amount for the 
service depending on internal regulations (Nguyen Van Tuan 2001; Nguyen Van 
Bon 2001); and the practice essentially infringed citizens’ right to choose their own 
lawyer, thus damaging public perceptions of lawyers (Nguyen Van Bon 2001). 
In 1997, the Communist Party released a policy consolidating and strengthening 
the judicial assistance agencies, strongly emphasising the role of lawyers, legal 
consultancy and forensic examination.15 These reforms were taken one step further 
in the 2001 Ordinance on Lawyers. 
From 2001 to the present 
The 2001 Ordinance on Lawyers has played an important role in the reform process 
of building a socialist state based on the rule of law. These reforms were meant to be 
implemented in depth and to include judicial reforms (Nguyen Dinh Loc 2001). 
This ordinance has considerably expanded lawyers’ rights, addressing some of the 
shortcomings of the 1987 Ordinance. The 2001 Ordinance stipulates in more detail 
the scope of lawyers’ practice, allowing them, for example, to practice independently 
or form partnerships with any number of members.16 Lawyers now may also 
establish joint ventures with foreign law firms under certain prescribed conditions.17 
Moving beyond litigation, the ordinance is more attentive to the legal consultation 
of lawyers, particularly legal consultations on investment and business. To some 
extent, the 2001 Ordinance has enhanced lawyers’ position, but in order to improve 
the social acceptance of lawyer’s services it will be necessary to amend a number of 
procedural legal normative documents (Nguyen Dinh Loc 2001). The most 
significant change in the 2001 Ordinance was the recognition of the career as a 
lawyer as a professional career. Beside the provisions on organisation and 
professional practice, the 2001 Ordinance provides a mechanism to protect clients.18 
All these changes have helped build public confidence in lawyers. 
This is reflected in some statistics. Throughout the country, 2,360 lawyers have 
registered so far in 61 bar associations, practising in 680 legal offices, 45 branches 
and four law partnership companies.19 As of 30 September 2004, under the 2001 
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Ordinance on Lawyers, approximately 26 per cent of these lawyers will be ineligible 
to practise law as they are civil servants, and 5 per cent will be rendered ineligible 
beyond the next five years because of their age.20 However, taking into consideration 
the number of trainees enrolled in legal professional training schools—over 1,835 
trainees in two years (2002–03)21 alone—it seems that the professional lawyer career 
is developing. 
ATTITUDE OF THE STATE AND THE PUBLIC TOWARDS 
LAWYERS 
Several factors shape how lawyers are perceived by society, such as certain 
characteristics of the state organisation, social features and legal institutions. 
Structure of the state 
Based on the comment of the former Minister of Justice Nguyen Dinh Loc that the 
‘lawyer career is a profession crucial to a democratic society’, it would appear 
evident that lawyers can only function well in a democratic society. Resolution 8 
mentioned the concept tranh tung dan chu (‘democratic adversarial proceeding’), but 
no definition of this concept has yet been given. Nor has the question of whether 
this ‘democratic’ concept might be governed by the principle of ‘democratic 
centralism’ yet been answered. State agencies seem puzzled in implementing the 
principle in democratic adversarial proceedings; one document by the Ministry of 
Police states that lawyers, who are Communist Party members, must respect the 
adjudication directions of the Party in the adjudicating proceedings.22 This almost 
reflects the attitude of state agencies and officers towards the lawyers. 
Lawyers are still not on equal footing with prosecutors in the democratic litigation 
process and administrative agencies are still not recognised appropriately in 
administrative procedures. This diminishes lawyers’ role, confining it to the position 
of a sub-actor needed to perform a complete vo kich (‘play’). 
Structure of the society 
Agricultural society. Perhaps the primary reason for the lack of recognition of 
professional lawyers might be attributed to the fact that Vietnam is an agricultural 
country, with more than 80 per cent of its population living in rural areas. In these 
areas, perceptions of social order are still heavily influenced by Confucian ideology. 
Efforts to change that perception have been unsuccessful. The revolution of August 
1945 dismantled the feudal regime, and the revolutionary government attempted to 
explain the new concept that state officers are day to cua nhan dan (‘servants of the 
people’). Involvement of state officers is still avoided; instead, the guidance of 
decision-making bodies is followed. 
In cases of dispute, recourse to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms is 
preferred. These mechanisms include amicable settlements, to hoa giai (‘conciliation 
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groups’), luat rung (‘lynch law or self-justice’), or approaching senior officers in the 
administrative system. Courts are seen as the last resort to resolve a dispute. 
Feudal ideology. Even though the August 1945 Revolution overthrew the feudal 
regime, the ideology upon which this regime had been based was much harder to 
eliminate from the people’s thinking. State agencies and officers often refused to 
work with lawyers. In fact, many state officers were still influenced by feudal ideology 
(Nguyen Thanh Binh 2002). The mandarin-like behaviour of mal du siècle (‘disease 
of the century’), or as it was popularly called, quan tinh, was considered appropriate 
under Confucian thought.23 This practice was often criticised by the Party. Although 
the Communist Party of Vietnam criticised feudal norms, in practice the principle of 
democratic centralism enabled a continuation of feudal thinking and relationships. 
Therefore, the attitude of revolutionary state officials, who considered lawyers as 
thay cai (‘master of arguing’, which did not facilitate an environment of mutual 
respect). 
Legal history. Judicial inexperience also contributed to the population’s general 
resentment of lawyers. The military and political influences affected not only lawyers 
but also the judicial system. This continued even after the revolutionary government 
took power. 
The court was immediately considered one of the agencies serving the political 
agenda of the new government. From 1946 to 1954, the major task for the 
revolutionary government was to drive out the French colonisers. The Revolutionary 
Court was primarily a military-style court to adjudicate over soldiers who did not 
fully perform their duties, anti-revolutionary gangs, capitalists, feudalists and 
landlords. Quite often the judges had already made their decision before the hearing 
and the trial was only held for political purposes, which may explain the popular 
concept in Vietnam of an bo tu (‘judgment already in the pocket’) (Pham Hong Hai 
2003). The defence counsel was often a cadre, a soldier of the Resistance Committee 
or the Administrative Committee, assigned by the court. The defence counsel’s 
function guided by the higher officials and/or the judge.24 The role of the defence 
counsel was simply to demonstrate that the judgment of the Revolutionary Court 
reflected principles of democracy and fairness, while in fact they were only an 
integral constituent of the revolutionary adjudication system. Furthermore, the fear 
of being stigmatised for defending anti-revolutionary activists prevented defence 
lawyers from voicing dissenting opinions. The principle of tap trung dan chu 
(‘democratic centralism’) guided the operation of all agencies in the socio-political 
system. Therefore, defence counsel could not, or dared not, break this rule. Some 
defence counsel even refused to take up a case when the other party was a state 
agency (which often happened in the administrative cases). Even so, several lawyers 
accepted the role of defence subject to ‘guidance’ of a state agency or a court body.25 
Contemporary experience with lawyers. Until the enactment of the Civil Code in 
1996, contemporary laws had no provisions permitting lawyers to act as 
representatives of their clients before the administrative agencies. After the Civil 
Code was enacted, however, the state officers were still permitted only to work 
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directly with the concerned parties. To be involved in the process, therefore, lawyers 
had to establish a relationship with the state officers. These relationships were 
called moi quan he tot dep (‘good relationships’) and included bribing state officers, 
and gave rise to the perception of lawyers as nguoi moi gioi (‘the broker or middle 
man’) or nguoi song ky sinh (‘parasites’).26 
Judicial proceedings 
Lawyers’ role in judicial proceedings is more clearly defined than their role before 
the executive agencies—their appearance demonstrating the new government’s 
democratic characteristics but their actions ultimately serving revolutionary aims. In 
theory, decisions and judgments were considered to express the righteousness of the 
revolutionaries, represent the people’s will, and were objectively and democratically 
rendered according to the principle of democratic centralism. Therefore, as a matter 
of practice, any act against the people’s will would not be tolerated. 
The role of lawyers in criminal proceedings illustrates this point. Their 
participation was confined to presenting their clients’ case at court since they were 
not allowed to be involved in the investigation stages.27 The current Criminal 
Procedure Code allows lawyers to participate from the time the suspect is accused, 
except in special cases of extremely serious offences endangering national security 
where it is necessary to keep the investigation secret.28 In reality, however, the 
investigative agency, the court and the prosecution have often denied lawyers the 
right to participate in the investigative stage, and there is no record so far of any 
cases where lawyers were allowed to participate in the investigative process, except 
for juvenile cases where it was essential that a lawyer was involved in order to 
provide a signature for completion of the case file.29 If a lawyer wants to participate 
in the investigation process, a good relationship with the prosecution is vital. The 
absence of lawyers in most cases creates opportunities for the investigative body 
and the prosecution to handle the file alone, and this lack of oversight opens the 
potential for investigators and prosecutors to become ‘subjective, or even sometimes, 
negative enough to distort the case file’.30 In many cases defendants have declared 
during court hearings that they were ‘induced or coerced to give testimonies’,31 placing 
the court in the difficult position of deciding whether these claims were true. This 
seems to be one of the reasons for many ‘wrongfully decided’ cases in Vietnam. 
There are several practical restrictions on lawyers when a case comes to trial. 
First, a lawyer needs an introductory letter from the bar to gain access to the criminal 
file. Second, access to the file is only granted when it is not needed by a panel 
member. Third, a lawyer is not allowed to photocopy the case file, but is permitted 
only to take notes of the important points. In complicated criminal cases, it can often 
take days for a lawyer to go through the file. Finally, if a lawyer wants to meet the 
client in a detention camp, another introductory letter, this time from the court or the 
bar, is required. All these aspects form a part of the xin cho (‘beg and give’) practice 
in criminal proceedings. 
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At the hearing, the lawyer has the right to express his opinions to defend his 
client. However, such opinions are rarely respected by the trial panel or recorded in 
the judgment. In reality, the conclusion of the judgment, or sometimes the entire 
judgment, is often written beforehand and contains only the opinions of the 
prosecutor as expressed in the indictment and offered to the trial panel. The defence 
lawyer’s opinions are summarised in one or two lines in the judgment32 or only 
with the phrase ‘after hearing the lawyer’s opinions’. 
This contributed to the development of a particular style for the speeches of the 
defence counsel 
• admitting that the prosecutor’s accusation is correct 
• analysing the causes to show that the defendant committed the crime 
• presenting some mitigating elements on behalf of the defendant 
• suggesting that the trial panel mitigate punishment of the defendant. 
This structure is widespread, especially among older lawyers.33 
The factors discussed above meant that the majority of citizens did not fully 
understand what the functions of lawyers were in criminal proceedings. Some viewed 
lawyers as government officials and therefore believed that they were of limited 
help since they would adopt a similar attitude to that displayed by governmental 
agencies. People who possessed some legal knowledge, or who were involved in 
court cases, knew that lawyers only had a limited function as a nguoi moi gioi 
(‘broker’). Thus, before seeking a lawyer’s services, many people resorted to their 
quan he (‘relationships’) to settle the case. Many business entities, especially state- 
run enterprises, rarely used lawyers in their business affairs,  preferring instead to 
take advantage of administrative interrelationships among the line agencies, or the 
privileges of a state agency, to support or defend their case. Moreover, lawyers were 
seen to complicate the case unnecessarily and annoy state officials. 
Law graduates also prefer not to become lawyers directly after graduation. Most 
graduates want to work in secure jobs in governmental institutions. This is the 
common attitude among graduates in the bao cap (‘government subsidy’) period of a 
centrally planned economy. Only those graduates who could not find jobs in 
government institutions would reluctantly accept a position as a lawyer.34 Even 
then, acting as a lawyer is regarded as a temporary job while waiting for a position 
in a government institution. 
Since the education of lawyers falls short in the area of practical experience—no 
training courses in professional skills existed until a pilot one-week course was 
held by the Ministry of Justice in 1996—a lawyer has to develop these skills alone.35 
This is a significant difference from other legal professionals where training courses 
were held and funded countrywide. Two years after the pilot course, the Asian 
Development Bank provided funds for the Ministry of Justice to establish a 3-month 
comprehensive professional training courses for lawyers. The newly-established 
Legal Professional Training School36 has held three professional skills training 
courses for lawyers in the last two years (2002–03). The training courses run for six 
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months and are expected to equip the trainees with good theoretical knowledge. 
However, they fail to reflect or address the difficulties and challenges that lawyers 
may face in practice. 
According to the Legal Needs Assessment Report for Vietnam for 2002–10, Viet 
Nam needs 17,000 to 18,000 lawyers by 2010.37 Unfortunately, the basis for this 
assessment is not known, but if these numbers are correct it is vital that the attitude 
towards the role and activities of lawyers in the judicial system is changed in order 
to attract lawyers to a career as practicing lawyers. 
Resolution No. 08-NQ/TW of the Politburo on Forthcoming Principal Judicial Tasks 
has laid foundations for judicial reforms. In particular, for the first time, an important 
document of the Central Communist Party and the state requires the legal systems 
‘to ensure democratic pleading with the barristers and the people’s advocate’.38 
It can bee seen that some important improvements have been made during the 
law reform process, at least on paper. 
THE ‘NAM CAM’ CASE39 
The Nam Cam trial tested the recent law reforms. This case study illustrates the 
shortcomings and improvements of the recent legal reforms, highlighting the 
discrepancies between the official Party line and the perception of the population 
with respect to the effectiveness of the legal system. 
The case of Truong Van Cam is considered the biggest case in the history of 
criminal procedures in Vietnam.40 This is not only because of the high number of 
defendants involved in the case—about 155, compared to the 77 defendants in Tang 
Minh Phung’s criminal case in 1999 and 74 defendants in Tan Truong Sanh’s case 
in 199941—but also because of its far-reaching implications. 
The trial tested the judicial system in two ways. First, it tested the seriousness 
and commitment of the Party to crack down on corruption within the Party and 
police. Therefore, if the Party was seriously committed to changes, it should have 
interfered less with the prosecution of officials. Crime and graft are two of the major 
problems investors are facing in Vietnam. The vicious circle of corruption is spurred 
on by civil servants’ low wages and a bureaucratic legal system that encourages 
businesses ‘to cut corners by offering bribes’ (Maria 2003:n.p.). 
Second, the trial tested the recent reforms with respect to the close nexus between 
the state and the Party. The question was whether the judges would utilise the 
changes in the legal system and thus withstand political pressure. According to the 
presiding judge Bui Hoang Danh, ‘it was a public and democratic trial, in line with 
legal reforms’ (Judge Bui Hoang Danh, cited in Cohen 2003b:A4). The trial has been 
further praised for the improvement of the rights of the defendant. Among other 
things,42 the court showed an unprecedented willingness to grant defence lawyers 
the right to express their opinion and the right to have access to their clients before 
the trial (Cohen 2003b). 
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In general, the criminal case against Nam Cam contains all the elements of a good 
Mafia criminal story and reads like Mario Puzo’s novel ‘The Godfather’.43 When 
Nam Cam was arrested in December 2001, the charges brought against him did not 
foreshadow the ultimate scandal. One of Nam Cam’s gang members had incurred 
an illegal gambling debt and left a car as collateral. The car’s licence plate, however, 
was fake, and the resulting search for the owner pointed to Nam Cam (Vasavakul 
2003). The subsequent investigation resulted in a mass arrest of 155 accomplices. 
Criminal history of Nam Cam 
Truong Van Cam has a long-standing criminal record. Owing to the intervention of 
corrupt state officials such as police, prosecutors and Party members, however, he 
had persistently been able to avoid arrest and prosecution (Quinn 2003). 
According to his police file, he was sentenced to a 3-year prison term for stabbing 
a man to death when he was 15 years old (Rowse 2003a).44 His career path afterwards 
included working at the docks and joining the South Vietnamese army, but after the 
reunification he started to rise through the criminal ranks to become a feared Mafia 
boss.45 The three arrests for gambling charges between 1978 and 1982 appeared 
trivial compared with what was to come. In 1995, army intelligence was alarmed by 
Nam Cam’s criminal activities and a report was given to Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet.46 
He was sentenced to a 3-year prison term in a re-education camp for his connections 
to the so-called xa hoi den (‘black societies’) and his money-lending practice.47 By then, 
however, Nam Cam had already established a close network with Party officials48 
and was able to secure an early release eight months ahead of schedule (Thayer 2002). 
The trial 
In December 2001, Nam Cam was arrested along with 155 associates. The trial 
proved to be an unprecendented logistical exercise. In preparing for the trial, the Ho 
Chi Minh City People’s Court spent billions of dong (VND) to upgrade trial facilities.49 
In order to reflect the recent law reforms, the Ho Chi Minh City People’s Court 
established an adjudication group of six judges (four principal judges and two on 
standby), five people’s assessors, and three court secretaries (two principal and one 
standby).50 The paperwork of the trial was immense; the case dossier consisted of 
118 volumes (20,000 pages in all), a 600-page indictment (colour-printed for the first 
time) distributed to all the lawyers and defendants, and a 400-page prosecutorial 
conclusion (The Gia 2003).51 
The hearing of the Nam Cam case took 57 working days, with 83 lawyers 
participating for the defence, and 238 summoned individuals.52 Over 300 police 
officers were mobilised to preserve order at the court proceedings. 
Experience of lawyers during the trial 
Lawyers experienced several improvements in their working conditions in 
preparation for and during the trial. With respect to preparation for the trial, the 
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meetings between clients and their lawyers were less restricted. The lawyers had 
access to the files and were given copies of the indictment free of charge.53 
The most significant improvements, however, were during the trial. Defence 
counsels were allowed to express their opinions without any interruption. Other 
activities allowed for the first time in a Vietnamese court hearing were that 
• defence lawyers were allowed to use secretaries in the court hearing 
• defence lawyers were allowed to use pictures and tape recorders to 
illustrate evidence before the court 
• defence lawyers were given the opportunity to present their case with 
more freedom and without the typical interruption or silencing by judges 
• defence lawyers asked for adversarial opinions of the prosecutor at the 
hearing in order to determine the objective facts.54 
The question of whether the defence counsel really had a position equal to the 
prosecutor during the proceedings can only be answered by studying the experience 
of Dang Van Luan. 
Dang Van Luan was the defence lawyer for Tran Mai Hanh, a former member of 
the Central Communist Party and former state radio chief who was accused of receiving 
bribes and disclosing state secrets. In the first days of the hearing, the proceedings 
were conducted without any startling events, but during the pleading procedure the 
defence counsel boldly stated that his client was innocent, that the charges brought 
against Tran Mai Hanh were ‘vague, unsubstantiated and unpersuasive’ and that 
the ‘police had orchestrated gangsters’ testimony in prison rehearsals’ (Cohen 
2003a:22). The prosecutor’s case indeed included some contradictions and gaps, 
the witnesses could not remember the location of Hanh’s office nor specify when 
and where Tran Mai Hanh was allegedly bribed. Defence Attorney Luan requested 
clarification of these points by the prosecution office but the prosecutor refused.55 
Dang Van Luan’s comments in court sparked a public debate about the 
appropriate behaviour in court of defence attorneys. The press was divided in its 
opinion about Luan’s comments, either finding it lam dung quyen dan chu (an ‘abuse 
of the democratic right’) or supporting the lawyer’s freedom of speech.56 It also 
showed the far-reaching consequences such behaviour could generate. The 
prosecutor of Tran Mai Hanh’s case commented that Dang Van Luan’s behaviour 
‘offended the agencies conducting the proceedings’ and referred to a provision of 
the Criminal Procedure Code, asking the presiding judge to prosecute the defence 
counsel at the hearing.57 The Ministry of Police asked several official bodies58 to 
initiate disciplinary proceedings against Dang Van Luan.59 
Dang Van Luan protested against these accusations, saying that he had not 
deliberately offended or slandered the judicial agencies; he had just performed the 
thien chuc (‘heavenly mandate’) and the su menh (‘mission’) of a barrister60 and 
condemned the actions by the prosecution office as gay ap luc (‘applying pressure’).61 
He was supported by the chairman of the Hanoi Bar Association Nguyen Trong Ty 
who said that ‘lawyers have the right to argue, to defend their clients’ and that there 
was ‘no reason to have a police investigation [of Luan]’ (Cohen 2003a:23). 
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However, the judgment did not take Luan’s arguments into consideration. Instead, 
they were regarded as suy luan chu quan (‘subjectively deduced’)62 and thus irrelevant.63 
The imposed sentence was therefore close to the sentence sought by the prosecutor. 
Thus, lawyers were willing to utilise recent law reforms and establish a more 
involved and active role in criminal proceedings, but these attempts fell short since 
the prosecution and the court rejected these efforts and resumed their ‘old ways’. 
Dang Van Luan’s experience in particular shaped public opinion of the Nam 
Cam trial. It was noted that defence lawyers had more freedom to conduct their 
defence, and was read as a sign that less political restriction was placed on lawyers 
than in the past. But the case also raised questions as to whether the current reforms 
went far enough (Tran Dinh Thanh Lam 2003). 
Public response to the case 
Daily press conferences, extensive press coverage in the newspapers and live 
television broadcast throughout the trial brought public attention to the trial. People 
from all social classes attended the public hearings. This exposure affected the way 
the public viewed the recent reforms to the legal system and the anti-corruption 
campaign. While the state and Party aimed to show their commitment to these 
changes, the public’s perception of the Nam Cam affair was split. The trial initiated 
the recent law reforms and pointed out the urgency for law reforms (Quinn 2003). It 
also secured Party commitment, albeit circumscribed, to crack down on corruption. 
The public, however, questioned this commitment during the trial. Neither foreign 
nor local observers were satisfied with the depth of the investigation. While 
speculation about the guilt of the charged Party officials was limited, most people 
saw them as just scapegoats to a very widespread problem, sacrificed in a trial that 
appeared ‘…more to do with competing factions and power bases among senior 
party members than anything else’ (Rowse 2003e). 
 A television talk show broadcast the night before the verdict was delivered 
featured a discussion about a new anti-corruption movie, Luoi Troi (‘Heavens Net’), 
that confirmed this impression. Apparently reflecting reality, the movie showed 
Party officials and business linked in a web of corruption, only its lesser criminal 
characters being convicted while the mastermind, a Party official, walks free. This 
caused one talk show participant to raise the question of whether the recent anti- 
corruption campaign targeted the ‘tigers’ or the ‘cats’ (Cohen 2003a:23). 
Evidence given during the trial supports this speculation. Party officials appeared 
to have been bought by minimal bribes, even by Vietnamese standards,64 probably 
in order to avoid the harsh punishments of the new anti-corruption law (Cohen 
2003c). It is not surprising, therefore, that none of the government-linked defendants 
received death sentences (Chicago Tribune, 15 September 2003). 
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CONCLUSION 
The Nam Cam trial illustrates the contradictions of the recent law reforms. On the 
one hand, improvements have been made with respect to the rights of the defendant 
and the participation of defence lawyers in the course of the trial. These recent 
changes have not yet been adopted and incorporated by other legal parties such as 
the judges and the prosecution. In fact their attitude and behaviour towards lawyers 
has not undergone significant changes. This is reflected in the public’s perception 
of the criminal justice system, which has not significantly improved. The public still 
views the legal system as unequipped to address the criminal activities of Party 
officials and views lawyers as still restricted by political constraints. 
In order for reforms to be more effective, significant changes in the judicial system 
are necessary; not only the position of lawyers but all parts of the judicial system 
need to be strengthened. This would enhance the effectiveness of judicial activities 
and reduce the phenomenon of may moc, don thuan, vo chinh tri (‘mechanical and 
simple legalism, non politics’) in the judiciary (Nguyen Van Hien 2001). 
The motive behind such improvements is not only internal as Vietnam is 
preparing for accession to the WTO. Lawyers are especially equipped to inspire 
and strengthen judicial reforms and contribute to an independent and transparent 
justice system. 
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Mapping legal change in the 
context of reforms to Chinese 
police powers 
Sarah Biddulph 
In 1978, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) began a 
program of economic modernisation and reform,1 a core aim of which was rebuilding 
the Chinese legal system.2 The importance of this aim increased further in 1996, 
when the Party approved the program of ‘ruling the country according to law’ (yifa 
zhiguo). In a speech in 1996 and in his subsequent keynote address to the Fifteenth 
National Congress of the CPC in September 1997, Jiang Zemin advocated ‘Us(ing) 
law to rule the country, protect the long-term peace and good order of the state (yifa 
zhiguo, baozhan guojia changzhi jiu’an)’.3 Subsequently, the Party adopted the slogan 
that ‘ruling the country on the basis of law is the basic program by which the Party 
leads the people in ruling the country’ (Zhu Rongji 1999:2). An increasingly 
important component of ‘ruling the country according to law’ has been a requirement 
that law provide the foundation on which state power is defined and exercised. 
That is, implementation of a system of law-based governance. The desire for formal 
legal legitimation of the exercise of the state’s administrative power is captured in 
the slogan ‘administration according to law’ (yifa xingzheng).4 
The process of constructing the legal system has, accurately, been described as 
‘an event of epic historic proportions’ (Alford 1999:193). While reforms to the legal 
regulation of economic relations have taken place at a phenomenal rate, this chapter 
focuses on the slower, and arguably more complex, process of reforming state 
administrative powers, specifically one of the administrative detention powers of 
the Chinese public security organs (gong’an jiguan, also referred to in this chapter as 
the ‘police’)5—detention for investigation (shourong shencha).6 This power is 
particularly interesting because it was ostensibly abolished by amendments to the 
Criminal Procedure Law in 1996. 
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DESCRIBING THE PROCESSES OF LEGAL REFORM: THE 
PROBLEM STATED 
Why choose to examine this power? My concern with the police and their detention 
powers in particular, lies in the slowness, complexity and unevenness of the legal 
reforms in this area. Scholars and human rights organisations agree that the reforms 
to the sanctioning system, including criminal and administrative sanctions, have 
not been as effective as in other areas of Chinese law.7 One scholar has commented 
that legal reforms in different sectors may ‘be out of synchrony and in conflict with 
each other’ (Winkler 1999:3). In attempting to describe the story of China’s legal 
modernisation in areas such as police power, we must find a way to engage with the 
internal diversity, even inconsistency, in the ways in which legal reform is given 
substance and implemented across different sectors. 
There are many different ways to approach a study of legal reform. The analytical 
framework brought to bear will influence not only the questions posed, but also our 
understanding of the answers to those questions. Even if we are content with a 
purely descriptive framework, the very act of selecting what to describe involves a 
choice about what we consider to be relevant or important. Arguably, pure description 
thus also reflects some paradigm, even if that paradigm is not articulated. 
One influential paradigm for evaluating legal reform since the beginning of the 
reform era8 has been to trace the strengthening and entrenchment of formal, 
bureaucratic, or judicial modes of justice under the rubric of socialist legality against 
a weakening of the informal modes of justice that predominated in revolutionary 
periods (Baum 1986; Brugger and Reglar 1994; Dreyer 1996). When plotted against 
the criteria of formal and informal modes of justice, the ongoing use of administrative 
forms of detention suggests that informal administration of justice persists. 
As legal reform has progressed, many studies have focused on whether reforms 
to China’s legal system indicate a transition from an instrumentalist vision of rule 
by law toward some version of the rule of law.9 Randall Peerenboom, for example, 
concludes that the Chinese legal system is moving towards, but has not yet achieved, 
a formalist rule of law. Nonetheless, he argues it is no longer apposite to characterise 
the Chinese legal system as rule by law.10 He argues that many areas of the Chinese 
legal system, including the administrative law system, have, over the last 20 years, 
shown signs of convergence with Western legal systems (Peerenboom 2002a). As 
this trend continues, it is likely that the Chinese system will develop traits in common 
with the legal systems of industrial countries (Peerenboom 1999, 2002b). Seen in 
this way, legal reform of the state’s coercive powers for crime control and social 
order appears to have ‘lagged’ behind that of other sectors. Many scholars argue 
that, despite legal reforms, the state’s sanctioning system remains an instrument of 
social and political control (Potter 1999; Lubman 1999).11 Viewed within the 
paradigm of transition towards a system of the rule of law, the continuing use of 
administrative forms of detention and hard strikes against crime has been 
characterised as a form of ‘pernicious instrumentalism’ (Peerenboom 1999:327–8). 
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Closely aligned to this model of the transition to the rule of law is consideration 
of the extent to which China’s legal system is becoming ‘modern’. The work of 
Weber12 is considered by many as the yardstick of whether a ‘modern’ criminal 
justice system is being created (Tanner 1999). Scholars such as Ma and Wong have 
noted that reforms in the structure and powers of the Chinese police have been the 
catalyst for the creation of a professional and ‘modern’ police force.13 Others conclude 
that the Chinese police have become an ‘institutional hybrid’, pointing to the 
coexistence of Maoist strategies of mass campaigns and the retention of ‘such 
mainstream Stalinist institutions as labour camps’, with a ‘groping toward more 
modern forms of police work…based on legal institutions and professional training’ 
(Winkler 1999:16–7). 
These models for understanding legal change focus our attention on the extent 
to which reforms have progressed towards embracing either a formal system of 
justice, the rule of law, or modernity. They highlight the continuing influence of 
earlier, revolutionary modes of justice on current reform processes by focusing our 
attention on the outcomes of current reform measured against some standard.14 
In this chapter, I will outline an alternative approach that focuses more on the 
processes of change than on its outcomes. This approach adopts the hypothesis 
that legal change is a structured yet contested process with an unknown endpoint. 
To do this, I will draw on a version of Bourdieu’s concept of the legal field, applied 
in the context of rapid change currently taking place in China. 
THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK INTRODUCED: THE LEGAL 
FIELD 
According to Bourdieu, a society comprises a ‘series of interrelated yet semi- 
autonomous fields, each of which has a distinct structure’ (Trubek et al. 1994:414). 
Each field may be divided into subfields, each of which has its own particular logic 
and rules (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). 
A field is described as ‘an area of structured, socially patterned activity or 
“practice” in this case (that is, the legal field) disciplinarily and professionally 
defined’ (Terdiman 1987:805–6) and a ‘network…of objective relations between 
positions’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:97). The legal field is ‘organised around a 
body of internal protocols and assumptions, characteristic behaviours and self 
sustaining values’.15 Each field has its own logic that is ‘specific and irreducible to 
those that regulate other fields’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:97).16 
Bourdieu draws an analogy between the legal field and a ‘game’, such as a game 
of tennis (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). The legal field is constituted by the ongoing 
struggle or competition between different legal actors to ‘appropriate the specific 
products’ (Bourdieu 1987:818; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992), or stakes, of the 
field—money, status, power (Trubek et al. 1994)17 and what Bourdieu describes as 
the ‘right to determine the law’ (Bourdieu 1987:816, 817).18 
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Whilst the players compete with each other for the stakes of the game, they all 
concur in their belief that both the game itself and the stakes of the game are worth 
competing for and vie with each other on the basis of the ‘rules of the game’ (Bourdieu 
and Wacquant 1992:98).19 Using the analogy of a tennis game, the net and the lines 
on the tennis court mark out the parameters within which these contests take place. 
Legal actors share a legal ‘habitus’, which is the shared practices, views, values and 
dispositions of actors, and what Terdiman describes as the ‘habitual ways of 
understanding, judging and acting’.20 
In China, the process of reconstructing the legal system is just over twenty years 
old. During the revolutionary era of CPC governance prior to 1978, efforts were 
made to obliterate the distinctive vocabulary and logic of the law and to displace 
legal institutions and actors in favour of political ones. The CPC’s decision to rebuild 
the legal system has created conditions conducive to the emergence of a distinctive 
legal field. Rather than assume the existence of an established, relatively autonomous 
legal field, the search in China is to trace the emergence of a legal field—that is, to 
identify legal actors, a distinctly legal habitus, rules of the game and stakes over 
which actors compete. 
The basic requirement that administration be carried out according to law has 
placed the Party’s authority behind the process of legalisation of the administrative 
agencies’ powers, requiring that powers now be justified in legal, rather than political 
terms. While the impetus for the emergence of the legal field derives from Party 
policy and Party leadership, it is not inevitable that the Party controls all the contests 
that take place within the field. Arguably, the policies of rule according to law and 
administration according to law are sufficiently flexible to permit adoption of a 
range of legitimate positions about the meaning and scope of these policies.21 
The boundaries of the field, according to Bourdieu, are themselves porous and 
constantly being negotiated—the ‘stakes of the struggles’ that take place within the 
field itself (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992; Trubek et al. 1994). The competition 
between legal actors helps to define the scope of the legal field itself (Terdiman 
1987). The logic and rules of the legal field are created as a result of this competition 
and not because of some immutable development toward a pre-ordained point 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). 
The building of law in China has promoted the emergence of a range of legal 
actors, whose professional qualifications now distinguish them from lay people. 
This has been facilitated by the program of legal institution building in China, 
which has imposed increasingly onerous qualification criteria on admission to be, 
for example, a lawyer or a judge. 
The use of specialised legal language and reasoning help define the legal field’s 
boundaries and degree of autonomy by requiring that disputes be reconstructed in 
legal terms and that they be resolved in accordance with the ‘rules and conventions 
of the field itself’ (Bourdieu 1987:831). Thus, for conflicts between parties to be 
resolved legally, they must first be redefined or, as Bourdieu (1987) puts it, 
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retranslated, in legal terms before being submitted for resolution in accordance with 
legal rules and procedures. The expansion of the field takes place as matters 
previously defined and exercised in a non-legal way are redefined in legal terms 
and brought within the legal field (‘appropriative constitution’) (Bourdieu 1987). 
The ongoing conflict over competence and status between legal actors results in 
the creation of a hierarchy amongst legal actors (Bourdieu 1987; Terdiman 1987), 
which is itself susceptible to change over time (Bourdieu 1987). This conflict, 
according to Bourdieu, determines which actors are authorised to make legitimate 
interpretations of legal texts and legal practice (Bourdieu 1987; Terdiman 1987). 
Changes in this hierarchy of privilege and authority reflect the changing political 
status of groups (Bourdieu 1987). Although some actors may dominate the field and 
‘are in a position to make it function to their own advantage…they must always 
contend with the resistance, the claims, the contention, political or otherwise, of the 
dominated’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:102). Law is produced as an outcome of 
this competition. 
An examination of the reforms to the administrative power of detention for 
investigation carried out in terms of the legal field raises a number of questions. Is 
there an emerging legal space in which a range of actors may adopt diverging 
positions, while at the same time agreeing on the basic parameters within which 
these positions are to be contested? Are the terms of the debate identifiably legal, 
using specialist legal vocabulary and legal reasoning? Is there sufficient force or 
attraction of this field, in terms of legitimation or some other stakes, to reconfigure a 
debate, which might otherwise have been conceived in political terms, into one 
framed in terms of legality? 
THE POLICE AS LEGAL ACTORS 
Of relevance to a discussion about police powers is the role of the police in legal 
debates. I argue that it is possible to define the police as legal actors and to see the 
police force itself as constituting a semi-autonomous social field22 that intersects 
with the legal field. The police are both influenced by, and influence, debates in the 
legal field and the state’s legal order. 
Alongside the reconstruction of the legal system, since 1978, the police have 
been required to transform themselves from a revolutionary force into a security 
force responsible for the management of public order and control of crime (Dutton 
2000; Fu Hualing 1994). Prior to 1979, their primary task was the violent suppression 
of class enemies. During what was seen as the revolutionary stage of establishment 
of the PRC, the police constituted one of the main politico-legal organs of the state, 
responsible for development and protection of the people’s democratic dictatorship 
(Cui Ming 1993a; Zhengci Falu Jiaoyanshi 1983). In their own words, the public 
security organs were a ‘sharpened weapon for suppression of class enemies’ (von 
Senger 1985:172; see also Wang Fang 1993).23 
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The task of reconstructing the public security organs began with decisions to 
revive the criminal investigation division to strengthen local-level public order work 
(Xi Guoguang and Yu Lei 1996) and revive the local-level organisations involved in 
that work, including residents’ committees, mediation committees and security 
defence committees (Peng Zhen 1982). In April 1983, the Central Committee of CPC 
approved a decision of its Central Political–Legal Committee to undertake a 
systematic and comprehensive reform of the public security organs, including 
strengthening the legal basis of police organisation and powers.24 
Since then, police reforms have gradually created a more professional force 
(Dutton 2000; Ward and Bracey 1985), with greater emphasis placed on the 
education and specialist technical training of police officers25 and the legalisation 
of police powers (Shen Zhongmin and Xu Zhenqiang 1997). Although the process 
of legalisation of police powers is incomplete in many respects,26 scholars such as 
Ma point to laws such as the 1995 People’s Police Law (PPL) as being significant in 
‘China’s efforts to create a more professional and modern police force’ (Ma Yue 
1997:113). Kam Wong (2002:294) asserts that the introduction of a system of police 
ranks has ‘regularised, rationalised and legalised the police along Weberian lines’. 
Fu Hualing’s work also suggests that it is no longer appropriate to assume that 
the police are an unreflexive enforcement arm of the Party; instead, the police have 
their own distinct institutional interests. Fu (1994) suggests that, along with their 
transformation to a more regular security force, the police have lost their privileged 
position with the CPC vis-à-vis other government departments. 
Viewed as a semi-autonomous social field, the police can be seen as having a 
multifaceted relationship with law. They have a vested interest in participating in 
the contests in which their powers are legally defined, most notably in areas where 
the principles of law enforcement are established and systems of accountability for 
the exercise of police power are set up. 
THE EXAMPLE OF ABOLITION OF DETENTION FOR 
INVESTIGATION 
Development of detention for investigation from the 1950s 
Detention for investigation (shourong shencha) developed out of the CPC’s efforts to 
restore social order after it took power in 1949. The power of detention for 
investigation was adopted by the CPC Central Committee (the ‘Central Committee’), 
and the State Council, at the end of 1957, to deal with the problem of unauthorised 
rural migration (Central Committee 1957; Zhang Qingwu 1990). It was used initially 
primarily to detain and repatriate rural migrants, as well as to investigate suspected 
criminal activities (Zhang Qingwu 1990). In response to the social upheaval caused 
by the famine resulting from the Great Leap Forward (Spence 1990), in 1961, the 
Central Committee approved the creation of ‘detention for repatriation stations’. 
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These stations were used for the detention and repatriation of rural migrants who 
had floated to the cities and for the investigation of those suspected of criminal or 
counter-revolutionary offences (Central Committee 1961; Fan Chongyi and Xiao 
Shengxi 1991; Cui Ming 1993b). At this time, the official purpose of the power was 
‘primarily to rescue, educate and help settle down people who had floated to the 
city as beggars and to protect social order’ (Wang Jiancheng 1992:179). 
Towards the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1975, the use of detention for 
investigation of suspected criminal conduct by transients was separated from the 
detention for repatriation of unauthorised rural migrants (Fan Chongyi and Xiao 
Shengxi 1991). The police were given responsibility for managing the detention and 
investigation of those suspected of criminal conduct, while the civil administration 
organs ran the stations responsible for repatriation of rural migrants (Fan Chongyi 
and Xiao Shengxi 1991). In 1980, at the beginning of the reform era, the Central 
Committee and the State Council jointly issued a report prepared by the Ministry of 
Public Security which provided for the gradual absorption of detention for 
investigation into Re-education Through Labour (RETL), where investigations of 
suspected criminal activity were to be carried out.27 At that time, legislative drafters 
declined to include detention for investigation within the scope of the Criminal 
Procedure Law. Instead, the Criminal Procedure Law provided the police with a 
more restrictive power to detain for interrogation a person suspected of committing 
a crime, which was limited to 10 days.28 
Before detention for investigation could be incorporated within RETL, in August 
1983 the Party launched the first campaign of the Hard Strike Against Serious 
Crime (Fan Chongyi and Xiao Shengxi 1991; Cui Ming 1993b). Not only was the 
work of integrating detention for investigation with RETL halted, but the use of 
detention for investigation expanded dramatically.29 As one senior academic noted 
at the time, ‘detention for investigation centres became large storehouses for 
detaining all types of offenders’ (Cui Ming 1993b:92). 
After this time, detention for investigation became a tool used by the police to 
detain for interrogation a wide range of people suspected of committing crimes. The 
time limits imposed for detention for investigation were considerably longer than 
the criminal detention power authorised under the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL).30 
Not surprisingly, the power was used as a substitute for criminal detention and 
investigation and for a range of other purposes (Liu Huayin and Liu Baiyang 1992; 
Zhang Shanyu and Zhang Shuyi 1991).31 
The problems with detention for investigation 
Detention for investigation was described as the ‘longstanding difficult problem’ 
(laodanan wenti) between construction of a socialist legal system and enforcement 
practice (Liu Shipu 1990:22). It was a power essentially without any formal legal 
basis. From 1985, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) issued a range of official 
documents that sought to define the targets, time limits, and procedures for imposing 
detention as a means of curbing the rampant abuse of this power.32 
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In 1987 the MPS described the power as 
…a type of coercive administrative investigation measure used by public security organs 
in accordance with State Council regulations against those who are suspected of roaming 
around committing offences, or have committed a criminal act and do not tell their correct 
name and address and whose background is not clear. It is not a type of criminal punishment, 
nor is it a public order administrative punishment.33 
By 1987, local public security organs had been repeatedly criticised by the MPS 
for abusing their powers of detention for investigation.34 The MPS continued to 
exhort local public security organs to curb abuse of the power, and even suggested 
that the power itself might be lost should the abuses continue unabated.35 
In 1987, the MPS issued a notice that criticised the continuing abusive practices 
under this powerbut at the same time sought to limit the public outcry against abuse 
of the power by restricting disclosure or public discussion of the power. It was 
argued that public and media discussions of the use of detention for investigation 
in handling criminal investigations had led to ‘misunderstandings’ and ‘bad 
impressions’.36 
The continuing problems of serious abuse led to increasing public dissatisfaction 
and concern at senior political levels (Wong 1996), in turn prompting increased 
scrutiny by state organs outside the public security sector. Amongst the numerous 
notices demanding that abuses of the power be curbed,37 the MPS indicated that 
abuses of detention for investigation had been the subject of complaints and 
investigation by people’s congresses at both local and national levels.38 
Finding a legal basis for detention for investigation 
While seeking to curb abuse and deal with the growing criticism of police 
misconduct, the MPS was also trying to address the criticisms that there remained 
no clear legal basis for the power. The clearest legal basis of the power had been 
provided by the Notice issued by the State Council on 29 February 1980 titled On 
Supporting the Unification of the Two Measures of Forced Labour and Detention for 
Investigation with RETL. Although this notice sets out the scope of targets for 
detention for investigation,39 it was unsatisfactory as a legal basis for the power in 
several respects,40 most notably because the main purpose of the notice—to merge 
detention for investigation with RETL—was never carried out.41 Further, this notice 
did not clarify the relationship between detention for investigation and other police 
powers to detain and interrogate criminal suspects set out in the Criminal Procedure 
Law, nor did it clarify its relationship to administrative sanctions for minor public 
order infringements that could be punished under the Security Administrative 
Punishment Regulations (SAPR).42 The MPS sought to supplement this document 
by providing a more detailed directive setting out targets and procedures for 
exercising the power in the 1985 MPS Notice on Strictly Controlling the Use of 
Detention for Investigation Measures. 
By requiring the MPS to draft a Detention for Investigation Law (Shourong Shencha 
Fa) in May 1983, the Central Committee of the CPC made it clear that detention for 
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investigation required a legislative basis and that it be subject to strengthened legal 
supervision (Central Committee 1983; Gao Xianduan 1990). However, the MPS failed 
in its bid to have its draft legislation placed on the legislative plan of the National 
People’s Congress Standing Committee and enacted as legislation because of its 
inability to obtain consensus on the major issues (Gao Xianduan 1990; Guo Dawei 
1990). 
Passage of the Administrative Litigation Law (ALL), which came into effect on 1 
October 1990, increased the urgency of finding a legislative basis for detention for 
investigation.43 The Administrative Litigation Law empowered the courts to 
determine the legality of certain categories of administrative decision-making, 
including those dealing with the imposition of detention44 and coercive measures 
against the person and property.45 Under the Administrative Litigation Law, the 
administrative agency was obliged to prove the lawfulness of the conduct, at least 
requiring the police to point to conformity of the detention with laws and regulations 
which, together, constituted the ‘legal basis’ of the power.46 There was some ambiguity 
about whether detention for investigation should be seen as an administrative act 
and so whether it fell within the scope of the Administrative Litigation Law. That 
question was resolved in the Opinion of the Supreme People’s Court Concerning 
Several Questions on the Implementation of the ‘PRC Administrative Litigation 
Law’ (for trial implementation), issued on 29 May 1991,47 which stated that 
[t]he scope of accepting cases at Article 11 of the ALL…citizens who are dissatisfied with 
the decision of a public security organ for coercive detention for investigation, can commence 
litigation in the people’s courts.48 
The MPS then outlined criteria on which the lawfulness of detention for 
investigation would be determined in the Notice on Several Questions about the 
Implementation by Public Security Organs of the ‘Administrative Litigation Law’.49 
The question of whether the MPS was authorised at all to specify the documents 
constituting the legal basis of the powers it exercised was ignored. 
DEBATES ABOUT REFORM OR ABOLITION OF DETENTION 
FOR INVESTIGATION 
Despite the MPS’s efforts to stifle public discussion of detention for investigation, in 
the late 1980s50 and early 1990s, debate about the possible reform of detention for 
investigation began appearing in law and police journals, and became incorporated 
in broader discussions about reform of the Criminal Procedure Law (Zhongguo 
Faxue Hui Susong Fa Yanjiu Hui 1992; Fan Chongyi and Xiao Shengxi 1991; Wang 
Jiancheng 1992).51 A number of proposals for reform of detention for investigation 
emerged. These included passing sui generis legislation either by the NPC or 
administrative regulations by the State Council, incorporating the substance of the 
power into the revised Criminal Procedure Law, or merging the power with RETL 
 (Gao Xianduan 1990; Fan Chongyi and Xiao Shengxi 1991). 
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Many legal academics and some representatives of people’s congresses, and 
one legal academic in the public security system in particular, argued that the power 
should be abolished as it was both arbitrary and illegal (Cui Ming 1993b).52 The 
arguments were framed in both legal and practical terms. There were a number of 
aspects to the legal arguments, with the overarching premise resting on assertions 
that the power’s existence was unconstitutional. First, it was argued that the power 
was contrary to the spirit of Article 37 of the Constitution, which guarantees freedom 
of the person unless lawfully arrested (Cui Ming 1993b; Wang Xixin 1993). A second 
argument was that the State Council was not competent to pass laws authorising 
detention.53 Third, it was noted that the power to detain administratively undermined 
the integrity of the criminal procedure system as it was, in practice, a substitute for 
criminal detention, but was outside the Criminal Procedure Law (Cui Ming 1993b). 
On a practical level, it was argued that the power was ineffective in the 
investigation of crimes (Zhang Jianwei and Li Zhongcheng 1994), and that reform 
would not solve the problem of abuse (Cui Ming 1993b). There was common 
recognition that the power was used as a substitute for criminal detention and other 
criminal coercive powers (Li Huayin and Liu Baiyang 1992; Zhang Shanyu and 
Zhang Shuyi 1991; Gu Haiwen 1992). 
Police, government officials54 and academics who argued for retention of the 
power agreed that reform was needed to rectify its inadequate legal and regulatory 
basis, but they also noted that it was very effective in practice (Li Huayin and Liu 
Baiyang 1992; Gao Chuanli 1990; Fan Chongyi and Xiao Shengyi 1991; Chen 
Weidong and Zhang Tao 1992b; Wang Jiangcheng 1992; Jiang Bo and Zhan Zhongle 
1994) and accorded with the ‘national spirit’ (Chen Weidong and Zhang Tao 
1992b:172). Views differed amongst academics discussing revisions to the Criminal 
Procedure Law about whether detention for investigation should be included as a 
criminal coercive measure.55 
Central to the debates about reform or abolition of detention for investigation 
was the question of whether the power should be characterised as administrative or 
criminal in nature.56 On one hand, the question had already been answered by the 
Supreme People’s Court’s interpretation of the scope of the Administrative Litigation 
Law.57 This was subsequently acted upon by the MPS in its specification of the 
documents constituting the legal basis for judging the lawfulness of any act of 
detention under the Administrative Litigation Law.58 Nonetheless, as part of the 
debate about reform or abolition of the power, its proper legal characterisation 
remained an important issue. 
The discussions about the fate of detention for investigation became subsumed 
within the debates about reform of the Criminal Procedure Law after a group of 
legal academics was appointed to prepare a discussion draft, published in 1995, of 
amendments to the Criminal Procedure Law (Chen and Yan 1995). The paper 
advocated the abolition of detention for investigation (Chen and Yan 1995), despite 
the obvious inconvenience to the police this would cause (Chen and Yan 1995:205–6). 
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As compensation, they suggested that the standard of evidence required to approve 
arrest be lowered to ‘where there is evidence to support a strong suspicion that a 
crime has been committed where the criminal suspect could be sentenced to 
punishment of no less than imprisonment’ (Chen and Yan 1995:22).59 The drafting 
group considered that, even though detention for investigation was to be abolished, 
it was inappropriate to lengthen the time limit for detention of a maximum of 10 
days set out under the 1979 Criminal Procedure Law.60 
In the meetings that were held after publication of the draft discussion paper, 
attended by interested state organs, the MPS turned its attention to negotiating 
inclusion of substantive elements of the power of detention for investigation into 
the amended Criminal Procedure Law.61 Proposals included decreasing the standard 
of evidence required for arrest62 and expanding the scope of targets and time permitted 
for detention to include those who previously fell within the scope of detention for 
investigation.63 It was further suggested that, in cases where suspects withheld 
their real names and addresses, the calculation of time in detention would not 
commence until the suspect’s name, address and background had been clarified.64 
Incorporation of detention for investigation into the amended Criminal 
Procedure Law and ongoing interpretations 
In his explanatory speech on the draft amended Criminal Procedure Law to the 
Fourth National Peoples’ Congress Meeting on 12 March 1996, Gu Angran 
proclaimed the abolition of detention for investigation, stating 
[d]etention for investigation is a type of administrative coercive measure that has been of 
positive use for clarifying and investigating crime, especially for investigating those who 
float from place to place-committing crime and whose identity is not clear. But, the time of 
detention in detention for investigation is comparatively long. Moreover, because it doesn’t 
involve any other judicial organ and the decision is made by the public security alone, it 
lacks a system for supervision and restriction and does not conform to the relevant 
requirements of the CPL. 
In order gradually to strengthen socialist democracy and legal system construction, better 
to protect the rights and interests of citizens, we have absorbed the contents of detention 
for investigation needed in practice for the struggle against crime into the CPL by 
supplementing and amending the relevant criminal coercive measures and have not retained 
the administrative coercive measure of detention for investigation. 
In the final version of the Criminal Procedure Law passed by the National People’s 
Congress, the public security organs had managed to claw back more power than 
the discussion draft would have allowed, in effect to incorporate many aspects of 
detention for investigation into the Criminal Procedure Law. The standard for 
approval of arrest had been further reduced to where ‘the principal facts of the 
crimes have been clarified and [the criminal suspect] could be sentenced to a term of 
not less than imprisonment’.65 The scope of targets for detention was expanded to 
include targets of the former detention for investigation where ‘there is a strong 
suspicion that the person goes from place to place committing crimes, who repeatedly 
commits crimes, or who gangs up with others to commit crime’.66 The time limits for 
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requesting arrest of certain categories of detainees, including some previous targets 
of detention for investigation,67 was increased from a maximum of seven days to 37 
days.68 
After passage of the amended Criminal Procedure Law, a police commentator 
suggested that, in theory, the broadening of coercive powers in that law provided 
the public security organs with sufficient power to perform their criminal 
investigation functions and to compensate for their loss of detention for investigation 
(Cui Xin 1996). The amendments, this author suggested, required the public security 
organs to ‘change their traditional work style’ from an emphasis on obtaining 
evidence through interrogation of detained suspects to a broader range of 
investigation techniques and competencies (Cui Xin 1996:36–7). Changing the police 
work style and improving their technical investigation skills may be difficult.69 
Of course, passage of the amended Criminal Procedure Law did not end the 
ongoing process of construction and reconstruction of police detention powers. 
After passage of the Criminal Procedure Law, the MPS issued a notice interpreting 
police-related provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law, which further expanded 
the calculation of the time limits for detention of criminal suspects who were targets 
of the former detention for investigation.70 In particular, the interpretation asserted 
the requirement that the time limits for detention not commence until there was 
clarification of the name, address and background of the detainee. Article 28 of the 
Criminal Procedure Law permits the ‘investigation and detention period’ (zhencha 
jiya qixian) for those ‘who do not tell their true name and address or whose identity 
is unclear’ to commence from the date their identity is clarified. Article 112 of the 
MPS’s interpretation document explained the scope of Article 128 of the Criminal 
Procedure Law as follows 
Criminal suspects who do not tell their true name and address, whose identity is not clear, 
if it has not been possible to clarify these matters and to apply for arrest within thirty days, 
after receipt of approval from the responsible person in the public security bureau at 
county level or above, the time period for detention will commence from the date on which 
the identity of the person is clarified, but it is not permitted to halt the investigation into 
their criminal actions. 
One academic claims the original intent of Article 128 of the Criminal Procedure 
Law was to permit extension of the period of detention after, rather than prior to, the 
arrest, and that in no circumstances could the period of pre-arrest criminal detention 
be extended past a total of 37 days (Wang Jiancheng 2000). The commentator suggests 
that such an interpretation should be abolished, otherwise ‘it would be easy for the 
previous detention for investigation to remain unchanged’ (Wang Jiancheng 
2000:95). 
Law as the forum for debates about administrative coercive powers 
What does the story of abolition of detention for investigation tell us about the 
process of legal reform? This story suggests that the legal forum provides an important 
framework within which debate about reform of the state’s coercive powers may be 
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conducted. Although police administrative detention powers were developed in 
the politically dominated context of social order policy, their reform and restructuring 
is now being debated in legal terms. 
This illustrates the importance of legally-grounded arguments relating to the 
organisation and justification of police administrative powers. The debate 
surrounding reform of detention for investigation was fuelled by concerns about its 
serious and endemic abuse, but also by the inability of the MPS to justify the power 
in legal terms. The terms of the debate and the ultimate fate of the power were legally 
framed in terms of the lawfulness of the power, its proper legal characterisation and 
its place in the legislative regime governing criminal justice. These debates could be 
seen as implementing the Party’s program of administration according to law. 
This case illustrates the active engagement of the MPS in the legal debates to 
define and justify its powers and how such debates can accommodate a range of 
different voices and positions to a greater extent than would be possible in a more 
overtly political context, such as the formulation of social order policy. The outcome— 
abolition of detention for investigation—shows that when the debate about the fate 
of the power was conducted in legal terms, the police were unable to assert their 
preferred option. Academics, congress members and permanent employees of the 
congress were more influential. 
Viewed in terms of the emergence of a legal field, these debates about the fate of 
detention for investigation indicate the development of a specialist language and 
logic which framed the debate about detention for investigation. It also revealed 
that the different actors adopted and advocated different positions, though strictly 
within the boundaries of, and arguably in furtherance of, Party policies favouring 
administration according to law and the preservation of social order. In contrast to 
the pre-reform era, with its focus on class struggle, the Party’s programs in the 
reform era are framed in terms that accommodate legitimate disagreement over how 
Party policy should be interpreted and implemented. The scope of these policies 
themselves enables the emergence of a field, and permits it a degree of autonomy 
consistent with the Party’s overall agenda for reform. We might argue that the policies 
of the reform era have permitted a pluralisation of interests and positions that remain 
consistent with, and in furtherance of, the Party’s overall reform agenda. 
The emergence of a legitimate sphere within which differing positions may be 
taken, and a specialist vocabulary in which they are debated, does not guarantee an 
outcome that better protects citizens’ rights. In the case of detention for investigation, 
though the power was abolished, the power of the public security organs to detain 
and interrogate criminal suspects was not dramatically reduced, just re-organised. 
CONCLUSION 
The process described above may be seen as one of the outcomes of economic reform 
and modernisation. Party policy has facilitated the emergence of a legal field in 
which actors, within the constraints of policy, compete to determine the law and 
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hence a space in which a proliferation of positions and views can take place. The 
self-interested nature of these debates facilitates the expansion of legal norms into 
areas and in relation to powers not previously framed in legal terms, as was the case 
with detention for investigation. The debates about detention for investigation reveal 
the emergence of not only a legal vocabulary but also a form of legal logic. Efforts to 
reform the power reveal the concern of academics at least to improve the internal 
coherence of the legal system. 
It is harder, however, to characterise the reform of this power as part of a transition 
towards a system of rule of law, as the power of the police to detain has not been 
substantially constrained, nor, arguably, even made more accountable. By the same 
token, it is no longer accurate to characterise the law as simply a tool of policy as the 
scope of policy itself is now susceptible to a range of differing interpretations which 
are not all necessarily directly controlled by the Party. From this, we might discern 
that the policy of governance on the basis of law is acquiring a force of its own, not 
in opposition to Party leadership, but out of it and, at present at least, as a way of 
implementing Party policies. 
NOTES 
1 See Benshu Bianxie Zu (2001); Baum (1994); and Potter (1995), who discuss the state’s central 
role in economic reform. 
2 Deng Xiaoping argued that socialist democracy must be ‘institutionalised and written into 
law’. In this speech, Deng set out the blueprint for subsequent legal reform by asserting that 
the program required that ‘there must be laws to go by, laws must be observed and strictly 
enforced and breaches of the law must be pursued’ (Deng 1978:157). See also Central Committee 
(1978:14). 
3 Jiang Zemin’s speech, extracted in Liu Hainian (1996:1). 
4 Ying Songnian (1992:415) defines yifa xingzheng in formalist terms as follows 
1. The administrative department must be established and its powers conferred by 
law. If the organ or any official acts outside the scope of organisational laws, acts 
where there is no delegated power, or acts in excess of delegated powers, the act will be 
void. 
2. Administrative acts must not be in conflict with the law and discretionary powers 
and must be exercised within the scope permitted by law 
3. Any act not carried out within the legally specified procedure will be in excess of 
power and so void. 
5 The categories of forces falling within the definition of the people’s police (renmin jingcha) are 
set out in Article 2 of the PRC People’s Police Law 1995 (PPL). They include the public security 
organs (gong’an jiguan), the state security organs (guojia anquan jiguan), the police in prisons 
(jianyu), RETL management organs (laodong jiaoyang guanli jiguan) and the judicial police (sifa 
jingcha) of the people’s courts and people’s procuracy. In this study, all references to ‘the 
police’ are to the public security organs. 
6 Also translated as ‘sheltering for investigation’ by Hsia and Zeldin (1992); ‘shelter and 
investigation’ by Hecht (1996:21–2), Epstein and Wong (1996:480), Chen Jianfu (1999:201–5) 
and ‘sheltering for examination’ by Wong (1996:367). 
7 See, for example, Lubman (1995, 1999); Clarke (1985, 1995); Chiu Hongdah (1992); Leng 
Schaochuan and Chiu Hongdah (1985); Amnesty International (1991, 1992, 1996); Dobinson 
(2002); Hecht (1996); Turack (1999); Human Rights in China (2001b). 
8 In this chapter, the ‘reform era’ refers to the period after December 1978 when the CPC Central 
Committee resolved to embark on a program of economic reform and modernisation. 
9 These include Lubman (1999); Epstein (1994); Peerenboom (1999, 2002a); Keith (1994); Keith 
and Lin Zhiqiu (2001); Li (2000); Orts (2001). Peerenboom (1999) draws a distinction between 
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‘thick’ (substantive) and ‘thin’ (formalist) versions of the rule of law and discusses different 
versions of the thick theories of the rule of law. Craig (1997:467) distinguishes formalist from 
substantive versions of the rule of law on the basis that the former is concerned with the 
manner in which law is promulgated, clarity of the norm and the ‘temporal’ aspects of the law, 
whilst the latter is concerned in addition with the content of the law, whether it protects rights 
and whether the law is considered ‘good’. 
10 For the purposes of this discussion, I adopt the distinction drawn by Peerenboom (2002b:510), 
when he distinguishes a ‘thin’, or formalist version of the rule of law from rule by law on the 
grounds that the ‘former entails meaningful legal limits on the government actors’. This 
distinction is drawn differently, however, by other scholars such as Orts (2001:94) who defines 
rule by law in a manner equating to Peerenboom’s ‘thin’ rule of law as ‘the use of legal rules in 
order to assure the uniformity and regularity of an existing legal system’. Orts (2001:94) 
defines the rule of law as referring ‘to a normative and political theory of the relationship of 
legal institutions and the political state that includes, but is not limited to, a theory of limited 
government through some form of constitutional separation between the judiciary and other 
state powers’, equating to Peerenboom’s ‘thick’ theory of the rule of law. 
11 For a similar analysis, see Lubman (1995); Clarke and Feinerman (1995); H. Tanner (1999); 
Dobinson (2002); Chen Jianfu (1999). Keith and Lin (2001) on the other hand, argue that 
amendments to the Criminal Procedure Law and the Criminal Law reflect a changing balance 
between the instrumental role of law as a tool for social control and law as a mechanism to 
protect the rights and freedoms of citizens. They subsequently revised this view in light of the 
state’s handling of the ‘Falun gong problem’ (see Keith and Lin Zhiqiu 2003). 
12 More particularly, interpretations of Weber by US sociologists, such as Talcott Parsons, that 
give universal application to Weber’s consideration of the conditions for the emergence of 
modern capitalism. Parsons argues that societal evolution and modernisation depends on the 
development of a general legal system that comprises an ‘integrated system of universalistic 
norms’ (Parsons 1964:351, 357). Parsons’ expanded application of Weber’s work is also 
discussed in Friedman (1969). 
13 Ma Yue (1997:113) argues that passage of the People’s Police Law in 1995 represented ‘the 
most significant event in China’s efforts to create a more professional and modern police 
force’. Wong (2002:294) asserted that the introduction of a system of police ranks ‘regularised, 
rationalised and legalised the police along Weberian lines’, and continued to argue that ‘a 
modern Weberian bureaucracy was in the making, the public security being restructured 
according to the functional needs of and based on a rational division of labour principle.’ 
14 Not all scholars are in full agreement with the use of such models to evaluate legal reform. 
Clarke (2001), for example, criticises as teleological analyses that view the development of the 
Chinese legal system in terms of how far away it is from a rule of law ideal. 
15 Terdiman (1987:806) suggests that this might informally be referred to as a ‘legal culture’. I 
prefer not to adopt this characterisation as it fails to address the extensive literature and 
divergent views on what constitutes legal culture. 
16 Emphasis in original. 
17 These are described by Bourdieu (1987:816–17) as economic, social, cultural, symbolic and 
juridical capital. Juridical capital is the capacity to define the language in which conflicts are 
expressed. Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992:98–9) and Johnston and Percy-Smith (2003:323) 
describe social capital as encompassing personal relationships and the benefits available to 
individuals as a result of participation in social groups. 
18 Although these actors are self interested, this definition suggests that the self-interest is not 
necessarily narrowly defined. Bourdieu (1990) argues it should not be understood as rational 
and conscious self-interest. 
19 Bourdieu uses the term ‘illusio’, to designate that each of the actors has their own ‘interest’ in 
the game and that they accept the stakes as valuable (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:116–7). 
20 More specifically, Terdiman (1987:811) explains the term habitus as ‘the habitual, patterned 
ways of understanding, judging and acting which arise from our particular position as members 
of one or several social “fields”, and from our particular trajectory in the social structure’. 
21 See general discussions on this point for example in Potter (2003) and Pei (1995). 
22 Goldsmith (1990) also discusses the Australian police as a semi-autonomous social field. 
23 Zhengci Falu Jiaoyanshi (1983:4) cites Lenin in support of their proposition that, as an instrument 
of class rule, the police are an instrument of violence to carry out the dictatorship of the proletariat. 
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24 Xi Guoguang and Yu Lei (1996:395–6) refer to the Several Questions Concerning Strengthening 
and Reform of the Public Security Work adopted at that meeting. Decisions at this meeting 
included transfer of responsibility for management of Re-education Through Labour (RETL) 
Camps to the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) and creation of a separate armed police force, the 
People’s Armed Police. 
25 In 2002, for example, 50,000 police officers studied for college diplomas; 35,000 studied for 
tertiary qualifications; 520,000 participated in new recruit training, professional or promotions 
training; 16,000 economic criminal investigation police sat proficiency tests; and 280,000 
police attended skills training programs (Gong’an Bu 2002:65). 
26 See, for example, Winkler (1999). 
27 State Council Notice Supporting the Unification of the Two Measures of Forced Labour and 
Detention for Investigation with Re-education through Labour, 29 February 1980. 
28 Article 41, Criminal Procedure Law 1979. 
29 The Ministry of Public Security’s Temporary Regulations on the Management work of Detention 
for Investigation Centres, 15 February 1984, were passed to ‘strengthen and improve the work 
of detention for investigation centres’. Article 2 states that ‘Detention for investigation centres 
are specialised organs for managing detention for investigation personnel, co-ordinate 
investigation and protect security’. 
30 Under the 1979 Criminal Procedure Law, Article 48, the police could only detain a person for 
three days prior to making an application for arrest to the procuracy, with a possible extension 
of up to four days. The procuracy was required to respond within three days. The total 
possible time for criminal detention was thus ten days. The initial period of detention for 
investigation, on the other hand, was one month, with possible extensions approved by higher 
level public security organs of up to a total of three months. Article 3, Ministry of Public 
Security, Notice on Strictly Controlling the Use of Detention for Investigation Measures, 31 
July 1985. 
31 Zhang Yu (1993:20) suggests that between 80–90 per cent of people convicted of criminal 
offences were first detained under this power. Ministry of Public Security, Notice Strictly 
Prohibiting Public Security Organs from Interfering in Economic Disputes and Illegally Seizing 
People, 25 April 1992, criticised and prohibited detention by the police of one party to a 
contract dispute and demanding payment of the amount in dispute to secure their release. 
32 The first of which is Ministry of Public Security, Notice on Strictly Controlling the Use of 
Detention for Investigation, 31 July 1985. 
33 Ministry of Public Security, Notice on the Inappropriateness of Publicly Reporting Detention 
for Investigation, 27 January 1987. 
34 These notices included: Ministry of Public Security, Notice on Strengthening the Management 
Work of Detention Centres and Detention for Investigation Centres, 23 November 1983; Ministry 
of Public Security, Notice on Strictly Controlling the Use of Detention for Investigation Measures, 
31 July 1985; Ministry of Public Security, Notice on Immediately and Conscientiously Rectifying 
Detention for Investigation Work, 31 July 1986. 
35 Ministry of Public Security, Notice on Immediately and Conscientiously Rectifying Detention 
for Investigation Work, 31 July 1986:381–2. 
36 Ministry of Public Security, Notice on the Inappropriateness of Publicly Reporting Detention 
for Investigation, 27 January 1987. 
37 Ministry of Public Security, Notice on Further Controlling the Use of Detention for Investigation 
Measures, 11 June 1991; Ministry of Public Security, Notice on Urgently Rectifying the Abuse 
of Detention for Investigation Measures, 15 February 1992; Ministry of Public Security, Notice 
on Strengthening the Work of Management of the Three Detention [Centres] and Putting an 
End to Situations where Detainees get Beaten to Death, 22 April 1993; Ministry of Public 
Security, Notice Strictly Prohibiting Public Security Organs from Interfering in Economic 
Disputes and Illegally Seizing People, 25 April 1992. 
38 Ministry of Public Security, Notice on Further Controlling the Use of Detention for Investigation 
Measures, 11 June 1991. Yang Xinhua (1991) reports on an inquiry into enforcement practices 
made by the Internal Affairs and Judicial Work Committee in 1990, which noted systematic 
abuse of detention for investigation. Ministry of Public Security, Notice on Urgently Rectifying 
the Abuse of Detention for Investigation Measures, 15 February 1992, refers to an investigation 
carried out by the Office of the Law Committee of the NPC and the Legislative Affairs Committee 
of the Standing Committee in December 1991 into abuses of detention for investigation. 
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39 Article 2 provides that 
[t]hose people who have committed minor criminal offences and do not tell their name 
and address and whose background is not clear, or they have committed a minor 
criminal offence and are suspected of floating from place to place committing crime, 
committing multiple crimes or forming a group to commit crime, who need to be taken 
in to investigate their criminal acts, should be sent to a specially formed unit in RETL 
camps to carry out investigation…In general where the danger would not be great if 
they were placed in society, can be placed under house arrest, or released on bail etc in 
accordance with the provisions of the CPL whilst carrying out investigation. 
40 One argument was that it was beyond the power of the State Council to regulate detention 
powers, discussed below. 
41 The process was commenced but never completed because it was overshadowed by the hard 
strike law and order campaign that started in August 1983 (Gao Xianduan 1990) and the 
transfer in May 1983 of responsibility for management of RETL camps from the Ministry of 
Public Security to the Ministry of Justice (Luo Feng 1992; Xia Chongsu 2001). 
42 Passed by the NPC Standing Committee on 5 September 1986 and amended 12 May 1994. 
43 Guo Dawei (1990:28) argues that the ‘only way out’ to preserve the existence of the power was 
for the NPC to pass legislation, to use legal means to regularise its existence. The Ministry of 
Public Security’s Notice on Several Questions about the Implementation of the ‘Administrative 
Litigation Law’ by Public Security Organs, 30 October 1990, set out the rules that were to 
constitute the legal basis of the power. 
44 Article 11(1)(i) enables those who are dissatisfied with an administrative punishment such as 
detention, imposition of a fine, revocation of a permit or licence, an order to suspend production 
of business activities or the confiscation of property to commence an action. This paragraph 
includes punishments such as administrative detention under the Security Administrative 
Punishment Regulations. 
45 Article 11(1)(ii) of the Administrative Litigation Law enables the court to accept complaints 
about, among other things, the lawfulness of measures taken to restrict or deprive freedom of 
the person. 
46 Articles 32, 52 and 53, Administrative Litigation Law. 
47 Discussed and passed at the 499th meeting of the Adjudication Committee of the Supreme 
People’s Court on 29 May 1991, reproduced in Huang Jie (1993:659). 
48 Article 2, Opinion of the Supreme People’s Court Concerning Several Questions on the 
Implementation of the ‘PRC Administrative Litigation Law’. 
49 Reproduced in Huang (1993:668). Point 3 of the Notice provides that 
[u]ntil the new detention for investigation legislation is published, the targets of detention 
for investigation can be determined according to the provisions of the 1980 Notice of the 
State Council on the Unification of the Two Measures of Forced Labour and Detention for 
Investigation with Reeducation through Labour, which was promulgated in the (1980) 
No.2 Gazette of the State Council. Investigation and approval procedures and the time 
limits for detention for investigation must be implemented according to the provisions 
of the 1985 Ministry of Public Security Notice on Strictly Controlling the Use of Detention 
for Investigation Measures. In handling specific detention for investigation cases you 
must incorporate the Ministry of Public Security Notice Printing and Distributing the 
‘Summary of the Minutes of Meeting of National Public Security Legal System Work’ of May 
this year, know it well and handle matters strictly according to its spirit. Each level 
public security organ must strictly eliminate the wanton expansion the scope of 
detention for investigation, exceeding the time limits, taking people into detention etc, 
such illegal phenomena. 
50 Hsia and Zeldin (1992) list articles published between 1987 and 1991. 
51 Hecht (1996) suggests that organised academic discussions on revision of the Criminal 
Procedure Law commenced in late 1991. 
52 Cui is professor in the Chinese People’s Public Security University. See also Wang Xixin (1993); 
Zhang Jianwei and Li Zhongcheng (1994). 
53 Cui Ming (1993b) cited arguments that the power to pass laws authorising detention was 
outside the scope of Article 89 of the Constitution, which sets out the powers of the State 
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Council. Cai Dingjian (1991) asserts that only the NPC or its Standing Committee has the 
power to pass laws that restrict personal freedom. 
54 Cui Ming (1993b) cites leadership of public security organs and government at different levels 
as the main proponents of its retention 
55 Fan Chongyi and Xiao Shengxi (1991) argued the power should be incorporated into the 
revised Criminal Procedure Law. Song Qian (1992) and Chen Weidong and Zhang Tao (1992b) 
argued it should not. 
56 Mao Zhibin (1991); Zhang Shanyu and Zhang Shuyi (1991); Chen Weidong and Zhang Tao 
(1992a, 1993) argue that the power is administrative and should not be abolished. Wang Xixin 
(1993), however, argues that the power is substantively criminal in nature and should be 
abolished. 
57 Passed by the National People’s Congress on 4 April 1989. 
58 Ministry of Public Security, Notice on Several Questions on the Implementation of the 
Administrative Litigation Law by Public Security Organs, 30 October 1990, at point 3 discusses 
the documents that are to form the normative legal basis for reviewing the legality of 
determinations to impose detention for investigation. 
59 The requirement for arrest in Article 40 of the 1979 Criminal Procedure Law was that ‘the 
principal facts of the crime have been clarified and [the defendant] could be sentenced to a 
punishment of not less than imprisonment’. 
60 Article 48, Criminal Procedure Law 1979. The maximum time for detention was three days, 
with a possible extension of up to four days. The procuracy was required to approve or reject 
the application within three days of receipt of the application. Article 96, Draft Criminal 
Procedure Law; Chen and Yan (1995). 
61 The unpublished Ministry of Public Security document is entitled Plan for Specific Revision of 
Provisions of the CPL Relevant to the Public Security Organs (Draft Soliciting Opinions). 
62 Proposed amendment to Criminal Procedure Law 1979 Article 40 to enable arrest where ‘there 
is evidence to show a criminal acts or suspicion of a crime, where it is necessary to pursue 
criminal responsibility…’, Plan for Specific Revision of Provisions of the CPL Relevant to the 
Public Security Organs (Draft Soliciting Opinions). 
63 Specifically, amendments to Criminal Procedure Law 1979 Article 41 to include those suspected 
of committing crime, who do not tell their true name and address and whose status is unclear, 
those who have committed a minor crime, who are suspected of going from place to place 
committing crime, and those who have committed a minor crime who are strongly suspected 
of committing many crimes or committing crimes in a gang. Plan for Specific Revision of 
Provisions of the CPL Relevant to the Public Security Organs (Draft Soliciting Opinions). See 
also the proposal that Article 48 of the Criminal Procedure Law 1979 be revised to extend the 
time limits for applying for arrest to seven days and for a possible extension of between five 
and 10 days ‘where there is a serious suspicion that they have gone from place to place 
committing crimes, committed many crimes or committed crimes in a gang, where the facts 
are complicated’. 
64 The proposal would amend Article 48 of the Criminal Procedure Law 1979. See Plan for 
Specific Revision of Provisions of the CPL Relevant to the Public Security Organs (Draft 
Soliciting Opinions). 
65 Article 60, Criminal Procedure Law. 
66 Article 61(7), Criminal Procedure Law. 
67 Article 69(2), Criminal Procedure Law refers to ‘Major suspects who are on the run, who 
repeatedly commit crime, or who gang up with others to commit crime.’ 
68 Article 69, Criminal Procedure Law. This category of person can be held for 30 days before the 
public security organ is required to apply for arrest. The people’s procuracy is required either 
to approve or reject the request for arrest within seven days of receipt. 
69 See Hecht (1996) and Human Rights in China (2001a) on the difficulties in reforming the 
Criminal Procedure Law. Fu Hualing (1998) discusses access of an accused person in detention 
to a lawyer. H. Tanner (1999) considers that in the 1980s many enforcement problems were due 
in part to problems of poor payment and lack of training. 
70 Ministry of Public Security, Regulations on the Procedures for Handling Criminal Cases, 
passed on 20 April 1998. 
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SOEs, law and a decade of 
market-oriented socialist 
development in Vietnam 
Adam Fforde 
THE BACKGROUND: SOES IN CLASSIC AND REFORMED 
SOCIALIST THINKING, AND THE VIETNAMESE CASE 
Three questions are common to the chapters in this book. The first is whether and 
how socialism shapes law and law-related institutions; the second is the role of 
external and internal factors in explaining legal change; the third is whether 
‘socialist’ doctrine inhibits legal change. This chapter will look at these issues in 
the context of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). 
For obvious reasons, the meaning of ‘Socialist’ in ‘Socialist Republic of Vietnam’ 
is not often discussed in academic fora. I think this is a pity, for, as Tony Benn 
remarked when interviewed shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union, this is the best 
thing to have happened to socialism in ages. Granted that the emerging labour 
regime in Vietnam appears relatively favourable to workers (Chan and Norlund 
1999), at least compared with China, and granted that Vietnam’s focus on the state 
sector positions Vietnam in a highly unorthodox position in terms of standard 
policy prescriptions, I welcome the chance to explore. 
In the longer term, we need to address the ‘Vietnam paradox’ of the surprisingly 
positive developmental role played by that part of the economy labelled as ‘state’. 
This was clear in the 1990s, when GDP data showed a rising share produced by the 
state sector, accompanied by rapid growth and macroeconomic stability—an 
outcome almost unthinkable in other developing countries though visible 
historically elsewhere, such as France after the Second World War. But here I want 
simply to look at law, the 1990s and SOEs.1 
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Beresford and Fforde (1997) provides one introduction to a possible definition of 
the changing notions of Vietnamese socialism. It argues that the basic ideas of 
socialism permit a division into necessary and unnecessary elements, and that the 
crucial partial reforms of the early 1980s saw a shift away from the latter but not the 
former. The first and most fundamental set, related to the traditional definition of 
socialism, comprised three principles: public ownership of the means of production, 
central planning, and distribution according to labour. The second set was of 
secondary importance and was in essence operational principles. It included central 
monopoly of foreign trade, state monopoly of the domestic circulation of goods, 
cooperative production in the agriculture and handicraft industries, planning of 
industrial production, state control of finance and credit, state determination of 
virtually all prices (including wages) and planned allocation of labour. It will be 
clear that this distinction permits the coexistence of central planning (suitably 
defined) and public ownership of the means of production with market-based 
domestic circulation of goods and market-based determination of industrial 
production. 
This distinction is, in essence, to argue that the ‘Law of Value’ is not antipathetic 
to socialism, so long as the definitional (rather than the operational) elements of 
socialism are maintained.2 This is, of course, the same position as that taken by 
Stalin in his ‘The Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR’, and much 
addressed by important Left intellectuals such as Bettelheim.3 It seems quite obvious 
that the basic issue here is that the progressive aspects of capitalism, perhaps 
expressed in terms of the operation of the ‘Law of Value’, had to be contained within 
and by the power of the socialist regime. 
It is clear that this intellectual distinction is consistent in many ways with what 
happened in Vietnam during the 1980s and 1990s, and opens the way to a working 
definition of the difference between ‘classic’ and ‘reformed’ socialism in Vietnam. I 
argue that (as we put it in Beresford and Fforde (1997)) the difference can be found 
in the distinction made above: whilst reform socialism abandoned the ‘operational’ 
aspects, it retained from ‘classic’ socialism the traditional defining elements of public 
ownership of the means of production, central planning and distribution according 
to labour, necessarily, however, losing the old content of ‘central planning’ but 
replacing it with a pervasive utilisation of state authority to regulate the internal 
workings of the state economy. This can be seen as not amounting to much of a 
change, especially if we recall the basic political thrust of these ideas, which is to 
subordinate the progressive elements of a development of the forces of production 
to a political power based on various structures, including those associated with 
the SOEs. 
It follows, then, that I will need to make the argument that little has essentially 
changed during the 1990s, a period when the state sector increased its share of total 
economic output, and, in the ‘Vietnam paradox’, it was sufficiently well-regulated 
for this not to be accompanied by macroeconomic instability. I will base this argument 
on the following 
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• comparison of the writings in the quality Vietnamese press that addressed 
SOEs and state business in the two periods 1992 and 2002 
• an examination of the legislation in force during these two periods that 
related to SOEs 
• a discussion of the contexts, and so a characterisation of how the SOE 
issue was conceived and how law and state activities sought to address 
this. 
Before going into these matters, though, it is worth saying something about other 
values and concepts related to these issues, not entirely the property of the Communist 
Party of Vietnam. 
DEVELOPMENT THINKING AND THE VIETNAMESE CASE 
Discussions of the role of the state in development have a long history, derived from 
attempts both to create development and to cope with the consequences of rapid 
change. Attempts to influence the flow of events often come down to discussions 
about the suitable role of the state, with opinions polarised between viewing the 
state as part of the problem, associated with the dominant Washington Consensus 
of the 1980s and 1990s, and views that treat the state as the most appropriate source 
of solutions. 
There are fundamental critiques of both tendencies, to do with their evidential 
basis. A good starting point for reflection, for example, is the literature on the empirics 
of the relationships between policy settings and economic performance, where 
respectable authorities argue that there are almost no robust examples of such 
relationships.4 It is hardly exceptional to point out that views of the correct role of 
the state in development not only vary, but orthodox opinion has shifted from a 
generally pessimistic view of markets after the Second World War and up to the late 
1970s, through a generally optimistic position, to what is now a somewhat confused 
situation, according to some.5 
Certainly, the increasing interest in the conditions leading to ‘market failure’, 
and growing belief that they are likely to be extremely common, has supported far 
greater interest in institutions amongst students of development, especially 
economists.6 Crucially, however, throughout much of the literature we find a 
combination of great certainty with questionable empirical evidence, accompanied 
by profound revisions to established positions. It is possible that what is going on 
here is what has been described, by Cowen and Shenton (1996) in their Doctrines of 
Development, as a resolution of the inherent nonsense of robust belief in a predictable 
future through a ‘logical sleight of hand’ that defines correct development as what 
authority says it is. 
Although I am no expert, a quick examination of the literature on ‘law and 
development’ would seem to show similar characteristics to those of the general 
development literature. Thus, Pistor and Wellons (1998:34) posit three ‘core theories’ 
in ‘the current thinking about law and socioeconomic development in their tendency 
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to converge both with each other and between economies and cultures’. This 
evolutionary theory they trace to Weber and Durkheim, linking the emergence of 
capitalism to actors such as law: here, ‘theory [predicts] that law develops over time 
and in interaction with changes in the socio-economic environment’ (1998:34). 
Cultural theory is said to be a defining feature of theories that view cultural factors 
as the major determinants for legal systems—law is essentially local in its character. 
Finally, utilitarian theorists reportedly see law as ‘an instrument to be used to promote 
economic development’ (Pistor and Wellons 1998:35). Pistor and Wellons’  position 
is that ‘law made an important contribution to Asia’s economic development and 
was most effective when it was congruent with economic policies’ (1998:1). Clearly, 
this assumes that economic policies were knowably ‘correct’, here situated in 
knowable cause–effect relations with economic performance, and that ‘law’ can be 
treated as a similar ‘independent variable’ to economic policy. Arguably, this simply 
reflects the ‘statism’ that is so common in thinking about development and change: 
the view that ‘policy’ can be construed as a category ‘external’ to, and so a cause 
that operates upon, ‘society’.7 A survey of recent articles shows that this position is 
common, as it must be given the general view of development as something that can 
be caused through correct state actions, construed as ‘policies’.8 
From this perspective, as hinted at by Almond in 1988, the use of state power in 
the Soviet Union to accelerate change through the methods that emerged under 
Stalin, and thus called ‘Stalinism’ can be seen as simply an extreme example of 
‘statism’, amplified in north Vietnam before 1975 by wartime social mobilisation 
and the particular certainties of Marxist social science. In my own opinion, it is 
unwise to take a dogmatic position for or against the importance of particular 
‘causes’ of change; indeed, given the dominant view that ‘policy matters’, it is often 
hard to isolate from much academic output empirics that permit a reasonable guess 
at the question ‘OK, but how much?’, which involves at least the possibility that 
policies do not matter at all. 
This chapter takes seriously the possibility that ‘law’ tends to reflect underlying 
socioeconomic processes and states. Such a ‘policy pessimism’ is contentious, 
assuming as it does that legal change has little active role to play in important 
change processes. It is not easy to situate within the simple typology presented by 
Pistor et al. (2003), but derives from a sense that formal law need not be important to 
economic life: markets can function efficiently enough, and accumulation processes 
can be robust enough, without identifiable and certain legal formality.9 In this sense 
the relationship between ‘law’ and outcome is likely to be complicated if not remote. 
Woodside, in his Community and Revolution (1976), is a rare example of 
scholarship that attempts to link more specific Vietnamese concerns to these wider 
sets of views. He argued that the combination of Vietnamese cultural and 
philosophical concerns with the particular historical circumstances of the 
destruction of community and invalidation of ideas caused by the French conquest 
‘suited’ the ‘proletarian mandarins’ of the Communist movement. The argument 
could be taken further, to the view that a suitable economic system would be one 
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that brought accumulating capital (beyond the peasant household) under ‘public’ 
regulation through the state economy, with its relationship with the farming economy 
mediated through exchange, perhaps market-based, perhaps through a plan, but not 
something that was ‘spontaneous’. ‘Law’, then, would be associated with this project. 
It follows that it would be unwise to view Vietnamese ‘socialism’ as being driven 
ideologically by imported texts. Rather, there is much in local conditions and 
circumstances to drive change and adaptation. Yet, we can see that defining the 
state and the state sector, and, more importantly for this chapter, the sources of its 
order, is central not only to Vietnamese concerns, but to those of many others. 
THE SITUATION IN THE EARLY 1990S 
Overview 
In the early 1990s, Vietnam was recovering from the major shocks associated with 
the emergence of an economy that no longer had as one of its major activities the use 
of the central planning apparatus to allocate Soviet bloc assistance to the state 
sector. Through the 1980s, SOEs had become increasingly market-focused.10 
After the loss of Chinese and most Western assistance in the late 1970s, assistance 
from the Soviet bloc had risen to around US$20 per capita, which is relatively high. 
The complicated economic events of 1988–90 had seen SOEs cut loose from these 
supports, and major job losses threatened social stability at a time when a ‘Yeltsin’ 
solution to the political problems of a ‘reformist’ Communist Party posed major 
obstacles.11 The sacking of Tran Xuan Bach appeared to mark the end of these trends. 
Examination of the detailed policy record, however, shows no clear shift away 
from the legislation and decrees of the late 1980s. Rather, people found that SOEs 
could and did find ways of generating cash flow and earnings that allowed them to 
survive, and this could be placed under a heading of ‘state-led rationalisation’.12 
Parallel to this, the balance of payments was brought under control, inflationary 
tendencies were curbed after the successful anti-inflationary measures of 1989, and 
a tax base was recreated that could secure resources for the government from what 
was now in many ways an ‘unplanned’ economy. But the economy was only 
‘unplanned’ in the sense that the planning methods of the classic neo-Stalinist 
system no longer existed.13 Through a range of mechanisms, the government 
continued to influence the pattern of economic growth, which, by the middle of the 
decade, was increasingly seen as regime-threatening in its stress on urban areas 
and SOEs. 
Compared with what was to come, and compared for example with China, 
however, the economic situation was one where SOEs had mainly to compete with 
each other and with imports. There was only a very negligible private sector, and 
almost no foreign direct investment to speak of. The ‘rationalisation’ forced upon 
SOEs was therefore coming from imports and the effects of the major economic 
changes accompanying the reforms and the loss of the large Soviet bloc aid program. 
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The ‘Law of Value’, therefore, allowed market forces to play themselves out within 
the state sector, giving the state, as Beresford (1997) has pointed out, a particularly 
subtle role in mediating interests. Interestingly, signs of a collapse of monetary and 
fiscal order marked by the impotency of central government in its relations with 
local authorities (a clear problem in China), seem to have been lacking; ad hoc decisions 
to delay tax payments, ease loan conditions and so forth, all with national systemic 
potential, tended to be mediated through Vietnamese national state structures. 
Law and policy towards SOEs needs to be seen in this light. It can be argued that 
the context, requiring a political and fiscal tightening, required strong attempts to 
bring SOEs under greater state control—a ‘conservative’ push in terms of the 
liberalising trends of the 1980s (Fforde, in progress). 
Law and policy towards SOEs 
A search of the Official Gazette for laws and decrees relating to SOEs for the period 
shows rather little innovation in the early years of the decade. The most interesting 
pointer is towards greater regulation of market-oriented activities, and a reduction 
of SOE property rights compared with the state. 
The thrust of legislation was still coming from the reforms of the late 1980s, 
specifically 217-HDBT, which was a strong attack on the central planning system, 
and other guiding documents that, it is clear (see Table 11.1), were to do with four 
areas. 
• Regulation. Matters such as No. 13 (business accounting) and No. 26 (on 
the role of the Chief Accountant), also No. 144 (financial management— 
also No. 408). 
• Addressing particular issues of the moment, specifically dealing with 
shed labour (No. 2), and the continuing program of equitisation. 
• Matters to do with profit shares and the nature of the property relations 
between the state and the SOE (No. 93 on depreciation and No. 316 on 
‘capital allocation’, as well as decree No. 27 on Enterprise Unions). 
• Matters to do with the creation and dissolution of SOEs (No. 315), especially 
the program of re-establishment of SOEs (No. 388). 
The process of negotiation and renegotiation of matters to do with state property— 
profit sharing (though often not called by that name), and relations between SOEs 
and the state (importantly No. 217, but also the Decree on Enterprise Unions)— 
show a continuity of focus that went back to the start of the 1980s and, as we will 
see, on into the 2000s. As is usual, much of this can appear arcane to the uninitiated, 
but an apparently dry decree on depreciation needs to be understood beside the 
reality that depreciation payments were, in essence, part of what value the SOE 
could retain from its commercial activities. And this was negotiable, regulated 
through these documents and decisions (a tendency that would also continue into 
the 2000s). 
Here, there are already the beginnings of an apparent reversal in direction, so 
that, whereas law of the late 1980s had reduced the power of formal state property 
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rights over SOEs, this was reversed in the very early 1990s (probably influenced by 
the context—see above). To gloss the preamble to No. 93, earlier decrees (No. 217 
and No. 50) had stipulated that 100 per cent of ‘basic depreciation’ (a category from 
the formal accounting system) was to be left to the enterprise—only for a small 
number of large projects was some to be given to the state budget. No. 93, however, 
bearing in mind the state’s need for revenue to carry out key investments, stipulated 
that 
• new projects must pay 70 per cent of basic depreciation to the state for the 
first three years, the remainder goes to ‘own-capital’ for use in the 
enterprise’s own investments 
• for existing base units, depreciation on assets paid for out of state 
budgetary funds will be left to the units at an average rate of 50 per cent for 
all branches—the rest will be paid to the state budget. The Minister of 
Finance will fix concretely the percentage retention for each enterprise in 
accordance with demand and requirements for replacement of the 
enterprise’s assets 
• The decision came into effect on 1 July 1989. 
This survey suggests that the details of SOE rationalisation, to cope with the 
problems of the moment and secure greater competitiveness, were not expressed in 
decrees at a level worthy of being published in the Official Gazette. Rather, decisions 
were taken on an ad hoc basis, and reported and disseminated through media such 
as the press. 
Local views of SOEs and their problems 
This discussion, and the next, rests simply on a reading of articles related to SOEs in 
the quality Vietnamese press. A search of my databases for 1992 and early 1993 
revealed over 100 articles relating to SOEs. Perhaps the most telling one was a ‘Tin 
ngan’ [Short News] in No. 4 (p.9) 1993 of KTVN ‘SOEs: holding to their key role but 
still loss-making’. This reported the results of a piece of research and a survey, 
showing that SOEs held two-thirds of economic assets and received 90 per cent of 
invested capital. That competition at this stage was mainly coming from imports 
and other SOEs is relatively clear (for example, Vu Manh Cuong 1992). 
These public discussions focused to a great extent on the problems of particular 
SOEs. This was an approach going back many years, for example to the early 1980s, 
before doi moi, when the official press carried many articles discussing the pros and 
cons of early steps to the commercialisation of SOEs. There is less concern, especially 
compared with the perceptions a decade later, with the details of systemic change; 
rather, the ‘market economy’—the ‘new system’—was largely taken as given.14 The 
concern of many articles was to show how SOEs had, through positive exploitation 
of the market mechanism, done well in terms of survival, maintenance of 
employment, payments to the state, and increased economic activity. These micro 
experiences show much about how law fitted into the local meaning of state 
commerce. 
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Regulation. Regulations were not widely discussed. It is clear from the texts that 
there was widespread illegality (see the discussion of kickbacks in the construction 
industry in Nguyen Toan Thang and Trong Dat (1992)). Law itself was not an active 
element in regulating the important changes of the moment. This is not so surprising, 
as central to change was the push to secure ‘return on capital’ as the gauge of 
enterprise performance, in a situation where SOEs’ formal structure did not permit 
this core element of the ‘Law of Value’ to be clearly realised. The shift to state business 
status, with the importance of treating SOEs as sites for the use of capital, marks this 
clearly. Thus, for example, Pham Bang Ngan notes 
the most specific characteristic of commercial performance for a business is the budgetary 
contribution target. High contributions, on the basis of high turnover, and high and rational 
employee incomes…are the most accurate way of establishing the commercial results of a 
business from the point of view of state management (1993:4). 
Particular issues of the moment. The overriding issue of the moment, which comes 
through very strongly from these articles, was to ensure that SOEs survived and 
were capable of competing, holding markets and employees, under the often very 
difficult economic conditions. Pro-SOE positions saw their main duties as often 
weakening their competitive position. Thus, for example, Dam Minh Thuy (1992) 
argued that four factors tended to push up their costs 
• preserving and developing state investments 
• high depreciation payments (see above) 
• positive real interest rates at the banks 
• the cost of electricity (this had recently been raised by the government). 
This article, however, respecting realities and the need to reduce inflationary 
pressures, ended up calling for import controls. 
Profit shares and the nature of property relations. As we have seen, law was pushing 
for a further redefinition of the relationships between SOEs and the state, and towards 
a formation of state interests that was more to do with return on capital and 
investments. An important element of this was the treatment of SOE’s ‘own’ capital. 
For example, the success story of the Hung Yen garments export factory (Tran Ta 
Uyen 1993) claimed that 4 billion dong of new investment had been made, of which 
3 billion was from the SOE’s ‘own capital’ (von tu co). 
This, interestingly, coincided with a wide range of accepted, but apparently 
extra-legal, arrangements that involved effective joint ventures. On the surface, these 
were usually reported in terms of deals done with the SOE’s workers. One example 
is ‘share groups’. These were essentially groups of workers who gave high fixed- 
interest loans to their SOE (Hoang Lan 1993). There is no mention in the article of 
any regulation. 
Creation and dissolution of SOEs. There were extensive reports of the re- 
establishment of SOEs as ‘state businesses’ (that is, from Xi nghiep quoc doanh, to 
Doanh nghiep nha nuoc), in accordance with Decision No. 388 (20/11/91). However, 
this was not a topic that generated much detailed discussion in the press, suggesting, 
as is probably the case, that the shift was largely nominal. To quote Trong Nghia 
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(1992a:1) ‘this is just the first step, the problem is how, through categorising SOEs 
and reorganising production, the city and the ministries can rapidly concentrate 
capital in stable and progressive enterprises that are short of capital’. The effects of 
No. 388 could include dissolution of SOEs (Trong Nghia 1992d) and were clearly 
part of the ongoing process of rationalisation. 
An interesting aspect of these references, which provides continuity through to 
the discussions a decade later, was the use of local terminology to refer to various 
forms of business cooperation. This was treated separately from the formal legal 
aspects of the creation and dissolution of SOEs (suggesting that law was derivative 
rather than proactive in relation to the direction of commercial change). For example 
• the distinction between lien ket and lien doanh (Trong Nghia 1992c); lien ket 
referred to cooperation that contained a technical basis, and was covered 
by the notion of ‘contract’; lien doanh was understood to involve a pooling 
of capital. That the distinction was locally significant points simply to the 
characteristics of the capital market at the time. 
• that of ‘share groups’ (see above). 
One can conclude that the market in institutions was rather free —people could 
try out various arrangements extra-legally to test their efficacy. 
Another example of this institutional variety was is the privatisation of the HCM 
City refrigerator factory (Tran Trung 1993), reportedly the second SOE to be privatised 
in the city. There were very few details of how this had been done, but by the late 
1990s its shares were being actively traded. 
Ideological issues. The articles in the Party press organ, Nhan dan, largely present 
stories about how individual SOEs had coped with what was called the ‘shift to a 
market economy’. Consistent with the overall ideological acceptance of a push to a 
market economy, we see greater stress upon acceptance of the role of return on 
capital, though subject to ‘social’ and political issues—the ‘Law of Value’ was to 
operate only subject to the political power of the socialist regime. 
Conclusion 
Examination of the legislation and the articles from the quality Vietnamese press 
seems to lead to the conclusion that, at this time, there is no significant difference 
between the position taken by Stalin and that of the Communist Party of Vietnam. 
Whilst the ‘Law of Value’ was to be allowed to operate, and clearly did in Vietnam 
in the early 1990s to a far greater extent than in early 1950s Soviet Russia, law and 
other elements of state activities are part of a conscious attempt to subject it to the 
priorities of the socialist regime. Further, the apparent willingness to permit extra- 
legal activities that clearly could have a strong effect on state control suggests that 
law was perhaps not the most important part of how the Communist Party of Vietnam 
governed SOEs. 
The argument here goes beyond the one, common in Vietnam studies, that it was 
the local market and players that were central to the dynamic of SOE change. Rather, 
viewed in terms of the overall political dynamic, and bearing in mind Beresford’s 
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(1997) stress on the importance of the state as a mediator between interests, for the 
overall political goals of regime survival and order in relationships between higher 
and local levels, SOEs appear to have maintained an important political function. 
Their existence, and the possibility of mediating interest group conflicts through 
such levers as the mass organisations and Party organisations within them, the 
allocation of state credits, deliberations over access to foreign direct investment, to 
participation in development plans, export marketing exercises, and so on, all reflect 
Beresford’s thesis. And, since this political project seems to have been successful, it 
follows, granted the widespread illegality, that law was not an important element of 
the ‘techniques of rule’. Another way of putting this is that, if one focuses on the 
‘rule’ in ‘rule by law’, then law was not very important to this, at least as far as SOEs 
were concerned. Little real effort was put into dealing with the widespread illegality, 
and this reflected political realities and priorities. 
THE SITUATION IN THE EARLY 2000S 
Overview 
In the early 2000s, the Vietnamese economy was, compared with the early 1990s, 
also showing somewhat unexpected signs of resilience and rapid growth after a 
period of shocks and difficulties. In this case the shocks were associated with the 
Asian financial crisis and the steep reductions in inward foreign investment at the 
close of the decade. The confidence of major aid donors was again high, however, 
marked by large loan arrangements made with the World Bank. One major trend 
was the apparent rapid emergence of a corporate private sector, and fast growth of 
labour-intensive exports, often coming from foreign-invested factories. The ‘Law of 
Value’ could, therefore, operate through a more complex field of commercial 
competition, where the private and foreign sectors both eased systemic issues by 
their contributions to exports and employment, whilst also offering sources of market- 
driven rationalisation that were not coming from within the state sector. 
It is important to realise also that after a decade of rapid growth the Vietnamese 
population, especially that associated with SOEs, was far richer, in terms of both 
assets and real incomes. It can be argued that the mid and late 1990s saw a build up 
in savings amongst the emerging middle classes that, combined with experience 
gained in business, amounted to a strong force pushing for the emergence of more 
strictly private forms of business than that which was entrenched in SOEs. In other 
words, the emerging middle classes sought property rights that could more easily 
be transferred, inherited and merged with others in various forms of joint venture. 
It is important to stress how important the state sector was to the rapid growth in 
the 1990s, and how much support it had been obtaining from the state. Even by the 
early 2000s, 85 per cent of subsidised credits were going to SOEs (Bac Hai 2002b). 
Further, it is useful not to assume that changes affecting SOEs reflect a metaphor 
of policy and policy implementability. I have argued elsewhere (Fforde 2002) that 
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the apparently random pattern of SOE equitisation15 and reform, when viewed as a 
policy-driven process, could as easily reflect a process where the key element of 
equitisation is the de facto and (now) de jure recapitalisation of an existing joint 
venture (rather than a Weberian bureaucratic entity). Further, since the apparent net 
flow of capital at equitisation is inwards (Fforde 2002), a more persuasive metaphor 
may well be the need for equitisation to compete with other opportunities for 
increasingly important and mobile capital. 
Law and policy towards SOEs 
The most significant element of policy towards SOEs in this later period was marked 
strongly at the Third Plenum of the Party Central Committee, which stressed the 
need to accelerate equitisation of SOEs. But this, of course, was simply a variation 
on the earlier theme of rationalisation and regulation of the nature of property 
relations. 
Reviewing the laws and decrees in the Official Gazette for the approximate 18 
months from mid 2000 to the end of 2002, we see a range of concerns that is very similar 
to those a decade earlier (see Table 11.2). There are, however, rather more legislative 
instruments than a decade earlier. The overall impression is one of far greater 
sophistication and textured awareness of the nature of the state sector: a ‘fine tuning’ 
of various elements already present a decade earlier. Thus, a rather large number of 
regulations deal with the particular event of equitisation of individual SOEs. 
Local views of SOEs and their problems 
The literature of the early 2000s is far richer and more detailed. Whereas the literature 
of the early 1990s offers a picture of individual SOEs, a decade later ‘SOEs’ are 
treated far more generally. This in part reflects the particular context: whilst in the 
early 1990s the major changes of 1989–90 were still being digested, in the early 
2000s there was much discussion of the ‘SOE problem’ and the advantages and 
disadvantages of ‘SOE reform’, including the central issue of why ‘equitisation’ 
was happening at the speed observed—for many, too slowly and clearly below the 
legislative targets. 
One can note, though, that the ‘formal reform’ aspects of what was happening 
were reflected in detailed regulation of the various ‘forms’ of SOE. Typologies were 
set by state decision rather than by the market. Thus, in one example amongst many, 
Doan Kim (2002:5) refers to decree No. 58 as defining the following ‘types’ of SOE 
• those with 100 per cent state capital 
• those that have been ‘transmogrified’ (da dang hoa)—equitised, dissolved, 
bankrupted. According to another source (P.V. 2002a) these other types 
were in fact clearly defined in ‘law’ as (a) Type 1, with 100 per cent state 
holdings and/or state holdings of 20 billion dong or more; (b) Type 2, 
with state holdings of over 50 per cent, or state holdings of under 50 per 
cent, but state control maintained through special legal decisions; and 
Asian Socialism and Legal Change 250 
SOEs with less than 5 billion dong in assets, which could not be equitised 
and which would be more directly handed over to other agents (see below); 
(c) Type 3, including SOEs not of Type 1, suffering long-term losses, which 
would be dissolved. 
Doan Kim (2002) argues that the basic reason for the slow pace of SOE reform is 
that ministries and localities are afraid of ‘losing’ them. Le Dang Doanh contends 
that equitisation is essentially the transfer of the business to a new investor [sic— 
‘nha dau tu’, not ‘owner’—‘chu’] to increase the efficiency of the business (Le Dang 
Doanh, in Bac Hai 2002c). 
Regulation. By this stage the ‘new regulations’ section of the leading newspaper, 
the Vietnam Economic Times, was producing regular and high-quality glosses of new 
decrees, on topics such as the treatment of financial aspects of SOE dissolution (for 
example, No. 66 in Thoi bao Kinh te Viet Nam [Vietnam Economic Times], 30 August 
2002:2). 
Particular issues of the moment. The dominant issue of the moment was the effort 
to improve competitive performance nationally, of which rationalisation of SOEs 
was a central part. In particular, where rationalisation was focused on property 
relations, understood essentially as a further extension of the ‘Law of Value’ through 
equitisation and the accelerated divestment of smaller SOEs.16 
As part of this, we see legal decisions to manage and deal with the old problem of 
the unpaid debts among many SOEs (No. 69). In a way familiar from the early 1990s, 
if not far earlier, this decree stated (to gloss P.V. 2002b) that ‘the SOE must itself deal 
with the problem, acting with the debtor to share burdens and solve the issue…’. 
Profit shares and the nature of property relations. A wide range of stories considers 
the implications of the shift to equity companies, such as the granting of permission 
for businesses to sell shares to foreign investors (Chan Hung 2002), discussed in the 
context of a draft decree from the Ministry of Finance. This was earlier said to be 
required to occur through a financial intermediary. Priority was to be given to sales 
‘within’ the SOE, including sales to poor workers. 
There was also much discussion of how SOEs were to be valued, with officials 
such as Tran Van Ta, a Deputy Minister of Finance, arguing that market valuation 
was needed (Quy Hao 2002a). 
Showing the process-nature of change, and the role of law in underpinning state 
projects, we see ideas floated that would have removed the power of line for ministries 
over SOEs (called ‘abolishing the ‘lead management role’) and vesting delegated 
state power in the hands of the Ministry of Finance as holder of the state’s shares 
(Quy Hao 2002b). 
Perhaps the clearest reflection of the nature of property relations can be seen in 
the reported differences between two decisions on equitisation—No. 44 (1998) and 
No. 64 (2002). These were reported (Kim Dan 2002) as follows 
• it was no longer obligatory to use all the workers in the SOE at equitisation, 
only as many as possible 
• earlier, a corporate entity could buy a maximum of 10–20 per cent of the 
shares (sic), and an individual 5–10 per cent. Now there were no limits 
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• SOE management staff, from deputy section heads upwards, were no 
longer limited in the numbers of shares sold at ‘favourable prices’. All 
employees could buy, and allocation would be based upon period in state 
employment [sic—not specifically at the SOE] prior to equitisation 
• it was now compulsory to sell a minimum of 30 per cent of the shares 
outside the SOE at equitisation. Priority should be given to producers and 
suppliers of agricultural, forestry and marine products inputs to the SOE, 
and all sales had to go through financial intermediaries 
• the establishing shareholders had to have at least 20 per cent of the equity 
• the form of shares would be based on the Ministry of Finance’s model, but 
did not have to follow it exactly 
• a variety of measures could be used to value the SOE being equitised 
• land-use rights could only be part of the deal for SOEs involved in housing 
and infrastructure; all others would still have to rent their land from the 
state 
• employees would receive a maximum of 10 shares per year of employment 
at the favourable price (defined as 30 per cent below the general price of 
100,000 dong per share) 
• the value of the SOE would be set by the Minister or the Chairman of the 
relevant People’s Committee 
• the prime minister would no longer directly approve all equitisations, but 
only the general plan of each ministry and locality. 
We can see from this the way in which the Communist Party of Vietnam had 
gradually shifted its position on SOEs, and even at this relatively late stage in the 
process was still using a range of powers to involve itself in the issue of who would 
have formal ownership of these businesses. The underlying power and position of 
the Party and mass organisations within these bodies, which remain powerful, was 
not discussed. 
Another area that offered great scope for confusion was the position of the general 
companies. A general company is a formal legal entity, essentially a sort of holding 
company. Their history is complex, but dates back well into the 1970s and a flirtation 
with the apparent success of the East German kombinaten in easing the problems of 
central planning. Here, planning of SOEs had been reformed by shifting them into 
large holding companies, which were then planned by central government: thus 
the number of units planners had to deal with was reduced, and the holding 
companies were often vertically and horizontally integrated. For example, inputs 
suppliers and groups of inputs users were brought within the one holding company, 
hopefully reducing transactions and coordination costs. 
In Vietnam, these Lien hiep also grouped SOEs, initially taking into their 
management officials from the line ministries. In the early 1990s, however, these 
were reformed through their transformation into general companies, for reasons 
that are not well understood. These existed at central and local level, and also as 
groups (Tap Doan, rather than the Tong Cong Ty, which I translate as ‘general 
company’). 
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Central to the discussion here of the role of law, and its continued irrationalities, 
is that the question of the power of general companies over their constituent SOEs 
once the latter had been equitised appears to have been left open. Thus whilst the 
shareholders would appoint, in some arguments, the management board of such 
an SOE, the general company would appoint the General Manager.17 Here, legislation 
to shift to a ‘Mother Company–Child Company’ model emerged (Minh An 2002a). 
Again, though, there were ‘experiments’ with four models (B.H. 2002). An Order in 
early 2002 apparently stated that an equitised SOE would remain a member of any 
general company it had belonged to (D.T. 2002). 
In a further extension of the experiments with legal forms seen in the early 1990s, 
we see general companies shifting to a situation where they have ‘no state supplied 
capital’ (Minh An 2002b). This apparently meant that they would shift to basing 
their activities on collateralised bank loans (90 per cent) and likely their capital. 
This was reportedly viewed by many as a rational model. 
Another example of this flexibility of form was the emergence of ‘single member 
Limited Companies’—that is, equitised SOEs with 100 per cent state ownership. 
This was addressed in a circular letter of the Ministry of Planning and Investment 
(M.G. 2002). 
Creation and dissolution of SOEs. The legislation clearly has much to do with the 
re-establishment of SOEs, as it did a decade earlier. Apart from details already 
mentioned, the treatment of small SOEs is very interesting. 
Decree No. 49 follows a series of decrees going back to the 1980s on relatively 
simple methods for handing small SOEs over to other agents, through ‘allocation, 
sale, business contracting (khoan kinh doanh) or renting (thue). According to Hoanh 
Anh (2002), many of these were loss-making, but sales would be possibile if 
conditions were eased further. 
Ideological issues. It is important to note how the legislation required a ‘typology’ 
of SOEs, and how this reflected a range of interests, above all the need to balance 
limited economic goals with the need to maintain capacity to deal with likely adverse 
political consequences. There was considerable political ‘push’ to secure the economic 
goals, with the combination of legislation to accelerate equitisation, overt commitment 
by the Communist Party of Vietnam, and sweeteners to possible new investors. 
Conclusion 
The sources reveal a different but essentially similar treatment of relations between 
SOEs and the state as a decade previously. In 1992, SOEs were commercialised 
entities participating in a range of joint ventures and seeking to meet a variety of 
goals suited to the position in which they were placed by the Party and state—a 
priority role in securing the general goals of national development and the specific 
political goals of securing the regime. At the time, conceptions were very much 
focused on the need for individual SOEs to survive the greatly increased pressures 
caused by the loss of Soviet aid and the need to tighten state support so as to maintain 
macroeconomic stability that had only recently been re-established. Law played a 
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role in regulating and ordering SOEs, but was ignored by both SOEs and the Party– 
state as necessary. 
By 2002, law was still essentially a fluid instrument of a ruling Communist 
Party, used to confront the progressive opportunities offered to them (as to Stalin) by 
an expanded role of the ‘Law of Value’; it was not something that governed and 
determined the activities of either SOEs or the Party–state, for, as we have seen, 
confusion in important areas remained, and the law was ignored by both sides 
when it suited. 
What is different about the early 2000s, however, is the presence of a dynamic 
private domestic sector and the foreign investment sector. The literature rarely refers 
to this, but considerable resources are devoted to maintaining the state sector. In 
fact, the intense focus of legislation on regulating the state sector can be interpreted 
as reflecting a pressing need to secure its position against the trend to a private 
market in the later years of the decade. 
The equitisation process itself, legally expressed, preserved considerable 
opportunity for hemming the operation of the ‘Law of Value’ in many ways, 
consistent with the continuing socialist direction. We can point to the residual 
powers to control SOEs when the state’s share was below 50 per cent, the commitment 
to use of the general companies as a channel of influence, not at all clearly defined, 
and the ongoing negotiated relationship between the managers and workers in 
SOEs and the wider world of the state and Party, still mediated by the Party’s local 
organisations and the mass organisations, whose attention could be increased and 
diminished as required. Law was not politically important to this. Other forces 
existed to support and order the emergence of markets. 
CONCLUSION: LAW AND THE NATURE OF MARKET-ORIENTED 
DEVELOPMENT IN VIETNAM 
This chapter contends that there has been no fundamental change in the basic 
structures of state–SOE relations during the decade from around 1992. The decade 
did not start with a SOE sector that was a-legal in the sense that pure Stalinism 
could be said to ignore the need to regulate ‘outside’ activities, of which those aimed 
at the market, and in a Marxian sense accepting of the ‘Law Of Value’, appear the 
most likely candidate. Rather, SOEs immediately after the crisis of 1989–91 were 
legally viewed as objects of regulation rather than control, or, rather, both, but certainly 
not subject to a definitive plan. As Beresford (1997) has stressed, planners had 
grown long accustomed to negotiating with SOEs, and from this it was not a long 
step to treating their commercial activities as such, relatively autonomous from the 
state’s wider goals—the plan—and driven as much by profit as other goals. Nor did 
the decade end with a clear program of ‘privatisation’; rather, SOEs, even the 
equitised ones, continued to operate in an environment where rationalisation and 
regulation went hand in hand, and where their activities were clearly subject to the 
wider political and social intentions of government and Party. 
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If we trace Vietnamese socialism back to Stalin’s great surprise of the early 1950s, 
when he re-admitted economics to formal discussion, and the ‘Law of Value’ to an 
acceptable ‘existence’ within what Brezhnev was later to call ‘existing socialism’, 
then clearly so long as the Communist Party of Vietnam and its government continue 
to hold to definitions of the defining elements of socialism as ‘public ownership of 
the means of production, central planning and distribution according to labour’, 
and consider that the relations they have with the economy provide the political 
and developmental results that central planning promised and failed to deliver, 
then they have much room for manoeuvre. Central to this is the ‘public’ nature of the 
various business forms pertaining. In Vietnam it is said that ‘the private is not 
entirely private and the public not entirely public’,18 then clearly much will turn, not 
on the private nature of SOEs, but the public nature of private companies. 
If we now return to the three questions set out at the beginning, some hesitant 
answers can be attempted. Does socialism shape law and law-related institutions, 
and, if so, how? It is clear from the discussion above that you need to know quite a 
lot about ‘socialism’ in order to understand the dynamics of SOEs and their political 
position. It is, however, the real rather than doctrinal aspects of socialism that are 
important; the politics of a ‘conservative’ transition were deeply influenced by neo- 
Stalinism and its local reality. Socialism, then, shapes law and law-related 
institutions through its influence over the local dynamic, and does so in contingent 
ways: for example, it turned out that illegality in matters to do with SOEs was not 
inconsistent with local political priorities during the 1990s. 
What is the balance between external and internal factors in explaining legal 
change? Since it appears that formal legal change was largely irrelevant, this 
question may appear moot. The forces that maintained illegality, however, were 
clearly domestic in origin. 
Finally, does ‘socialist’ doctrine inhibit legal change? The answer to this goes 
beyond the scope of the chapter. This is because the central position of SOEs in the 
1990s accompanied the relative absence from the scene of more private forms, which 
only started to emerge fast in the late 1990s. The work by McMillan and Woodruff 
(1999a, 1999b) argues that formal legal institutions were not necessary to the 
development of good inter-firm relations; the market did not need the state. But 
whether and to what extent the failure of private firms to emerge in the 1990s was 
due to ‘socialist’ doctrine is not something that can easily be answered. What the 
argument does suggest, however, is that the state (and Party) could effectively mediate 
between social groups without use of legality per se, and that it was, perhaps, this 
political success rather than doctrine that was central. After all, the great effort, 
reported above in terms of the decrees and other legal documents, did go into 
developing the outward forms of law. 
NOTES 
1 In other ongoing work, I am examining the nature of SOEs in terms of ‘real property’, and also 
the longer-term history of SOEs, going back to before 1975. 
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2 The ‘Law of Value’ is a term used by Marx, and more importantly by Stalin, to refer to the 
economic and social effects of the exchange of commodities; that is, production for the market— 
for profit. Stalin’s ‘Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR’ surprised many at the time 
(the early 1950s) by arguing that the Law of Value operated within the Soviet economy, 
specifically in areas such as trade with the peasantry on their private plots. That such an 
obscure terminology should mean this can be understood by reference to Marx’s theory of 
surplus value, whereby separation of workers from the means of production allowed capitalists 
to pay them less than the value of their work, with value understood here in terms of the 
embodied labour in commodities, rather than the market price. The point in the discussion here 
is that profit-oriented exchange was doctrinally accepted within Stalinist thinking, which may 
come as a surprise to some readers. 
3 It was of course Stalin’s famous U-turn in the Bolshevik position on collectivisation that saw 
the retention of private plots and output from them disposable on markets, that defined what 
was, in the future, to be a critical difference between Stalinist and neo-Stalinist thinking and the 
‘pure’ position of Maoism, reflected in the extinction of differences between ‘state’ and ‘economic’ 
structures in the People’s Communes—a position never accepted by the Communist Party of 
Vietnam. 
4 See Levine and Zervos (1993), which looks at the evidence from cross-country regression work, 
reporting almost no robust relationships between economic policy settings and economic 
performance, Also, Kenny and Williams (2001) who discuss the significance of the assumptions 
of ontological and epistemological universality inherent in the use of terms such as ‘law’ and 
‘development’ in many contexts. See also Brock and Durlauf (2000) for further and later work 
than Levine and Zervos (1993); Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) for an examination of the evidential 
basis for blanket policies that advocate trade liberalisation; and Prasad et al. (2003) for an 
example of a clear reversal in established orthodoxy, in this case arguing that capital market 
liberalisation is not necessarily associated with good economic performance. 
5 For a neat argument about the current state of affairs, see Lindauer and Pritchett (2002). 
6 See North (1995) for what I read as an open and non-doctrinaire approach. Greenwald and 
Stiglitz (1986) was a major push to exploration of these issues within economics. If market 
failure is pervasive then there are strong a priori arguments for an active state. 
7 Cowen and Shenton (1996) discuss issues to do with the historical origins of this view in the 
longer term, and Almond (1988) looks at how, and perhaps why, mainstream political science, 
having largely abandoned state–society metaphors, eventually re-adopted them. 
8 For example, Pistor et al. (2003:89) remarks that the ‘importance of law and economic 
development has been long acknowledged’, but then appears to argue in a more ‘evolutionary’ 
vein, that, based upon the evidence from transitionary economies, simple transplanting of law 
does not cause the desired effects; rather, what is sought are the conditions for the creation of 
endogenous processes of legal evolution suited to rapid economic growth, a more subtle 
cause-effect logic. Berkowitz et al. (2003) argue similarly, for the importance of successful 
localisation. Botero et al. (2003) reflect modern scepticism about the arguments over the 
implications of simple economic theory and the links between policy and performance, and 
can be read as suggesting that any particular causal links posited are not likely to be robust. 
9 Compare with McMillan and Woodruff (1999a, 1999b) for studies of how such order can be 
based upon things like trust, with empirical reference to Vietnam, and so economic success be 
attained without apparent formal legal support. 
10 See de Vylder and Fforde (1996) and Fforde (in progress). Micro level data show this uneven 
process clearly. For example, the 10-10 Hanoi textile mill had (according to Trong Quyen 1992) 
stopped being subject to any central planning in 1985 (that is, before the announcement of doi 
moi at the 1986 Sixth Party Congress) and had been the first SOE in the city to be allocated 
capital upon which a return had to be made (as part of the shift to state businesses), in 1990. 
For a contrary example, of rather slow adaptation to the market, see for example Vu Phong 
Tao (1992) on the Viet-Tiep local factory, which only really started to diversify in 1992. 
11 By a Yeltsin solution, I mean one where somebody from within the apparat presents to the 
population for proper election, thus perhaps (and in Yeltsin’s case with success) acquiring 
enough political legitimacy to crash the system when and if circumstances permit. Perhaps the 
Vietnamese conservatives saw this coming, or perhaps Tran Xuan Bach’s activities were simply 
a stalking horse, to flush out possible adherents to such a strategy. 
12 See Johnson (1982) for the importance of ‘rationalisation’ within the economic development 
support activities of MITI in Japan. 
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13 Whilst the basic ideas of central planning emerged during the Soviet Five Year Plans of the late 
1920s and 1930s, there is enough prima facie reason to suppose the possibility of local adaptation 
of these in other countries for the term ‘neo-Stalinist’ to be useful. For example, whilst Uncle Jo 
(Stalin) simultaneously held the top positions in the Party, state and security structures in the 
USSR, thus permitting a certain pattern of ‘mediation’ (to apply such a term to his appalling 
practices), once Ho Chi Minh had lost influence, power at the top in Vietnam tended to be 
shared between competing groups, leading to characteristic problems for a country used to a 
monarchy, that used a system effectively monarchical/dictatorial in character (Stalinism), but 
had a number of competing offices. A wide range of books explain the peculiarities of central 
planning, where most goods and services were sold, but in quantities and at prices set by the 
plan, so that the meaning of ‘sell’ is quite different from that in market economies. Typically, 
in such economies planners ensured that prices were set at levels where SOEs enjoyed large 
profits, which were then used to finance large levels if investment. For a while, thanks to the 
high levels of investment, growth was very fast, but then slowed as constraints such as 
primary inputs and the low efficiency of the system started to bite. For a fascinating account 
of the collapse of this system in the USSR see Ellman and Kontorovich (1998), which collects 
writings by insiders after the event. 
14 For example, in discussions of the Hai Phong refrigerator works (Trong Nghia 1992b) and the 
garments industry (Phan Huy Hien 1992). 
15 Occasional confusion continues about the significance of this term. Literally translated as 
‘equitisation’, it seems as often to be used to refer to the re-establishment of an SOE as an 
equity company, with some ownership rights expressed through that form, as it refers to an 
avowed process of privatisation. 
16 As discussed below, these smaller SOEs were not treated as subject to equitisation, but rather 
to simpler and more radical (in terms of the ‘Law of Value’) measures. 
17 The original legislation on the new-style general companies was extremely opaque on their 
rights and powers. On the situation in the early 2000s, see for example Bac Hai (2002a). 
18 Dao Xuan Sam, personal communication—‘Tu khong han la tu, cong khong han la cong’. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 11.1 Legislation and decrees relating directly to SOEs immediately prior to 
1992 (chronological order) 
Quyet dinh so 217-HDBT ban hanh cac chinh sach doi moi ke hoach hoa va hach toan kinh 
doanh xa hoi chu nghia doi voi cac xi nghiep quoc doanh [Resolution # 217-HDBT 
Promulgating Policies for the Reform of Planning and Socialist Accounting for SOEs]; 
Authority: HDBT; Date:14/11/87; Source: CB 10/12/87 
Chi thi so 13-CT ve viec trien khai thuc hien Quyet dinh so 217-HDBT ngay 14/11/87 ban hanh 
cac chinh sach doi moi ke hoach hoa va hach toan kinh doanh xa hoi chu nghia doi voi cac xi 
nghiep quoc doanh [Order # 13-CT on Implementation of Resolution # 217-HDBT 14/11/87…]; 
Authority: HDBT; Date: 7/1/88; Source: CB 31/1/88 
Quyet dinh so 98-HDBT ve viec ban hanh ban Quy dinh ve quyen lam chu cua tap the lao dong 
tai xi nghiep quoc doanh [Decision # 98-HDBT on the Promulgation of Regulations on the 
Rights to Collective Mastery of the Collective of Labour in SOEs]; Authority: HDBT; Date: 2/6/ 
88; Source: CB 30/6/88 
Nghi dinh so 26-HDBT ban hanh Dieu le ke toan truong xi nghiep quoc doanh - Dieu le ke toan 
truong xi nghiep quoc doanh [Decision # 26-HDBT Promulgating the Statute on the Chief 
Accountant of an SOE—The Statute…]; Authority: HDBT; Date:18/3/89; Source: CB 31/3/89 
Nghi dinh so 27-HDBT ban hanh Dieu le Lien hiep xi nghiep quoc doanh - Dieu le Lien hiep xi 
nghiep quoc doanh [Decision # 27-HDBT Promulgating the Statute on Enterprise 
Associations—the Statute…]; Authority: HDBT; Date: 22/3/89; Source: CB 15/4/89 
Quyet dinh so 93-HDBT ngay 24/7/89 cua Hoi Dong Bo Truong ve viec sua doi che do nop khau 
hao co ban cua cac don vi xi nghiep kinh te quoc doanh [Resolution No. 93-HDBT of Council of 
Ministers on Revising the System of Depreciation Contributions of State Economic Enterprises]. 
Quyet dinh so 144-HDBT ngay 10/5/90 cua Hoi Dong Bo Truong ve chan chinh quan ly tai 
chinh xi nghiep quoc doanh [Resolution No. 144-HDBT of the Council of Ministers on 
Improving the Financial Management of State Enterprises]. 
Quyet dinh so 143-HDBT ngay 10/5/1990 cua Hoi Dong Bo Truong ve viec tong ket thuc hien 
Quyet dinh so 217-HDBT ngay 14/11/87, cac nghi dinh 50-HDBT ngay 22/3/88 va 98-HDBT 
ngay 2/6/88 va lam thu viec tiep tuc doi moi quan ly xi nghiep quoc doanh [Resolution No. 
143-HDBT of the Council of Ministers on Summarising the Results of Implementing the 
Decision No. 217-HDBT dated 14/11/87, as well as the Decisions No. 50-HDBT dated 22/3/ 
88 and No. 98-HDBT dated 2/6/88 and on Experimental Continuation of State Enterprise 
Management Reform]. 
Quyet dinh so 315-HDBT ngay 1/9/90 cua Hoi dong Bo truong ve chan chinh va to chuc lai 
san xuat va kinh doanh trong khu vuc kinh te quoc doanh. - Qui dinh mot so diem co ban ve 
Vu Manh Cuong, 1992. ‘Xi nghiep lien hop pham dam va hoa chat habald sau van 
tan ure: ky luc tu su hoi sinh [Best ever: the HABALD Associated Enterprise 
fertiliser and chemical factory produces 60,000 tones of Urea]’, Labour (Vietnamese 
edition), 22 October:1, 3. 
Vu Phong Tao, 1992. ‘Xi nghiep khoa viet tiep: dau tu hon 1 ti dong de phat trien san 
xuat [The Viet-Czech lock factory: investing more than a billion dong in the 
development of production]’, People’s Army (Vietnamese edition), 17 September:3 
Woodside, A.B., 1976. Community and Revolution in Vietnam, Houghton Mifflin 
Company, Boston. 
261 Market-oriented socialist development 
thu tuc giai the xi nghiep quoc doanh bi thua lo nghiem trong (Resolution No. 315-HDBT of the 
Council of Ministers on Improving and Reorganising Production and Business in the State 
Sector. Regulations on Some Basic Points Regarding the Dissolution of State Enterprises 
Suffering Serious Losses]. 
Chi thi so 316-CT ngay 1/9/90 cua Chu tich Hoi dong Bo truong ve viec thi diem trao quyen 
su dung va trach nhiem bao toan von san xuat kinh doanh cho don vi co so quoc doanh. Qui 
dinh tam thoi ve nhung nguyen tac va noi dung trao quyen su dung trach nhiem bao toan va 
phat trien von cho cac xi nghiep quoc doanh [Order No. 316-CTHDBT of the President of the 
Council of Ministers on Experimentation with Allocating the Rights and Responsibility to Use 
Capital to State Production Units. Temporary Regulations Thereon]. 
Chi thi so 408-CT ngay 20/11/90 cua Chu tich Hoi dong Bo truong ve viec tiep tuc chan chinh 
cong tac tai vu ke toan va hach toan kinh te cua cac xi nghiep quoc doanh; [Order No. 408-CT 
of the President of the Council of Ministers on Continuation of the Strengthening of Financial 
Work in Accounting and Economic Accounting in State Enterprises]. 
Thong tu lien bo so 2-TT/LB ngay 5/3/91 huong dan viec giai quyet chinh sach doi voi lao 
dong khi giai the xi nghiep quoc doanh [Inter-Ministerial Circular Letter No. 2-TT/LB Guiding 
Implementation of the Labour Policy on Dissolution of State Enterprises]. 
Table 11.2 Legislation and decrees relating directly to SOEs, second half of 2001 
and 2002 (chronological order) 
Quyet dinh so 153/2001/QD-TTg ngay 9/10/2001 cua Thu Tuong Chinh Phu phe duyet 
doanh nghiep Nha nuoc hang dac biet [Decision No. 153/2001/QD-TTg of the Prime Minister 
on the Approval of Special State-Own Enterprises]. 
Quyet dinh so 172/2001/QD-TTg ngay 5/11/2001 cua Thu Tuong Chinh Phu ve viec xu ly 
gian no, khoanh no, xoa no thue va cac khoan phai nop ngan sach nha nuoc doi voi nhung 
doanh nghiep, co so san xuat kinh doanh co kho khan do nguyen nhan khach quan [Decision 
No. 172/2001/QD-TTg of the Prime Minister on the Reduction, Deferral, and Forfeit of 
Overdue Taxes and Other Payments to the State Budget Due to Objective Difficulties]. 
Quyet dinh so 182/2001/QD-TTg ngay 20/11/2001 cua Thu Tuong Chinh Phu ve viec sua doi, 
bo sung Quy che cong khai tai chinh doi voi ngan sach nha nuoc cac cap, cac don vi du toan ngan 
sach, cac doanh nghiep nha nuoc va cac quy co nguon thu tu cac khoan dong gop cua nhan dan 
ban hanh kem theo Quyet dinh so 225/1998/QD-TTg ngay 20/11/1998 cua Thu tuong Chinh 
phu [Decision No. 182/2001/QD-TTg of the Prime Minister on the Amendment of, and 
Supplement to, the Protocal on the Disclosure of Budget of Local Governments, Public Entities, 
SOEs, and Funds from Public Contributions According to Decision No. 225/1998/QD-TTg]. 
Quyet dinh so 1489/2001/QD-TTg ngay 21/11/2001 cua Thu Tuong Chinh Phu ve viec thanh 
lap to cong tac trien khai thuc hien chuyen doi doanh nghiep nha nuoc, doanh nghiep cua to 
chuc chinh tri, to chuc chinh tri - xa hoi thanh cong ty trach nhiem huu han mot thanh vien 
[Decision No. 1489/2001/QD-TTg of the Prime Minister on the Commission of a Specialist 
Group to Change SOEs, Economic Enterprises of Political and Socio-Political Bodies into Single- 
Owner Limited Liability Companies]. 
Chi thi so 27/2001/CT-TTg ngay 22/11/2001 cua Thu Tuong Chinh Phu ve viec trien khai thuc 
hien chuyen doi doanh nghiep Nha nuoc, doanh nghiep cua cac to chuc chinh tri, to chuc chinh 
tri - xa hoi thanh cong ty trach nhiem huu han mot thanh vien [Directive No. 27/2001/CT-TTg 
of the Prime Minister on Changing SOEs, Economic Enterprises of Political and Socio-Political 
Bodies into Single-Owner Limited Liability Companies]. 
Thong tu lien tich so 89/2001/TTLT-BTC-BCA ngay 8/11/2001 cua Bo Tai Chinh va Bo Cong 
An huong dan viec nop, su dung va quyet toan tien thu thue doi voi cac doanh nghiep nha 
nuoc hoat dong cong ich thuoc Bo Cong an [Inter-Circular No. 89/2001/TTLT-BTC-BCA of the 
Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Police on the Collection, Use and Report of Tax 
Payments of Non-Profit Enterprises of the Ministry of Police]. 
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Thong tu so 94/2001/TT-BTC ngay 22/11/2001 cua Bo Tai Chinh huong dan bo sung quy 
dinh tai Thong tu so 121/2000/TT-BTC ngay 29/12/2000 cua Bo Tai chinh huong dan thuc 
hien dau thau mua sam do dung, vat tu, trang thiet bi, phuong tien lam viec doi voi cac co 
quan Nha nuoc, luc luong vu trang, doan the va doanh nghiep nha nuoc su dung nguon ngan 
sach Nha nuoc [Circular No. 94/2001/TT-BTC of the Ministry of Finance to Supplement 
Circular 121/2000/TT-BTC of the Ministry of Finance on Auction for the Purchase of Facilities 
and Equipments for Public Bodies, the Arm Force, Associations and State Enterprises Funded 
by the State Budget]. 
Quyet dinh so 1627/2001/QD-TTg ngay 27/12/2001 cua Thu Tuong Chinh Phu ve viec chuyen 
doanh nghiep Nha nuoc cong ty xuat nhap khau hang tieu thu cong nghiep TP HCM thanh cong 
ty co phan [Decision No. 1672/2001/QD-TTg of the Prime Minister on Changing the HCMC’s 
Import–Export Company of Industrial Consumption Products into a Public Company]. 
Quyet dinh so 53/2002/QD-TTg ngay 11/1/2002 cua Thu Tuong Chinh Phu ve viec chuyen 
doanh nghiep Nha nuoc Cong ty xuat nhap khau thuy dac san tanh cong ty co phan [Decision 
No. 53/2002/QD-TTg of the Prime Minister on Changing the Import–Export Company of 
Marine Special Products into a Public Company]. 
Quyet dinh so 55/2002/QD-TTg ngay 14/1/2002 cua Thu Tuong Chinh Phu ve viec chuyen 
doanh nghiep nha nuoc cong ty kinh doanh xuat nhap khau thuy san Minh Hai thanh cong ty 
co phan [Decision No. 55/2002/QD-TTg of the Prime Minister on Changing Minh Hai Import– 
Export Company of Marine Products into a Public Company]. 
Quyet dinh so 110/2002/QD-TTg ngay 4/2/2002 cua Thu Tuong Chinh Phu ve viec chyen 
doanh nghiep Nha nuoc cong ty Noi hoi VN thanh cong ty co phan [Decision No. 110/2002/ 
QD-TTg of the Prime Minister on Changing Vietnam Hydraulic Pumping Company into a 
Public Company]. 
Quyet dinh so 111/2002/QD-TTg ngay 4/2/2002 cua Thu Tuong Chinh Phu ve viec chyen 
doanh nghiep Nha nuoc cong ty xay dung thuoc TCTy cao su VN thanh cong ty co phan 
[Decision No. 111/2002/QD-TTg of the Prime Minister on Changing Construction Company of 
the Vietnam General Rubber Company into a Public Company]. 
Chi thi so 04/2002/CT-TTg ngay 8/2/2002 cua Thu Tuong Chinh Phu ve viec tiep tuc sap 
xep, doi moi, phat trien va nang cao hieu qua doanh nghiep Nha nuoc [Directive No. 04/2002/ 
CT-TTg of the Prime Minister on Continuation of Rearrangement, Reform, Development and 
Improvement of Efficiency of SOEs]. 
Quyet dinh so 178/2002/QD-TTg ngay 28/2/2002 cua Thu Tuong Chinh Phu ve viec chuyen 
doanh nghiep nha nuoc Cong ty phat trien dau tu cong nghe (FPT) thanh cong ty co phan 
[Decision No. 178/2002/QD-TTg of the Prime Minister on Changing FPT Company into a 
Public Company]. 
Thong tu so 03/2002/TT-BLDTBXH ngay 9/1/2002 cua Bo Lao Dong-Thuong Binh-Xa Hoi 
huong dan thuc hien Nghi dinh so 28/CP ngay 28/3/1997 va Nghi dinh so 03/2001/ND-CP 
ngay 11/1/2001 cua Chinh phu ve doi moi quan ly tien luong va thu nhap trong doanh nghiep 
xay dung Nha nuoc [Circular No. 03/2002/TT-BLDTBXH of the Ministry of Labor–Invalid– 
Social Affairs to Implement Decree No. 28/CP and Decree No. 03/2001/ND-CP of the 
Government on Reform in Salary and Income in State Construction Companies]. 
Thong tu so 04/2002/TT-BLDTBXH ngay 9/1/2002 cua Bo Lao Dong-Thuong Binh-Xa Hoi 
huong dan thuc hien quan ly tien luong va thu nhap doi voi doanh nghiep Nha nuoc hoat dong 
cong ich [Circular No. 04/2002/TT-BLDTBXH of the Ministry of Labor–Invalid–Social Affairs 
on Reform in Salary and Income in Non-Profit Public Entities]. 
Quyet dinh so 213/2002/QD-TTg ngay 25/3/2002 cua Thu Tuong Chinh Phu ve viec chuyen 
doanh nghiep Nha nuoc Cong ty giong cay trong mien Nam thanh con ty co phan [Decision No. 
213/2002/QD-TTg of the Prime Minister on Changing FPT Company into a Public Company]. 
Thong tu so 22/2002/TT-BTC ngay 21/3/2002 cua Bo Tai Chinh huong dan xu ly tai chinh va 
hach toan doi voi doanh nghiep Nha nuoc co gop von thanh lap doanh nghiep lien doanh theo 
Luat Dau tu nuoc ngoai tai VN khi doanh nghiep lien doanh cham dut hoat dong (Nghi dinh so 
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41/2002/ND-CP ngay 11/4/2002 cua Chinh Phu ve chinh sach doi voi lao dong doi du do sap 
xep lai doanh nghiep Nha nuoc [Circular No. 22/2002/TT-BTC of the Ministry of Finance on 
Financial Works and Report in State Enterprises Investing in Joint-Venture According to the Law 
on Foreign Investment in Vietnam When the Joint-Venture is Dissolved]. 
Thong tu so 26/2002/TT-BTC ngay 22/3/2002 cua Bo Tai Chinh huong dan xu ly tai chinh khi 
chuyen doi doanh nghiep nha nuoc, doanh nghiep cua to chuc chinh tri, to chuc chinh tri - xa 
hoi thanh cong ty trach nhiem huu han mot thanh vien [Circular No. 26/2002/TT-BTC of the 
Ministry of Finance on Financial Works When SOEs, Enterprises of Political and Socio-Political 
Bodies are Changed into Single-Owner Limited Liability Company]. 
Nghi dinh so 49/2002/ND-CP ngay 24/4/2002 cua Chinh Phu sua doi, bo sung mot so dieu 
cua Nghi dinh so 103/1999/ND-CP ngay 10/9/1999 cua Chinh phu ve giao, ban, khoan kinh 
doanh, cho thue doanh nghiep Nha nuoc [Decree No. 49/2002/ND-CP of the Government to 
Amendment of, and Supplement to Decree No. 103/1999/ND-CP on Assignment, Sale, Lease, 
Rent SOEs]. 
Quyet dinh so 58/2002/QD-TTg ngay 26/4/2002 cua Thu Tuong Chinh Phu ve ban hanh tieu 
chi, danh muc phan loai doanh nghiep Nha nuoc va TCTy nha nuoc [Decision No. 58/2002/ 
QD-TTg of the Prime Minister on the List and Criteria to Classify SOEs and State-Owned 
General Companies]. 
Thong tu so 30/2002/TT-BTC ngay 27/3/2002 cua Bo Tai Chinh huong dan tam thoi su dung 
khoan tien su dung von nha nuoc tai doanh nghiep [Circular No. 30/2002/TT-BTC of the 
Ministry of Finance on Temporary Guidelines on the Use of State Investment in SOEs]. 
Thong tu so 32/2002/TT-BTC ngay 10/4/2002 cua Bo Tai Chinh huong dan thuc hien Quyet 
dinh so 172/2001/QD-TTg ngay 5/11/2001 cua Thu tuong Chinh phu ve xu ly hoan no, 
khoanh no, xoa no thue va cac khoan phai nop ngan sach nha nuoc doi voi nhung doanh nghiep 
co so san xuat kinh doanh co kho khan do nguyen nhan khach quan [Circular No. 32/2002/TT- 
BTC of the Ministry of Finance on the Implementation of Decision 172/2001/QD-TTg on the 
Reduction, Deferral, and Forfeit of Overdue Taxes and Other Payments to the State Budget 
Due to Objective Difficulties]. 
Thong tu so 22/2002/TT-BTCCBCP ngay 23/4/2002 cua Ban To Chuc Can Bo Chinh Phu 
huong dan viec xu ly can bo, cong chuc, can bo trong doanh nghiep nha nuoc vi pham cap phat, 
su dung van bang, chung chi khong hop phap [Circular No. 22/2002/TT-BTCCBCP on 
Guidelines for Sanctions against SOEs’ Cadre Who use Fake Education Certificates]. 
Nghi dinh so 64/2002/ND-CP ngay 19/6/2002 cua Chinh Phu ve viec chuyen doanh nghiep 
Nha nuoc thanh cong ty co phan [Decree No. 64/2002/ND-CP of the Government on Changing 
SOEs into Public Companies]. 
Thong tu so 11/2002/TT-BLDTBXH ngay 12/6/2002 cua Bo Lao Dong-Thuong Binh-Xa Hoi 
huong dan thuc hien mot so dieu cua Nghi dinh so 41 2002 ND CP ngay 11/4/2002 cua Chinh 
phu ve chinh sach doi voi lao dong doi du do sap xep lai doanh nghiep Nha nuoc [Circular No. 
11/2002/TT-BLDTBXH of the Ministry of of Labor–Invalid–Social Affairs on Policies for 
Surplus Workforce as a Result of Reform of SOEs]. 
Nghi dinh so 69/2002/ND-CP ngay 12/7/2002 cua Chinh Phu ve quan ly va xu ly no ton 
dong doi voi doanh nghiep nha nuoc [Decree No. 69/2002/ND-CP of the Government on 
Management of Overdue Debts in SOEs]. 
Quyet dinh so 85/2002/QD-BTC ngay 1/7/2002 cua Bo Tai Chinh ban hanh quy che quan ly 
va su dung quy ho tro lao dong doi du do sap xep lai doanh nghiep nha nuoc [Decision No. 
85/2002/QD-BTC of the Ministry of Finance on the Protocol on the Management and Use of 
Funds for Surplus Workforce of Reformed SOEs]. 
Thong tu so 66/2002/TT-BTC ngay 6/8/2002 cua Bo Tai Chinh huong dan trinh tu, thu tuc xu 
ly tai chinh khi giai the doanh nghiep Nha nuoc [Circular No. 66/2002/TT-BTC of the Ministry 
of Finance Guiding the Procedure for Financial Settlement of Dissolved SOEs]. 
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Thong tu so 76/2002/TT-BTC ngay 9/9/2002 cua Bo Tai Chinh huong dan nhung van de ve 
tai chinh khi chuyen doanh nghiep nha nuoc thanh cong ty co phanb [Circular No. 76/2002/TT- 
BTC of the Ministry of Finance on Changing SOEs into Public Companies]. 
Quyet dinh so 895/2002/QD-TTg ngay 4/10/2002 cua Thu Tuong Chinh Phu ve viec phe 
duyet Phuong an tong the sap xep, doi moi doanh nghiep nha nuoc thuoc TCTy luong thuc 
mien Bac giai doan 2002–2005 [Decision No. 895/2002/QD-CP of the Government on Reform 
of the Northern General Food Company during 2002–2005]. 
Thong tu so 75/2002/TT-BTC ngay 9/9/2002 cua Bo Tai Chinh huong dan thuc hien phuong 
an tai chinh co cau, sap xep lai doanh nghiep nha nuoc va ngan hang thuong mai 2001–2003 
[Circular No. 75/2002/TT-BTC of the Ministry of Finance on Guidelines on the Implementation 
of Financial Outlines for Reform of SOEs and Commercial Banks During 2001–2003]. 
Thong tu so 79/2002/TT-BTC ngay 12/9/2002 cua Bo Tai Chinh huong dan xac dinh gia tri 
doanh nghiep khi chuyen doanh nghiep nha nuoc thanh cong ty co phan [Circular No. 79/ 
2002/TT-BTC of the Ministry of Finance on Guidelines on Evaluating SOEs for privatization]. 
Thong tu so 80/2002/TT-BTC ngay 12/9/2002 cua Bo Tai Chinh huong dan bao lanh phat 
hanh dau gia ban co phan ra ben ngoai cua cac doanh nghiep nha nuoc thuc hien co phan hoa 
[Circular No. 80/2002/TT-BTC of the Ministry of Finance on Guidelines for Guarantee of 
Auction of Shares of Privatized SOEs]. 
Thong tu so 85/2002/TT-BTC ngay 26/9/2002 cua Bo Tai Chinh huong dan thuc hien Nghi 
dinh so 69/2002/ND-CP ngay 12/7/2002 cua Chinh phu ve quan ly va xu ly no ton dong doi 
voi doanh nghiep nha nuoc [Circular No. 85/2002/TT-BTC of the Ministry of Finance on 
Implementing Decree 69/2002/ND-CP]. 
Quyet dinh so 1015/2002/QD-NHNN ngay 19/9/2002 cua Ngan Hang Nha Nuoc ve viec ban 
giao ho so dang ky khoan vay nuoc ngoai cua doanh nghiep [Decision No. 1015/2002/QD- 
NHNN of the State Bank on the Registration of Borrowing from Foreign Creditors]. 
Thong tu so 05/2002/TT-NHNN ngay 27/9/2002 cua Ngan Hang Nha Nuoc huong dan viec 
cho vay von doi voi nguoi san xuat, doanh nghiep ky ket hop dong tieu thu nong san hang hoa 
theo Quyet dinh so 80/2002/QD-TTg ngay 24/6/2002 cua Thu tuong Chinh phu [Circular 
No. 05/2002/TT-NHNN of the State Bank on Lending Producers and Enterprises Buying 
Agricultural Products According to Decision 80/2002/QD-TTg]. 
Thong tu so 94/2002/TT-BTC ngay 21/10/2002 cua Bo Tai Chinh huong dan xac dinh chi tieu 
von nha nuoc va thu nop ngan sach de phan loai doanh nghiep theo Quyet dinh so 58/2002/ 
QD-TTg ngay 26/4/2002 cua Thu tuong Chinh phu [Circular No. 94/2002/TT-BTC of the 
Ministry of Finance Guiding Criteria on State Investment and Payments to the State Budget to 
Classify SOEs According to Decision No. 58/2002/QD-TTg]. 
Quyet dinh so 1101/2002/QD-BCN ngay 22/10/2002 ve viec to chuc lai cong ty xay lap 3, 
doanh nghiep thanh vien hach toan doc lap cua TCTy xay dung cong nghiep VN thanh cong ty 
me nha nuoc truc thuoc Bo Cong nghiep thi diem hoat dong theo mo hinh Cong ty me - cong ty 
con [Decision No. 1101/2002/QD-BCN of the Ministry of Industry on Restructure of the 
Construction Company No. 3, a Subsidiary of the General Industrial Construction Company of 
the Ministry of Industry]. 
Thong tu so 15/2002/TT-BLDTBXH ngay 23/10/2002 cua Bo Lao Dong-Thuong Binh-Xa Hoi 
huong dan ve chinh sach doi voi nguoi lao dong khi chuyen doanh nghiep Nha nuoc thanh cong 
ty co phan theo Nghi dinh so 64/2002/ND-CP ngay 19/6/2002 cua Chinh Phu [Circular No. 
15/2002/TT-BLDTBXH of the Ministry of Labor–Invalid–Social Affairs on Policies for Labor in 
Privatized SOEs According to Decree 64/2002/ND-CP]. 
Quyet dinh so 15/2002/QD-TTg ngay 7/11/2002 cua Thu Tuong Chinh Phu ve viec phe duyet 
phuong an tong thu sap xep, doi moi doanh nghiep nha nuoc truc thuoc tinh VinhLong giai 
doan 2002–2005 [Decision No. 15/2002/QD-TTg of the Prime Minister on Approval of the 
Policy for Overall Restructure of SOEs in Vinh Long during 2002–2005]. 
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Quyet dinh so 152/2002/QD-TTg ngay 7/11/2002 cua Thu Tuong Chinh Phu ve viec phe 
duyet phuong an tong the sap xep, doi moi doanh nghiep nha nuoc truc thuoc Bo Thuong mai 
giai doan 2002–2005 [Decision No. 152/2002/QD-TTg of the Prime Minister on Restructure of 
SOEs of the Ministry of Finance during 2002–2005]. 
Quyet dinh so 11/2003/QD-TTg ngay 2/1/2003 cua Thu Tuong Chinh Phu phe duyet phuong 
an tong the sap xep doi moi doanh nghiep Nha nuoc truc thuoc Uy ban nhan tinh Phu Yen giai 
doan 2002–2005 [Decision No. 11/2003/QD-TTg of the Prime Minister on the Restructure of 
SOEs of the People’s Committee of Phu Yen Province during 2002–2005) 
Quyet dinh so 12/2003/QD-TTg ngay 2/1/2003 cua Thu Tuong Chinh Phu phe duyet phuong 
an tong the sap xep doi moi doanh nghiep Nha nuoc truc thuoc Uy ban nhan tinh TuyenQuang 
giai doan 2002–2005 [Decision No. 12/2003/QD-TTg of the Prime Minister on Restructure of 
SOEs of the People’s Committee of Phu Yen Province during 2002–2005]. 
Quyet dinh so 13/2003/QD-TTg ngay 2/1/2003 cua Thu Tuong Chinh Phu phe duyet phuong 
an tong the sap xep doi moi doanh nghiep Nha nuoc truc thuoc Uy ban nhan tinh Thai Nguyen 
giai doan 2002–2005 [Decision No. 13/2003/QD-TTg of the Prime Minister on Restructure of 
SOEs of the People’s Committee of Thai Nguyen Province during 2002–2005]. 
Quyet dinh so 39/2003/QD-TTg ngay 8/1/2003 cua Thu Tuong Chinh Phu ve viec phe duyet 
Phuong an tong the sap xep, doi moi doanh nghiep Nha nuoc truc thuoc tinh VinhPhuc den 
nam 2005 [Decision No. 39/2003/QD-TTg of the Prime Minister on Restructure of SOEs of the 
People’s Committee of Vinh Phuc Province until 2005]. 
Quyet dinh so 60/2002/QD-TTg ngay 13/1/2002 cua Thu Tuong Chinh Phu ve viec phe 
duyet phuong an tong the sap xep, doi moi doanh nghiep Nha nuoc tinh CanTho giai doan 
2002–2005 [Decision No. 60/2003/QD-TTg of the Prime Minister on Restructure of SOEs of 
the People’s Committee of Can Tho Province during 2002–2005]. 
Quyet dinh so 64/2002/QD-TTg ngay 14/1/2003 cua Thu Tuong Chinh Phu ve viec phe 
duyet de an tong the sap xep, doi moi doanh nghiep Nha nuoc thuoc Uy ban nha dan tinh 
ThuaThien - Hue den nam 2005 [Decision No. 12/2003/QD-TTg of the Prime Minister on 
Restructure of SOEs of the People’s Committee of Thua Thien–Hue Province until 2005]. 
Chi thi co 01/2003/CT-TTg ngay 16/1/2003 cua Thu Tuong Chinh Phu tiep tuc day manh sap 
xep, doi moi phat trien va nang cao hieu qua doanh nghiep Nha nuoc [Directive No. 01/2003/ 
CT-TTg of the Prime Minister on Accelerating the Restructure and Improving Efficiency of SOEs]. 
Quyet dinh so 14/2003/QD-TTg ngay 20/1/2003 cua Thu Tuong Chinh Phu phe duyet 
phuong an tong the sap xep, doi moi doanh nghiep Nha nuoc truc thuoc TCTy thuoc la VN giai 
doan 2003–2005 [Decision No. 14/2003/QD-TTg of the Prime Minister on Restructure of 
Subsidiaries of the General Tobaco Company during 2003–2005]. 
Quyet dinh so 109/2003/QD-TTg ngay 24/1/2003 cua Thu Tuong Chinh Phu ve viec phe 
duyet phuong an tong the sap xep doi moi doanh nghiep Nha nuoc truc thuoc Uy ban nhan 
dan tinh Hung Yen giai doan 2002–2005 [Decision No. 109/2003/QD-TTg of the Prime 
Minister on Restructure of SOEs of the People’s Committee of Hung Yen Province during 2002– 
2005]. 
Quyet dinh so 115/2003/QD-TTg ngay 27/1/2003 cua Thu Tuong Chinh Phu ve viec phe 
duyet Phuong an tong the sap xep, doi moi doanh nghiep Nha nuoc truc thuoc UBND tinh Ca 
Mau giai doan 2002–2005 [Decision No. 115/2003/QD-TTg of the Prime Minister on 
Restructure of SOEs of the People’s Committee of Ca Mau Province during 2002–2005]. 
Quyet dinh so 125/2003/QD-TTg ngay 28/1/2003 cua Thu Tuong Chinh Phu ve viec phe duyet 
de an tong the sap xep, doi moi TCTy nha nuoc va doanh nghiep Nha nuoc thuoc bo Cong nghiep 
giai doan 2003–2005 [Decision No. 125/2003/QD-TTg of the Prime Minister to Approve the 
Masterplan on Restructure of SOEs of the Ministry of Industry during 2003–2005]. 
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Quyet dinh so 132/2003/QD-TTg ngay 30/1/2003 cua Thu Tuong Chinh Phu ve viec phe 
duyet phuong an tong the sap xep, doi moi doanh nghiep Nha nuoc truc thuoc UBND tinh Ha 
Tay giai doan 2002–2005 [Decision No. 12/2003/QD-TTg of the Prime Minister on Restructure 
of SOEs of the People’s Committee of Ha Tay Province during 2002–2005]. 
Quyet dinh so 133/2003/QD-TTg ngay 30/1/2003 cua Thu Tuong Chinh Phu ve viec phe 
duyet phuong an tong the sap xep, doi moi doanh nghiep Nha nuoc truc thuoc UBND tinh 
SocTrang giai doan 2003–2005 [Decision No. 12/2003/QD-TTg of the Prime Minister on 
Restructure of SOEs of the People’s Committee of Soc Trang Province during 2002–2005]. 
Quyet dinh so 134/2003/QD-TTg ngay 30/1/2003 cua Thu Tuong Chinh Phu ve viec phe 
duyet phuong an tong the sap xep, doi moi doanh nghiep Nha nuoc truc thuoc UBND tinh 
BacGiang giai doan 2003–2005 [Decision No. 12/2003/QD-TTg of the Prime Minister on 
Restructure of SOEs of the People’s Committee of Bac Giang Province during 2002–2005]. 
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Public Administration Reform in 
Vietnam: foreign transplants or 
local hybrids? 
Martin Painter 
[Reform]…must be started from the practices of Vietnam, of its characteristics, its national 
traditions; concurrently it must consult and learn from the international achievements and 
experience. But it must not absolutely copy them and apply them exactly, as this would be 
harmful for the interest of the nation (Do Muoi 1995). 
…[G]lobal capitalism, far from simply threatening the Vietnamese state, is supplying an 
arsenal of techniques by which state-directed cultural borrowing will salvage and refine a 
managerial regime whose previous policies had seriously tarnished it (Woodside 1997:74) 
Vietnam is in the midst of a process of fundamental state restructuring prompted by 
the abandonment of the command economy and the adoption of a long-term strategy 
of doi moi (‘renovation’) that essentially entails market reform and integration with 
the world economy. In the process, the Vietnamese government has embarked on a 
substantial public administration reform (PAR) program. The public administration 
reform program was basically initiated with the launch of doi moi at the Sixth Party 
Congress of 1986, but it was formally given the status of a coordinated national 
program at the Eighth Plenum of the Seventh Party Congress in January 1995. 
Following a major review in 2000, the government decided in September 2001 to set 
out a Master Program on Public Administration Reform for the Period 2001–2010, 
with four key reform areas (institutional reform, organisational structures, civil 
service reform and public finance). Different government agencies were responsible 
for seven programs within these four areas, and implementation plans and sub- 
programs were drawn up and fleshed out (UNDP 2001, 2002). 
The Master Program summarises the problems and makes proposals for reform 
within the broad framework of a move towards ‘a market-oriented economy with a 
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socialist orientation’. The program identifies the Soviet-style ‘centralized and 
subsidized bureaucratic management system’ as a major cause of many problems 
(Government of Vietnam 2001:2), with pre-existing procedures, structures and habits 
continuing to hold back the adaptation of public administration to the new 
environment. Administrative structures are ‘overlapping…inconsistent… 
centralized and compartmentalized’, while ‘administrative procedures are 
cumbersome and complex’ and ‘administrative order and discipline are loose’. 
‘[A]ppropriate financial mechanisms’, it finds, do not exist for the operation of 
public service and administrative agencies. Cadres and civil servants lack skills, 
professionalism and ethical standards, and corruption and ‘harassment for bribes’ 
remain a ‘rather serious’ problem. 
The main focus of this chapter is on the origins of, and reasons for, the selection 
and adoption of reform ideas and proposals as a solution to these problems. Here, 
we consider two sources of reform ideas in particular: first, Party doctrine as it has 
evolved within the context of recent Vietnamese development; and second, external, 
‘global’ models of administrative reform.1 The Master Program is quite explicit about 
the significance of both these sources, stressing, first, the Party’s role in articulating 
theories and practical issues and, second, that public administration reform ‘must 
benefit from appropriate application of international knowledge and experience of 
organization and management operations’ (Government of Vietnam 2001:3). 
Thus, on the one hand, parts of the document bear the stamp of contemporary 
critical ‘insider’ reviews of the role of the Party, including the manner in which it 
should ‘renovate’ itself consistent with its socialist traditions, and current reflections 
on the developing role of the state under the doctrine of democratic centralism. 
• The reform and perfection of public administration will be closely linked 
to the building and rectification of the Party, the renovation of the contents 
and leading modalities of the Party over the state in general and public 
administration in particular…(Government of Vietnam 2001:7) 
• Administrative agencies and civil servants should place themselves under 
close supervision by people. There must be effective measures to curb acts 
which violate democracy and freedom and which indulge in arbitrariness, 
red tape, corruption, harassment for bribes and trouble-making to people 
(Government of Vietnam 2001:7) 
• PAR policies…should encourage…the maintenance of order and 
discipline in economic activities to promote the economic growth and 
improve the people’s life (Government of Vietnam 2001:7) 
• …implement the grassroots democracy regulation…whereby leading 
officials…at the various levels will be required to periodically and directly 
meet and talk with people and businesses (Government of Vietnam 2001:9) 
• The state will develop policies, mechanisms to enable social organisations, 
mass organisations and the people themselves to deliver directly services 
which serve production and living requirements (Government of Vietnam 
2001:16) 
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On the other hand, Vietnam is hungry for ideas, and in the world of administrative 
reform there is no shortage. Armies of consultants hired by aid donors promote 
apparently consensual ‘best practice’ global models (Larmour 2002).2 To add to 
their weight and authority, international agencies such as the OECD and World 
Bank give these ideas their seal of approval (Common 2001). This global exchange 
of reform ideas increases policy diffusion and ‘transfer’ (Bennett 1991; Dolowitz 
and Marsh 1996; Halligan 1996). Not surprisingly then, the ‘menu’ of proposals 
and solutions shows a strong trace of conventional global public administration 
reform discourse.3 
• Functions and duties of heads of institutions will be clearly established 
whereby they will be responsible and accountable for the performance and 
results of the institutions which they head (Government of Vietnam 2001:12). 
• The mechanism for decentralising financial and budgetary management 
will be reformed to ensure unity of the national financial management 
system…(and) promote localities’ and sectors’ proactiveness, dynamism, 
creativity and accountability…a mechanism for calculating budget 
requirements on the basis of outputs and quality of operations, ensuring 
the monitoring of outputs, quality of targets and objectives (Government 
of Vietnam 2001:16 ). 
• The salary system will be reformed in line with a new concept…fully 
monetising salaries…a salary-related allowance scheme…a system of 
bonuses for excellent services (Government of Vietnam 2001:14). 
• A number of activities and public services, which are not necessarily 
handled by government agencies, should be transferred to enterprises, 
social organisations, private…and non-government organisations 
(Government of Vietnam 2001:5–6). 
• …encourage investors to invest in the development of…education 
institutions and…high quality hospitals…Contracting out mechanism 
will be applied to some…services (Government of Vietnam 2001:17). 
Since the reform proposals in the public administration program stem from 
different sources, several important questions remain. First, is this all rhetoric, or 
‘reform talk’, governed by the need to pay lip-service to one or more sets of doctrine? 
Second, in so far as the substance of the ‘talk’ relates to proposals for action, what 
factors lie behind the appropriateness and attractiveness of particular proposals? 
Third, are ‘foreign ideas’ carefully and systematically filtered through a prism of 
Communist Party doctrine? Is consistency or coherence required? And finally, how 
are solutions adapted to a local set of problems when taken ‘out of context’? 
Here, we have two quite distinct issues to address. The first is the fate of solutions 
with origins in Communist Party doctrine in a context of reform proposals that 
address problems of ‘marketisation’; and the second is the fate of solutions drawn 
from the wider global discourse when they are applied in the specific context of 
development and transition being experienced in Vietnam. If parts of the menu are 
familiar, are the dishes the same? And what sort of meal do they produce? 
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GARBAGE CANS AND TRANSPLANTS 
A useful starting point is John Kingdon’s (1984) application of ‘garbage can’ theories 
of organisation (Cohen, March and Olsen 1972). In this view, the reform process can 
be considered as three separate streams of action: a ‘problem stream’, a ‘policy 
stream’ and a ‘politics stream’. Reform is not so much a rational decision-making 
process in which problems are first identified and solutions then sought, but a more 
disjointed set of events in which the nature and significance of problems are contested 
in the ‘problem stream’, and solutions currently found in the policy stream become 
attached to some of them as a result of events in the politics stream. In the policy 
stream, ideologues, policy experts and advocates explore and contest ideas and 
proposals. The separate streams have a life of their own, and solutions look for 
problems as much as problems give rise to a search for solutions. Ideas and doctrines 
about administrative improvement emerge in the policy stream independently of 
administrative problems, and the way they are connected is somewhat random. An 
important part of this process of attaching solutions to problems is rationalisation 
of the ‘choice’, meaning that the process of justification is as much retrospective and 
rhetorical as it is prospective and analytical. Means–end rationality—whether it is 
in the form of Party doctrine or management theory—is suborned to the purpose of 
justifying a particular, convenient attachment of solution to problem. 
This depiction of the meeting of solutions and problems shares similarities with 
Alan Watson’s (2001) analysis of the transplantation and borrowing of legal ideas. 
Watson also suggests that a somewhat serendipitous process is at work in this 
process: fashions come and go, local reformers pick and choose what seems like a 
‘good idea’ from the contemporary scene for reasons that are none too systematic, 
and much of what is transplanted (often for reasons of political convenience) 
subsequently lies on the surface of a set of social processes from which it can remain 
disconnected. The ‘substance’ of what is borrowed is not necessarily linked to the 
reason for its adoption (Watson 2001). Similarly, the manner in which contemporary 
administrative reform ideas and recipes are picked up in different jurisdictions 
seems by most accounts to be a somewhat haphazard affair. Nils Brunsson 
(1998:264), for example, calls the phenomenon of simultaneous adoption of 
contemporary reform proposals ‘cropping up’. As he describes it, the adoption of 
new organisational forms in a number of places simultaneously is as much in the 
realm of ‘talk’ as in the realm of instrumental problem-solving and action (in 
Brunsson’s ‘garbage can’ view of organisational life, ‘talk’ and ‘action’ are frequently 
‘de-coupled’). Rationalisation through expounding a reform discourse is a very 
large part of reform activity, which is principally about future intentions and hopes. 
How the adopted solutions actually affect local practices is another story (Brunsson 
1998)—whatever is borrowed is also ‘transformed’ as it is adapted to a local political 
or administrative culture (Christensen and Laegreid 2001). The result of the 
transplants is a set of new hybrids. 
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One objection to this approach is that it seems to trivialise the importance of 
reform as ‘problem solving’. In Vietnam, reform is a central political priority because 
the regime’s survival depends on its success. The process brings to the surface a 
long list of deep and urgent policy problems. On the one hand, these imbue the 
reform agenda with an especial urgency, which may seem to offer a stern test of the 
approach outlined above, in particular the proposition that the process is best 
understood as a somewhat haphazard connection of solutions with problems. On 
the other hand, the heightened need for successful problem solving is precisely the 
condition under which the somewhat random and serendipitous attachment of 
ready-made solutions—including foreign transplants—might become more 
common. The intensity of solution advocacy as an independent stream of activity in 
such a situation also increases. Similarly, the Party’s production lines of doctrinal 
affirmation and renovation shift rapidly through the gears as the lengthening list of 
problems pose new puzzles. As the pressure to adopt solutions becomes more urgent, 
this urgency may prompt the Party to lower its ideological resistance to particular 
solutions and subsequently to find new forms of rationalisation. 
The analysis presented here begins with a broad historical overview of the evolution 
of the public administration reform program as interconnected streams of problems 
and solutions. This draws on official accounts given by Vietnamese public officials 
about the nature, aims and achievements of the reform process, both when the reforms 
were announced and retrospectively. These accounts reflect on both the nature of the 
problems—the diagnosis—and the justifications for the solutions. The data are drawn 
to a large degree from an official comprehensive review undertaken in 2000, with the 
close involvement of senior officials in the central agency concerned most with public 
administration reform, namely the Government Committee for Organization and 
Personnel (now the Ministry for Home Affairs).4 This approach has its limitations, of 
course: any text has its own purposes and cannot be treated simply as a piece of 
‘objective evidence’, and every text has an inner history that can rarely be recounted. 
With these limitations in mind, the analysis also pursues a case study strategy, 
looking at a range of interconnected issues underlying and associated with salary 
reform, one of the seven public administration reform programs. This brief case 
study draws on additional sources, including media reports, documents released 
by the government and other sources, and discussions with officials and government 
advisors. 
What is presented here, however, is only one ‘take’ on the reform process. Separate 
attention needs also to be given to the political factors that are at play in giving 
priority to one set of problems and, at the same time, to a parallel set of solutions. 
Observing some of the products of these political struggles—official statements of 
intent, government decisions and announced programs of particular administrative 
reform—the discussion and analysis in this chapter seek to provide some glimpses 
of the subtle interplay of local agendas and foreign transplants in administrative 
reform in Vietnam. The account stops short of looking at the implementation and 
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outcome of reforms. 
UNDERLYING THEMES OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM 
IN VIETNAM 
The underlying purposes of public administration reform in Vietnam are derived 
from a set of quite particular local circumstances and problems. The core of the 
issue, according to most public officials, is the transformation of the state from one 
that managed a command economy to one that seeks to regulate a ‘multi-sector’ 
economy. Public administration reform is officially perceived as one of the core 
elements of doi moi, and is traced back to the same origins. The Sixth Party Congress 
of 1986, when the doi moi program was launched, stated the need to ‘carry out a 
major reform of the organizational structure of the state machinery’ by (among other 
things) creating a ‘unified system, with clear definition/separation of 
jurisdictions…according to the principle of democratic centralism; distinguishing 
between functions of economic-administration management and production- 
business management’ and ‘a lean apparatus with…a contingent of officials and 
civil servants who are politically qualified and competent in state management and 
socio-economic management’ (quoted in Government Steering Committee 2000b:8). 
The Sixth Party Plenum in March 1989 newly emphasised that ‘the state has 
to…manage all activities in social life by laws and in accordance with the Party’s 
direction and policies’. 
In the early 1990s, a number of measures were implemented, including a reduction 
in the number of administrative units at central and local levels, the introduction of 
a Civil Service Ordinance in 1993 and re-drafting of legal documents. Further 
important changes to the structure of government were brought in under the new 
1992 Constitution, such as setting out a clearer distinction between the executive, 
legislative and judicial arms of the state machinery, defining the powers and 
responsibilities of state offices such as that of prime minister, and specifying more 
clearly the relationships between them. This marked a clearer delineation of authority, 
replacing a tradition of diffuse power sharing and collective leadership. At the 
same time, the leadership role of the Party was clearly re-affirmed, albeit within the 
context of a ‘state ruled by law’. A report to the Second Session of the Ninth National 
Assembly in December 1992 highlighted this second element 
In principle, the national administration must be institutionalized and regulated by the system 
of administrative laws to govern the relations arising in the process of state management [emphasis 
in original] (Government Steering Committee 2000b:14). 
This growing formalisation and rule-governed nature of administrative practices 
was a broad umbrella under which a number of specific administrative measures 
advanced, for example anti-corruption efforts, simplification of overlapping 
administrative jurisdictions, monetisation of ad hoc reward systems, and ‘bringing 
to account’ off-budget fees and charges. The underlying agenda, however, was 
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tempered by recognition of a set of cross-cutting concerns. As stated in the 1992 
report to the National Assembly quoted above 
In order to accomplish the objective of PAR, which is to develop an effective and efficient 
administration and prevent any sign of devolution, and localism, it is important to move 
towards the democratic administration which is close to the people and responsive to people’s needs 
(Government Steering Committee 2000b:14). 
A clear expression of this link between ‘democratic’ administrative reform and 
political stabilisation was provided in the resolution of the mid-term Party plenum 
in January 1994, which set out a set of principles underlining the ‘gradual perfection 
of the State of Vietnam based on rule-of-law’ (sic)— 
• the state of the people, by the people and for the people, governing all social 
activities by laws, develops the country under the socialist orientation 
• practising socialist democracy 
• protecting human rights and basic civil liberties 
• mobilising people to the cause of the country’s development 
• installing orders and rules (Government Steering Committee 2000b:15). 
In sum, public administration reform was only in part about efficiency and 
effectiveness. Of equal, if not greater, concern were order and stability under the 
Party’s political guidance. Development, requiring rationally ordered and efficient 
state machinery, would also require the mobilisation of consent and of closely 
monitored group and individual contributions. The prominent references to 
‘grassroots democracy’ and ‘close supervision by the people’ in the 2001 Master 
Program continue to reflect this political priority. 
The first official recognition of public administration reform as a coherent 
program came at the Eighth Party Plenum of the Seventh Congress in January 1995. 
The resolution on public administration reform had three ‘fundamental themes’. 
• Public administration reform is considered a pressing need and central 
task in developing and improving the Socialist Republic of Vietnam 
• The main objective of public administration reform is to develop a 
competent, clean and transparent administration that does not abuse its 
power and is moving towards modernisation effectively and efficiently, 
to manage the affairs of the state, to promote the healthy development of 
society in the right direction, to serve the people better, and to develop a 
rule-of-law routine. 
• Public administration reform is…composed of the following three 
components: institutional reform, re-engineering of the organisational 
structures…and the development of a contingent of administrative civil 
servants (Government Steering Committee 2000b:16). 
The agenda of administrative reform has continued to be dominated by these 
responses to the initial ‘transition problem’, but it has also been affected by a set of 
issues arising from the course of the reform process itself. The importance of these 
second-order issues is reflected in the problems created by dismantling the old 
administrative control and command mechanisms over production units, which 
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created a vacuum that was filled by more informal systems of control and ownership. 
The grant of commercial freedoms resulted in a virtual appropriation of state property 
by managers, bureaucrats and Party officials. On the one hand, this may have 
succeeded in releasing productive potential but, on the other hand, the dispersed 
centres of wealth and power that resulted challenged the authority of the state and 
the legitimacy of the Party, particularly where they were associated with corruption 
and other abuses (Beresford 2001; Fforde 1993; Gainsborough 2003; Vasavakul 
1996). Similar authority gaps and loss of control were seen in relations between 
central and provincial governments and within the control and coordination systems 
of ministries and departments. Thus, the public administration reform agenda as it 
evolved gained new political significance and reinforcement as a set of measures 
through which the central Party–state could reassert authority (Vasavakul 1996). 
In sum, by 1995 the substance of the public administration reform agenda had 
been set out and many of the dilemmas and obstacles identified. A series of remedies 
adapted to the Party’s needs and local circumstances were being identified. As 
second-order issues such as growing corruption came to the fore, the stream of 
problems grew in volume. Moreover, the interconnectedness of the problems became 
increasingly apparent. For example, the problem of transition from a state that 
managed production to a state that managed a ‘multi-sectoral economy’ and 
regulated private economic activity was seen in terms of the need to disentangle the 
state simultaneously from economic micro-management and from some pre-existing 
forms of social protection and dependency. A conception of the role of the state as 
manager/funder, but not provider/producer, evolved in a manner that did not 
distinguish between economic and social policy sectors. 
There has been a clear distinction between state management functions pertaining to 
public power organs and business administration and production pertaining to enterprises 
and businesses and public services provision pertaining to public professional agencies 
and units; thus every and each one of them can perform their own right given authority, 
functions and responsibilities within the overall public administration system. Those 
functions that do not belong to state management agencies will be transferred to SOEs and 
professional agencies, especially those functions of direct productive and business 
administration and management and the provision of public services (Government Steering 
Committee 2000c:8). 
In addition, the reform agenda spoke in one breath of ‘equitisation’ and 
‘socialisation’ (the word ‘privatisation’ was quite deliberately not appropriated to 
the local discourse) and of self-help, or co-production. 
The stance and viewpoint of Vietnam is that socialisation of some activities in the public 
sector, as well as equitisation of a proportion of SOEs, can be by no means considered as 
privatisation. Socialisation will be conducted under the principle that ‘the work is shared 
between the State and the people, and the State will take the principal role, exercising State 
management functions (Government Steering Committee 2000b:18). 
Thus, ‘socialisation’ was conceived as ‘the transfer of government work to non- 
government agencies’ (Vasavakul 2002:10). As against the traditional style of ‘begging 
and giving’ and state subsidy, the ‘people’s resources’ needed to be mobilised for 
public service delivery, along with ‘associations, non-government organisations 
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and private sector organisations’ (Government Steering Committee 2000a:15). This 
manner of framing the issue appears as a product of socialist doctrinal traditions 
that put collective above individual effort and contributions. The ‘people’s 
resources’, however, were to be both collective and individual—local communities 
would meet to contribute labour and funds to local road maintenance, and families 
would pay user fees and charges to support local schools and health centres. 
Vietnam’s burgeoning NGO sector, which was subject to increasing regulation and 
political oversight in the 1990s, was viewed as a potential participant in this process 
of socialisation (Vasavakul 2002). 
The distinction between the functions of ‘state management’ on the one hand, 
and ‘production’ or ‘public service delivery’ on the other, received greater attention 
during the 1990s as demands for public services grew. In the process, ‘socialisation’ 
and ‘equitisation’ as solutions became attached to one cross-cutting problem: the 
effects of ‘state subsidy’. The characterisation of state budgetary support for both 
economic and social protection as ‘subsidy’ served to derogate both kinds of public 
expenditure. Ways were sought to restrain demands for subsidy, and many social 
expenditures came to be viewed in that light. As discussed later in more detail, the 
solution was to increase user fees and charges. An overriding ‘driver’ of this agenda 
was a strict budget constraint, which was partly a deliberate policy of fiscal prudence 
that had been adopted as part of the stabilisation strategies in the late 1980s, when 
Vietnam experienced rampant inflation. The need for restraint was also dictated by 
weaknesses in a tax system that was only slowly being adapted to the realities of a 
market economy. Tight fiscal policy was maintained by effective central control over 
disbursements to spending units, one result of which was increased pressure on 
local governments to make up the shortfall. 
Local governments’ share of state expenditure grew from 26 per cent in 1993 to 
over 43 per cent in 1998 (World Bank 2002a). Local governments increasingly relied 
on a variety of ad hoc revenue sources, particularly service charges and fees, over 
which there was quite loose central oversight (probably deliberately so), with local 
units operating many accounts and activities ‘off-budget’. This situation solved 
problems for the central Party–state by easing some of the burden of service delivery 
or regulatory functions, and also created problems, by increasing local autonomy. 
Reformers worried about the ills of ‘devolution and localism’, as the idea of 
‘decentralisation’ was tainted by a conventional Party–state centralist 
predisposition. As we see in the next section, however, certain sorts of 
decentralisation were increasingly both legitimate and convenient. 
THE CASE OF SALARY REFORM 
‘Salary reform’ was identified from the beginning of doi moi as a key area for action. 
In 1993, a set of simplified salary scales was drawn up and new rates applied to 
provide for a greater degree of uniformity across types of job and to take account of 
movements in prices. This new system of steps, based on multiples of a base salary, 
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provided the pegs on which to hang a system of grades and ranks in the public 
service under the Civil Service Code, also promulgated in 1993. Uniform salary 
scales pegged to length of service and differentiated by job types were a necessary 
component. In this phase of salary reform, however, the lack of a systematic set of 
civil service position rules was a less pressing issue than the need to monetise in- 
kind rewards, such as free or heavily subsidised housing, health care and education, 
which had traditionally formed a major component of the benefits that flowed from 
being a state employee. 
‘Salarisation’ was a profound change, as it altered the basis of public finance. A 
parallel change was the shift from relying primarily on extraction of surpluses from 
state enterprises to a cross-sector tax system. State employees of one kind or another 
comprised the great bulk of the salary income earners in the economy. But the levels 
of tax revenue under the evolving new system of public finance were not sufficient 
to provide for a state budget that would enable both the monetisation of public 
goods as higher salaries and their provision as ‘free’, universal public services.5 
Salarisation thus carried with it the overt expectation that the monetised salary 
would provide the individual employee with the ‘ability to pay’, justifying a range 
of new fees and charges for public services.6 
Government…by the end of 1992 has roughly salaried allowances for housing, health care 
insurance, transportation, and eradicated subsidised education (except primary education) 
and free of charge health care services and treatment, house granting and other high-price 
subsidy for public servants (Government Steering Committee 2000d:44). 
While there were strong doctrinal and practical reasons to continue subsidising 
some public service provision, such as primary education, the practical issues raised 
by transition and underdevelopment precluded the possibility of a Western-style, 
tax-funded welfare state.7 
Another major problem has been the perceived inadequacy of the official wage in 
the eyes of most public employees. The standard pay scales were set at a level that did 
not provide most state employees with what they considered a ‘living wage’, while 
the promotion and advancement mechanisms locked most employees into a rigid 
system of regular but very small increments. This state of affairs generated a myriad of 
interconnected problems. Among them was the widespread tendency for public 
employees—health workers and teachers, for example—to move partly into the private 
sector (while remaining on the public payroll) in order to supplement their income. 
The occupation of a position in many government agencies is viewed as a launching 
pad for a variety of private income-earning activities. Local stratagems to cope with 
low pay have undermined efforts to modernize the system of public administration 
according to the principles of the ‘state ruled by law’. Most local administrative 
units have found ways to generate ‘unofficial’ funds so as to top up wages. 
Government cannot control all sources of incomes of public servants. Entities decide by 
themselves allowances for lunch, or additional income for public services taken from state 
budget or other sources of income generated by additional services (GSC 2000d:50). 
Thus, while pay is supposedly uniform and set according to strict levels and 
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categories of employment, the real situation is very different. Personnel management 
is highly decentralised in the state apparatus, and not regulated with a heavy hand 
by the central personnel agency.8 Heads of administrative units (as with political 
leaders more broadly) often feel a strong obligation towards their workforce, in part 
a reflection of the importance of patronage in Vietnamese political life. Low pay 
reproduces some of the conditions under which such patrimonial rather than legal– 
rational norms pervade the civil service. 
Thus, in the absence of sufficient resources in the national budget to make a 
significant impact on the adequacy of the official wage, the operations in practice of 
the salary system have undermined central discipline and control. Many agencies, 
and the workers in them, have learnt the ways of self-sufficiency only too well. 
[While]…operation of all organisations…is…run from state budget, other financial gains 
by the organisation are divided among and by themselves. Government completely lost 
control over additional incomes, although the operation is run [using] the state’s assets 
and by state public servants (Government Steering Committee 2000d:50). 
The government clearly acknowledged that the current salary system contained 
overt incentives to take ‘unofficial’ local initiatives, to which the centre was forced 
to turn a blind eye or even to grant its blessing. The dual problem thus emerged of 
reining in off-budget activities and exerting some kind of discipline over 
administrative agencies and service delivery units. 
In a pattern familiar from the wider reform experience of doi moi, the centre’s 
reforms put the official stamp on a state of affairs that had already been in existence 
as a result of local ‘fence breaking’,9 and tried to turn them to the centre’s purposes. 
Given budget scarcity, the very resource mobilisation capacity that led to the 
indiscipline was picked up as part of the solution. The chosen strategy was officially 
to sanction and make use of the fact that all public service delivery units were 
capable of generating income (including what was currently unofficial income) 
from their productive capacities. Such bodies in a market socialist system were 
engaging in a new set of social and economic relations outside the boundaries of the 
state, and for that reason they should neither be subject to administrative interference 
by line agencies, nor expect ‘subsidy’. The state management principle underlying 
this argument was identical to the one that justified the reconstitution of state owned 
enterprises into autonomous business units and removal of their ‘subsidies’ (Painter 
2003a). Thus, service delivery units should also have greater autonomy, including 
in matters of salary, to the extent that their revenue provided such freedom. However, 
if income-generating public service delivery bodies could in this manner help to 
solve the problems on the salary reform agenda, ‘administrative’ agencies, which 
had no major income sources other than the central budget, needed a rather different 
approach. For them, the solution was to seek efficiency gains through budgetary 
and management reform. The common element in both strategies was increased 
autonomy for local managers. 
Thus, a new round of salarisation (this time, of income supplements derived 
from off-budget local revenue) was envisaged. The means to achieve this was to 
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grant income-generating bodies much greater financial and personnel management 
autonomy within a more complex and transparent set of global budgeting rules, 
and to establish a new set of allocation rules where subsidisation was needed. 
These rules would serve the purpose of providing the necessary incentives both for 
bringing off-budget transactions into the budget, and for funding the next stage of 
salary reform. Vietnamese reformers arrived at a fashionable global solution— 
devolved budgeting, flexible pay scales and accountable management—in the course 
of working through some very local problems. 
This strategy was worked out over a number of years. At first, the problem of low 
wages was dealt with simply by funding wage increases from the budget, but these 
rises hardly kept pace with price inflation. In 1993, the monthly basic wage was set 
at VND120,000 (about US$8); this was raised to VND144,000 (about US$10) in 
1997, and step by step to VND210,000 (US$14) in 2001. In seeking to fund further 
salary increases, one option was to cut staff numbers. The government decided in 
October 2000 to cut overall staff numbers by 15 per cent by the end of 2002. All 
administrative units were instructed to submit plans showing how they would 
achieve the target, albeit with little concrete result. In the meantime, a high-level 
working group supported by experts in the Ministry of Finance framed a new set of 
proposals for funding a series of substantial salary increases. On 1 January 2003, 
the basic salary was raised to VND290,000 (about US$19), a rise of thirty eight per 
cent, and from October 2004 to approximately VND380,000 (about US$25). Half of 
these pay rises would be funded from the state budget, including savings made by 
local managers out of downsizing, the rest from revenue raised locally. 
For the upcoming salary reform, funds will not only come from the state budget—other 
avenues like allowing non-productive institutions to use part of their budgets to pay 
wages, and commercialising the healthcare, education and sport sectors and so forth 
would contribute.10 
Separate measures applied to administrative agencies and to revenue-raising or 
public service delivery agencies respectively. Administrative bodies would now be 
funded from a lump sum allocation rather than by a funding formula based on 
existing levels of employment and salaries. The new ‘block allocation’ is effectively 
a one-line budget, with all the autonomy that this makes possible, and was first 
piloted in Ho Chi Minh City, where it led to savings and stimulated restructuring 
and downsizing. In December 2001, the scheme was extended to a larger number of 
pilots, with the clear intention to implement it across the state sector. This measure 
would assist both in meeting the downsizing targets and in paying the higher 
salary bill 
…bearing in mind the current practices, which reveal extreme wastefulness in using funds 
from the State budget, giving lump sums to State administrative agencies will help promote 
savings, prevent wastefulness and reserve a part of the sums to improve employees’ 
wages (Quy Hao 2003:15) 
The very low level of salaries had ironically contributed to ‘waste’ through 
excessive rigidities and ‘incremental creep’ in staffing levels under the previous 
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budget allocation system, with central allocation formulae based largely on the size 
of the workforce. Local managers sought for the most part not only to protect their 
employees by resisting downsizing but also to ‘pad’ their annual request for central 
budget allocations on the basis of a growing establishment. The additional cost to 
the official budget of taking on additional staff was very low, while the political 
costs of downsizing were very high. 
One of the potential attractions to the centre of the kind of managerial devolution 
now being engineered was the expectation that a stronger set of interdependencies 
would be created as a consequence between local managers and the central 
managerial and political élite, with a concomitant weakening of the local patron– 
client relations that are critical to local bosses. The incentives and rewards for 
managers are now geared more towards taking up a more ‘managerialist’ stance 
vis-à-vis employees in pursuit of downsizing and efficiency gains, so as to provide 
the remaining workforce with their salary increases and supplements. As described 
below, the new central budget allocation and accounting processes at the same time 
put new instruments of potential control in the hands of the centre. 
This new set of evolving relations between centre and periphery and employer 
and employee in the state apparatus is seen clearly in the case of public service 
delivery agencies. Decree 10 of December 2002 granted them extensive budgetary 
autonomy, allowing them to ‘(i) manage their own revenue accounts; (ii) adjust 
salary payments to reward performance; (iii) restructure their staffing to gain 
efficiency; (iv) set administrative spending norms that are different from those set by 
the government; and (v) carry forward funds unspent in the previous year’ (Cuvillier 
and Hoan Van Hai 2002). In the course of implementing this so-called ‘financial 
self-determination mechanism’, each public service delivery agency would be 
classified according to their revenue generating capacities, and the amount of state 
budget funding (if any) would be calculated and fixed for three years (with a ‘mark- 
up’ factor to cover cost increases). At the same time as the cost of salary increases 
was passed down to local managers and the capacity provided to meet it from 
internal budgets, the discretion was granted to managers to pay above-award rates 
to reward efficiency-improving performance. 
Thus, by a series of self-reinforcing steps, the government moved rapidly in 
2001–02 towards a far more devolved system of financial and personnel 
management, in which local revenue-raising would play a growing role. But this 
was not the whole story, for the measures also forced local managers to ‘open their 
books’ and removed some (but not all) of the incentives to conceal ‘off-budget’ 
activities, in effect legitimising previously informal arrangements.11 The aim of greater 
control and discipline was also to be achieved by new budget reporting and 
monitoring requirements.12 Part of the ‘package’ of devolved accountable 
management everywhere is the substitution of ex ante input controls by ex post output 
controls, coupled with audit of financial transactions—that is, old, counter- 
productive systems of control are replaced by new ones, including measures to 
improve efficiency. The centre, however, retained a number of strict controls, limits 
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and thresholds such that the granting of autonomy was within clear constraints. 
Among the latter were a set of measures to limit and monitor local fees and charges 
in order to retain some level of uniformity and to prevent local abuses. Despite this, a 
possible adverse consequence of the package did not go unnoticed by outside observers 
…the government articulates a welcome commitment to improve the system of exemptions 
for education costs and the provision of free health services to poor households, (but) this 
may conflict with the recently-issued Decree 10…The concern here is that managers…will 
not be receiving the clear and consistent message that it is a high priority of government to 
ensure that poor people receive free primary education and curative health care 
(International Monetary Fund 2002:9) 
OUTSIDE INFLUENCES 
While clearly dealing with a set of problems that were rooted in Vietnam’s historical 
development, the most recent salary reform measures echo themes and models that 
are very familiar in the global context of contemporary administrative reform, 
revolving around 
• an increasingly decentralised system of pay and rewards, with increased 
management discretion 
• overt reference to ‘market rates’ and ‘ability to pay’ in different employment 
environments 
• use of differential rates of pay or ‘bonuses’ as an incentive mechanism to 
reward performance. 
So what role should we attribute to the use of solutions brought in from outside 
Vietnam? 
The overseas development aid (ODA) program has been a primary and direct 
source. According to the World Bank Development Indicators, annual ODA to Vietnam 
averaged 20 per cent of annual central government expenditures between 1994 and 
1999, rising to 27 per cent in 1999. Aid has increasingly focused on ‘governance’, 
under which public administration reform is subsumed, although significant amounts 
of governance-focused aid only began to flow in after the adoption of the Master 
Program. Prior to that, Vietnam had only received some US$23 million for twelve 
separate projects related to public administration reform (Thang Van Phuc 2001). 
Among them was a series of UNDP projects beginning in 1991, the most prominent of 
which provided technical assistance for the conduct of the PAR Review in 2000. Since 
2001, UNDP and bilateral donor programs have continued, but significant ADB and 
World Bank loans have also been approved, accompanied by technical assistance 
with central coordination of public administration reform, provision of IT infrastructure, 
civil service training, and reform of public finances among other projects. 
The Vietnamese government, in an attempt to deal with what it perceived to be 
specifically local problems, set the broad outlines and objectives of the public 
administration reform program. The program, as such, was not ‘imposed’, nor was 
it delivered ready-made by a set of external donors or advisers under any kind of 
duress. One component of the public administration reform, salary reform, was not 
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nominated by the government as a high priority for direct donor aid and technical 
assistance. The issue is highly sensitive politically, and goes to the core of issues of 
Party control, state capacity and political stability. Many donors, notably the World 
Bank, moreover, were perceived as having a doctrinaire and unhelpful approach to 
the issue based on recommendations such as radical downsizing and privatisation, 
presented in an ideologically insensitive manner. As we have seen, the local experts 
were not, as a result, inhibited from selecting from some of the same solutions, but 
the process of local control was vital. 
The influence of donors and their advisers has been more direct in other, related 
parts of the public administration reform agenda. The technical experts of the 
Ministry of Finance who provided significant input to the salary reform issue were 
already involved in quite extensive dialogue with international consultants over 
other issues of budgetary and financial reform. Such projects were among the more 
popular with aid donors. A stocktake in 2001 listed eight separate aid projects and 
ten IMF or World Bank missions on budgeting and financial management since 
1996, claiming significant results. 
Following the first Government–donor Public Expenditure Review in 2000 (PER-2000), the 
Government adopted in 2001 a comprehensive program to strengthen public expenditure 
management. The aim is to improve comprehensiveness, consistency and transparency of 
budgetary information as well as equity and efficiency of public spending (World Bank 
2002b:30) 
International consultants and local experts working directly with the Ministry 
of Finance in projects associated with the Public Expenditure Review have played 
an active role in disseminating ideas and responding to government proposals on 
financial reform.13 Their role as a conduit for international ‘best practice’ models of 
public financial management cannot be dismissed. Moreover, these models are quite 
precise and well articulated, achieving a high level of consensus in the donor and 
international consultancy community (see, for example, Allen and Tommasi 2001; 
OECD 1998). Thus, although the government and Party wished to retain control of 
the agenda of problems being defined as critical, they were more than willing to be 
exposed to the technical detail and rationales embodied in particular solutions. Of 
course, experts in the Ministry of Finance hardly needed international consultants 
to bring the latest models of budgetary and financial management best practice to 
their awareness, and international textbooks could have provided the menu of 
contemporary thinking about devolved management, output budgeting, lump sum 
or one-line allocations and user charges. However, the strong involvement of World 
Bank, UNDP and other advisers and consultants in the budgetary reform process 
also directly exposed the Ministry of Finance to the global discourse of contemporary 
financial management. 
CONCLUSION 
Analysis of the wider public administration reform agenda showed the significance 
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of themes and doctrines that related problems on the ground to wider themes of 
evolving Party doctrine. However, in the specific case of salary reform, both the 
problem definitions and the canvassing of available solutions were mainly 
concerned with practical dimensions of fiscal capacity and administrative control. 
Perhaps the strongest doctrinal influence had a somewhat perverse outcome, in 
that the carefully articulated doctrine of socialisation came to be coupled with more 
extensive use of user fees for collective goods levied on family or private income. The 
recourse to user fees and charges was tempered by state subsidy for basic, essential 
services but the overall design principles evinced a decidedly individualistic, market- 
driven ‘capacity to pay’ principle of service access. While this was carefully married 
with the more communitarian rhetoric of self-help or co-production, including the 
careful choice of the term ‘socialisation’, the rhetoric provided only the thinnest of 
veneers over what was effectively a process of commercialisation. 
The adoption and adaptation of tools such as user charges and devolved budgets 
had very particular local implications and meanings, but also brought reformers in 
touch with a global reform discourse. The evidence, however, demonstrating that 
the proponents and purveyors of this discourse had either direct or indirect influence 
is mixed. On the one hand, the case of salary reform suggests that the reformers were 
brought to adopt these solutions by the logic of local circumstance and convenience, 
but overseas models and experience, particularly with financial management tools, 
provided at least part of the solution eventually adopted. There is, however, a two- 
way process in the relations with consultants and donors. Vietnamese reformers’ 
receptivity to the concepts of modern public sector management saw adoption of 
particular ideas from overseas but also generated commitment among the donors 
funding reform implementation. The significance of this strategic aspect of reform 
adoption is a subject for further research, but a similar strategic relationship has 
been observed in other contexts, such as poverty reduction (Painter 2005). For the 
Vietnamese government, controlling the agenda of problem definition and the scope 
of the imported solutions while also tapping generous overseas aid donations, is 
critical. 
The pattern of borrowing and transplantation that I have described has 
similarities with the phenomenon of ‘cropping up’, discussed earlier. The definition 
of the problems arose from a local debate about some fundamental issues of deep 
concern to the Party and top state officials, who were intent on achieving and 
maintaining control over state resources and capacities, while the internationally 
familiar menu of budgetary reform and devolved management offered solutions to 
these locally identified problems. Cropping up is both a process of reproduction or 
borrowing and of transformation. The use of parts of one administrative system’s 
‘toolkit’ of measures in another can be expected to produce anomalies and paradoxes. 
As noted earlier, the doctrine and practices of democratic centralism do not admit 
significant formal political devolution, although quite significant decentralisation 
was built into the tiered system of provincial and district administration. The 
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unintended consequences of relaxing controls of the command economy and the 
attempt to build new systems of administration in the 1990s in some respects added 
to the power and autonomy of local units—for example, the greater reliance on local 
revenues put new patronage and other discretionary powers in the hands of local 
leaders. The new forms of devolution envisaged in the most recent salary reforms 
are coupled with a set of financial controls with the hope of undermining these 
sources of local power. In other words, paradoxically, the techniques of devolved, 
accountable management are being appropriated to an agenda concerned with 
enhancing discipline and control. Whether the design realises this objective remains 
to be seen, particularly in the light of the weak institutionalisation of the rules in the 
first place. It is just as likely to result in a new set of local unofficial stratagems and 
their attendant irregularities. 
While the dynamics of the cropping up and the development of local hybrids 
suggest a Vietnamese-controlled process of reform, the longer-term implications for 
retaining control of the outcomes may be more uncertain. Once the ‘problem’ (for 
example, of salary reform) gets defined in terms of one set of solutions rather than 
another, the problem-solving and policymaking processes may become set on a 
course of action that carries them forward to unexpected destinations. The ‘whole’ 
that results may take on a character that each of its parts was originally disconnected 
from in the process of selecting pragmatically from the menu. Local actors have 
slipped imperceptibly and naturally into talk of ‘commercialisation’, when original 
thinking conceived of the same thing as ‘socialisation’, and in the process they may 
help transform it. Despite being adapted and transformed to suit local conditions, 
the borrowing of transnational administrative tools and rationales by local actors 
intent on furthering their own schemes has the potential to bring with it modes of 
thought and techniques of improvement that have new logics, and inject new 
resources and opportunities into the local scene, with potentially unpredictable 
consequences. 
Thaveeporn Vasavakul (1996) and Adam Fforde (2002) have argued that the 
importation of external ideas drawn from the developmental experience of non- 
socialist states is more than just a temporary, tactical concession within an 
unreconstructed Communist doctrinal worldview, but part of a more fundamental 
rethinking by state leaders that serves to reconstruct their power on a new footing. 
That is, as Alexander Woodside suggests in the quotation at the head of this chapter, 
the results of borrowing and transplantation may be evidence less of a process of 
global homogenisation than of new forms of local enablement.14 At the same time, 
the second and third-order consequences may yet be more profound, as digging the 
ground for a reformed public administration system of transplants and hybrids 
may have uprooted more than was intended. 
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NOTES 
1 The purpose is not to identify all external sources and weigh their respective influence. For 
example, no direct reference is made in this chapter to the lessons learnt from China. The 
contemporary western discourse on administrative reform is selected as a case to explore the 
results of interaction between local problem solving and outside ideas. 
2 This has been the case in the administrative reform process in Vietnam. As early as 1991, a 
UNDP mission was providing stimulus to local debate and helping shape discussion. Since 
then, both bilateral donors and the international institutions have been quite active in public 
administration reform. 
3 There is much overlap between these two lists. It is clearly not feasible to extract from a unified 
text two identifiably distinct sets of ‘local’ and ‘foreign’ proposals. These examples are chosen 
because they suggest strong traces and echoes from different sources. 
4 The review was set up by government decision under the guidance of the PAR Steering 
Committee, which was located in the Office of Government. Five groups were established, 
covering different aspects of public administration reform. The groups drew on technical 
assistance from a small number of international consultants, provided with the help mainly of 
UNDP funding, and three workshops were held in May 2000 to allow national and provincial 
senior officials to make a contribution. Official Vietnamese and English language versions 
were released together in June 2000, and are available on the UNDP Vietnam Office website. 
The reviews formed an important input for a subsequent major announcement on public 
administration reform, and a new set of national programs, in September 2001. 
5 The introduction of income and consumption taxes lagged behind ‘salarisation’, and their 
ineffective implementation accentuated the problem. 
6 The same logic applied to rural workers who were given ‘property rights’ over formerly 
collectivised farming land. The economic proceeds of making use of those rights would provide 
the wherewithal for individual households to pay for those services formerly provided as one 
of the benefits of membership of the collective. Regulations on fee exemptions were introduced 
to cushion the impact on the very poor. 
7 The current situation is that families account for about 80 per cent of the total health budget, 
as against the state’s 20 per cent. In education, public subsidies provided respectively 61 per 
cent of primary, 42 per cent of lower secondary, 33 per cent of upper secondary and 46 per cent 
of higher and vocational education expenditure (World Bank 2001) 
8 Oversight by the Party is another matter, albeit through a layered system of Party committees 
at the appropriate levels. 
9 The importance of ‘fence breaking’ as a pattern of bottom-up reform is widely acknowledged 
in the literature on doi moi. Where the centre is indecisive or merely cautious, a ‘blind eye’ may 
be turned to ‘illegal’ local solutions and initiatives that, if effective, provide a momentum to 
wider reform following the granting of official blessing. 
10 Quach Duc Phap, Director, Department of Fiscal Policy, quoted in Quy Hao (2003:15). 
11 Additional potential side-benefits include a better set of accounting mechanisms to check 
fraud and corruption. 
12 The ‘modernisation’ project of the public administration reform program also involves 
establishing effective databases and information systems pertaining to personnel and financial 
transactions in order to facilitate this control. 
13 UNDP Project 96028 Phase II is located in the Ministry of Finance. Its objectives are: ‘to build 
the capacity to conduct a public expenditure review at the central government level; to enable 
three provincial governments to undertake periodic public expenditure reviews, and disseminate 
the results and experience to other provinces; to improve the ability of the Ministry of Finance, 
key sector ministries and other relevant agencies to better prepare budget’. It claims the 
following ‘results’: ‘improved understanding among senior government staff at all levels of the 
use of a PER as a tool for improving resource allocation and strengthening the budget allocation 
process; a core group of staff in relevant ministries and pilot provinces trained in public 
expenditure analysis; PER guidelines set up; PER implemented; a medium-term expenditure 
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framework established; recommendations for improvement of PER system’. 
14 On globalisation as an ‘enabling’ process, see Weiss (2003:15–19). 
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13 
Fragmented pragmatism: the 
conclusion and adoption of 
international treaties in 
Vietnam 
Tannetje Bryant and Brad Jessup 
Although The Socialist Republic of Vietnam (hereafter ‘Vietnam’) has rules regarding 
the conclusion and adoption1 of international treaties, they do not make clear whether 
international obligations entered into by Vietnam are self-executing or require the 
passage of national legislation to become effective domestically. The resolution to 
this issue is important because the mode of adoption of international treaties 
determines which law to apply where there is a conflict between an international 
treaty obligation and a domestic law. The issue also indirectly relates to how Vietnam 
complies with its treaty obligations. 
This chapter will examine the rules with regard to the conclusion and adoption 
of treaties by Vietnam, questioning whether the Ordinance on the Conclusion and 
Implementation of International Agreements 1998 reflects an incorporation or 
transformation approach with respect to treaty adoption. Further evidence, 
specifically an analysis of the measures undertaken by Vietnam in fulfilment of its 
treaty obligations, the perceived application and effect of international treaties in 
Vietnam’s socialist law regime and the treatment of treaties in domestic laws, will 
be relied on to conclude how treaties are adopted in Vietnam. 
CONCLUSION AND ADOPTION OF INTERNATIONAL TREATIES 
BY THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM 
Under Article 102 of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (hereafter 
‘Constitution’), the president is elected and capable of being removed by the National 
Assembly. The president is the head of state responsible for acting on behalf of 
Vietnam in domestic and foreign affairs,2 and has the duty and power under Article 
103(10) of the Constitution 
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to negotiate and sign international agreements on behalf of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam 
with the heads of other states; to approve or join international agreements, except in cases 
where a decision by the National Assembly is necessary. 
The National Assembly has the obligation and power, under Article 84(13) of 
the Constitution 
to decide fundamental policies in external relations; to ratify or annul international 
agreements that have been signed or participated in on the proposal of the country’s 
President. 
It is the role of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly ‘to carry out the 
National Assembly’s external relations’.3 The government—the executive arm of 
the National Assembly—has the duty and power under Article 112(8) of the 
Constitution, to conclude international treaties made in the name of the government, 
to undertake unified management of the external affairs of the state, and to direct the 
implementation of international treaties to which Vietnam has signed or acceded. 
Pursuant to Articles 103 and 1064 of the Constitution, the president promulgated 
the Ordinance on the Conclusion and Implementation of International Agreements 
1998 (hereafter ‘Ordinance’), which governs the conclusion and adoption of 
international treaties in Vietnam. The ordinance replaced a similar ordinance enacted 
in 1989 (hereafter ‘1989 Ordinance’). 
The 1989 Ordinance had many problems and deficiencies. In particular, it was 
passed under the 1980 Constitution, which was replaced in 1992 by a constitution 
that established new structures and bodies within government with which the 
1989 Ordinance was inconsistent (Doan Nang 1998). For example, the former Council 
of Ministers was replaced by the government, the powers of the State Council were 
transferred to the president and the National Assembly Standing Committee was 
divested of its explicit power with regard to the conclusion and adoption of treaties. 
There were also difficulties with the signing, approval, ratification, reservation, 
suspension and cancellation of treaties. In particular, the provisions in the 1989 
Ordinance were not sufficiently specific and did not clearly identify the role to be 
played by the Supreme People’s Court and the Procuracy and other government 
agencies in negotiating and entering into treaties (Doan Nang 1998). The 1989 
Ordinance also failed to distinguish between international agreements signed by 
the state and those signed by other ministerial authorities. The competence of the 
state and other ministerial authorities to enter into treaties, and many key terms, 
also had to be defined. A clear explanation was needed of the effect of entering into 
an international agreement on domestic law and the effect of withdrawing 
reservations (Doan Nang 1998; Vu Thu Hanh and Jin 1997). To remedy these defects, 
the government passed the new Ordinance. 
The Ordinance maintains many similarities with its predecessor, but rectifies 
provisions made inaccurate by the passage of the Constitution and seeks to clarify 
those provisions that were previously unclear. This is important for our discussion 
because the Ordinance will apply only to those treaties ratified after the enactment.5 
The 1989 Ordinance will continue to prescribe the rules for conclusion, adoption 
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and implementation of treaties ratified between 1989 and 1998, but the new 
Ordinance can be used to illuminate ambiguities in the 1989 Ordinance. 
THE 1998 ORDINANCE ON THE CONCLUSION AND 
IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 
Although similar to the 1989 Ordinance, the Ordinance is more expansive and 
overcomes some of the inadequacies of its predecessor. Notably, it sets out more 
clearly the rules to be applied by Vietnam in treaty negotiation, signature and 
ratification and the effect of treaties on domestic law. The purpose of the Ordinance 
is to specify the rules with regard to treaty practice in Vietnam and provide detail for 
the exercise of constitutional powers. The Ordinance consists of six chapters, which 
are further subdivided into 35 articles. The Ordinance is summarised below and in 
Figure 13.1. 
General provisions (Articles 1–4) 
Chapter 1 sets out the scope of application of the Ordinance. Article 1 details the 
stages of treaty conclusion, adoption and implementation that are regulated by the 
Ordinance and identifies the institutions that may conclude a treaty on behalf of 
Vietnam, namely 
• the state 
• the government 
• the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuracy 
• the ministries and ministerial agencies. 
Article 2 defines an ‘international agreement’ as all written arrangements 
concluded between Vietnam and one or many other nations, international 
organisations or other subjects of international law. For the purpose of this chapter, 
‘treaty’ is used interchangeably with ‘international agreement’. It also defines a 
number of terms used in treaty-making practice, including ‘proxy’, ‘conclusion’, 
‘approval’, ‘ratification’, ‘accession’, ‘reservation’ and ‘suspension’, a feature absent 
from the 1989 Ordinance. 
Article 3 sets out the principles to be applied in the conclusion of treaties, 
including the principle that international agreements must accord with the 
Constitution.6 Article 4 classifies international agreements according to the 
institutions with the power to negotiate and conclude particular types of treaties.7 
The classification will depend on the character of the document and content of the 
treaty being entered into. Article 4(2) provides that the state may conclude treaties 
concerned with 
• peace, security, borders, territory and national sovereignty (Article 4(2)(a)) 
• the rights and obligations of citizens (Article 4(2)(b)) 
• universal international and important regional organisations (Article 4(2)(c)) 
• other contents agreed upon by the signatories (Article 4(2)(d)). 
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Virtually all multilateral treaties fall within this category of international agreement. 
Most multilateral treaties lead to the loss of sovereignty of a state, as the obligations 
require the state either to act in a certain way or to prohibit acts. In cases where treaties 
do not affect the sovereignty of a nation, negotiating parties will nevertheless ordinarily 
demand that a treaty be concluded by the state, in its capacity as representative of 
all its citizens. Because the great majority of multilateral treaties fall within this 
classification, the discussion in this chapter focuses on this category of treaty. 
Article 4(3) identifies those treaties that may be concluded by the government, 
including treaties made in the name of the state that are not prescribed under Article 
4(2), and treaties concerning international and regional organisations beyond the 
scope of Article 4(2)(c). 
Article 4(4) provides that the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s 
Procuracy may conclude treaties regarding international cooperation in areas within 
their jurisdiction. 
Article 4(5) provides that the ministries and branches of the ministries may 
conclude treaties in the name of the state or government if the contents of the treaty 
fall within that ministry’s or branch’s field of competence and are not prescribed in 
Articles 4(2) and 4(3). 
Conclusion of international agreements (Articles 5–22) 
Article 5 sets out how treaties are to be entered into on behalf of the Vietnamese 
government, including their negotiation and signature. Articles 5(1) and 5(2) provide 
that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or another relevant ministry in consultation 
with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, must submit all plans for the negotiation and 
signing of international agreements to the government. 
Article 5(3) deals with preparation and negotiation of treaties. Where the treaty 
provisions are contrary to, or not yet stated in, any Vietnamese National Assembly 
or National Assembly Standing Committee legal documents,8 they must be submitted 
to the National Assembly for consideration. The proposing agency is obliged to 
consult with the relevant ministerial bodies and seek an evaluation from the Ministry 
of Justice. The government then considers the ministries’ opinions before reporting 
to the National Assembly Standing Committee, which then submits its comments to 
the National Assembly. 
Nations with a system of treaty incorporation typically require parliamentary 
approval of treaties containing provisions contradictory to, or not yet stated in, 
existing law. Although the National Assembly is not competent to decide whether 
or not to commence negotiations and sign an international treaty,9 the process of 
evaluation and consideration by the government and the National Assembly 
represents the first step in Vietnam towards such a parliamentary approval process. 
The Ordinance provides for the National Assembly to receive extensive 
information to aid its consideration of the treaty. Article 5(4) provides that the report 
proposing the negotiation and signing of an international agreement must include 
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• the aims of the agreement, particularly its effects on Vietnam’s rights and 
obligations 
• an evaluation of the political, economic and social financial impact 
• an evaluation of the observance of Article 3 of the ordinance and other 
provisions of law 
• opinions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other relevant ministries 
• the title of the treaty, the name in which it is signed, and the timeframe for 
its implementation 
• issues requiring comment. 
Article 6 details which institutions are competent to decide whether Vietnam 
will negotiate and sign treaties after the proposals for negotiation and signature 
have been considered in accordance with Article 5. They are 
• the president, who will do so in the name of the state 
• the government, in the name of the government 
• the National Assembly Standing Committee, in consultation with the 
government, which decides the negotiation and signing of international 
agreements by the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s 
Procuracy 
• heads of ministries, with the permission of the prime minister, in the name 
of their respective ministries. 
Article 7 presents the rules regarding the persons or bodies that can negotiate 
and sign international agreements without a proxy, stating that the president, the 
prime minister, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the President of Supreme People’s 
Court, the Chair of the Supreme People’s Procuracy and heads of diplomatic missions 
do not require a proxy. 
Article 8, to new addition in the Ordinance, deals with the authorisation for the 
negotiation and signature of international agreements. Under this article, delegates 
are permitted to negotiate and sign a treaty on behalf of the state, the government, 
the Supreme People’s Court or Procuracy, ministries or branches, provided these 
bodies have authorised the delegates to do so. 
The process for ratification and approval of treaties is set out in Articles 9–11.10 
Article 9 states that the agency proposing conclusion of a treaty must report to the 
government within 15 days of signing, providing a summary of the treaty’s contents 
and a proposal for ratification or approval.11 
Article 9(2) provides that the documents proposing ratification must include 
• an evaluation of the agreement’s impacts on Vietnam 
• the necessary proposals on ratification or approval 
• the opinions of the ministries concerned 
• the contents of any reservation. 
Article 10 states that treaties requiring ratification are those 
• set out in Articles 4(2)(a) and 4(2)(b) 
• that contain provisions contrary to, or are not yet provided for in, 
Vietnamese law 
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• that relate to state business 
• containing provisions on ratification. 
Article 10(2) goes on to provide that the president will decide whether to ratify a 
treaty except where there is a need for the treaty to be submitted to the National 
Assembly, for instance where the laws of Vietnam are either contrary to, or are silent 
on, the provisions of the treaty. As in Article 5(3), parliamentary approval of the 
treaty is required in such circumstances before it may be ratified. 
Although Article 10(2) of the Ordinance purports to grant the president the 
power to ratify international agreements, it is unclear whether the president has 
this power under the Constitution. Article 84(13) of the Constitution gives the 
National Assembly the power to ‘ratify’ international agreements, though the 
language used regarding the president in the Constitution is different. Under Article 
103(10) of the Constitution, the president has the power to ‘approve or join’ 
international agreements. The government also has the power to ‘join’ and ‘approve’ 
international agreements (on behalf of the government). As has already been noted, 
the Ordinance distinguishes between the processes of ‘ratification’ and ‘approval’. 
If one were to apply the definitions in the Ordinance to the Constitution, the president 
would be prevented from ratifying international agreements. 
Article 10(2) of the Ordinance is also inconsistent with the more authoritative 
Law on the Promulgation of Legal Documents (hereafter ‘the Law’).12 Under Article 
20(2) of the Law, the National Assembly holds the power to issue resolutions ratifying 
international agreements. The Law contains no similar provision giving the 
president the power to issue resolutions ratifying treaties. Instead, the president’s 
power is limited to promulgating (proclaiming) the resolutions of the National 
Assembly, pursuant to Article 50 of the Law. 
The process of ratification is set out in Article 10(3) of the Ordinance. The ministry 
or agency that proposed the conclusion of the treaty coordinates with the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs to submit to the president a proposal for ratification. The president 
has 30 days to give an opinion on the submission. Once the decision to ratify has 
been made, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has 15 days to put in place the diplomatic 
procedure required to finalise the treaty, including notifying the relevant agencies 
of the treaty’s effects. 
The process for the approval of international agreements is set out in Article 11.13 
This article provides that international agreements signed in the name of the 
government or a ministry and that contain provisions on approval or provisions 
contrary to or not yet regulated by the legal documents of the government require the 
approval of the government. Articles 11(3) and 11(4) detail the process of approval, 
which is similar to the ratification process outlined above. 
Article 12 deals with accession to multilateral international agreements, 
describing who may seek accession of a treaty and the process involved in seeking 
approval or ratification according to terms of the treaty, including the documentation 
required and the time within which a decision is to be made.14 
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Article 13 provides that bilateral agreements must be in Vietnamese and that 
treaties signed in foreign languages must be translated into Vietnamese. 
Article 14 provides that an international agreement concluded in the name of 
the state or government must be sealed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Articles 15 and 16 set out the procedures and rules with regard to reservations to 
international agreements. 
Article 17 deals with the effect of international agreements and states that an 
international agreement will come into force in Vietnam according to the provisions 
of the agreement or under other arrangements made between the signing parties. 
The article also states that treaties may come into force temporarily in circumstances 
where full conclusion of a treaty is conditional on the occurrence of a later event 
under the control of the state.15 
Promulgation and depository of international agreements (Articles 18–22) 
Article 18 states that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will manage and archive the 
original texts and instruments of ratification of international agreements, and Article 
19 provides that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs must send duplicates of international 
agreements to the National Assembly, the president, the government and others. 
Article 20 deals with the details of the promulgation of international agreements. 
It provides that all agreements must be promulgated, that is, proclaimed as a law of 
Vietnam, unless otherwise decided by the signing parties, the president or the 
government. The state must perform the promulgation of international agreements, 
in accordance with Article 30 of the Ordinance (see below), which is a function 
normally performed by the president.16 An international agreement promulgated 
under Article 20 must be published in the Official Government Gazette within 15 
days of the agreement taking effect.17 
Under Articles 21 and 22, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is required to register 
international agreements with the relevant international organisation and perform 
the function of depositary of international agreements where Vietnam is the 
depositary nation. 
Implementation of international agreements (Articles 23-29) 
Article 23 provides that Vietnam must strictly observe international agreements it 
has concluded. Article 24—‘Ensuring the implementation of international 
agreements’—sets out the actions that must be undertaken for the implementation 
of international agreements. It provides that 
• the agencies that propose the conclusion of international agreements 
submit to the government plans on the implementation of those agreements, 
clearly stating the implementation schedule, organisational, managerial 
and financial measures and other suggestions to ensure the 
implementation of the agreement. 
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• the concerned ministries and/or branches shall, within their functions, 
tasks and powers, implement the international agreements already 
concluded by Vietnam. 
• in cases where an international agreement is breached, the agency that 
has proposed the conclusion of such agreement or the concerned state 
agency will coordinate with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in proposing 
to the government measures necessary to protect the legitimate rights and 
interests of Vietnam. 
• annually, and when requested, agencies that propose the conclusion of 
international agreements and relevant state agencies shall submit to the 
government and the president reports on the implementation of the 
concluded international agreements. Such reports must also be submitted 
to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for monitoring. 
• in cases where the implementation of an international agreement requires 
that legal documents of Vietnam be amended, supplemented, annulled or 
replaced, the agency that proposed the conclusion of the agreement and 
the relevant state agencies will promptly organise those changes, either 
directly or through another relevant state agency, in accordance with the 
Law on the Promulgation of Legal Documents. 
Article 25 identifies the people and agencies with the authority to seek the 
amendment, supplement or extension of international agreements. Namely, state 
agencies entitled to negotiate a treaty under Article 6 are entitled to make 
amendments, and the institution that ratified the treaty also has the power to make 
amendments (Article 25(1)). These bodies must, however, first consult with, and 
obtain comments from, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Article 25(2)). Article 25(3) 
requires the documents that propose an amendment include 
• the aim of the amendment 
• the legal basis of the amendment 
• the written comments from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and others 
• the contents of the amendment together with the international agreement. 
Once an amendment has been decided on, the institution then coordinates with 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in completing the procedures for that amendment 
(Article 24(4)). 
The grounds for suspension and termination of international agreements are set 
out in Article 26. A treaty may be suspended or terminated 
• according to its own provisions 
• where there is a violation of the conclusion principles prescribed in Article 
3 of the ordinance 
• where the international agreement is seriously violated by the other 
signatories. 
The institution that ratified, approved or acceded to the international agreement 
has the competence to decide the suspension and termination of the agreement 
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(Article 27), but a report must be provided to underpin any proposal for such an 
action (Article 28). 
The rules regarding the interpretation of international agreements are detailed 
in Article 29. Generally, the contents of international agreements must be interpreted 
in accordance with international law. Where conflicting interpretations arise, the 
government must resolve the conflict. 
The National Assembly Standing Committee is competent to interpret 
international agreements ratified by the National Assembly and international 
agreements that contain provisions contrary to, or not yet provided for in, legal 
documents promulgated by the National Assembly or the National Assembly 
Standing Committee. The institution in whose name the treaty was concluded is 
also competent to interpret the international agreement. 
State management over the conclusion and implementation of international 
agreements (Articles 30–33) 
Article 30 details the state’s role in the domestic process of concluding, adopting 
and implementing international agreements, specifically that the state is responsible 
for 
• promulgating legal documents on the conclusion and implementation of 
international agreements 
• organising and ensuring the implementation of international agreements 
• popularising, disseminating and guiding the implementation of legislation 
on the conclusion and implementation of international agreements. 
• collecting state statistics on international agreements 
• organising the archiving and deposit of international agreements 
• supervising, inspecting, examining and handling violations of the 
legislation on the conclusion and implementation of international 
agreements 
• settling complaints and denunciations related to the conclusion and 
implementation of international agreements. 
The functions required of the state in Article 30 must be exercised by the 
government, assisted by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and other ministries and 
agencies, according to Article 31. 
Pursuant to Article 32, the National Assembly, National Assembly Standing 
Committee and the government must supervise the conclusion, adoption and 
implementation of international agreements. 
Implementation provisions (Articles 34–35) 
Article 34 provides that the government must issue separate regulations on the 
conclusion, adoption and implementation of international compacts concluded by 
provinces and cities that are directly under the control of the government and by 
other organisations. 
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The agency that proposed the conclusion of the treaty must submit plans on the 
implementation of the treaty to the government. The ministries and agencies shall 
implement the treaties within their own powers, and at least annually submit reports 
to the government and president on the implementation of the treaty (Article 24). 
EVALUATION OF THE PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTING TREATIES 
INTO DOMESTIC LAW 
Although the Ordinance provides detailed rules on the procedures concerning the 
conclusion, adoption and implementation of treaties in Vietnam, it does not clearly 
specify whether a treaty that has been ratified is self-executing or requires the 
enactment of legislation to incorporate the treaty obligations into Vietnamese 
domestic law. The question of whether the treaty-making process reflects an 
incorporation or transformation approach is an important one. Because Vietnam 
has rarely enacted laws to ‘transform’ the provisions of international treaties into 
municipal law, if the Ordinance and practice in Vietnam reflects a transformation 
approach, then the legal regimes established in international treaties will not displace 
domestic laws in Vietnam, they will not be enforceable and Vietnam would not be 
complying with its international obligations. 
The articles in the Ordinance that provide the rules regarding the adoption of 
treaties are examined, to analyse the perceived application and effect of international 
treaties in Vietnam’s socialist law regime, and to investigate state practice with 
respect to treaty adoption and implementation to determine whether an incorporation 
or transformation approach to treaty adoption prevails in Vietnam. 
The competing doctrines of incorporation and transformation 
The relationship between international law and domestic laws may be described by 
the competing theories of monism and dualism. The theory of monism posits that 
international law and domestic law are part of the same legal system, which may be 
enforced in the domestic or international arena, and international law will prevail 
where there is conflict. Conversely, the theory of dualism posits that international 
law and domestic law operate in different spheres and regulate different legal 
systems (Fitzmaurice 1957). Under the dualist theory, domestic laws regulate the 
internal activities of a state and its constituents and international law regulates the 
relations between states. International law must be transferred into the domestic 
law before creating individual rights (Balkin 1997). 
With respect to the status of international treaties in domestic law, the doctrines 
of incorporation and transformation reflect the application of monist and dualist 
theories respectively. 
The doctrine of incorporation, which reflects the monist theory, posits that a rule 
of international law becomes part of the municipal law without being expressly 
adopted by the legislature or the courts of the state (Shaw 1997)—its ratification 
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results in its incorporation into a domestic legal system. The international law is 
said to be self-executing. With respect to treaties, a treaty ratified by the state will be 
incorporated into municipal law immediately on coming into effect. 
By contrast, the doctrine of transformation, which reflects the dualist theory, 
posits that the rules of international law do not become part of municipal law until 
they have been expressly and deliberately enacted into domestic law by the use of 
the appropriate constitutional machinery, for instance, by the passage of a law 
through the state’s legislature (Shaw 1997). Without transformation, the rights and 
obligations within international treaties may not be enforced in the domestic sphere; 
they operate only within international dispute mechanisms (Balkin 1997). 
Much of the world, with the exception of a number of current and former territories 
of the British Empire and a collection of other nations, takes the incorporation 
approach to treaty-making. This is largely a result of the fundamental doctrine of 
pacta sund servanda. The principle was given the force of a treaty in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties in 1969, Article 26 of which provides that ‘each 
existing international treaty shall be binding upon all State Parties and implemented 
voluntarily by them’ (Vu Duc Long, forthcoming). 
For example, in Germany, Article 25 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of 
Germany provides that the rules of international law are incorporated into German 
domestic law and take precedence over domestic legislation. Similarly, Articles 93 
and 94 of the Netherlands’ 1983 Constitution provide an incorporation approach 
to treaty-making. In South Africa, ratification of a treaty is a function of the parliament 
(Section 231(2) of the South African constitution) and upon ratification the treaty 
provisions become part of the law of the republic (Shaw 1997). 
In France, treaties ratified and officially published operate as laws in the domestic 
sphere. Article 55 of the French constitution provides that ‘from their publication, 
duly ratified or approved treaties or agreements have a higher authority than 
[domestic laws] subject for each treaty or agreement, to its implementation by the 
other party’. A number of classes of treaties may, however, only be ratified through 
the enactment of legislation (Shaw 1997).18 
Similary, Article 15(4) of the Russian constitution adopts a rule of incorporation 
of treaties (Shaw 1997), stating that, where there is an inconsistency between a 
domestic law and a treaty obligation, the treaty will prevail. This position is reiterated 
in Article 5 of the Federal Law of the Russian Federation in International Treaties of 
the Russian Federation. Article 5(1) provides that concluded treaties are an ‘integral 
part’ of the Russian legal system and Article 5(3) provides that provisions of 
international treaties adopted by Russia ‘shall operate in the Russian Federation 
directly’ (Butler 2002). 
Although China has no constitutional provisions or specific laws dealing with 
the conclusion and implementation of treaties, Li Zhaojie (1993:62) concludes, based 
on provisions in certain laws and Chinese state practice, that China incorporates 
ratified treaties directly into its domestic laws. Article 142 of China’s General 
Principles of Civil Law, for instance, states that 
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[i]f any international treaty concluded or acceded to by the People’s Republic of China 
contains provisions different from those found in the civil laws of the People’s Republic of 
China, the provisions of the international treaty shall prevail, except for the provisions to 
which the People’s Republic of China has declared its reservations (Li Zhaojie 1993:79). 
China’s domestic laws relating to taxation, foreign investment, pollution, the 
environment and diplomatic privileges and immunities all contain provisions 
stating that a treaty will prevail over an inconsistent domestic law. 
The Japanese process of concluding and adopting international treaties, which 
has been considered as reflecting an incorporation approach, is similar to that in 
Vietnam. In Japan, a treaty becomes a part of domestic law after the Diet has approved 
and the Cabinet ratified it.19 Article 98(2) of Japan’s constitution provides that treaties 
concluded by Japan ‘shall be faithfully observed’. Shaw (1997) argues that this 
provision, which requires a step of parliamentary approval, reflects an incorporation 
approach. Interestingly, it is similar to Article 23 of Vietnam’s Ordinance, which 
requires Vietnam to ‘strictly observe’ international agreements it has concluded. 
The various approaches adopted in France—Vietnam’s former colonial ruler— 
neighbouring countries such as China and Japan, and Russia—a former socialist 
nation—are instructive when determining Vietnam’s approach to the conclusion of 
treaties. Some of these nations’ laws do share similarities with Vietnamese laws, 
and each incorporates treaties into domestic law. These nations are a part of the 
large majority of nations who either expressly or by state practice, based on the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, incorporate treaties directly into their 
domestic laws. 
A minority of nations, led by the United Kingdom, and most nations of the 
Commonwealth, adopt a transformation approach to treaty provisions (Brownlie 
1990).20 In Attorney General for Canada v Attorney General for Ontario,21 Lord 
Atken stated that 
within the British Empire there is a well-established rule that the making of treaties is an 
executive act, while the performance of its obligations, if they entail alteration of the 
existing domestic law, requires legislative action…the stipulations of a treaty duly ratified 
do not within the Empire, by virtue of the treaty alone, have the force of law. 
The rationale behind the adoption of the transformation approach in countries 
such as the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada, is that under their constitutions 
the executive is responsible for negotiating, signing and ratifying treaties. The 
institution with the power to make and amend laws, the legislature, is not involved 
in the treaty-making process. If treaties were automatically to become part of the law 
of these nations, the consequence would be that the executive could alter the laws of 
the state without consulting parliament (Shearer 1994; Jacobs 1987). 
The same principle can be seen to operate in most of the nations where an 
incorporation approach to treaty provisions prevails. In nations such as France, 
Germany, South Africa and Japan, parliamentary approval of treaties occurs prior 
to, or is part of, the process of treaty ratification. In a sense, then, it could be argued 
that whether a nation adopts an incorporation or transformation approach to treaties 
will depend largely on when, if at all, parliament is involved in approving treaties. 
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Where the nation’s parliament is involved in approving the text and obligations of 
the treaty before it comes into force, that nation will probably adopt an incorporation 
approach. Conversely, where the parliament is not involved in the treaty-making 
process, it will generally have a role in reviewing the treaty and deciding whether to 
give effect to its obligations after the treaty is in force. In such a nation the 
transformation approach is likely to be followed (Jacobs 1987). 
The approach adopted in Vietnam 
Vietnam’s socialist legal regime. According to Marxist interpretations of democratic 
legal systems, the law is a reflection or an instrument of capitalism, used by capitalist 
states to maintain a privilege over other states in the international sphere and over 
the working classes in the domestic sphere.22 The suspicion with which Vietnam 
treats democratic legal systems is expressed in its own legal system—described as 
being aimed at developing Vietnam in accordance with the socialist orientation, as 
opposed to the laws of the ‘bourgeois state’, which are aimed at protecting capitalism 
(AusAID 2001). While Vietnam’s National Assembly is active, most legal controls 
are enacted and enforced by the administration through orders and decrees, 
bypassing the scrutiny of the democratic parliament (Gillespie 1997). 
Since the doi moi reforms began in 1986, Vietnam has begun to participate in the 
international legal community and to ratify and accede to international treaties, 
principally motivated by the need to attract foreign investment to Vietnam and to 
integrate the Vietnamese economy into regional and international economies (AusAID 
2001; Doan Nang 2002). But Vietnam has maintained its suspicion of international 
law, and Vietnamese bureaucrats believe that international treaties do not apply in 
the socialist domestic legal system—in accordance with the theory of dualism, they 
argue that the international and domestic legal spheres are not integrated. Doan 
Nang, the head of the legal group within the Ministry of Science, Technology and 
Environment, for instance, states that the socialist legal system dictates that national 
sovereignty and self-determination must be respected when entering and implementing 
international treaties. The mere conclusion of an international treaty does not elevate 
the obligations and rights in the treaty above those found in the domestic law (Doan 
Nang 2002). Although Doan Nang rejects the doctrine of transformation on the basis 
that it is impossible for states to transform international laws into domestic laws, his 
comments that Vietnam must and will enact laws when required in an international 
treaty (and that the international treaty does not automatically become the law of 
the state) in fact indicate that the doctrine of transformation is his understanding of 
Vietnam’s approach to adopting international treaties (Doan Nang 2002:39). That 
is, that rights and obligations imposed on individuals will not become operative 
unless and until the rights and obligations are expressed in domestic laws. 
China, which shares Vietnam’s socialist ideals, appears less opposed to the 
incorporation of international treaties into its domestic laws. Domestic laws relating 
to taxation, foreign investment, pollution, the environment and diplomatic privileges 
and immunities all contain provisions stating that a treaty will prevail over an 
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inconsistent domestic law, a reflection of the application of the monist international 
law theory and the doctrine of incorporation in China (Li Zhaojie 1993). The Chinese 
approach demonstrates that a socialist legal regime is capable of recognising the 
incorporation of international treaties, at least within specified jurisdictions. 
Therefore, the mere fact that Vietnam’s legal system is a socialist one does not mean 
that an incorporation approach cannot prevail in Vietnam. Rather, the approach 
adopted should be determined through an analysis of Vietnam’s laws, particularly 
the Ordinance, and state practice. 
The Ordinance. It has been noted that the Ordinance does not explicitly adopt 
either an incorporation or transformation approach to the conclusion of treaties. 
The Ordinance does contain a number of articles similar to those in other 
‘incorporation’ nations, but also has a number of articles that appear more consistent 
with a transformation approach. 
The Ordinance (as shown in Figure 13.1) creates a different process for treaties 
where 
1. the provisions are already prescribed in domestic law 
2. the treaty provisions are not yet stated in the laws of Vietnam 
3. the treaty provisions are contrary to the laws of Vietnam. 
In the first class of treaty, the issue of incorporation versus transformation is 
irrelevant as the treaty provisions are a part of the domestic law of Vietnam before 
the treaty is signed and ratified. In the second and third classes, the negotiation and 
signing of treaties to be concluded in the name of the state must be approved by the 
president following consideration by the National Assembly (Articles 5(3) and 6(1)). 
Treaties falling into these classes must also go through a process of ratification. 
Although the Ordinance purports to require treaties be ratified by the president 
(Article 10(2)), the Constitution and the Law on the Promulgation of Legal Documents 
appear to reserve this power for the National Assembly. Nevertheless, according to 
Article 10(2), only the National Assembly may ratify treaties containing provisions 
contrary to, or not yet stated in, the domestic laws of Vietnam. Consequently, when 
the treaty enters into force it will have twice been considered by the National 
Assembly and approved on one occasion. Only treaties containing provisions that 
comply with pre-existing domestic laws may be ratified by the president. It is therefore 
arguable that the treaty has already been ‘ratified’ by the National Assembly. 
This process is common to those nations that adopt an incorporation approach. 
Given that the National Assembly, the highest parliamentary body in Vietnam, has 
approved these treaties, it can be strongly argued that the moment the treaties enter 
into force their provisions become the law of Vietnam. The Ordinance, however, 
may require additional action. 
Where the treaty contains provisions contrary to the domestic laws of Vietnam 
(class 3 above), the implementation of the international agreement requires ‘legal 
documents of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to be amended, supplemented, 
annulled or replaced…promptly in accordance with the Law on the Promulgation 
of Legal Documents’ (Article 24(5)). 
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The Law sets out the types of legal documents that require promulgation and the 
institutions competent to promulgate them. It also specifies the rules and procedures 
for passing different types of legal rules into domestic law. Article 24(5) of the 
Ordinance means that, if an international obligation requires an amendment, 
supplement, annulment or replacement of a domestic law, then that change will 
have to go through the process required under the Law on the Promulgation of 
Legal Documents. 
Because the Ordinance requires the alteration of domestic laws to comply with 
international obligations, where an international obligation entered into by Vietnam 
has an effect on an existing domestic law, the international obligation will prevail 
over the inconsistent domestic law but will first require the appropriate changes to 
be made to the existing domestic law. The inconsistent treaty obligation will not be 
self-executing but will require the passage of laws making the appropriate changes. 
The international obligation that conflicts with a domestic law will not take effect or 
form part of domestic law until the change has been made domestically. Article 24 is 
not clear on the process where an international agreement does not affect existing 
domestic law but does introduce a new obligation with domestic implications (that 
is, a ‘class 2’ treaty). 
Under Article 24(1) the agency that proposed the conclusion of an international 
treaty is ‘required to submit to the government plans on the implementation of 
international agreements including a schedule, organisational managerial and 
financial measures’. Article 24(4) requires state agencies that have concluded 
international agreements to submit reports on their implementation to the 
government and the president. These provisions, particularly given their silence on 
the need to enact legal documents, presuppose that the treaty provisions have already 
become law by the time the relevant agencies are developing plans and measures to 
give practical effect to the treaty’s terms. 
Indeed, interviews conducted with Mr Nguyen Ba Son Zang of Vietnam’s 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Dr Dao Duc Tuan, Director of the National Office 
for Climate Change and Ozone Protection, have confirmed that, where treaties are 
not yet stated in or not inconsistent with the domestic laws of Vietnam, they will be 
self-executing.23 
In summary, with regard to the issue of incorporation and transformation of 
concluded international agreements, the provisions of the ordinance, though not 
explicit, suggest that 
• treaties that are contrary to the pre-existing laws of Vietnam will need to 
be ‘transformed’ into the domestic law of Vietnam. They will not be effective 
until the relevant laws are amended or repealed. 
• treaties with provisions that are not yet stated in the laws of Vietnam will 
be automatically incorporated in the domestic law when the treaty comes 
into effect. 
State practice. No specific domestic laws implementing international treaty 
obligations seem to have been passed. In Vietnam, treaty obligations tend to be 
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implemented by the administration, using under-laws (typically circulars and 
resolutions), policies, strategies or action plans rather than specific laws passed by 
the National Assembly. These types of laws are more quickly and easily passed 
than those of the National Assembly, which meets just twice a year, and fit Vietnam’s 
socialist legal system, in which legal control is generally exercised by administrators 
loyal to the government. Incorporation, because it is efficient and convenient, seems 
to be the approach adopted when treaty provisions are consistent with pre-existing 
domestic laws. If Vietnam adopted a transformation approach, whereby the rights 
and obligations imposed by international treaties remain in the international law 
sphere until given effect by the enactment of domestic laws, those obligations and 
rights, because of the nature of the Vietnamese socialist legal system, would be 
unlikely ever to be applied. 
Environmental law provides some examples of situations where Vietnam has 
used policies and under-laws to implement international obligations without first 
passing legislation to transform international treaties.24 
• Vietnam ratified the Convention on Biological Diversity in 1994. There is 
no comprehensive legislation implementing the convention’s obligations, 
but a Biodiversity Action Plan 1995 is in place. 
• Vietnam acceded to the World Heritage Convention in 1987, and between 
1994 and 2003 two natural and three cultural heritage sites have been 
inscribed on the World Heritage List. There are, however, no laws in place 
protecting these sites from human interference. 
• Vietnam ratified the Law of the Sea Convention in 1994. Various 
documents have identified the need for marine and coastal conservation 
programs and territorial sea delimitation. 
• Vietnam acceded to the Convention on International Trade of Endangered 
Species in 1994. Article 29(5) of the Law on Environment Protection 
prohibits trading in precious or rare species of plants and animals, and 
the Council of Ministers passed the 1992 Decree Determining the List of 
Precious and Rare Wild Plants and Animals and Regulating Their 
Management and Protection. 
• Vietnam acceded to the Convention on Wetlands of International 
Importance (Ramsar) in 1989. To date, one site has been listed as a Ramsar 
site—the Xuan Thuy Natural Wetland Reserve in the Red River Delta, 
and the Biodiversity Action Plan proposes the establishment of 64 
protected wetland areas. 
• Vietnam acceded to the Vienna Convention on Ozone Depletion and the 
Montreal Protocol in 1994, and the Vietnam Country Programme for the 
Phase out of Ozone Depleting Substances was formulated in 1994. 
There are also domestic laws that specifically refer to international treaties and 
their effects. Direct reference to international agreements and their obligations is 
made in the Civil Code (Article 827), the Commercial Code (Article 4(1)), the Maritime 
Code (Article 23) and the Law on Environment Protection (Articles 24 and 25). 
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Article 827(2) of the Civil Code provides that, where it is in conflict with an 
international agreement, the international agreement prevails. Similarly, Article 4(1) 
of the Commercial Code states that, where a provision of the code is inconsistent 
with an international treaty obligation, the international obligation prevails. Article 
23(1) of the Maritime Code makes reference to ships operating within Vietnamese 
territorial waters, stating that ships both of Vietnam and of foreign countries must 
observe ‘the provisions of any international agreements to which Vietnam has signed 
or recognised’. 
All three examples here seem to indicate adoption of the incorporation theory. 
They assume that obligations under international agreements entered by Vietnam 
are a part of the domestic law, but do not identify how this should be achieved. 
Chapter V of the Law on the Protection of the Environment deals with 
‘International Relations in Respect of Protection of the Environment’. Article 45 
provides that Vietnam shall implement ‘all international treaties relating to the 
environment to which it is a signatory or participant, and shall respect all 
international treaties relating to protection of the environment on the basis of respect 
for independent sovereignty, territorial claim and mutual benefit’. 
Article 48 provides that 
Where a dispute relating to protection of the environment arises in the territory of Vietnam 
and involves one or more foreign parties, the dispute shall be resolved by the governing 
laws of Vietnam and also by reference to international laws and practices. Any dispute 
between Vietnam and other countries in respect of the environment shall be resolved by 
way of negotiation, taking into account international laws and practices. 
The Law on the Protection of the Environment does not detail how international 
treaties are to be implemented into domestic law (whether automatically upon entry 
into force or through the enactment of legislation), but these articles firmly state that 
Vietnam is obliged to fulfil the terms of any environmental treaty and supports the 
conclusion that obligations within treaties not inconsistent with pre-existing laws 
are automatically incorporated into the domestic law of Vietnam. 
Although an analysis of state practice supports the assertion that treaties 
containing provisions not inconsistent with pre-existing domestic laws will 
automatically be incorporated into the domestic laws of Vietnam, it is not emphatic. 
CONCLUSION 
Although Vietnam has an Ordinance on the Conclusion and Implementation of 
International Treaties it does not clearly identify whether obligations under treaties 
ratified are self-executing or not. The only conclusion that is consistent with the 
articles of the Ordinance and current state practice, however, is that treaties that are 
not inconsistent with the domestic laws of Vietnam are self-executing. This view is 
shared by Dr Vu Duc Long (forthcoming) who concludes that ratified and concluded 
treaties are incorporated into Vietnam’s domestic laws upon entry into force. Those 
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treaties with obligations contrary to the pre-existing laws of Vietnam, however, will 
not become the law of Vietnam until the inconsistent legal document has been 
amended or replaced. Thereafter, the obligations under international agreements 
will prevail over any later domestic law. 
This conclusion is not supported by other Vietnamese bureaucrats, including 
Doan Nang, who claims that socialist legal theory dictates that international laws 
are not integrated into the domestic legal system (Doan Nang 2002). Widespread 
acceptance of Doan Nang’s claims, which are not reflected in the Ordinance, would 
result in a stifling of legal development in Vietnam. It would mean that the many 
international treaties that Vietnam has ratified or acceded to would only be binding 
on the state in the international legal system and would not operate to advance the 
livelihood of Vietnamese citizens or the protection of the environment. 
It would be beneficial if Vietnam amended the Ordinance to include a provision 
that sets out clearly whether obligations under international agreements are 
incorporated into the domestic law of Vietnam upon their entry into force or whether 
further action is required by the state before the obligations are transformed into 
domestic law. The National Assembly appears to have acknowledged that benefits 
would flow from clarifying the relationship between Vietnamese domestic laws 
and treaties concluded by Vietnam, which is largely absent from the Ordinance. On 
23 May 2005, the National Assembly passed the Law on Signing, Joining and 
Implementing International Treaties. This new law will commence on 1 January 
2006 and will replace the Ordinance. All treaties concluded from 2006 will be subject 
to this new regime. An English language draft of the new law, dated 5 April 2005 
and distributed at the National Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee workshop 
‘International Treaties and Roles of Legislatures’, indicates the drafters’ intention 
to include an article in the new law addressing the relationship between domestic 
laws and treaty obligations. 
The draft law proposed a new Article 4 ‘International treaties and provisions of 
domestic law’. The final expression within this article, however, remained 
contentious, with various drafting options included in the draft version of the law. 
Generally, the options all reflected an incorporation approach to treaty adoption, 
supporting the conclusion reached in this chapter about the current approach in 
Vietnam. 
It would be helpful if the new law describes how international obligations to 
which Vietnam is a party are to be adopted (either through transformation or 
incorporation) and implemented. This would be especially important where an 
obligation in a treaty requires the taking of specific action, for example, the passing 
of domestic controls or laws. As Vietnam becomes increasingly deeply connected 
with the rest of the world, and particularly as multinational corporations seek to 
invest in the country, issues of which sphere of law they are bound by—domestic or 
international—will grow more pressing. 
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NOTES 
1 The authors have used the word ‘adoption’ to describe the process (either incorporation or 
transformation) of bringing international treaty obligations into a nation’s domestic laws. 
‘Implementation’ is used to refer to the process of introducing programs, policies or laws after 
treaty obligations have been adopted to give effect to and fulfil the obligations within the treaty. 
2 Article 101, Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. 
3 Article 91(11) of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The Standing Committee 
of the National Assembly comprises the Chairman and Vice-Chairmen of the National Assembly 
and other members determined by the National Assembly. A member of the Standing 
Committee, however, may not also be a member of the government. 
4 Article 106 provides that the president shall issue orders and decisions for the accomplishment 
of his duties and the exercise of his powers. 
5 Article 76(1) of the Law on the Promulgation of Legal Documents states that ‘only in extremely 
necessary cases a legal document may have a retroactive effect’. 
6 A similar provision was contained in Chapter 2 of the 1989 Ordinance. 
7 This is similar to Article 3 of the 1989 Ordinance. 
8 That is, any laws, resolutions and ordinances. See Articles 1(1) and (2) of the Law dated 12/11/ 
1996 of the National Assembly on the Promulgation of Legal Documents. 
9 See Article 6 of the Ordinance and Article 84(13) of the Constitution. 
10 The Ordinance distinguishes between acts of conclusion by the state and the government. 
Under Article 2, ‘ratification’ is a legal act undertaken by the National Assembly or President 
acknowledging the effect of the concluded treaty to Vietnam. ‘Approval’ is defined as a legal 
act by the government, acknowledging the effect of a concluded treaty to Vietnam. 
11 A similar provision was contained in Article 7 of the 1989 Ordinance. 
12 An ‘ordinance’ is a by-law enacted by the National Assembly Standing Committee. A ‘law’ is 
enacted by the National Assembly. 
13 This was previously set out in similar terms in Article 8 of the 1989 Ordinance. 
14 This was provided for in Article 9 of the 1989 Ordinance. 
15 For example, the fulfilment of trade liberalisation requirements. 
16 Authors’ personal email communication with Ly Quoc Hung, Deputy Chief of Press, 
Publications and Public Information Division of the National Assembly of Vietnam, 16 July 
2001 and 11 August 2001. 
17 The government’s Decree No. 161/1999/ND-CP, dated 18 October 1999, regulates the 
promulgation process in further detail. 
18 Under Article 53 of the French Constitution, parliament must ratify peace treaties, commercial 
treaties, treaties relating to international organisations, treaties which commit the finances of 
the state, treaties relating to the status of persons, and those treaties involving the transfer, 
exchange or addition of territory. 
19 Article 7 of the Japanese Constitution. 
20 Some exceptions do exist. For example, treaties relating to the conduct of war or cession of 
territory. See Shaw (1997:112). 
21 [1937] AC 326. 
22 See, for example, Sampford (1989) and Keach (2003). 
23 Personal communication [interview with Tannetye Bryant] with Nguyen Ba Son Zang, 
Department of Foreign Affairs in Vietnam, 6 November 2000. Also personal communication 
[interview with Tannetye Bryant] with Dao Duc Tuan, Director of the National Office for 
Climate Change and Ozone Protection of Vietnam, 7 November 2000. 
24 See further Bryant and Jessup (2002). 
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The Vietnamese state, the 
Catholic Church and the law 
Peter Hansen 
In the village of Phuc Nhac, in the province of Ninh Binh, about 120 kilometres 
south of Ha Noi, stands a large whitewashed Catholic church. It is the worshipping 
centre of an active congregation drawn from the local population, more than 75 per 
cent of which is Catholic. Masses and devotional liturgies are frequent, well attended, 
and uninhibited. 
In front of the church stands a small, somewhat neglected chapel, dedicated to 
the memory of St. Anna Le Thi Thanh (De), a Catholic laywoman martyred in 1841 
under the emperor Thieu Tri, and canonised as a saint by the universal Catholic 
Church in 1988. The altar in the chapel bears the inscription 
Sanguis martyrum 
est Semen Christianorum 
The blood of the Martyrs 
is the seed of Christianity 
This little tableau stands almost as an allegory of the present situation of the 
Catholic Church in Vietnam. Those who contend that the Vietnamese church enjoys 
total religious freedom justifiably point to the example of Phuc Nhac’s thriving 
Catholic community, which goes about the articles of its faith—prayer, liturgy, 
sacraments, and catechesis—peacefully, unmolested and uninterrupted. The 
inscription in St. Anna’s chapel, however, hints of another, different reality. The 
relationship between Catholicism and the state has through the long duree of almost 
400 years, been fraught with conflict, mutual suspicion, antipathy, anti-Catholic 
persecution and martyrdom. The Vietnamese state has for centuries sought to use the 
law as a tool to regulate and control not only Catholicism, but other religions as well. 
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Many Vietnamese Catholics now see the church as suffering exactly the same 
persecution it endured in centuries past, its clergy imprisoned, property confiscated, 
and its vital functions—such education of the clergy—tightly regulated. The law, 
they argue, is the means by which the present Vietnamese government seeks to 
slowly choke life from the church. Yet, perversely, they are often keen to embrace— 
and perhaps even perpetuate—Catholicism’s status as an embattled religion. The 
blood of the martyrs is, as the inscription tells us, the seed of the church. 
Fundamentalist misconceptions bedevil understandings of the relationship 
between the church and the state. At one end of the spectrum is the view pushed by 
various Viet Kieu groups, that there is no freedom of worship at all for Vietnamese 
Catholics, making the practice of religion all but impossible. At the opposite end, 
the Communist Party of Vietnam and the Vietnamese government argue that the 
thriving and active church communities demonstrate the unfettered religious 
freedoms provided in Vietnam. The truth, as always, lies somewhere in between. 
The relationship between the Catholic Church and the Vietnamese state is not 
governed well by the law, which remains a deeply imprecise and subjective 
instrument, capable of manipulation by either side. Similarly, while Marxist ideology 
has characterised humanity’s religious/spiritual quest as illusory—famously, 
through the phrase ‘the opiate of the masses’—this has not been the principal driver 
of the Party’s or the state’s attitude towards the Catholic Church. Although atheism 
remains the ‘religious position’ of Marxist ideology, and hence of the Communist 
Party of Vietnam, there is little to suggest that this ideological difference is the basis 
of their antagonism. 
What factors, then, do govern the contemporary relationship between church 
and state? Historical antagonisms and earlier perceived wrongs continue to generate 
unease. Moreover, the Vietnamese church’s desire to cast itself as a nationalist 
institution contradicts the state’s desire to be the sole arbiter of the national history, 
the teller of the national story, and creator of national heroes. 
But the law is an important instrument in the conduct of this historical–political 
conflict, capable of application and manipulation by both sides. I propose to examine 
certain aspects of the effects of Vietnamese law in the context of this debate and their 
effects on the operation of the Vietnamese Catholic Church as a religious and social 
institution.1 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
Article 70 of the 1992 Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam provides that 
[t]he citizen shall enjoy freedom of belief and religion; he can follow any religion or follow 
none. All religions are equal before the law. The places of worship of all faiths and religions 
are protected by the law. No one can violate freedom of belief and of religion, nor can 
anyone misuse beliefs and religions to contravene the law, and State policies.2 
Provisions guaranteeing religious freedom have formed part of every constitution 
since Ho Chi Minh’s declaration of independence in 1945.3 Indeed, Ho declared on 
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the first day after the promulgation of the declaration that ‘the colonialists and 
feudal regime carried out [a] policy of division between our religious and non-religious 
compatriots with a view to facilitating their domination. I propose that the government 
declare religious freedom and unity between religious and non-religious people’.4 
The unequivocal constitutional declaration that ‘the citizen shall enjoy freedom 
of belief and religion’ seems to support the Vietnamese government’s oft-repeated 
claim that its legal system provides and enforces a regime of religious freedom and 
tolerance. Yet, dissenting voices contend that the provision is in reality a frail shield, 
so easily ignored, contradicted, and compromised by other provisions that it is 
rendered entirely hollow and meaningless. Where, then, does the truth lie? 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE AS EFFECTIVE 
Even critics of the Vietnamese government concede that ordinary Vietnamese 
Catholics now enjoy reasonable freedom to attend liturgies and services at their 
places of worship (cf. Tran Xuan Tam 2002). Although Catholics may still face some 
discrimination at the local level from party or state functionaries seeking to restrict 
active church participation, the ordinary lay worshipper is nowadays seldom a 
direct victim of government restrictions. The views expressed to an Agence-France 
Presse journalist in April 2000 seem representative 
In Hanoi, the country’s capital, as worshippers packed St. Joseph’s Cathedral for Sunday 
services, Nguyen Thi Minh said how proud she was to be a Catholic. Minh, 58, said 
Vietnam’s Catholics were free to practice their religion, but she was quick to point out that 
they still face discrimination. ‘Although we are patriotic, Catholics have less opportunities 
to take important positions in society and in the armed forces. I hope this will improve in 
time’, he said. 
Another church attendee, a 22-year old girl who asked not to be named, said plainclothes 
police still often monitor church services. ‘All members of my family are Catholics, and I 
feel free to follow the Church, although I sometimes see plainclothes police walking around 
here at church services’. 
She added that Catholics still suffer from some stigma because of their association with 
the old Saigon regime, but she added that this was changing fast. ‘I am happy to be 
Catholic, although sometimes it restricts my social relations,’ she said. ‘Some people are 
still careful about making friends with Catholics, because my father told me that during 
the wars, many Catholics followed and worked for enemies. But this complex is disappearing 
fast’ (de Nerciat 2000). 
Some critics of the government deride the significance of such ‘superficial’ liberty 
as nothing more than a smokescreen concealing the deprivation of any meaningful 
religious freedom. But such derision not only negates the government’s view; it also 
infers that Vietnamese Catholics who feel their spiritual needs are currently being 
met (such as those quoted above) are deluded. 
Article 70 is not entirely inconsequential. Whatever religious freedoms presently 
exist in Vietnam can be at least partly attributed to the constitutional protection 
offered by the article. 
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An important illustration of this constitutional protection is the tolerance granted 
to the local church’s continued communion with the universal Catholic Church 
through allegiance to the Papacy. Although the connections between the Catholic 
Church in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the outside world were effectively 
cut between 1954–75, the Vietnamese state never required its citizens to renounce 
spiritual allegiance to the Vatican. In 1955, the government oversaw the establishment 
of an association of pro-government Catholic laity and clergy, the Uy Ban Lien Lac 
Cong Giao Yeu To Quoc va Hoa Binh [Liaison Committee of Patriotic and Peace-loving 
Catholics] (Denney 1990). This body became the Catholic affiliate to the Mat Tran To 
Quoc [Fatherland Front] and usurped many of the normal entitlements of the episcopal 
hierarchy, particularly in the realm of spokesmanship of the church. It still fulfils this 
role, although it has been known since 1983 as the Uy Ban Doan Ket Cong Giao Yeu 
Nuoc Viet Nam [The Solidarity Committee of Patriotic Vietnamese Catholics]. However, 
the association never set itself up as a church per se; it was always viewed by the 
state as an association that Vietnamese Catholics could join while remaining loyal 
in the spiritual realm to the established church.5 Crucially, neither the government 
nor the ‘Patriotic Association’ made any endeavour to establish a parallel, state- 
controlled church, by ordaining bishops not in communion with Rome. The 
contention often made that the Vietnamese state claims the right to appoint bishops 
is incorrect.6 Whilst they claim a veto right over Vatican appointments, and have on 
many occasions in the past exercised that veto in rejecting candidates proposed by 
the Vatican, they have never sought to ordain candidates not endorsed by the Vatican. 
In this regard, the history of the Catholic Church under the Communist regime 
in Vietnam is radically different to that in the People’s Republic of China. In 1958, 
the Chinese government first arranged for bishops to be validly but illicitly ordained; 
that is, consecrated by other validly ordained bishops, but without the approval of 
Rome (Tong 1993).7 These bishops then pledged allegiance to the Chinese state and 
abjured allegiance to the Pope. Chinese Catholics were called on to follow this new 
‘Patriotic Church’, with its parallel episcopacy, out of communion with the Vatican. 
Bishops, priests and laity who continued to profess communion with Rome—a 
profession deemed inconsistent with membership of the ‘Patriotic Church’—were 
committing a punishable criminal offence and became known as the ‘Underground 
Church’ (Tong 1993). 
To an outsider, these matters canvassed may appear semantic, pedantic, and 
inconsequential, but from a Catholic perspective, they are of the deepest significance. 
The Catholic Church believes that the gravest fate that can befall it is schism; that is, 
the division of the church. Schism threatens its universality, and thus its deepest 
sense of identity. Whereas religious persecution is to be endured (and perhaps even 
profited from), two millennia of church history provide innumerable examples of 
how the body of the church has been irreparably damaged by schism. In this respect, 
the church mirrors Vietnamese self-perceptions, whereby mat doan ket dat nuoc [loss 
of national unity], is amongst the most serious of allegations that can be levelled 
against history’s less favoured monarchs. 
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What has all this to do with the Vietnamese Constitution? On one level, the 
original decision to permit Vietnamese Catholics’ continued spiritual affiliation to 
Rome—almost certainly made by Ho Chi Minh himself—was a political decision, 
made to assuage Catholics, and to enlist their support for the post-colonial regime. 
Catholics have for three centuries formed a much larger and more influential segment 
of the Vietnamese population than in China. Moreover, Ho had successfully sought 
to ensure that Catholics were well represented in the broad coalition of social and 
political forces that comprised his government in 1945–46.8 There is no doubt that 
these political considerations informed the constitutional assurance of religious 
freedom currently embodied in Article 70. 
But the constitutional provisions also have their own efficacy. Any subsequent 
attempts to start a state-sponsored church—as opposed to an association of Catholic 
believers—and to forbid communion with Rome (as happened in China), would 
have been in flagrant breach of the state’s own constitutional provision. In other 
words, the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom bolstered the Vietnamese 
church’s capacity to preserve its most treasured asset—its membership of the 
universal Catholic Church. It is therefore difficult to sustain the argument that Article 
70 is entirely worthless and devoid of meaning for Vietnamese Catholics. 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE AS INEFFECTIVE 
At the same time, the contrary proposition—that Article 70 is evidence of the 
uncompromised nature of religious freedom in Vietnam—is similarly difficult to 
sustain. Its efficacy is compromised by internal inconsistencies within Article 70 
itself, by inconsistencies between Article 70 and other constitutional provisions, 
and by inconsistencies between Article 70 and other Vietnamese laws. 
Statutory interpretation of Article 70 indicates that its guarantee of religious 
freedom is not absolute, but qualified. The article’s provision that no one can misuse 
beliefs and religions to contravene the law and state policies must be interpreted as 
derogating from an absolute guarantee. The phrase ‘misuse of beliefs and religions’ 
is indeterminate and susceptible of many interpretations. Could some ordinary 
religious functions, such as the Catholic engagement in social justice and advocacy 
for human rights, be regarded as a ‘misuse of beliefs and religions’? The Catholic 
Church has long seen engagement in social advocacy, including support for the 
marginalised and opposition to structural injustice, as a fundamental role, entrusted 
to it by Jesus Christ as part of its emulation of his earthly mission. Yet, there is every 
chance that the state would interpret any endeavour by the Vietnamese church to 
fulfil this apostolic function as a ‘misuse of beliefs and religions’ under Article 70. 
Article 70 provides no criteria as to what is considered a ‘misuse’, nor does it 
state  who is to be the arbiter of whether a particular activity falls within the definition. 
Arguably, it was the constitutional drafters’ intent that the determinative power rest 
with the Vietnamese state, with the church itself having no role to play. This 
315 The Vietnamese state, the Catholic Church and the law 
potentially grants to the state the effective capacity to circumscribe what constitutes 
legitimate religious activity, and axiomatically, to place outside the bounds of 
legitimacy whatever it finds displeasing. This is not to say that the Vietnamese 
Party and state will always exercise this power in an arbitrary or totalitarian manner; 
after all, it currently tolerates a great many religious activities, which it probably 
wishes were not happening. Nonetheless, the connection within Article 70 between 
the concepts of ‘misuse of religion’ and ‘contravening state policy’, without causality, 
is of some concern. It suggests that religious legitimacy is contingent on congruence 
with the political and administrative aims of the ruling party. Taken to its logical 
conclusion, this renders religious activity an instrument of state policy; as, indeed, 
many statements from party and government spokespeople proclaim it to be. Such 
a view is so incompatible with the church’s theological and ecclesiological self- 
perceptions as to render it permanently unacceptable to the church. 
Reading Article 70 in the context of the constitution as a whole does little to 
improve the situation. Several other constitutional provisions may also be read as 
compromising Article 70’s efficacy. As with Article 70 itself, their often benign 
appearance is compromised by qualifications or exceptions which render the 
provisions ineffective, or even retrograde, in the hands of any government with 
malevolent intent. 
One constitutional provision often cited as an impediment to religious freedom 
is Article 4, which enshrines the leading role of the Communist Party of Vietnam. It 
states that 
[t]he Communist Party of Vietnam, the vanguard of the Vietnamese working class, the 
faithful representative of the rights and interests of the working class, the toiling people, 
and the whole nation, acting upon the Marxist-Leninist doctrine and Ho Chi Minh’s thought, 
is the force leading the state and society. All Party organisations operate within the 
framework of the Constitution and the law. 
This provision no doubt gives succour to anticommunist antagonists who would 
view the Vietnamese Constitution in an ‘instrumentalist’ context. Professor Mark 
Sidel, in his analysis of the Vietnamese Constitution, described instrumentalism 
thus 
[t]he instrumentalist theory is relatively clear-cut: Constitutions in Communist-Party run 
socialist countries have been, and remain, a means of political control by a single party, a 
way of expressing Communist Party political, economic and social policy in constitutional 
terms, a method for mobilising action, and a malleable document subject to redrafting and 
adoption by a compliant legislature as times and policy changed (Sidel 2002:42).9 
The Special Rapporteur on Vietnam, Abdelfattah Amor, in his 1998 Report to the 
United Nations Commission on Human Rights, adopted a largely instrumentalist 
stance in considering the possible ramifications of Article 4 on religious freedom 
[e]ven greater concern is raised by Article 4 of the Constitution, which sets forth the principle 
of the Communist Party of Vietnam as the ‘guiding force’ of the state and of society. State 
policies are therefore those of the Communist Party, which has its own ideology with 
regard to religion, initially perceiving religion to be the opium [sic] of the people and 
therefore to be combated, and later evolving toward a special recognition of religion... 
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Whatever the ideology, the Special Rapporteur is of the opinion that, from the international 
law standpoint, the problems involved are similar to those of a State religion. If, for the 
sake of analysis, we take the Communist ideology as the ‘state religion’, the problems, in 
terms of international law, is not seen in relation to that given, but in terms of its 
manifestations. It is essential that that given should not be used to undermine human 
rights, in particular freedom of religion or belief (Amor 1998:paras 103–4). 
If one takes an instrumentalist view of the Vietnamese Constitution, then its 
enshrinement of the Communist Party’s primacy can be seen as having adverse 
implications for religious freedom, especially when that freedom might be used to 
the detriment of the Party’s exercise of power. 
However, ‘state ideology’ is not the same as ‘state religion’, and Amor is 
misguided in equating the two. To the contrary, the Party has always been emphatic 
in insisting that religion has no role to play in the development of state policy, nor 
the ideology on which it is based. There is, therefore, no theoretical inconsistency 
between a state political ideology, and the tolerance of religious pluralism. Ideology 
has never been the primary ground of contestation between the Communist Party of 
Vietnam and the Catholic Church. Party criticisms of the church seldom, if ever, 
make negative reference to Catholic theology, doctrine, or dogma. Exposition of the 
classical Marxist position on organised religion can nowadays only be found in 
obscure theoretical journals. And, as noted above, those same journals now 
sometimes endeavour to explain away Marx’s views on religion as limited to a 
given historical-political context. Instead, Party/state criticism of the church 
concentrates on its historical antecedents, particularly its association with the French 
colonisation of Vietnam. While Article 4 has a considerable influence on the overall 
question of democratic pluralism within Vietnam, its influence on the position of 
the Catholic Church is largely theoretical.10 The potentially more significant 
provision in terms of a constitutional threat to religious freedom is the punitive 
Article 13, which provides that 
[t]he Vietnamese motherland is sacred and inviolable. All machinations and acts directed 
against the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the motherland, 
against the construction and defence of the socialist Vietnamese motherland, shall be 
severely punished in accordance with the law. 
Although this provision refers specifically to the state—in contrast to Article 4’s 
reference to the Party—the tight symbiosis between the contemporary Communist 
Party of Vietnam and the state makes it likely that threats against the Party are seen 
as threats also to the ‘socialist Vietnamese Motherland’. Yet there is no suggestion 
that the practice of religion is in any way contextualised as a ‘machination directed 
against’ sovereignty. Provisions of the criminal code guarding national security 
have been employed against a notable Catholic dissident, Fr. Thaddeus Nguyen 
Van Ly, although the suggestion that his ‘actions against national unity’ were of a 
religious nature is open to question. 
Another significant provision is Article 30, which covers the protection of national 
culture. The article concludes that ‘the propagation of all reactionary and depraved 
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thought and culture is forbidden; superstitions and harmful customs are to be 
eliminated’. The use of the term me tin (‘superstition’) is, again, typical of the 
ambiguity prevalent in Vietnamese constitutional and legislative practice. What 
does ‘superstition’ mean? How is it to be distinguished from religion? Who will 
judge this delineation, and what methodology will they use? 
There is no suggestion that the Vietnamese government has recently used ‘anti- 
superstition’ provisions against mainstream Catholic religious practice.11 Article 
247 of the 1999 Penal Code gives some guidance as to how ‘superstition’ is to be 
viewed—‘Exercise of superstitious practices: any person who practices divination, 
acts as a medium, or pursues other superstitious practices...’12 
There remains a concern that legitimate religious activity may wrongly be 
regarded as  ‘superstition’. A Party statement in April 2003 declared that 
[t]he Party also recognises that there are many complicated matters in religious practices, 
which will create disorder and instability, and endanger national security. Many people 
and illegal preaching groups are taking advantage of local people’s beliefs to increase 
superstition and disseminate hostile attitudes to erode great unity among the peoples 
(‘Party publicises policies on religion and faith’, Vietnam News Briefs, 25 April 2003).13 
There is also a worrying prospect for overlap, whereby religious activities 
considered legitimate by the church nonetheless attract official approbation as 
‘superstition’. This problem most recently arose in 1998 at the 200th anniversary of 
the Marian apparition at La Vang. Vietnamese Catholics revere La Vang, a small 
village in central Quang Tri province, where in 1798, the Blessed Virgin Mary is said 
to have appeared to a group of poor woodcutters. Each year, on 15 August—the 
feast of Our Lady of La Vang—Catholics from all over Vietnam gather at the 
apparition site to venerate, commemorate, and celebrate these events. 
Not surprisingly, the 200th anniversary celebration in 1998 saw even larger 
crowds than usual. The gathering of an enormous crowd not immediately under 
government auspices and control caused officials considerable consternation,14 
which was no doubt exacerbated by the political undertones of the La Vang 
apparition. The original events had occurred at a time of significant anti-Catholic 
persecution. The political message of the apparition—implied but unspoken in the 
current era—is not to lose heart in the face of state oppression, for the power of the 
divine remains with believers. These quasi-political implications troubled the 
Vietnamese government and, together with the event’s tinges of superstition, 
prompted then Party Secretary, Le Kha Phieu, to claim that ‘thrift is more important 
than festivals during difficult economic times’ (Soloman 1998:n.p.). In other words, 
the La Vang anniversary did not fulfil a legitimate religious purpose.15 A rationalist 
or utilitarian view can always find ‘superstition’ in religious ritual, and, while this 
has not yet occurred overtly, the provision remains a potential weapon if the 
Vietnamese government should decide on a more aggressively anti-Catholic stance. 
No other constitutional provisions refer directly to religion, but several have a 
potential impact on religious freedom. For example, Article 33, which bans ‘all 
Asian Socialism and Legal Change 318 
activities in the fields of culture and information that are detrimental to national 
interests, and destructive of the personality, morals and fine lifeway [sic] of the 
Vietnamese’, effectively provides a justification for limiting the church’s ability to 
publish materials not in conformity with Party/state precepts. As will be seen in the 
next section, this justification is used extensively to ensure that the church—like 
other non-state institutions—has limited access to publishing and media. 
Finally, there is a group of provisions concerning the duties of the citizen within 
the Vietnamese state that may also have ramifications for the practice of religion 
and citizens’ religious rights. For example, Article 51 provides that 
[t]he citizen’s rights are inseparable from his duties. The State guarantees the rights of the 
citizen; the citizen must fulfil his duties to the State and society. The citizen’s rights and 
duties are determined by the Constitution and the law. 
Articles 76–79 provide that 
76. The citizen must show loyalty to his motherland. To betray one’s motherland is the 
most serious crime. 
77. It is the sacred duty and the noble right of the citizen to defend his motherland. The 
citizen must fulfil his military obligation and join in the all-people national defence. 
78. The citizen has the duty to respect and protect the property of the State and the public 
interest. 
79. The citizen has the duty to obey the Constitution and the law, join in the safeguarding 
of national security and social order and the preserving of national secrets, and abide by 
the regulation of public life. 
The above provisions are arguably capable of bearing a benign interpretation. 
Their cumulative effect, however, is to provide that the citizen’s first duty is always 
to the state, so that where an individual’s duties to church and state conflict, duty to 
the state must prevail.16 This is not simply a hypothetical prioritisation. The 
Vietnamese state often stresses to Catholics that they are ‘Vietnamese first, Catholics 
second’. This contradicts the Catholic Church’s claims over the supreme allegiance 
of its adherents and thus bears potentially significant practical consequences. For 
instance, in the 1970s and 1980s, it was quite common for Catholics to be compelled 
to undertake corvée labour on Sundays, sometimes thereby preventing them from 
fulfilling their Mass obligations.17 That the primary claim of church and state over 
Vietnamese Catholics focuses on notionally separate realms—the secular and the 
spiritual respectively—does not necessarily resolve the matter. For example, Vietnam 
has one of the highest abortion rates in the world, which can be at least partly 
attributed to the population control policies of the Vietnamese government (Haub 
and Phuong Thi Thu Huong 2003). How then can the church advocate its 
traditionally strident anti-abortion stance without contravening government policy? 
And on what basis should individual Vietnamese Catholic women make their 
personal choice?18 
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People the world over face potential conflicts between their religious and civic 
duties as citizens, but the cumulative effect of the constitutional provisions referred 
to above goes beyond this to effectively compel citizens to prioritise their duties to 
the state. Moreover, where the state is essentially conflated with a political party 
that harbours historical antagonisms and suspicion towards the church, the potential 
for conflict between religious and civic duties becomes all the more acute. 
THE LEGISLATIVE CONTEXT 
Ambiguity and resolution 
The Catholic Church, well-organised and accounting for 6–10 per cent of the 
Vietnamese population, has always represented a significant potential challenge to 
the Party and the Vietnamese state.19 The state deals with the Church not by seeking 
to eliminate it, but rather by regulating, circumscribing, and hence controlling it. It 
maintains a similar attitude to other religions. Antagonists of the current regime 
claim that, in so doing, the state hopes that the church will ultimately wither at the 
roots and die. The government, for its part, argues simply that it requires the church 
to follow the example of all other social institutions by submitting to the requirements 
of the law. 
The legal regulation of religious affairs is nowadays principally embodied in 
Government Decree 26/1999, promulgated on 19 April 1999. It is in turn based on 
a directive of the Communist Party (No.37 CT/TW), issued on 2 July 1998, which 
directs the state to pursue a policy of regulatory control 
[t]he government will issue detailed provisions and guidance on the activities of religious 
orders and associations, fund-raising, financial operation, humanitarian and charitable 
actions, cultural and artistic activities, external relations, land use, building and repair of 
places of worship, training of clerics and religious dignitaries, and other activities of 
religions in conformity with the existing policies and laws.20 
The Party’s insistence that the state regulate religion is reflected in the preliminary 
provisions of the decree 
(3) Religious activities must obey the law of the State of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. 
(4) Religious activities in the legitimate and lawful interests of the believers are assured. 
Religious activities in the interests of the Motherland and the people are encouraged. 
(5) All acts of violation of the freedom of belief and religion, all acts of misusing belief and 
religion to oppose the State of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, prevent believers from 
discharging their citizens’ obligations, sabotage the cause of unity of the entire people, and 
harm the healthy culture of the nation, and all superstitious practices, shall be dealt with 
according to law (Nguyen Minh Quang 2001:136). 
All of the comments made above concerning the amorphous, general, and open- 
ended wording of constitutional provisions apply equally to these quasi-legislative 
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provisions. How, for instance, does one define ‘citizen’s obligations’ or ‘the healthy 
culture of the nation’? If we were examining such legislative provisions within the 
context of common law systems, such as Australia’s, such ambiguity could be 
resolved in a number of ways. First, one could look to definitional clauses that 
might further elaborate  upon the meaning of the phrases adopted in the legislation. 
Second, recourse may be had to legal precedents, either binding (ratio decidendi) or 
persuasive (obiter dicta), indicating how the subject provisions had previously been 
interpreted by the courts. Or, in the absence of either of these aids, the  courts can 
interpret the provisions, particularly to decide whether they were ultra vires by 
infringing on any express or implied  constitutional guarantees or protections. None 
of these tools of statutory interpretation are currently used to any great extent in 
Vietnam.21 
Further, the lack of a Constitutional Court, in particular, has been a matter of 
some recent controversy. The system provides no real means either to interpret 
legislative and quasi-legislative instruments or to adjudicate on their 
constitutionality. 
In 2001, a Ho Chi Minh City newspaper carried a call from a delegate to the 
National Assembly ‘for the establishment of a Constitutional Court [Toa An Hien 
Phap] to defend the Constitution...against the many forms of constitutional violation 
that at present cannot be investigated or adjudicated’ (quoted in Sidel 2002:79). 
Legal scholar Nguyen Van Thao was even more direct in his criticism of the lack of 
judicial oversight 
[i]n nearly ten years of Constitutional implementation, we have never once seen the National 
Assembly or its Standing Committee abrogate, cancel, or suspend the implementation of 
a single document issued by the President, the government, or the Prime Minister. The 
system of monitoring is almost never exercised by the government or the Prime Minister 
with respect to the ministries or local authorities, despite the fact that some legal documents 
issued by ministries and local authorities evidently violate the Constitution or laws (quoted 
in Sidel 2002:71). 
Such lack of resolution methods renders the laws and their interpretation more 
susceptible to manipulation on the part of an omnipotent state. Many would suggest 
that this is exactly what has occurred in relation to the Vietnamese government’s 
regulation of religious affairs. Certainly, the specific regulatory controls imposed by 
the subsequent provisions of Decree 26 form the basis of many Catholic complaints 
about restrictions on the church’s ability to operate freely as a religious institution. 
The specifics of regulation 
Chapter 2 of Decree 26 provides for the specific aspects and modes of state regulation 
of religion. Many of these provisions have drawn criticism as constituting a de facto 
impediment to true religious freedom. 
Most fundamentally, all religions and religious denominations must seek the 
permission of the Prime Minister in order to operate legally.22 Article 8 (5) provides 
that religious organisations ‘which act in variance with the principles, objectives, 
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line of worship and organizational structure permitted by the Prime Minister shall 
have their operations suspended’. Under Article 8(2), religious activities (for example, 
liturgies, prayers services, sermons, catechetical teachings) must be licensed annually 
or given specific permission per event under Article 8(3). Article 8 (4) provides that 
those undertaking religious fundraising activities must be licensed by local People’s 
Committees.  Further, according to Article 12, repairs to religious buildings, and 
fundraising for such repairs, can only be undertaken with state approval. Retreats 
and ‘similar religious activities’ must be in accordance with government regulations 
under Article 9; religious conferences must have state approval (Article 10). Finally, 
Article 14 provides that the printing, publication and the importation of publications 
and ‘religious cultural articles’ is to be regulated by the state.23 
The formation, ordination, and activities of the clergy are also regulated. Persons 
unlicensed by the state cannot claim to be, or function as, religious clergy (Article 
16). Seminaries must be licensed by the prime minister (Article 18(1)), and their 
activities supervised and inspected by state agencies (Article 18(3)). The bestowal of 
religious titles (for example, bishop, cardinal) requires the permission of the prime 
minister (Article 20), thus providing a de facto government veto over episcopal 
appointments. At a lower level, the appointment and transfers of clergy (to parishes, 
seminaries, agencies) must be approved by local People’s Committees (Article 21). 
Clergy are obliged ‘to carry out exactly their functions and roles in the domain of 
their religious responsibility already approved by the competent state management 
agency’ (Article 15(2)). Religious orders must seek state permission to operate (Article 
19(1)), whilst admission into monastic life must conform with the stipulations of 
the State Religious Affairs Committee (Article 19(2)). 
The existence of religious charitable establishments and associations, while  not 
prohibited, must ‘operate under the guidance of competent state authorities’ 
according to Article 17(2). The Vietnamese Catholic Church maintained significant 
welfare and educational infrastructures under pre-Communist regimes, and is now 
slowly re-establishing its presence in the sector through licensed activities in 
accordance with the article. Permission is still frequently withheld, however, and 
local authorities can effectively countermand permission granted by the State 
Religious Affairs Committee. 
Given its particular connection to the Vatican, and the universal Catholic Church 
in general, the articles regulating foreign religious involvement are of particular 
importance to the Vietnamese Catholic Church. Religious organisations’ international 
activities must comply with state policies and precepts (Article 23), and such 
organisations must advise the Religious Affairs Committee of any instructions 
received from ‘foreign religious organisations’, and then comply with any 
instructions issued by the committee (Article 22). Invitations to ‘foreign religious 
organisations and individuals’ must be approved by the Committee for Religious 
Affairs in accordance with Article 24. Foreigners wishing to undertake religious 
activities in Vietnam must register with local People’s Committees (Article 25), and 
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any aid received from foreign religious organisations must be approved by the State 
Religious Affairs Committee (Article 26). 
Application of the decree 
Whilst the situation of the Catholic Church has improved in recent years, and the 
overall trend has been towards greater liberalisation, these articles are not merely 
‘on paper’ provisions. They are actively applied to control the Catholic Church and 
regulate its activities. The nomination of bishops, which requires prime ministerial 
permission under Article 20, was frequently thwarted, resulting in dioceses 
remaining vacant, sometimes for many years (cf. Brunnstrom 2000).24 This situation 
has improved significantly over recent years, so that few Vietnamese sees now remain 
vacant. Local ‘People’s Committees’ have used the decrees to refuse permission for 
priests to be appointed to parishes, or for churches to be built (cf. ‘Vietnamese 
Catholics cite persecution amid success’, Fides, 6 March 2000). Whilst the situation 
regarding the training of seminarians and the ordination of new priests has greatly 
improved recently, each of the six Catholic diocesan seminaries is restricted to only 
twenty students every two years. Admission of students to the seminary, and 
subsequent ordination, is dependent on their being vetted by the ‘Religious Affairs 
Committee’ (‘An interview with Joseph Nguyen Cong Doan’, America, 23 October 
1999). This stringent requirement has led to severe shortages of clergy in some 
dioceses. 
Restrictions on publishing are also actively enforced. For example, an attempt 
on the part of the ‘Episcopal Conference’ to publish its own permanent bulletin was 
quickly thwarted when permanent publishing permission was denied (Tran Cong 
Nghi 2001).25 
As strident as church complaints have been concerning these particular 
provisions, they are in one sense all subordinate to the overarching  provision that 
religions must be registered, and hence licensed by the state. The requirement that 
religious activity be approved by the state effectively limits the constitutional 
guarantee of religious freedom, confining it to a freedom to practice only state- 
sanctioned religion. In its 2000 ‘Report on Religious Freedom in Vietnam’, the Bureau 
of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor of the US State Department concluded that 
[t]he government requires religious groups to register, and uses this process to control and 
monitor church organisations. The granting or withholding of the official recognition of 
religious bodies is one of the means by which the Government actively intervenes to restrict 
religious activities by some believers (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 
2000). 
The Vietnamese government defends the licensing provisions, claiming that they 
assist in protecting religious freedom 
Virtually, ‘freedom’ and ‘permission’ in their proper sense are not contradictory. Across the 
globe, maybe no law-ruled state would demolish the administrative procedure of ‘request 
for permission’, which helps society differentiate between legal and illegal undertakings. 
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And the most important principle in this issue is that the State and law protect, guarantee 
and safeguard legal undertakings. ‘Request for permission’ is aimed to obtain permission, 
and permission entails the ‘right to protection’. Therefore, failure to request for permission 
is tantamount to relinquishing a very valuable right; the right to be protected. Then, in 
what way is ‘request for permission from the State’ abnormal? (Nguyen Minh Quang 
2001:117–8). 
The answer to that rhetorical question lies in the falsity of the assumption that 
religious activity lying outside of the state purview should be regarded as illegal. 
When religious figures seek to place themselves in conflict with the Vietnamese 
state over questions of religious freedom, however, the state does not use decrees on 
religion, opting instead to punish such behaviour through the criminal law. Both 
sides of the debate have sought to manipulate this use of the criminal law to their 
own advantage. 
The criminal law context 
Some aggrieved Viet Kieu observers accuse the Vietnamese Catholic Church—and 
especially its bishops—of being supine in the face of governmental pressure (cf. 
Tran Xuan Tam 2002). But there have always existed religious figures who, instead 
of striving for accommodation, consensus and agreement between the church and 
the state, challenge the status quo, and condemn what they perceive to be unfair 
treatment meted out to their religion. It is these religious dissidents that the provisions 
of the criminal law seek to affect.26 It should be remembered, however, that such 
dissidents constitute only a small proportion of religious practitioners in Vietnam; 
most manage to find a way of operating under the regime, albeit sometimes an 
uncomfortable one. 
Almost invariably, when criminal charges are laid against religious dissidents, 
they are made under the provisions of Chapter XI of the 1999 Criminal Code, which 
deals with the violation of national security. Some of the offences in Chapter XI are 
clearly defined and well understood in any developed legal system—treason (Article 
78), espionage (Article 80), rebellion (Article 82), piracy (Article 83), and terrorism 
(Article 84). 
Other provisions, however, are ill-defined and ambiguous, generating situations 
whereby actions that are currently outlawed would not necessarily be seen as 
criminal in other socio-political contexts. This in turn leads to allegations that these 
provisions are actively manipulated to achieve desired political or administrative 
outcomes. These amorphous provisions include ‘activities aimed at overthrowing 
the People’s power’ (Article 79); ‘sabotaging the infrastructure of socialism’ (Article 
85); ‘undermining national unity’ (Article 87); ‘propaganda against the socialist 
system’ (Article 88); ‘endangering public security’ (Article 89); and ‘illegally fleeing 
to or staying in another country with intent to undermine the People’s power’ 
(Article 91). 
The following case study, involving a well-known Catholic dissident, addresses 
the use of one of these provisions, namely Article 87. 
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THE CASE OF FR. THADDEUS NGUYEN VAN LY 
Fr. Thaddeus (Tadeo) Nguyen Van Ly was born in Quang Tri Province in 1946, and 
ordained as a priest of the Archdiocese of Hue in 1974. He subsequently served as 
secretary to the Archbishop of Hue, Phillip Nguyen Kim Dien, himself an ardent 
critic of the Vietnamese government and campaigner for religious rights, who died 
in 1988. Ly had already served 10 years’ incarceration; one year of cai tao (‘re- 
education’) from 1977 to 1978, and nine years’ imprisonment (1983–92) for ‘opposing 
the revolution, and destroying the People’s unity’ (see  ‘Archbishop calls for release 
of Viet priest’, Catholic Weekly (Sydney), 5 September 2001). Some time after being 
released, he was appointed to Nguyet Bieu, a small and impoverished parish of 
about 150 Catholics on the outskirts of Hue city. 
According to the ‘Free Vietnam Alliance’ (not, it must be said, an impartial source), 
the current problems of Fr. Ly and his parishioners began in 2000, in a dispute with 
local authorities over confiscated land 
Soon after 1975, the Nguyet Bieu parish lost to the local agricultural commune 10,000m2 
of rice-growing land and 5,000m2 of dry land, including 1905m2 within the perimeter of the 
church. According to Order 297/CP, issued on November 11, 1997 by the Government, the 
commune must return the entire area of 1905m2 of rice-growing land for compensation. In 
reality, however, the commune returned only 250m2 of rice-growing land, and 250m2 of 
pond surface. Not only that, it usurped an additional 200m2 of land inside the church 
perimeter for an irrigation canal. After submitting many complaints to the local government 
for redress without results, the parishioners of Nguyet Bieu decided to redirect the irrigation 
canal around the church perimeter so that they can cultivate the lands inside of the 
perimeter as a source of income for the church’s religious activities. 
In 16–20 November 2000, Public Security cadres arrived and prevented parishioners from 
removing the soil to the area to build the new canal. The people of the parish, however, 
continued to prepare the land beside the church perimeter for the coming growing season. 
On 4 December 2000, parishioners of Nguyet Bieu planted a large banner with the words 
‘We need freedom of religion’ on the Church’s land, in an attempt to intimidate Father 
Nguyen Van Ly. They uprooted the banner and threw it into the nearby pond...27 
The scope of Fr. Ly’s aggrieved response went far beyond issues pertaining to the 
unjust confiscation of parochial land. On 20 December 2000, he issued a statement— 
widely circulated by Viet Kieu sources—along with a subsequent  letter to Pope John 
Paul II and other dignitaries on 11 January 2001, both of which condemned the 
Vietnamese government for its alleged suppression of the Catholic Church, its 
intolerance of religion, and its abrogation of the Vietnamese Constitution.28 However, 
his most controversial and most internationally publicised criticism of the 
Vietnamese state came in a letter of testimony to the Commission for International 
Religious Freedom of the US Congress. At the time of the presentation—13 February 
2001—two events of considerable political importance and sensitivity were in 
prospect. The first was the Ninth Party Congress, which was due to commence the 
following May. The second was the pending signature and ratification of a bilateral 
trade agreement between Vietnam and the United States. Fr. Ly, in his overall 
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condemnation of the Vietnamese Communist Party/state, chose to address explicitly 
the issue of the trade arrangement 
...The second matter that you would like me to contribute my ideas to is whether or not the 
US Congress will go ahead to pass the bilateral trade agreement (BTA) this Spring? How 
will this passing affect freedom of religion in Vietnam? 
I am only a priest, not specialising in trade and politics. I only stand on the viewpoints of 
a Vietnamese who loves my country enthusiastically, and is concerned about the human 
rights situation for my compatriots. I would like to contribute my simple ideas as follows: 
Vietnam is deeply in need of the BTA to develop its economy. In principle, I earnestly wish 
my country to win other nations’ trust, among them the US, in order that it may soon move 
to prosperity, and my compatriots enjoy a civilised and developed society in all aspects. 
But if the Vietnamese communists continue to maintain a totalitarian dictatorship, do not 
respect the basic rights of citizens...then should the United States and other countries 
create more favourable conditions for Communist Vietnam to continue its dictatorial rule? 
It is only a minority group who will benefit from new conditions to prolong their power, 
and to the detriment of our miserable people, who get little from the BTA, and have to 
endure their fate under long-term oppression. 
(...) Therefore, if the US and other nations truly love our miserable people, are truly 
concerned about human rights, especially freedom of religion in our country, then the U.S. 
and other nations should not support the Vietnamese communists to prolong their 
totalitarian dictatorship. On the contrary, the U.S. and others should stop the Agreements 
[i.e., the BTA] that the Vietnamese communists abuse, and find ways to put hard pressures 
on them to bring about freedom and democracy for Vietnam (Nguyen Van Ly 2001b:n.p.).29 
The reaction of the Vietnamese authorities to this highly provocative advocacy 
was swift. After receiving reports from the District People’s Committee dated 14 
February (the day after Fr. Ly’s written congressional testimony) and the Provincial 
Advisory Council, the Provincial People’s Committee of Thua Thien–Hue Province 
issued a decision on 26 February 2001, subjecting Fr. Ly to administrative detention 
(in effect, house arrest) pursuant to Directive 31/CP.30 Directive 31/CP, promulgated 
in April 1997, authorises village-level People’s Committee and Public Security 
officials to detain individuals without trial for between six months and two years 
(Human Rights Watch 1997). Article 2 of the Directive states that 
[a]dministrative detention applies to those individuals considered to have violated the 
laws, infringing on the national security, as defined in Chapter 1 of the Criminal Code, but 
[whose violation] is not serious enough to be prosecuted criminally (Human Rights Watch 
1997). 
There is notable concern about this article, as Human Rights Watch points out, 
‘because there is no criminal prosecution [under Decree 31/CP], the detainee is not 
brought to trial, and therefore there is no opportunity for legal defence’ (Human 
Rights Watch 1997). 
The Notice of Decision to detain Fr. Ly provided only a brief description as to 
why the detainment had been imposed. 
Reason for administrative detainment: Citizen Nguyen Van Ly has committed actions in 
violation of the laws, and harmful to the national security. However, it is considered that 
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Mr. Ly should be given time to be educated and favourable conditions to correct his 
mistakes. The administrative detainment is, therefore, needed as specified by the current 
regulations.31 
It seems Fr. Ly chafed at the restrictions that administrative detention placed on 
him, and he soon faced charges under the criminal code for breaching the terms of 
his administrative detainment and for having ‘undermined national unity’. He 
was arrested in mid May 2001 and brought to trial on 19 October. After a half-day 
trial, he was sentenced by the People’s Court of Thua Thien–Hue Province to 
consecutive sentences of two and thirteen years respectively, with a further five 
years of home detention thereafter (‘Vietnam jails priest for 15 years’, Reuters, 20 
October 2001).32 He was released into house arrest as part of the New Year amnesty 
of 2005. The charge that he had ‘undermined national unity’ was laid pursuant to 
Article 87 of the 1999 Vietnamese Criminal Code, which provides that 
(1) Any person committing any of the following acts with intent to undermine the people’s 
power shall be subject to a term of imprisonment of between five and fifteen years. 
a. Sowing division amongst social strata, or between the people and armed forces, and the 
people’s power and social organisations; 
b. Sowing hatred, discrimination and division, and committing infringements of equal 
rights among the different ethnic groups in Vietnam; 
c. Sowing division between religious believers and non-believers, between the former and 
the people’s power and social organisations; 
d. Undermining the implementation of the policy of international solidarity. 
(2) If the offence is committed in less serious circumstances, the offender shall be subject 
to a term of imprisonment of between two and seven years. 
Neither the court sentence nor the details obtained from the brief of the People’s 
Procuracy gave any specific details on how Fr. Ly’s actions had infringed Article 87 
(Amnesty International 2003). 
The imprisonment of Fr. Ly prompted  condemnation  of the Vietnamese state by 
Viet Kieu groups and by human rights organisations. The Free Vietnam Alliance 
claimed that 
[w]ith world attention focused on the international fight against terror, the Vietnamese 
authorities quietly brought Father Nguyen Van Ly to trial in a closed-door proceeding 
without the presence of a defence lawyer or independent witness. Father Nguyen Van Ly 
had peacefully called on the Vietnamese authorities to respect religious freedom. His 
efforts received the support of Vietnamese and international friends...The harsh sentence 
against [him] is part of an escalating pattern of religious and human rights repression over 
the last five months (Free Vietnam Alliance 2001). 
Archbishop George Pell of Sydney wrote to Vietnam’s ambassador to Australia that 
I formally protest Fr. Ly’s arrest, and the long campaign of persecution and harassment 
that he and others working for religious freedom in Vietnam have suffered at the hands of 
the authorities (‘Archbishop calls for release of Viet priest’, Catholic Weekly, 5 September 
2001:n.p.). 
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Unsurprisingly, the Vietnamese authorities repudiated these claims, stressing that 
Fr. Ly had committed non-religious crimes. A ‘Voice of Vietnam’ report concluded that 
[i]nstead of focusing on religious activities, Nguyen Van Ly repeatedly broke the law, and 
was punished several times. Recently, Nguyen Van Ly conducted activities that disrupted 
public order, incited people to act against the administration, and undermined public 
order and security...He also urged his disciples to stage disruptive activities in the Truyen 
Nam Hamlet, and at the office of the Phu An commune People’s Committee, frustrating 
local people and Catholic followers (Voice of Vietnam 2001:n.p.). 
What lessons are to be learned from the case of Fr. Ly? First, his prosecution 
exemplifies how the explicit constitutional provision guaranteeing religious freedom 
can be made meaningless by the use of other, contrary, provisions. Some accuse the 
Vietnamese state of manipulating the legal process by applying national security 
laws to stifle religiously motivated dissent. Fr. Ly was, after all, a religious leader, 
who, in his antigovernment pronouncements, was conducting a campaign with a 
specifically religious purpose—to ensure religious freedom and tolerance for the 
Vietnamese Catholic community and beyond. 
Such an impression is only accentuated by the vague, indeterminate and 
subjective nature of the national security provisions in Chapter XI of the criminal 
code generally, and Article 87 in particular. What does it mean to ‘undermine the 
people’s power’? What does it mean to ‘sow division amongst social strata’, or to 
‘sow division between the people’s power and social organisations’?  It is difficult 
to avoid the instrumentalist conclusion that they mean whatever suits the Party 
and government at any given time, convenient for silencing anyone, religious or 
otherwise, who would seek to speak out against those in power. Those who seek to 
condemn the Vietnamese government for their prosecution of Fr. Ly could argue 
that, in construing the provisions of Article 87, the People’s Court of Thua Thien– 
Hue had no recourse to definitional provisions contained within the legislation or 
to precedents in the interpretation of the provision. In seeking a determinative 
outcome,  the parties had no recourse to a Constitutional Court to determine whether 
the provisions of Article 87, as used in Fr. Ly’s case, breached the guarantee of 
religious freedom provided in Article 70 of the Vietnamese Constitution of 1992, 
and was hence ultra vires. Such antagonists argue that the cumulative effect of these 
deficiencies provide for an arbitrary and manipulable application of the legal 
provisions, effectively negating the constitutional provision on religious freedom. 
This is precisely the position adopted by Amnesty International in naming Fr. Ly a 
prisoner of conscience (Amnesty International 2003). 
But the Vietnamese government is not the only actor that can manipulate the 
uncertainty surrounding the provisions of the criminal code. It must be remembered 
that, amongst his many other actions, Fr. Ly wrote to the legislature of a foreign state 
(the United States), asking that they not enter into a bilateral trade agreement with 
his own government. 
I happen to share two characteristics with Fr. Ly. First, I am a Catholic diocesan 
priest, and second, I am a citizen of a nation that recently negotiated a bilateral trade 
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agreement with the United States (namely, Australia). If I were to write a widely 
publicised letter to the United States Congress asking that they not enter into a trade 
agreement with Australia, I am sure the Australian government would not take the 
least bit of notice. I am equally sure, however, that I would receive immediate, and 
possibly punitive, attention from my own diocesan authorities. The reason is that I 
would be seen to have strayed into areas of party-politics and public policy, which 
is outside my public role as a cleric, since they are not matters of a religious nature, 
even when that term is broadly construed. 
Now, lest it be thought that I am criticising Fr. Ly for his pronouncements, or 
supporting the Vietnamese government for the action taken against him, I make it 
clear that I am doing neither. As Amnesty International stated, Fr. Ly was imprisoned 
solely for the peaceful expression of political beliefs (Amnesty International 2003). 
I do, however, suggest that there is a certain element of disingenuousness on the 
part of Fr. Ly’s supporters in suggesting that he has been imprisoned for religious 
reasons, and that the action against him was part of a wider campaign to eradicate 
religion generally, and the Catholic Church in particular. It must be remembered 
that the dispute over the Nguyet Bieu lands, and his earlier letters of protest calling 
for religious freedom, resulted only in a house arrest. Whilst some would regard 
this result as iniquitous and unjust in a democratic pluralist society, it was only Fr. 
Ly’s venture beyond religion and into party-politics that prompted  the Vietnamese 
government to prosecute him under the criminal code. The mere fact that an act or 
statement comes from a religious figure does not make it ipso facto a religious act. 
Other Catholic dissidents—notably the Redemptorist priest, Fr. Chan Tin—have 
been no less persistent in their criticism of the government and their calls for religious 
freedom. Yet in recent years, none have been so harshly punished as Fr. Ly, perhaps 
because none have ventured so far into the political realm. 
Fr. Ly’s supporters are able to claim that the vagueness of the code’s national 
security provisions enables the government to manipulate them against religion and 
religious figures. It is this very same vagueness that enables them to claim that he was 
prosecuted for his religious beliefs, when his actions were in fact not strictly religious, 
but political. Again, the treatment meted out to Fr. Ly would be rightly seen in any 
democratic pluralist society as an unacceptable restriction on political freedom. 
However, Fr. Ly’s supporters can now portray him as a religious ‘martyr’—a figure 
deeply symbolic and heroic to Catholics generally, and to Vietnamese Catholics in 
particular (see Hansen 2000). They point to his extended prison sentence as an 
example of religious persecution, when it is in fact the consequence of a specifically 
political action. This suggests that the Vietnamese Communist Party and state are not 
the only ones capable of manipulating the laws to obtain a desired political outcome.33 
Furthermore, the government now seems under pressure to ensure that actions 
taken against religious leaders follow due process in accordance with the criminal 
sanctions prescribed by the law. In 1999, a Jesuit priest, Fr. Joseph Nguyen Cong 
Doan, imprisoned on dubious charges for many years, told the Catholic Journal 
America that 
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[t]he approach of the Government has softened somewhat in regard to religious figures 
who are accused in this way; the policy is now to try to settle the matter without a trial and 
incarceration. Agents of the Ministry of Public Security can no longer act with as much 
impunity as they did in the 1980s, arresting anyone whom they suspected and imprisoning 
them. Now they take much more care to follow legal procedures (‘An interview with 
Joseph Nguyen Cong Doan’, America, 23 October 1999). 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM—ALL OR NOTHING? 
If the preceding analysis suggests that the law does not provide a complete basis for 
religious freedom for the Catholic Church in Vietnam, what is to be made of the 
competing ‘fundamentalism’ referred to at the start of this chapter, which argues 
that there is no real religious freedom in Vietnam at all? In other words, are we to 
conclude that these are contrasting ideas that cannot be reconciled? Or are there 
gradual differences between theory and practice? 
In a 2002 critique of the state of religious freedom in Vietnam, a Vietnamese- 
American priest, Fr. Tran Xuan Tam, wrote 
The VCP [Vietnamese Communist Party], using these relaxations and permissions, 
deceitfully causes in the mind of many superficial and inexperienced Western observers 
the impression that the Catholic Church in Vietnam today has a true religious freedom, 
though it may not be complete with respect to certain areas...However, this impression 
must be discarded as a false one. Religious activities cannot be mistaken for religious 
freedom, at least in the context of a country ruled by totalitarianism like the VCP [sic]. In 
this context, religious freedom for the Church must mean that she is completely independent 
of the Party and truly self-governing or autonomous in her own organisation, and in all her 
religious activities. Then religious freedom is not identical to the existence, kind and 
number of religious activity. Religious freedom is rather an intrinsic quality which every 
religious activity should have. No religious freedom can exist without religious activity, 
but there can be religious activities without religious freedom. Thus understood, it is 
obvious from my foregoing analysis that the religious freedom of the Vietnamese Catholic 
Church is still suppressed in essence by the Party (Tran Xuan Tam 2002). 
There are several highly problematic aspects to this analysis. First, Tam concedes 
no credence to the legal rights granted to religious freedom and practice in Vietnam 
at present; even though underlying restrictions on the church remain in place, Tam 
contends these permitted activities do no more than create an illusion of freedom. 
But drawing this radical dichotomy between religious freedom and religious 
activity makes no inherent sense. That Vietnamese Catholics can attend mass, receive 
the sacraments, read the scriptures, catechise their children, and be shepherded by 
bishops in union with the universal church, is no mere illusions. These activities 
are, for Catholics, very real and demonstrable aspects of their faith life in action. 
These activities demonstrate a degree of legal religious freedom that has continued 
to widen over recent years. To accept Tam’s viewpoint is to regard the improvements 
in the church’s situation since the late 1980s as illusory and insignificant. Yet, for 
Vietnamese Catholics, they are neither. 
This, however, by no means suggests that religious freedom in Vietnam is 
complete. Insofar as religious activities remain tightly controlled by administrative 
law, and criminal law is applied against religious figures on spurious allegations 
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of criminality, neither the Catholic Church nor other Vietnamese religions can be 
satisfied that their religious freedom is complete. But Tam’s ‘all or nothing’ approach 
to religious freedom is deeply problematic. To contend simply that any restriction 
on religious freedom implies no freedom at all is to ignore the real improvements 
made in relationships between the church and the Party/state, and the increased 
tolerance the church has experienced over recent years. These improvements should 
not be overlooked, even if the Vietnamese state still seeks to control and to limit the 
church and its concessions are not granted out of a sense of affection and trust. If 
Vietnam were the ‘totalitarian’ state that Tam believes it is, surely even these 
concessions would not have been made. The description by Professor Carlyle 
Thayer—that ‘Vietnam today is best described as an authoritarian state, not a 
totalitarian one’—is surely to be preferred (Thayer 2001:n.p.). 
Tam’s portrayal of the church as presently suffering from a crushing burden of 
totalitarian persecution—in effect, a sort of institutional martyrdom—must be viewed 
within its historical context. The Vietnamese Catholic Church’s identity is deeply 
rooted in its suffering at the hands of persecutors over many centuries, a suffering 
which it believes has strengthened and sanctified it. Conversely, the historical 
antecedents of the Catholic Church, with their association with colonialism, party- 
political intriguing, and virulent anticommunism, have significantly conditioned 
the attitudes of the Vietnamese Communist Party/state towards it. The party–state’s 
attitude to religion—and especially to Catholicism—is fundamentally formed by 
the historical experience of religion in Vietnam, and in particular by institutional 
religion’s attitude towards nationalist and revolutionary struggles. 
It is true that the doctrine of collective mastery—an inherent part of Marxist 
regimes—precludes alternative mass organisations, and that the Catholic Church 
can be seen as the mass organisation in excelsis. This has probably been a major 
factor in the Fatherland-Front endorsed Union of Patriotic Catholics’ assumption of 
many functions—particularly in the realms of publishing and communication— 
that would be reserved for the church hierarchy in other societies. However, the 
reasons for this are not unrelated; again, the historical relationship can account for 
this development as much as the doctrine of collective mastery. 
In most Party-sponsored analyses of Catholicism, little attention is paid to the 
truth or untruth of its spiritual or theological claims. What is canvassed at length is 
the negative historical antecedents of Catholicism in Vietnam, which led it to become 
(by this analysis) a tool of oppression, first in the hands of the ruling class, later in 
the hands of external colonial forces. In this context, Catholicism has been portrayed 
as the most reactionary and counter-revolutionary of all the religions practiced in 
Vietnam. 
But some within the church can now claim that it is itself a victim of oppression, 
and is thus on the side of the oppressed, rather than oppressors. This is a direct 
challenge to the government’s contextualising the merits of the Vietnamese church 
entirely in political and historical terms, without making allowance for either its 
spiritual dimension or its social contribution below the level of institutional politics. 
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It is therefore more than theoretically significant that, in recent years, state- 
sponsored journals have begun to publish articles praising the contribution of the 
Catholic Church to Vietnamese historical and contemporary culture and society (cf. 
Nguyen Hong Duong 1993; Huy Thong 2001).34 These suggest a real acceptance of 
the Catholic Church’s legitimacy in Vietnam, and even a concession to the church 
being a positive social force.35 Such acceptance may in future be incorporated into 
the legal system, both in terms of legislative and quasi-legislative provisions, and 
the manner in which they are interpreted and applied. 
The Vietnamese Catholic Church remains dissatisfied with the level of legal 
control exerted over it by the state, and it has reason to do so. This chapter, however, 
has demonstrated that  recent changes have been largely positive. There are sound 
reasons for believing that these trends will continue if both sides can shake off the 
shackles of mutual historical antagonism. 
NOTES 
1 The legal situation of the Catholic Church in Vietnam, whilst distinguishable from that of other 
religions on some points, is sufficiently parallel to those religions that the conclusions drawn 
here have significant applicability to them. I have chosen to use the Catholic Church as an 
example of interaction between church and state, as I have a better grounding in its situation, 
and a greater access to sources, than with other Vietnamese faiths. 
2 All quotations from the Vietnamese Constitution are taken from the English translation 
(Government of Vietnam 2001) available at http://vietforum.org/English/Documents/ 
doc16.htm [accessed 31 March 2003]. Amendments to the constitution passed in 2001 did not 
directly affect Article 70. 
3 Constitutions were promulgated in 1946, 1959, 1980, and 1992 respectively. For a brief history 
of the successive Vietnamese constitutions, see Sidel (2002). 
4 Quoted in Nguyen Quang Minh (2001:110). 
5 Indeed, it was initially Msgr. John Dooley, the Apostolic Delegate to Hanoi, rather than the 
Vietnamese state, who declared in 1955 that no Catholic could in good conscience belong to 
both the church and the ‘Patriotic Association’ (Denney 1990:274). Whilst this injunction is no 
longer in force, it is generally believed that only a minority of Vietnamese Catholics are affiliated 
to the Patriotic Association’s successor. 
6 For example, Associated Press reported in 2001 that ‘Relations between Vietnam and the 
Vatican are strained because Hanoi keeps religious groups on a tight leash, and reserves the 
right to appoint Catholic bishops. Under Catholic canon law, the right to appoint bishops is 
reserved to the Pope, although the right to internal consultation is also provided to some 
national churches’ (‘Vietnam reacts coolly to naming of new Vietnamese Cardinal’, 22 February). 
7 Under the church’s Canon Law (Canon 1382), any bishop ordained without the permission of 
Rome is illicitly ordained, and both the new bishop and the ordaining bishop are subject to 
excommunication (Canon Law Society of Great Britain and Ireland 1984). 
8 In March 1946, the head of the ‘Young Catholic Workers’ Movement’, Nguyen Manh Ha, was 
appointed as Minister of Economics. The Bishop of Phat Diem, Le Hu Tu, was appointed a 
‘senior advisor’ and member of the High Council (Gheddo 1968:25). 
9 Sidel goes on to call for a much broader frame of reference in interpreting the Vietnamese 
constitution than the narrow confines of instrumentalism. 
10 For a discussion of the attempts to delete or amend Article 4 at the time of the 2001 constitutional 
amendments, see Sidel (2002). 
11 Various charismatic sects may perhaps be less fortunate. So might charlatans, such as the 
group that allegedly tried to create apparitions of the Blessed Virgin Mary using laser lights 
(‘Vietnam names three over fake religious apparitions’, Reuters, 27 October 1999). Historically, 
the state’s view of Catholic practice was less favourable. Elaborate, lengthy and costly liturgical 
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and devotional practices were regularly described as ‘superstitious’, and in some cases restricted 
or prohibited by local cadres. It was eventually the liturgical reforms of the Second Vatican 
Council, rather than government intervention, which saw these practices curtailed. 
12 All references to the 1999 Criminal Code are from Government of Vietnam (2001b). Disapproval 
of such practices would also accord with official Catholic doctrine, if not with Catholic folk 
practice. 
13 The pronouncement seems to have been made in response to unlicensed Protestant Churches 
working amongst ethnic minorities in the Central Highlands. 
14 Foreigners, and many of the Viet Kieu, were effectively prevented from attending. I applied for, 
and was denied, a visa to attend. 
15 Government attitudes to the event changed considerably as it reached its climax. The tone of 
official pronouncements became more favourable as time passed; they were, perhaps, eventually 
satisfied that the gathering constituted no political threat. 
16 This becomes clearer in the introductory provisions to Decree 26/1999 on Religious Activities. 
17 To the best of my knowledge, this now happens rarely if ever. 
18 Social policy questions can also bring church and state into happier alignment. The Vietnamese 
government has praised the Catholic Church for being in the vanguard of the campaign 
against ‘social evils’. 
19 The Catholic proportion of the Vietnamese population is difficult to determine with precision 
(Cong Giao va Dan Toc [Catholicism and the Nation] Magazine 1995). 
20 All English translations of Party Directive 37 and State Decree 26 are taken from Nguyen Minh 
Quang (2001:125–46). The directive goes on to provide for the establishment of a government- 
controlled religious publishing house (2001:132). 
21 There is some recourse to legal precedent within the Vietnamese legal system, but of only very 
limited effect. The Vietnamese system shares this characteristic not only with legal systems in 
other socialist countries, but also other civil law jurisdictions, including those of most western 
European nations. 
22 This permission is presently provided to six churches: the Roman Catholic Church, the 
Confederation of Evangelical Alliances (representing Protestants), the Buddhist Church of 
Vietnam, and peak bodies representing the Cao Dai, Hoa Hao and Islamic faiths. 
23 Hence the reference in the Party Directive to the establishment of a state religious publishing 
house. 
24 Considerable progress, however, was made in this issue during 2002–3, with several important 
diocesan vacancies being filled. 
25 This problem does not prevent the publication of bibles, prayer books, liturgical texts and 
devotional works, all of which are regularly licensed. Its effect is largely to restrict publications 
regarding church affairs, which remain the domain of the ‘Solidarity Committee of Patriotic 
Catholics’, particularly through their weekly magazines Nguoi Cong Giao [‘Catholics’] in Ha 
Noi, and Cong Giao va Dan Toc [‘Catholicism and the People’] in Ho Chi Minh City. 
26 The spokeperson for the Vietnamese Foreign Affairs Department, Phan Thuy Thanh, employed 
a well-worn (and technically correct) phrase in telling foreign reporters that ‘In Vietnam, no-one 
is detained on religious grounds, there are only law violators who are punished’ (‘Vietnam 
denies persecution of Hill Tribe People’, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 23 January 2003:n.p.). 
27 Untitled press release of the Free Vietnam Alliance, 6 December 2000. The Free Vietnam 
Alliance is a US-based organisation of overseas Vietnamese, associated with the pre-1975 
republican government, who seek the overthrow of the current regime. 
28 The statement and letter are available at http://www.fva.org [accessed 15 January 2001]. 
29 Fr. Ly went on to discuss, amongst other matters, the record of Ho Chi Minh, whom he came 
close to branding a war criminal. 
30 An English translation of the decision is available at  http://www.fva.org  [accessed 3 June 2001]. 
31 English translation of decision at www.fva.org, last accessed 3 June 2001. 
32 The sentencing of Ly was televised nationally by the state-owned VTV (‘Vietnam sentences 
Catholic priest’, Associated Press, 19 October 2001). 
33 Interestingly, three strident Catholic critics of the Vietnamese government’s attitude to religious 
freedom, writing at or after the time of Fr. Ly’s case, all failed to mention him in their catalogue 
of complaints of religious intolerance (Tran Cong Nghi 2001; Tran Xuan Tam 2002). 
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34 Previous praise of Catholicism was confined to the political role of ‘patriotic Catholics’ who 
showed their nationalist antecedents by opposing the feudalists, the colonialists (that is, the 
French), or the imperialists (namely, the Americans). 
35 Particularly in relation to the church’s strong support for the government’s ‘social evils’ 
campaign. 
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